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Abstract 
The food situation in India today defies conventional development wisdom: while the government 
struggles to dispose of massive food surpluses, the population is among the most malnourished 
and food-insecure in the world. This dissertation traces the conceptual lineages of the policies that 
have produced this “paradox of plenty” back to the Green Revolution of the 1960s through to 
today. In this exploration, my research finds that the situation is not a “paradox,” but 
unfortunately, is a predictable, even banal, result of the very policy prescriptions offered as the 
means of ending hunger and the path to development. Navigating policy details, readings of 
development and modernization theory, and the uniquely important role of food and agricultural 
aid and hunger in India-US relations, I draw on extensive archival research and insights yielded 
through “expert” interviews to unravel the logic underlying development and the policy 
prescriptions to elucidate how the logic of the Green Revolution’s “development” path has 
produced today’s conditions of hunger amidst plenty.  
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Preface 
The Work of Hunger in “Feeding the World” 
1 | Hunger Amidst Abundance: The Global Food Crisis 
 In early 2008 a “global food crisis” erupted, seemingly out of nowhere. The prices of basic 
staple food commodities—such as wheat, rice, maize, sugar, and cooking oil—rose between 60% 
and 200% in a few months.1 Rising prices pushed hundreds of millions of people over the thin 
threshold—from just affording basic foods to deprivation, and hunger.2 Malnutrition and food-
insecurity rates soared. “Food riots” broke out in almost 100 countries across the world.3 At the 
same time, global foodgrain harvests in both 2007 and 2008 were among the highest ever 
recorded; surpluses of staple foods were abundant. 
 The food crisis was the starkest manifestation of a “paradoxical” situation—of increasing 
hunger amidst increasing surplus food—which has become more and more familiar, even banal, 
over the last two decades.  
 Pundits declared that the global food crisis of 2008 was markedly different than food crises of 
the past. The decade of the mid-1960s through the mid-1970s was punctuated by repeated 
declarations of impending food crises; these crises were seen as a result of food shortages, 
specifically in the “Third World.”4 They were cast as crises of “overpopulation” and 
underproduction due to natural disasters and lack “modern” farming techniques. As such, the 
overriding (politically viable5) concern was the need to increase global food production.6 The 
production-centric rhetoric and mindset from that earlier era continue to define our responses to 
hunger today—even when the reasons for hunger are entirely unrelated to the quantity of food 
produced, as was the case with the 2008 food crisis.7  
 The 2008 crisis was a food price crisis, a result of speculation. It was a crisis of food as a 
commodity, which happened to occur during a year of record surplus production. Over the 
following months and years, the ongoing global financial crisis unfolded. The food crisis was 
financial crisis’ predecessor—finance capital was on the move, en masse. Fleeing the impending 
collapse of the US housing market, hedge funds and investment banks regarded staple food 
commodities as a more stable and secure investment choice8—for, people will always need to eat, 
presumably above all else.  
 The current global food situation of shortage and deprivation for one billion people amidst 
vast food surpluses exists because this ongoing food crisis is also a commodity crisis. But, the 
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food crisis is not merely a commodity crisis, for food is not quite like any other commodity. Food 
is singularly necessary. It is this aspect—food’s singularity—that has made food a commodity 
uniquely “valuable” to speculators.9 This use of food is not new—food’s dual nature (as the 
necessary commodity) has made food “valuable” in a vast array of settings and purposes 
throughout history—but, the current manifestation is distinct.  
1.1 |  Situating the Crisis 
In the two decades preceding the onset of the 2008 food crisis, global harvests consistently 
increased. During this period marked by rising harvests, record food surpluses, and booming 
economic growth rates, record numbers of people were also excluded from these gains. Over the 
past decade, the number of people in hunger worldwide increased twenty-five percent. The 
hunger and deprivation of those excluded from these gains is not a matter of lack of resources, or 
scarcity, but a matter of political and societal choice. This thoroughly institutionalized series of 
choices manifest in a biopolitical state. While these social choices are seemingly invisible, their 
effects—the economic and biopolitical exclusion they produce—are viscerally evident in the 
increasing numbers of food-insecure and malnourished people. If there was any remaining 
question, the first decade of this millennium (should have) made it clear even to adamant 
(neo)Malthusians that in today’s world, hunger and inadequate access to food are a result of 
exclusion—a lack of access to basic necessities and financial resources, coupled political 
structures unaccountable to the poor. This form of exclusion is not correlated with the abundance, 
or lack, of food in the market.10  
Situated in this context of exclusion-producing policies, the price spikes of the global food 
crisis almost doubled the number of people considered “food insecure” worldwide. Millions more 
were condemned to hunger. The stark effects brought the specter of hunger to the fore in the 
mainstream media briefly in the 2008, but the discussion of the crisis elided the driving factors 
behind the price increase. Even in self-declared “policy” and “economic” forums, instead of 
attending to the effects of increased global financial integration in a policy architecture of 
spatially uneven deregulations, or even the effects of policy deregulations which allowed finance 
capital’s crisis to spill over into global food markets, instead the pundits pushed the same old 
answers as the self-evident fix: increase production and further entrench the unevenness of 
regulations, subsidies, and protections, in the name of economic “liberalization.”   
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1.2 |  Responses to the crisis 
During the food crises of the 1960s and 70s, Western leaders located the cause as “Third 
World” “overpopulation,”11 and promoted “modernization” to rapidly increase the food supply, 
coupled with improved family planning methods. In 2008, however, global power brokers 
presented a somewhat different diagnosis and solution. Diagnosing the problem as largely caused 
by a financial crisis, the decreed solution was two-fold. First, an increase in the use of agricultural 
technology to further “modernize” agricultural production in developing countries.12 Second, the 
expansion of economic and policy deregulation of developing countries’ food and agricultural 
sectors—namely, the elimination of any (remaining) trade protection “barriers” in the “Third 
World” (where people were most affected by the price spikes).13 These approaches, the experts 
repeated—seemingly oblivious to the fact that they could have been reciting a list of the causes of 
the crisis—are the only viable solutions to the deprivation, hunger, and food insecurity that one 
billion people face.14   
1.2.1 | The response of Productionism 
The spike in hunger and exclusion from basic necessities instigated by the food crisis of 
2008 was also seized upon by agribusiness’ PR departments which played up the crisis’ apparent 
“shortages” as clear evidence of the inherently humanitarian nature of agribusiness as a “life 
sciences” industry, and as evidence for the need to expedite genetically engineered, or genetically 
modified (GM), crops across the “Third World.”15 As the major players in agribusiness made 
record profits from 40% to 1200% higher than the preceding year, their ads at the peak of the 
crisis proclaimed “We Feed the World.”16  
Agribusiness’ cries of “feeding the world” explicitly summon a vision of the “humanitarian” 
work of agricultural technology in decades past—namely the Green Revolution.17 We are assured 
that their updated agricultural technologies—most prominently GM crops—are just as necessary 
today to “feed the world” and address the renewed prevalence of hunger. Their claims invoke a 
relationship between hunger and food that is ostensibly “natural” and self-evident, a cause and 
effect which needs no further explanation: insufficient food = hunger.  
1.2.2 | The response of deregulation and financialization 
On another side of the issue, the international institutions and sanctioned “experts” 
recognized the issue as one of (a lack of) access to financial resources and explained the crisis as 
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a result of the increasing financialization of food. For instance, the World Food Program’s (WFP) 
Executive Director, Josette Sheeran explicitly recognized the threat—explaining “the bottom 
billion will become the bottom two billion.”18 The WFP maintained that because the causes of 
this crisis are different than past crises, the solution must also be different. Explaining: “there was 
a time when we didn’t know how to produce enough food in the world … Now we do,”19 Sheeran 
insisted that this crisis with its “high food prices and increased demand present[s] a huge historic 
opportunity” for poor farmers.20 In the WFP’s rendition, the issue is not the simple production 
increases which agribusiness proposes, but rather the issue is conquering poverty. As reporter 
Fredrick Kaufman explains: “since money had become the key to the hunger problem, the key to 
the hunger solution could be summed up in one word: markets.”21 The international institutions 
and sanctioned “experts” recommended deepening and extending the reach of financial markets 
to encompass “the poor as players” not merely relegated to the sidelines of the global market (Ch. 
1 unpacks the lineages of this diagnosis). As any student of development, agrarian change, or 
political economy knows, and as Kaufman duly explains: “[m]any had tried to bring markets to 
the impoverished before, but no one had had the support of Bill Gates. And under Sheeran’s 
direction, the WFP would guarantee a market where none now existed.”22 The WFP’s 
collaboration aimed to eradicate hunger by incorporating poor farmers as “players” in burgeoning 
food-commodity futures markets.  
This focus can be read in multiple ways—a “fix” of market expansion, and/or a response to 
critiques of the exclusion of the poor from development policy. The WFP’s project offers a 
response that brings the two together—claiming to redress exclusion and simultaneously 
expanding market reach—into a development package made to sell. Thus, while this focus is 
implicitly pointing to the need to make the poor (i.e. those who have been excluded) the subject 
of development policy—rather than recipients of some benefits of a larger process they are 
otherwise excluded from—what Kaufmann and others examining these financialization projects 
point to is that the methods and structure proposed by such efforts are just as incapable of 
producing the desired outcome as past projects which sidelined the poor. But, such technicalities 
are seemingly outside of the point, for, this program was made to sell; it was not just the global 
power brokers and the financial prowess of Bill Gates and Warren Buffet behind the effort to 
eradicate hunger, an old well-worn tactic also was revived to bolster this approach. Just as hunger 
had played an essential role in selling the solution of the 1960s (the Green Revolution23) and that 
of the 1970s (the conceptual framework of “food security”24), hunger was once again enrolled as 
the lynchpin propelling and justifying this new economic vision of expanding financial markets. 
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The food crisis’ spike in hunger offered a “policy window”25 in which agriculture and hunger 
could again become a geopolitical “security” concern.  
Speaking to this context, US Senators Richard Lugar and Robert Casey co-sponsored a bill 
that explicitly summoned the laudable goals of conquering poverty and ending hunger, and 
reinforced these with the moral obligation of American exceptionalism. They explained that: 
“[t]he global food crisis is a zone where U.S. strengths and moral commitments can generate 
major returns.”26 Restoring the positon of the subject of development as the elite, not the poor, 
the Bill (US H.R. 3077 “Lugar-Casey Global Food Security Act”) summons action—not just any 
action, but the vigilant enforcement of expanded economic liberalization in the name of American 
conscience, the moral call of ending hunger, and ultimately the threat of imminent geopolitical 
instability. 
The [food] crisis is historic and a call to conscience… [one which] poses three 
fundamental threats.  
A moral and humanitarian threat, which is pushing an additional 100 million 
people into poverty and deepening global hunger and chronic malnutrition …  
A developmental threat, which is erasing the economic gains of the past decades, 
while putting at risk the recent historic investments… [and a] 
 A strategic threat, which is endangering the stability of developing countries … 
Thirty countries have experienced food-related riots and unrest in 2008.27 
 
They argue for28 a renewed “[f]ocus [in] U.S. trade policy … that promotes investment and trade 
in developing country agriculture and reduces long-standing subsidy and tariff barriers.”29   
 Reflecting the diagnosis of the mainstream pundits,30 in the text of the US’s Global Food 
Security Act, it is only “developing” countries’ agricultural sectors that US trade policy needs to 
target for further liberalization. For, in “developed” countries—which had not been required (by 
earlier international agreements) to cut supports to farmers or to citizens, and had not been 
mandated (by the same international policy reforms) to liberalize their own agricultural sectors—
the food crisis was barely felt. The contradiction shines. In the places where state support for 
agriculture and food security had been most severely eroded by neoliberal reforms over the last 
two decades, the food crisis posed the largest—moral, developmental, and strategic—threat.31 
Yet, the “solution” offered was not for these places to be encouraged, or even allowed, to 
implement the types of support offered in “developed” countries. Instead, the “solution” was to 
further the policies which had produced their vulnerability.32  
 The mainstream focus on the crisis quickly faded from media and political attention. 
Attention shifted to the banks and the financial crisis, but not for the banks’ role as drivers of the 
food crisis, or the effects of their trading schemes in condemning another one billion people to 
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deprivation of basic food necessities. Rather, the focus was on the threat that the banks might 
“fail”—as if they had not already done so. The threat of widespread financial collapse eclipsed 
the food crisis, but did not make it go away. As the Director General of the UN Food and 
Agriculture Organization (FAO), Jacques Diouf, explained the food situation, “when the 
[economic] recovery picks up, we will be back to square one.”33 
1.3 | The work of (responses to) the crisis 
 That the “moral call” of the global food crisis “present[s] a huge historic opportunity,”34 in 
which the answers offered by institutionalized forces rest upon the very conditions which 
produced the crisis, should elicit pause.  
 That it does not, elicits the question: What is the work of this food crisis? For whom does the 
expansion of futures trading and selectively targeted liberalization offer “a huge historic 
opportunity”? Will the further consolidation of these forces offer much “opportunity” to those 
who are already suffering from the expansion of these processes? 
1.4 | My focus: the production of “common sense” 
 I will demonstrate that the issue here is the way that the otherwise self-evident nature of the 
causes of, and solutions to, a situation of increasing hunger amidst surplus food are continuously 
inverted, overturned, and harnessed to a project enacting “economic” self-interest by deploying 
the moral righteousness of “life” itself. To understand this process and the roles that food and 
hunger play in geopolitical and economic spheres (as summoned, for example, in claims of 
“Feeding the World”), we must unpack the coupling of liberal responsibility with the logic of 
advancing “economic” self-interest. This naturalized coupling allows, for instance, the earnest 
assertion of economic liberalization policies as a means to address the “moral” threat of hunger. 
How exactly the hungry are to benefit need not be asked.  
 The mainstream understanding of the food problem, the metrics of assessing the possible 
solutions, and the implicit subject of action, are based on largely unexamined re-interpretations of 
past agricultural development projects, both failed and successful. While the proposed solutions 
may seem to be uniquely “neoliberal” responses, today’s debates and mainstream “solutions” to 
questions of hunger, food, and agriculture are locked in a pattern that is decades—and in some 
cases centuries—old. My concern is how these have come to be the “naturalized” responses. As 
such, I attend to both how this “common sense” understanding has been produced as well as to 
what is left out of this reductive and simplifying equation. To do so, I suggest that a lens attentive 
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to policy and texts must have a theory of reading. Further, this lens can offer insights distinct 
from those of ethnography and is particularly useful for investigating the conceptual formation 
and policy work of agricultural development across time and space. 
 My concern is to interrogate (1) how dominant narratives come to be written, transformed 
from contingent and/or controversial policy approaches into naturalized responses imbued with 
the structure of necessity. (2) How these narratives and understandings travel across topical 
policy realms and international policy space. And, (3) the work that these narratives, as 
naturalized understandings, perform. I follow these dominant narratives into policy to (4) 
excavate and trace how defining policy understandings and approaches have come to be, and in 
so doing, to unravel their self-evident biographies; and to (5) address how these processes and 
policies efface the legacy of contestation and alternative paths.  
1.4.1 | Approaching the Questions: Reading Agricultural Development Policy histories 
 My approach is genealogical, and I engage in a symptomatic reading to advance this 
genealogy. I structure my account not as a linear temporal narrative, but rather, I start with 
contemporary debates and assumptions—around hunger, agricultural “modernization” and the 
roles of technology therein (e.g. GM crops)—and I seek to unsettle the tenets on which their 
claims rest. In this excavation, I trace the contemporary situation and its problematic back to the 
Green Revolution and its antecedents to demonstrate some of the ways that the presuppositions 
which we take for granted have come to be established.  
2 |  The work “feeding the world” 
 The decoupling of food production from access to food underwrites the idea of 
“development.” This decoupling—or separation of “the feeder” from “the fed”—is a precondition 
for development and a requirement for industrial agriculture. The ways in which projects of 
“feeding the world” are imagined and articulated depend upon the naturalization of these two 
distinct subject positions, the feeders and the fed, which in times of “crisis” become the saviors 
and the saved. The assumption of this separation underlies the logic of modern industrialized 
agriculture—it underwrites the way that food, and the food system, operates globally. Hunger 
(amidst plenty) is not incidental but integral to how modern agriculture—globally disseminated 
with the Green Revolution—functions. Hunger continues to exist not despite agriculture’s obvious 
successes in some areas, but rather, because of processes integral to, and constituted in, the 
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successes of “industrializing” agriculture. As such, it is necessary to understand the nature of this 
disjuncture and who is the subject of this model of agriculture.  
2.1 | The logic of productionism and the work of “feeding the world” 
This deteriorating situation poses a dilemma for the wealthy, food-
surfeited citizen of the developed world. He must decide whether he has a 
moral obligation to feed those who are starving even if the food shortage 
in the poorest countries could have been prevented by population control. 
Morals aside, out of sheer self-interest he must ponder whether the hungry 
half-billion will allow him to live peacefully, enjoying his wealth. He 
must realize that there is the chance that the impoverished might resort to 
war to take his wealth and food. … Finally, Western man must decide 
whether his own sense of human dignity—which is the basis for 
democratic institutions—can survive as he witnesses so many people 
starving around the globe. –Time Magazine, 197435  
The crux of the problem of the last food crisis, as Time Magazine’s editorial staff opined (with 
somewhat less subtlety than commentaries on the contemporary food crisis) offers us insights into 
the project of “feeding the world.” The subject of anxious concern in an increasingly dire food 
situation, where millions risk starvation, is not those who are threatened with or facing starvation; 
rather, it is surfeited “Western man.” The driving question—of how does “Western Man” assuage 
“his troubled conscience?”—is revealing: he does so by relying on two primary narratives. The 
first, a discourse of liberal “responsibility for,” hitched to the second, the logic of “economics” as 
the guiding metric for how to enact this responsibility, or moral obligation. These two narratives 
operate as alibi in the geopolitics around food policy and in the production of food. The primary 
form this project has taken is the expansion of food production and commoditization in the name 
of combating hunger and feeding the world. These projects hold such tremendous power because 
they are also moral projects, and wield a moral authority to their ends. 
The “most dangerous” threat the “food problem” posed pivoted on the West’s sustaining 
obsession with population. The obsession of the American elite with this threat is hard to 
overstate—as John D. Rockefeller III explained in a 1961 lecture: “To my mind, population 
growth is second only to the control of atomic weapons, as the paramount problem of our day.”36 
Just nine years later, the terror that Rockefeller had expressed at the “cold inevitability, a 
certainty that is mathematical …[of] the problems posed by too-rapid population growth” 37 was 
echoed, but now in a celebratory way, with a massive sigh of relief from the “affluent 
industrialized societies.” Noting that, “[t]he world has been oscillating between fears of two 
catastrophes—the population explosion and the atom bomb. Both pose a mortal threat,”38 in 1970 
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the Nobel Peace Prize Committee announced the “surfeited citizens” could finally stop holding 
their “panic-stricken” breath as they watched “the race between the world's population explosion 
and the world's available food,” transfixed in horror.39 For: “In this intolerable situation, with the 
menace of doomsday hanging over us, Dr. Borlaug comes onto the stage and cuts the Gordian 
knot. He has given us a well-founded hope, an alternative of peace and of life—the green 
revolution.”40 As the Nobel Prize Committee indicates, the project of “feeding the world” 
manifests most famously, most successfully, and most starkly in an international development 
project in the late 1960s—now called “the Green Revolution.” Norman Borlaug himself came to 
be colloquially titled “the man who fed the world.”41  
 The Green Revolution’s ongoing global imaginary is writ large across agricultural 
development, aid, geopolitics, environmental issues, the agrarian question and their intersecting 
narratives. In the Green Revolution (GR) these two strands—the logic of a liberal responsibility-
for distant others and the then emerging logic of the “economy” in “development” (as the means 
through which the responsible subjects must enact the massive responsibility they have given 
themselves)—come to articulate the logic of “feeding the world.”  
This refrain of “feeding the world” mobilizes the subject of “modern” agriculture as the 
moral subject, responding to the imperative of its own slogan. The moral imperative is to “solve” 
the real and pressing problem of persistent hunger (while disregarding questions of how hunger 
comes to be produced and how it is underwritten—such questions are deemed more complicated 
than their solution requires and as such are not to be the concern). The task is straightforward: 
produce more food to eradicate hunger. This separation over time comes to be changed, 
modernized, updated, and transformed, with the GR. The fundamental premise of this project 
comes to be articulated in the forging of development as an “education project.” This education’s 
mission is fundamentally technocratic—to form an India committed to American modernization 
and “market” values.  
 This coupling of a naïve utilitarian ethics and simplistic empirical science has been named the 
“productionist paradigm.”42 This approach functions through its simplifying renderings to define 
the problem as shortage and the only answer as increased production. The moral imperative it 
produces is not an accessory; rather, it is integral to its power and unquestioned necessity. The 
specter this imperative wields is so well known that its Malthusian vision need not even be 
spelled out. But, this paradigm also reveals insights into the nature of production-oriented 
technocratic solutions: while agricultural science is an empiricist field-science, the success story 
of the GR’s “fields” is arguably more dependent on having a dominant narrative than on the 
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quantifiable amounts produced (see Ch. 4). Moreover, agricultural science is not only a 
“practical” or “applied” science, it is also a moral science. And agricultural development—where 
agriculture meets the “dismal science” of economics—is a science with a moral imperative. This 
moral imperative is sustained by and harnessed to the specter of hunger, which provides the 
ostensible reason for “progress.”  
 I suggest that this project be understood as an ideological project because (i) it is 
fundamentally about subject production, (ii) it is a knowledge project, and (iii) despite repeated 
declarations of “success,” by its own quantifiable metrics it does not “work” (i.e. it does not 
accomplish its claims—of producing more food than other methods). By reading modern 
industrialized agriculture of the Green and Gene Revolutions as an ongoing ideological project 
we can understand its “work” as something far broader than its justification of producing 
increased yields.  
2.2 | Hunger Amidst Abundance: India 
The current food crisis brought “hunger amidst plenty” into the international spotlight for a 
few months in early 2008. This could be read as a brief global appearance of a series of ongoing 
processes, problems, and promised solutions that have been developing and deepening in various 
countries around the world over the last two decades—most notably in India. Today, India has 
not just an abundance of food, but vast and troublesome surpluses to dispose of. In 2013 the 
Government of India’s grain stocks in storage were worth about USD$30 billion and could feed 
500 million people for one year. The Government allocates millions of US dollars annually to 
dispose of millions of tons of foodgrain that rots while lying in “surplus.” At the same time, 
malnutrition rates in India are higher than they have been at any time since before Independence. 
The “paradox of plenty,” as it is widely dubbed, is deemed paradoxical not only because of 
hunger amidst surplus, but also because India is a democracy with a state committed to 
development. According to our conventional theories of development, people are not supposed to 
go hungry under democratic states that possess sufficient food surpluses.  
 India’s social welfare and food distribution polices have been “rolled-back” over the past two 
decades. Attendant with neoliberal policy restructuring, food supports were limited—to “target” 
only the very poorest—eligibility for food aid was slashed by 60%, and foodgrain consumption 
declined by 70%. As a result, the Government of India (GoI) spends far more on the storage and 
disposal of foodgrain stocks than it had spent on subsidies and food distribution prior to 
economic liberalization.43 These “targeted”44 policies are generally considered to have produced 
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today’s ostensibly “paradoxical” conditions of plummeting average caloric consumption and 
skyrocketing malnutrition rates alongside mounting grain surpluses.45  
 Extensive schools of work have meticulously documented the effects that these cuts in 
distribution policies have had on hunger and malnutrition rates.46 The object of my inquiry is not 
the significant changes in distribution policies, but rather (and perhaps at first counter-intuitively) 
the logic of production policies. More precisely, it is the top-down productionist logic of the late 
1960s’ Green Revolution (GR) as a “development” project. The productionist logic embodied in 
the GR not only dominates food and agricultural policy in India to this day; it also possesses a 
power and relevance that extends far beyond its borders. India’s GR continues to be one of the 
most frequently cited projects as a model to emulate around the world, particularly in Africa.  
 As hunger has increased over the last two decades, the majority of India’s population has 
come to be considered “food insecure.” Theirs is a situation of (bio)political exclusion, implicitly 
justified under the alibi of an “economic” problem. During a decade of a booming economic 
growth rates, the presumed direct relationship between economic growth and access to food has 
been severed, and in some places even reversed.47 This severing is a result of top-down 
production policies coupled with the “targeted” distribution policies. Together these have 
manifest in this specifically neo-liberal spike in hunger, amidst plenty.  
 In this context it is evident that it is not a “deviation” when such a “paradox of hunger amidst 
plenty” occurs, but a logical outcome of how society has come to be (re)structured by modern 
agricultural relations. When increased hunger is not the result—and it most certainly does not 
have to be—social policies have intervened to ameliorate the effects of the exclusion produced by 
this approach; as, for example, was the case during the Green Revolution era in India.  
2.2.1 |  Reading policy assumptions 
 A method of reading can draw out contingencies and conjunctures now long naturalized and 
reveal the Green Revolution (GR) as a conjunctural moment, a turning point in international 
approaches to agricultural and economic development. Sold as an agricultural production method, 
the GR also marked a process that began to “open” or liberalize India’s economic policy 
regulations, introducing policy shifts that manifest more clearly decades later. With significance 
far beyond the intricacies of policy, these two shifts initiated by the GR recast the subject of 
development. The agrarian majority—the small and marginal farmers—were not to drive 
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development. Instead, development was at best, to “trickle down” to them from the elite, and the 
government was to (re)include them via redistributive policies. 
 I argue that the policies selected are social choices; the ways that they are imagined and 
enacted have very real impacts on shaping the structures of possibility of people’s lives.  
2.3 |   The Green Revolution: creating subjects and exclusions   
 To understand the policy logic underlying the realities of widespread food insecurity in India 
today, it is necessary to look beyond distribution policies, and specifically to excavate how the 
Green Revolution reworked access to food. And hence, how—via its reworking of social relations 
and food as a commodity within these social structures—the Green Revolution reworked the 
nature of food, and (re)defined the development subject. To unpack the logics underwriting 
contemporary food (in)security and hunger, it is necessary to attend to how this subject was 
produced and who was effaced in these processes. 
The GR was not simply a project of modernizing agriculture. It was a selective modernization 
model, defined not only by the use of “modern” inputs or new seeds, but also by the subject that it 
selected as able to use these new inputs. The GR was planned to be applied to less than 10% of 
India’s arable land (it reached close to 8%). The eligibility criteria for participation required: 
“progressive farmers” who were already producing for a market, who had guaranteed access to 
water and “immunity from natural hazards.”48 This, in effect, meant that only the already wealthy, 
already surplus-producing farmers were eligible for the assistance.49 The approach “strategically” 
cut out the rest of the agrarian sector in the name of “scarcity:” the scarcity of resources to 
support them (e.g. foreign exchange to procure the inputs, and capital outlay for price support 
prices); the scarcity of food for the nation (a scarcity which mandated this drastic solution); and 
the scarcity of “nature” (as manifest in the drought which preceded the GR and in the criteria that 
farmers have guaranteed access to water). But, the project of spreading agricultural modernization 
also depended on the creation of another subject position, beyond the GR’s subject, dubbed the 
“progressive farmer:” it also depended on the invocation of the hungry masses and poor who 
could not feed themselves. The modern GR “progressive farmer” was to wield modern 
technology, creating “miracles” to produce enough food for the nation. The GR was 
indispensably about the new subjects it introduced and produced, and the forms of governing it 
created. 
What the GR policies entailed was the decoupling of food production and food distribution 
goals. Small famers were excluded from the benefits of these policies, but they were not to be 
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cut-off from entitlement to state support. As the Rockefeller Foundation scientists reflected in an 
internal memo: the “new strategy” (i.e. the GR) was one that explicitly 
…singled out small farmers as one group which may suffer relatively to other 
economic groups. In a country which is dedicated to developing a Socialistic 
Pattern of Society … the implications of inter-personal distribution cannot be 
ignored.50  
 
As such, they reasoned that despite the fact that   
 
…some groups of people and areas of the country have not participated as fully 
as others from these technological gains… [r]ather than indict a program for 
failure to do what it was not intended to do,51 new policies should [instead] be 
designed to accomplish these new objectives. In other words, the production and 
welfare targets of [the] agricultural program should be explicitly recognized and 
instruments best suited for these two purposes should be advocated on their own 
merits.52  
 
They insisted that production and redistribution policies not be conflated; the two must be 
recognized as entirely separate projects. The “industrialization” of agriculture is premised upon 
this decoupling, or separation of food production and access, which in turn underwrites the 
concept and project of “feeding the world.” 
 The RF acknowledged that the small farmers were by design excluded from the approach of 
the GR, but this was to be a temporary “stage”—in a progress narrative where the GR was the 
“base” upon which programs of social inclusion could be built to re-include the poor into the 
development imaginary, with time. Rendering the poorer segments of society outside of the 
subject position of development agents, and instead to be included after (i.e. to be towed along, 
with the “rising tide”) has clear and lasting ramifications. That there should be, on the one hand, 
production goals and policies, and on the other, an entirely different set of policies for the welfare 
and re-inclusion of those dispossessed by the first set of policies, creates a two-fold exclusion. 
First, the policies legitimize exclusion as a means to development in the name of delayed stages 
of progress and modernization; second, they (later) couple with a lack of welfare or re-inclusion 
policies (i.e. distribution-side). Together these policies do not “fix,” or even address, the crux of 
the situation: the poor and hungry are disproportionately the agrarian laborers and marginal 
producers, who are still excluded from the production-for-development policies. Thus, inadequate 
(re)distribution policies are certainly a problem, but they are not the root cause of poverty or 
hunger53—rather, tracing these lineages, it becomes evident that the policies regulating 
production generate the conditions wherein the vast majority of farmers are effectively excluded 
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from the benefits of “development.” That is, the production policies are themselves exclusion-
producing. 
 This approach was not simply accepted, it faced significant challenges and was controversial.  
Many people at the time, and since, advocated that agricultural policy should shift and attend to 
the vast majority—the 80% of farmers who till without irrigation. However, these policies have 
remained largely stuck in the top-down productionist model, with the vast majority of producers 
effectively invisible. In this manner the GR’s policy shifts authorized production and support 
structures in which the subject of development came to be defined against the agrarian majority. 
Since the majority were not to be the productive agents of the process of agricultural 
development, its benefits were to reach them—initially—through redistribution programs (such 
as subsidized food). Eventually, the economy was envisioned to expand enough to re-include 
them. However, while their exclusion was sanctioned, the timeline and mechanisms of their re-
inclusion were not planned, but relegated to the promise of development and economic growth. 
Thus, when the “initial” (re)distribution programs were slashed under neo-liberal restructuring in 
the 1990s, hunger skyrocketed. The exclusion of the majority continues—evidenced in the 
decoupling of food security and economic growth today—as a lasting legacy of the GR into the 
Second GR.   
2.4 | Understanding the continuities: “A Long Green Revolution” 
 Scholarship on the Green Revolution has established that the Green Revolution (GR) was an 
important step in subsuming agriculture to control of the state and the market. Food and 
agricultural aid and agricultural technologies played a pivotal role in restructuring the relationship 
between “the state” and “the market” in regulating the agricultural sector. The development goal 
of reaching, and accelerating beyond, “take-off” was pursued through the injection of exchange 
value into crops via the purchase and use of new agricultural inputs. As these technologies 
became increasingly controversial, they came to be imbued with the status of an awaited savior.54  
 I understand the GR of the 1960s and the second GR (or “Gene Revolution”) today as an 
ongoing process, a “long Green Revolution,”55 held together by the expansionary logic “the 
market” as the catalyst through which (changing understandings of) “food security” could best be 
attained. The concept of a long Green Revolution ties the changes in agriculture to larger 
economic structures (including the regulatory regime that has facilitated specific forms of 
accumulation in the name of global market integration). Initially, trade was to bind nations to a 
particular path of development and its visions of “freedom” and “democracy.” Later, the 
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“security” was no longer an explicitly Cold War battle; food security was to be pursued via 
international trade. In both GRs, this logic is funneled through specific bilateral and geopolitical 
projects; these are not discrete events, but constitute critical nodes in the “long Green 
Revolution.”56 This view of the GR events as part of longer processes of accumulation enables 
the recognition that these projects were not simply major agricultural strategies, but were 
designed to accelerate market control in the name of development, technological modernization, 
and feeding the nation. Drawing out these continuities is important because the relationship 
between the GRs in popular imagination and much of the literature is marked by a sharp 
disjuncture—characterizing the “original” GR of the 1960s as largely “good” and the current 
“second” GR as markedly worse. But such characterizations do not offer insight into the drivers 
behind the respective projects or the governing logics. Rather, reading the dynamics of the two 
eras as within a shared logic constituting a “long Green Revolution,” allows me “to trace a 
trajectory of accumulation, legitimation and development from the first Green Revolution to the 
present.”57 This longer term perspective incorporates a more nuanced understanding of how and 
why the projects were created and sustained, and hence a more nuanced understanding of how 
they can be changed. The projects of legitimation and accumulation are intertwined and operate 
together to produce their logic.  
2.4.1 | The Green Revolution’s enduring shifts 
 The (first) GR was an early moment which established the possibility for ongoing shifts. I 
emphasize three main aspects. First, the GR project was, and is still, viewed as foremost a project 
of ensuring sufficient food for the nation and its population. While the language of “food 
security” was not used at the time (the terms of discussion were “food self-sufficiency” and “food 
enough” for the nation) in hindsight the GR is widely seen to embody the concept of “food 
security.” Further, the GR introduced a new model of production from which the concept of 
“food security” was to emerge.  
 Second, the GR began the first (aborted) process of liberalization in the country (~1966). The 
economic, regulatory, and market liberalization moves that were requirements of US food-aid 
were not immediately built upon, or even continued, but did begin to pry open markets and set the 
(agricultural and economic) policy trajectories, returned to decades later. Of lasting significance 
is the ways in which these approaches lay the conceptual groundwork for how to diagnose and 
address these issues.58 The moment of the 1960s food crisis and the “New Strategy” to address it 
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(which became the GR) provided a window through which powerful actors within the elite policy 
circles in India could push a nascent liberalization agenda.59  
 Third, the GR offered a technical solution to a political problem of distribution of land, 
resources, and development attention. This approach was pushed enthusiastically because it 
offered a means of addressing these problems without having to deal with social questions; 
difficult and entrenched social and political relations would not need to be directly confronted: 
technology would do the work.60 Beyond setting in place a policy trajectory, or path dependency, 
this approach built material relations and structures around this approach and instituted the re-
production of this approach as “knowledge.” This aspect—the knowledge project—has become 
arguably the most sedimented aspect—institutionalized in policy, multiple government agencies, 
education institutions, curriculum, etc. This choice of a technical solution has established the 
mindset that has been the most significant in establishing the continued dominance of the GR 
approach. The GR’s hegemonic understanding of how to address agricultural development, food 
shortages, and even the specter of hunger—and whom these policies should focus on—continues 
to this day.  
 Thus, the Director of the World Food Program (WFP), Josette Sheeran’s characterization of 
skyrocketing food prices in the wake of the financial crisis’ spillover into food commodities as “a 
huge historic opportunity”—on the premise that high food prices will help poor producers—is 
based on ignoring the actual results of policies implemented in the name of this logic in favor of 
the politically convenient theoretical results, which are supposed to be beneficial. However, 
international development and food organizations’ own studies of the actual results of the 
policies have found that: 
Paradoxically rising food prices do not provide sufficient commercial stimuli for 
small farmers, despite FAO suggestions that rural households producing food 
staples traded internationally could benefit from rising food prices. 
  
Rather, the World Bank reports that, because farmers tend not to seek such 
market rewards because of fertiliser and fuel inflation, in addition to previous 
commitments to sell harvests at fixed rates, and/or that, because farmers in poor 
regions self-consume more of their own output, their gains from price increases 
are marginal.61 
 
When examining the results and the devastating effects of their policies, the development 
institutions pushing the idea of individual food security through the global market and food 
security through trade conclude that it is not their theories that are inadequate or lacking. Rather, 
it is the behavior of the small farmers: that they are not seeking the inevitable benefits of the 
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market, and that is why they are not “competitive.” Thus, with this framing, their solution is to 
not just to incorporate, but to subsume, these small farmers into the global market in the name of 
their own food security.  
 The premise behind this critique and my argument is this: policies need to attend to 
vulnerability and poverty, and meet food-security goals through a focus on securing the 
livelihoods of marginal and landless producers, as they are the bulk of the country’s acutely 
malnourished. While this may seem like the self-evident approach, food security policies continue 
to operate within the framework of the GR, and as such are locked into a legacy of subsidizing 
larger farmers and (re)distributing to marginal farmers. As the food distribution system has been 
drastically rolled back, this has created a double exclusion of the agrarian poor which has 
increased the urgency of redirecting production policies to resolve the “paradox of plenty.” Their 
exclusion continues.  
 The concern of the following chapters is to excavate the production of this dominant logic 
where exclusion comes to be integral to development. I do not address this vast population, nor 
the many movements for change; I do not claim to know, or represent, their realities—my aim is 
to take on the logic of “development” projects that have been, and continue to be, enacted in the 
name of poor farmers and the hungry. These projects too often further consolidate approaches to 
agricultural production and development that are premised upon exclusion. As there has been a 
sustained effort to write the majority of farmers—those who till small and marginal plots—
outside of the subject position of “modern agriculture,” one must be very wary of recent promises 
to “re-include” marginalized farmers via production of specialty export crops and/or futures 
trading.  
3 | Research: research questions and methodological approach 
 My examination of how the construction of the “self-evident” common sense of 
productionism as the answer to hunger, couples with liberal responsibility and “economic” logic 
as manifest in India’s two Green Revolutions offers: (i) a means of examining the narratives of 
development and agricultural “modernization” in order to reveal the work of this approach as a 
knowledge project and (ii) offers a way of viewing how the re-structuring of agricultural and 
welfare policies (under the Long Green Revolution) have redefined development and re-worked 
how the state articulates its responsibilities. Addressing these shifting logics of governance is 
necessary to understand the persistence of hunger amidst plenty.62  
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 I used archival documents, published texts, and multiple in-depth “expert” interviews,63 to 
examine the ways in which the terms of agricultural development and approaches to development 
(both achieving growth or/& eliminating its deprivations, e.g. hunger) have become inscribed in, 
and circulate through, policy networks (from bilateral negotiations to local level regulations). As I 
set about this project, the initial research questions I sought to answer were:  
1. How have imperatives to ensure “food for the nation,” to manage the specter of hunger, 
and abide by geopolitical demands for a “free-market” manifest in agricultural 
development policies?  
a. What role has agro-technology played in negotiating these imperatives?  
b. How has the broad shift from public to private ownership of these technologies 
affected their roles? 
2. What roles have food, aid, hunger, agricultural development, and “food security” 
played in Indo-US bilateral relations and policies?  
a. How have agriculture, food, and agricultural technology been deployed in 
negotiating other political-economic, security, and ideological concerns?  
b. How has the specter of hunger been harnessed in these policies: for what ends, 
with what concerns, and what discourses have been mobilized? 
3. In what ways have the shifting frameworks of agricultural development and food 
security/food distribution support policies articulated with, or diverged from, the 
frameworks of dominant economic development policies? 
a. How has the relation between “food security” and “national security” emerged and 
changed over the course of shifting development frameworks? How has the 
understanding of what constitutes “food security,” and of how it is to be pursued, 
changed? 
b. In what ways do neo-liberal modes of government and agro-technological 
“solutions” to hunger converge?—with what effects on access to food? 
 The fieldwork (archival work and interviews) was conducted in the US and in India. There 
were two main components: (i) archival and policy research (at the National Archives of India, 
Nehru Memorial Library, Yale Archives, Rockefeller Foundation Archives, and the National 
Archives of the United States); and (ii) semi-structured in-depth interviews also in both India and 
the US, primarily with policy makers, scientists and development professionals (who were largely 
Foundation and/or NGO based).  
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3.1 |  Research methodology and justification 
 In pursuing information and historical material, my aims were three fold. First, through 
archival work, I sought to trace evolving understandings of hunger, food security, and agricultural 
technology, how they have manifest in agricultural development policies, and the relationship of 
these policies with economic policies. Second, through in-depth “expert” interviews, to examine 
how institutional actors perceive the policy process: specifically, the role of technology in 
agricultural policy, and how they account for policy shifts and understand policies’ effects. Third, 
through a genealogy and symptomatic reading, to excavate how these perspectives and discourses 
have set the context for the ways in which social “problems” and needs have been understood and 
policy responses framed, and what roles agro-technology has played in resolving competing 
demands on the state.  
 Recognizing that texts produce the stability and iterability of organizations and institutions, 
my approach of a “symptomatic reading” and genealogy is distinct from conventional textual and 
ethnographic methods. Together these allow me to both “step back” for a larger context and to 
“zoom-in” to investigate the ways “inscriptions” (i.e. understandings made legible and usable) 
come to be formed and how they circulate in producing the practices of “simplification” and 
“legibility”64 that are necessary for the functioning of policy and state apparatuses across scales.65 
In analyzing the material I collected, the methodological pairing of a genealogy and symptomatic 
reading66 of archival documents and in-depth interview transcripts allowed me to trace (i) the 
ways inscriptions come to be formed and how they circulate through documents, policy, and 
discourse; and (ii) to then investigate these understandings further in my interviews. Tracing these 
processes enables understanding how the many policy convergences over the period I examined 
have come to be and have functioned.67 
3.2 | Method of Inquiry: Symptomatic Reading and Genealogy 
Questions of how narratives of our taken for granted knowledge about agricultural 
development (including conquering hunger, feeding the world, and feeding the nation) came to be 
written and what they reveal and conceal can be effectively approached through the 
methodological coupling of a symptomatic reading and a genealogy. What the concept-term 
“symptomatic reading” offers is an approach that is, tactically and methodologically, a double 
reading; a reading of the text not simply for what is said, but that also emphasizes what is not 
said.68 As such, “the symptomatic reading, analyzes the textual mechanism which produces the 
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sightings and oversights rather than merely recording it.”69 The purpose of such a reading is not 
simply to create a “record” of what is and is not said (although that is a part of the first aspect of 
the reading, in an empiricist mode); more significantly, attending not only to what the text 
literally says and/or omits, this double reading attends to what work this does.70  
 To proceed, a symptomatic reading identifies a “problematic.” A “problematic” is the 
background, or ideological framework, on which the narrative rests and was produced; that is, a 
“problematic” is the anchoring on which “common sense” pivots. Identifying the “problematic” 
allows drawing-out the underlying assumptions which structure the text’s thought and enable its 
approach but are not made explicit or spelled-out. Attending closely to the textuality of narrative, 
this method of reading locates contradictions and assumptions of the text, reading them as 
“symptoms” of the necessary but unarticulated framework that underpins the text’s approach (i.e. 
of the problematic). Thus, a problematic’s anchoring can be understood as the social force which 
operates by investing certain questions and concepts with the self-evidence of “common sense;” it 
is a legitimating and de-legitimating force.  
In exploring the work of narratives of development and modernity in agriculture, “texts” and 
“history” together consolidate the narrative. Thus, while a symptomatic reading is essential, to 
excavate this history I complement a symptomatic reading with a genealogical inquiry as an 
attempt to draw apart how these particular “common sense” understandings have come to be 
naturalized. The concept-method of “genealogy”—as a “history of the present”—offers an 
overlapping and complementary cut into how to read historical and social phenomena, tying 
methods of reading to a specifically historical focus. 
A “genealogy” asks which of our present and ostensibly “necessary” artifacts are actually 
mere contingencies—that is, historical legacies impinging the confines of our sense of the 
possible (e.g. how we think about things and what we can do about them).71 The attempt to 
excavate the guardrails of everyday assumptions as contingencies means that we operate on a 
field where ideas do not retain their logic and words do not retain their meaning. To navigate this 
field and conduct a genealogy is to attempt to “record the singularity of events outside of any 
monotonous finality.”72 This search (for events and their singularity), Foucault maintains, must 
take place outside of the places of standard “historical merit.” As such, a genealogy necessarily 
operates in a field of entangled and confused texts: it is in places “without history”—sentiments, 
instincts, conscience—that a genealogical investigation dwells.73 But, as subaltern studies and 
postcolonial scholars have documented, this “standard” story is also the archive that we have; we 
must read these materials for gaps and silences in the narrative (not try to ascertain the 
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consciousness of undocumented historical figures). A theory and method of reading are 
indispensable. The reading I offer here is rooted not only in the official reports (though such 
reports provide opening questions), but in a myriad of texts, speeches, symposium, writings, 
letters, notes, and other less “official” texts from the 1950s and 1960s (era of PL 480 food aid), 
leading up to the Green Revolution and after it, and also contemporary texts relating to projects 
associated with the emergent “second Green Revolution” (i.e. Gene Revolution). The 
symptomatic reading enables this method to operate, whether on theoretical texts or 
archival/historical materials. 
Methodologically, there is similarity and compatibility between these two approaches.74 A 
symptomatic reading unsettles; and building on that unsettling, a genealogy excavates beyond the 
text and its problematic (or enabling assumptions) to help reveal how these understandings have 
come to be naturalized as such. As a genealogy helps to excavate how specific terms, concepts, 
and processes have become naturalized, or taken for granted, it can also excavate how the 
“anchoring,” which underpins a symptomatic reading’s “problematic,” has come to be 
naturalized. As such, a symptomatic reading could be said to provide a method within a 
method—reading the GR (narrative) as text, it can help to enact a genealogy that beyond 
excavating the enabling assumptions also denaturalizes these narratives, revealing how they came 
to be and how they produced these particular understandings as natural or self-evident. Thus, 
further building on the unsettling, a genealogy enables action beyond that of a symptomatic 
reading.  
4 | Laying out the Research: Literature review and context  
 Pursuing the question of the production of “common sense,” the method I laid out above 
excavates contingencies and their naturalization, it also seeks to expose how these logics come to 
be dominant. Scholarship in critical Geography attends to the processes through which particular 
“hegemonic geographies” have become dominant and how they rewrite and silence other worlds. 
Such “world-making processes”—as Matthew Sparke’s conceptual definition of “geo-graphy” 
offers—can be uncovered to reveal their workings. The task of excavating long naturalized 
knowledge projects is also one that postcolonial and subaltern studies lead us through—in a 
different, complementary way—pushing boundaries by calling our taken-for-granted categories 
into question. 
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The methodological approach I laid out above is informed and supplemented by the 
conceptual grounding of my research questions and the theoretical framework within the subfield 
of critical development geography. Comfortably interdisciplinary in its concerns, critical 
development geography draws together scholarship including political economy, postcolonial, 
feminist, and poststructural theory to forge a framework for understanding “development” 
projects and processes.75 Development geography brings together an analysis of political-
economic and cultural factors to understand the contemporary and historical geo-political project 
of development; critical development geography engages in this empirical task, but pushes the 
bounds of the analytic and methodological frameworks. As such, critical development geography 
offers a model and framework for excavating and attending to how power relations are inflected 
through, and given meaning by, discursive formations. Its amalgamated insights can be translated 
into tactics for tracing these formations through processes and projects of knowledge production, 
subject production, relations of exclusion, the work of ideology, and how hegemony (i.e. as 
naturalized understandings) is produced, and what is effaced in these processes; it offers a 
framework that attends to these questions from the geopolitical scale to the local.  
4.1 | Question 
 Positioned within this approach, I attend to the empirical context of food, hunger, and 
agricultural development in “geopolitics,” specifically India-US relations, explored through the 
Green Revolution in India and the debates around a second Green Revolution in India today. My 
approach is genealogical, entering from the present, I ask how today’s “paradoxical” realities 
have come to be and I trace the conditions of possibility back through conceptual and policy 
lineages. This involves attending to three distinct but encompassing questions: (1) practices of 
“governing” and the logic of exclusion, and (2) the logic of productionism in agriculture, and (3) 
processes and projects of the global dissemination of these logics. 
4.2 | Governing and exclusion  
Postcolonial and subaltern studies scholars writing on India have laid out the paradoxes of 
exclusion and governing today in ways that help reveal and further interrogate the logic of these 
practices (an issue I explore more in Ch. 1). Setting the context, Partha Chatterjee76 maps 
evolving understandings of the changing political relations in India, invoking Sudipta Kaviraj’s77 
earlier conception of a “passive revolution,” a concept-term able to explain the unique dynamics 
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of the “process of class domination in postcolonial India,”78—a form “marked by its difference 
from classical [i.e. European] bourgeois democracy”79 and citizenship.  
 The governing structure in earlier (post-Independence) eras was marked by heavy 
involvement of the state and was referred to as a “transitional system” (e.g. as if India were “yet” 
to catch up on its path to European political modernity). Since the 1990s’ restructuring of state-
capital relations (broadly neoliberal reforms—e.g. the dismantling of ISIs, the decline of the 
“license raj,” rise of a corporate political class, etc.), what has emerged is not the convergence of 
the Indian political system with “classical” models of capitalist democracy. Instead of a polity 
that resembles these “classical” models, Chatterjee suggests that the critical distinction in the 
political and governing formations in India today is marked by a split that can be seen as 
increasingly manifest in the ways that two groups relate to and interact with their government. He 
names this a split between “civil society” and “political society.” 
 The former, “civil society,” encompasses those who are (full) “citizens” with recognized, or 
“legitimate,” claims on the state (e.g. the urban middle classes). The latter, “political society,” 
refers to those members of the “population” whose claims are not recognized as legitimate, and 
whose demands on the state are met in a manner that is contingent, temporary, and granted as an 
exception—such that “[t]heir entitlements, even when recognized, never quite become rights.”80 
Those relegated to political society constitute the majority of the people in India. Yet, they are 
outside of the moral and political leadership of the capitalist class—the interests represented by 
the political parties. These political parties’ mantra is “rapid economic growth”81 as the answer to 
all of India’s problems; this is the new hegemonic consensus, this is the passive revolution in 
action. But, at the same time, Chatterjee notes that there is also an implicit recognition that even 
with successful “rapid economic growth,”82 the type of development this anticipated growth will 
bring will not be able to include most of political society, and, as such, has no existing model. 
The European model of development is not possible; India cannot export its masses as did 
Europe, and, the industrial and technological revolutions of today will not absorb all of those 
displaced from agrarian labor into low-wage factory labor. Yet, in a democracy, it is necessary to 
appease those excluded by these processes. For,  
…most of these victims of primitive accumulation are unlikely to be absorbed 
into the new growth sectors of the economy. They will remain marginalized and 
rendered useless as far as the sectors dominated by corporate capital are 
concerned. But, the passive revolution under conditions of electoral democracy 
makes it unacceptable and illegitimate for the government to leave these 
marginalized populations without the means of labor to fend for themselves. That 
carries the risk of turning them into the “dangerous classes.” Hence a whole 
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series of government policies are being, and will be, devised to reverse the 
effects of primitive accumulation.83 
 
The new nature of the ongoing passive revolution (under neoliberalism) requires that something 
be done to appease “political society”—for, ensuring political stability requires efforts at 
“reversing the effects of the primitive accumulation of capital.”84 In the context of the paradox of 
plenty and widespread hunger, the 2013 National Food Security Act, NFSA (among other bills 
such as NREGA, the National Rural Employment Guarantee Act) can be read as policy efforts 
meant to contain the problem. Such policies are meant to ameliorate the egregious levels of 
deprivation, not to address the fundamental problem; that role and responsibility is allocated to 
“rapid economic growth.” Chatterjee’s analytic lens tells us why governments create programs 
like the NFSA or NREGA, but it does not explain the dynamics of exclusion or the processes of 
policy foreclosures; rather it takes their exclusion almost as a given.  
 My concern in the following chapters is how the logics of exclusion have been produced and 
have played out as a knowledge project in the realm of food and agriculture. For my purposes 
here, the insights and approach of this literature are helpful to understanding the naturalized 
acceptance of the logics, assumptions, and practices constitutive of exclusion, however, it is also 
necessary to interrogate the work of this exclusion.  
 Extending this understanding of poverty and exclusion—not assuming it as a necessary part 
of the political order, but rather seeking to answer how its life depriving effects are so accepted, 
even banal—Akhil Gupta85 pushes the concept of the poor as “exception” in how the state 
governs them. Gupta draws on, but pushes and fundamentally reworks, Agamben’s ideas on the 
production of bare life and the state of exception; Gupta suggests that we see the extremely poor 
as homo sacer. While an integral part of democratic politics, the extremely poor are excluded 
from basic rights—simply because they are so poor.  Their status as legally included but at the 
same time excluded by the logic of “the economy” demands a reconceptualization the nature and 
logics of biopolitical exclusion. Returning to the fundamental paradox—that Chatterjee’s 
explanation also pivoted on—the poor in India are legally full citizens of the state; but as Gupta 
emphasizes, we must also attend to how it they are “let die” by state policy and/or the lack 
thereof.  
 To interrogate the policy narratives legitimating their exclusion, it is necessary to address the 
dominant logic of our time, the dominant global denomination of power: “the economy,” both in 
its theoretical presumptions and in its operation. For this task, I draw on literature in political 
economy as an indispensable backbone of such an examination. In the context of these policies 
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and their promises, literature on the political economy of development extends the conceptual 
framework. The power of development’s policy narratives is not simply economic. Such 
narratives are marked by an enduring faith in economic growth, not necessarily growth in and of 
itself, but certainly for what it promises—modernity, technology, a consumption society, etc. To 
interrogate the power of these narratives, critical development geography draws on insights from 
postcolonial and poststructural theory; for instance, geographer Victoria Lawson emphasizes the 
dually descriptive and productive work of discourse in imaginaries of development and in 
producing development realities.86 To consider the work of exclusion, the perspective and 
response of economic growth needs to be pushed a bit further; beyond the work of economic 
growth as alibi, it is necessary to address the nature of responsibility being enacted here. The 
project of “development”—and, specifically the economic growth it is to bring—is the dominant 
geopolitical denomination of responsibility. Underwriting narratives about hunger in particular, 
the logic of “the economy” as ready answer couples with the naturalized logic of liberal 
responsibility. The solution offered in the neoliberal era is economic growth and productionism. 
Although arguments for productionism have been thoroughly dismantled in extensive bodies of 
literature, they retain a disarming salience. What needs to be unpacked is the power of these 
arguments themselves—not what causes hunger, or what to is to be done to address it. That is 
well established. The real question is how the approaches that we know work are consistently 
foreclosed and replaced with productionist narratives and policies.  
4.3 |  Unpacking the logic of productionism and the work of “Feeding the World” 
 To unpack these logics, I build upon three distinct literatures within the broad political 
economic tradition: (i) addressing hunger, (ii) the global agro-food system and agricultural 
technology, (iii) development studies and the political economy of knowledge. I bring these 
together with work in postcolonial studies that addresses the nature of exclusion, subject 
production, and knowledge to interrogate the formation and workings of power relations beyond 
the realm of the “economic.” Together the analytic tools and topical insights of these bodies of 
work enable me to interrogate the forms of knowledge and “reason” that define these 
development regimes and that collaborate with capital in authorizing and consolidating processes 
of marginalization and exclusion.  
 There is a vibrant and growing trans-disciplinary body of work that aims to bridge the gap 
between political economy and postcolonial scholarship, but work in agro-food studies remains 
largely within the confines of political economy and does not engage with postcolonial studies, 
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and vice versa. The power and appeal of “development” exceed the realm of the “economic.” The 
enduring and evocative power of “the conquest of hunger,”87 the role of food in imaginaries of 
“the nation,” and the many ways that these appeals have been harnessed to specific agricultural 
projects and development policies, while topically about food, is also situated conceptually at the 
crux of post-colonialism’s articulation with questions of representation, modernity, the subject, 
political economy, and, geopolitics. 
4.4 | Development 
 “Development,” as the dominant denomination of responsibility (and its affiliate, economic 
growth, as the dominant governing logic of today) is a project of trying to grow, or “bring up,” 
economies. As such it also has a sequential or stagist rendering—both in its progress (through 
stages) and in its lack thereof (not yet). 
 Development, as geographer Gillian Hart aptly points out, is a geo/political project as well as 
a process. Naming these “Big D” Development and “Little d” development, she explains: 
“Big D” Development I define as the multiply scaled projects of intervention in 
the “Third World” that emerged in the context of decolonization struggles and 
the Cold War. “Little d” development refers to the development of capitalism as 
geographically uneven but spatially interconnected processes of creation and 
destruction, dialectically interconnected with discourses and practices of 
Development.88 
 
I attend to the interconnections89 of these two senses of D/development. Furthermore, what Hart 
calls “Big D” Development is not simply a global project, but the defining terrain of North-South 
relations for the last sixty years; as such, the study of development necessarily has historical and 
spatial aspects to it. Geographers have offered an analytic framework and means to understand 
the ways in which these processes are territorialized and the complicated geopolitical historical 
connections of these processes—forged in relations across space and between places, such that 
particular places come to take on particular political and governmental configurations. One way 
of tying together these histories, narratives, and their continuing power is by approaching 
development as a project operating at “the convergence of economic and cultural approaches to 
understanding imperialism,”90 as geographer Mona Domosh offers. Literature in this vein draws 
together historical geographies of development as an integral component of the expansion of 
American influence91 to map the emergence, consolidation, and operation of “American 
Empire.”92 In the context of food and agriculture, the historical geographies of development and 
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American empire overlap significantly with literature in history (and particularly with diplomatic 
history) that details the operations and expansion of development projects during the Cold War.93 
4.4.1 | Producing a “solution:” Productionism as Development  
 The evocative power of the project of development deeply permeates how we understand and 
“manage” agriculture and food. I unpack the complex ways in which economic development 
policies articulate with a productionist logic in agriculture. To do so, I attend to how imaginaries 
of development shape ideas of production regimes and how these, in turn, translate into 
development policies and projects on the ground. I trace three key themes in the ways that 
imaginations of development and production regimes interact. First, how naturalized hegemonic 
understandings of (economic) development operate in agricultural development, particularly the 
coupling of a teleology of progress with technology; and the ways this operates to write social 
and political questions into “technicalities,” which, in turn, creates a naturalized history of 
modernity and progress. Second, how food and agriculture have been used as tools of leverage for 
creating compliance with particular development regimes. Third, how the specter of hunger has 
been mobilized to authorize these policies. In particular, how the urgency of its moral force and 
political threat have been deployed to naturalize existing power relations and obscure the 
complex causes of hunger, thus propelling a technical approach as the most “efficient” and 
effective.  
 These questions and themes are thoroughly documented in the vibrant and growing body of 
agro-food literature (a sub-field spanning across traditional disciplinary boundaries). But, the 
ways these salient themes of the post-war development era articulate with governing practices 
and policy foreclosures underwriting today’s exclusionary “paradox” have not been drawn out. 
Attending to these dynamics at the local and geopolitical scales offers a conceptual framework for 
approaching how knowledge is produced and naturalized within the realm of agriculture, 
agricultural development, and addressing hunger.  
4.4.2 | Political economy of agro-food 
 Extending this to the contemporary era, the knowledge project coming out of imperial 
relations ties to modern “geo-economic”94 relations—particularly in food and agriculture. First, 
seminal works in liberal political economy have repeatedly demonstrated that hunger is an issue 
of distribution and entitlements, not scarcity.95 As such, the relevant questions are of policy: 
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political, economic, and societal choices. It is necessary to attend to the policies regulating food 
distribution and production as well as to the ideologies and imaginaries underlying these policy 
landscapes. In the realm of production and agricultural “development” or “modernization,” the 
issue of concern with agricultural technologies is how they rework power relations within the 
agro-food system, how this system is produced and regulated, in whose interest, and what work 
this management performs.  
 Mapping out these relations is one of the driving questions behind the second body of 
political economy literature I draw on—the diverse scholarship on the agro-food system. Probing 
the geopolitics and biopolitics of hunger and food distribution, I take insights from the ways in 
which control over food production and supplies have been used as mechanisms of leverage in 
domestic and international politics—a case made clearly evident in both political economy 
approaches to uneven development and in political science and diplomatic history literatures.96 
 The roles of agricultural development, food distribution, and hunger prevention policies in 
domestic politics in India are well documented.97 However, despite the fact that geopolitical 
considerations have informed development planning since India’s Independence, and have been 
significant in how policies are formed, there remains a surprising paucity of literature 
investigating the relationship between geopolitics, development aid and agricultural development 
policies in India.98 
 Work on the political economy of food regimes—or global histories of how food and 
governance operate together—is helpful for building an analytic framework to approach these 
issues. The diverse scholarship on the agro-food system and “food regimes” addresses how 
control over the food system (whether via the market or the state) has been used to secure 
political-economic power across scales and particular regimes of governance, and documents “the 
strategic role of food and agriculture in the construction of the world capitalist economy.”99 This 
substantial literature has also begun to consider the ways in which the shifts in these structures 
and in global governance with neoliberal policies (which enabled the Gene Revolution) are 
intertwined with the retrenchment and reformulation of “food security” policies.100 
 I leverage insights from the agro-foods literature to confront the logic of these policies and 
conjunctures; the logic that “development” disseminates, not just power nor simply measurable 
political ends, but systems of knowing, understanding and diagnosing and fixing problems in the 
world around us. These are projects of “government.” 
4.4.3 | Aid 
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 This naturalized understanding of productionism as development comes into being most often 
through international aid projects, both state/public and private/foundation aid. The work of aid—
as a denomination of responsibility, as a conditional (even coercive) project, and as a political and 
knowledge project that articulates, extends, and enforces the dominant logic of power, has been 
addressed in scholarship in political economy, development studies and geopolitics/political 
geography. We can read geographer Jamey Essex’s101 recent account of geopolitics and 
geoeconomics of development as bringing these concerns and literatures together. He explains the 
term “geoeconomics” as referring to the geopolitical context in which “national economic 
position in a brutally efficient world economy would trump military strength as the primary 
ordering mechanism for the state system.”102 This synopsis offers a take on how the dominant 
regime of power/knowledge—“the economy” (and in developing nations, “rapid economic 
growth”)—plays out at the international scale. Further, it suggests why abiding its logic still 
seems non-negotiable to states, even if they realize that to do so is to operate under the banner of 
the same exclusionary logic of dispossession that they are trying to address domestically.   
 As indispensable as the “economic” logic propelling these processes may be, it does not act 
alone. This “economic” logic is itself a knowledge project, and the result of historical power 
relations, propelled by sustaining narratives and belief structures.  
4.4.4 | the work of narrative and the production of the subject 
 Taking on the work of these narratives, postcolonial and subaltern studies accounts have 
persuasively demonstrated the formative roles that imaginations of modernity, “science,” and the 
nation have had in sustaining and justifying policy trajectories.103 As the discourses of an array of 
Government officials, Ministers, and the Prime Minister exhibit, the specter of hunger continues 
to be marshaled in the name of “science” and “technology.” While a common response is to 
dismiss such claims, this is inadequate; the discourse cannot be dismissed as either mere ideology 
or political convenience, nor simply justification for corporate profit. The claims perform 
significant work—a “responsibility for” is being produced—and it must be examined. Yet, much 
of the scholarship on development has ignored the power of narratives around conquering 
hunger, ensuring national food self-sufficiency, and the legacy of the Green Revolution104 as key 
for understanding development projects today.  
 Postcolonial studies takes on the questions that have informed recent iterations of 
development geography in a concerted way, interrogating their underlying concepts and placing 
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concerns of poverty, exclusion and subjectivity, or subject production, center stage. It is 
necessary to attend not only to the imperatives this project mobilizes, but also to the nature of the 
exclusions being produced. The agricultural projects culminating in the Green Revolution sought 
to create a new modernity through instilling a “rational” modern mindset—agricultural 
development was a project of subject creation. This was a project in which most were not 
included; small farmers were excluded and effaced from the GR policies. Hence, today projects 
which claim the mantle of being a “second GR” promise to extend the GR to small and marginal 
farmers—via new (bio)technology.  
4.4.5 | Technology and technopolitics 
 One of the primary ways in which projects of development have operated has been to 
disseminate technology. Technology in these projects is not simply about objects, but is as much 
about technological knowledge to be transferred; more specifically, it is about disseminating a 
way of knowing, assessing, engaging with, and addressing the world. As historians such as 
Gabrielle Hecht105 have documented, development is a “techno-political” project. The Green 
Revolution was a project of subject-creation through technology. 
4.5 | Wrapping up: “critical geographic responsibility” 
 The projects that I excavate in the following pages seek to map “the ways in which the 
geographies of their worlds are subsumed by hegemonic geographies of power.”106 In this, I take 
up what Matthew Sparke refers to as “critical geographic responsibility,”107 mapping these 
processes in what Neil Smith titled “American Empire.”108 I map this through attending to both 
the said and the unsaid in texts, to excavate the naturalization of these processes. When the 
projects and processes are seen more clearly, they may be challenged, and forms of engagement 
more responsible to those excluded may no longer be foreclosed but instead, may emerge as 
alternatives that compel consideration. 
5 | Chapter Outline 
 In the first chapter, the Introduction, I pose a question to the “paradox of plenty” and lay out 
the theoretical framework for approaching this problem. In so doing I both provide background 
(historical and topical) and examine the logic and the work of policies enacted in the name of 
“food security” and development, tracing their conceptual and policy effects. While studies of 
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hunger and food insecurity generally examine the distribution side of the issue (conceptually or 
empirically), I attend more to the logic guiding production side questions. I conclude that to 
understand the integral nature of exclusion in production regimes we see manifest today we must 
go back to the Green Revolution’s interventionist policies.  
 In the second chapter I examine the debates around Bt brinjal, a genetically engineered 
eggplant, in India. I follow these discussions as a lens into competing imaginaries of society’s 
development futures. I suggest that what came to be the most significant issue of debate was the 
question of authority. This specifically technocratic authority came to be debated in two main 
realms (1) food security and development and (2) the terrain of scientific expertise. Both of these 
lineages stem from the Green Revolution, which continues to set the defining framework for 
discussions of agriculture and development in India today. I suggest that this is a techno-political 
framework and that because of the way the discussion on Bt brinjal was structured, the authority 
of the techno-political approach itself started to come into question. These debates, perhaps 
unexpectedly, began to open the contradictions of development up for a wider discussion, 
questioning, and re-imagination. I ask: to what extent did this process reframe development and 
its GR legacy? 
 In the third chapter I offer a reading of early agricultural development policy as a pre-history 
of the Green Revolution through the texts of U.S. Foundations in India. Reading the reports and 
notes around rural development policy, I excavate some of the significant aspects of these 
(forgotten) discussions and trace how their approach eventually came to manifest in what we 
know today as the “New Strategy” of the Green Revolution. Tracing through the discussions, I 
read the dominant narratives and themes that emerge—initially an obsession with changing the 
“mindset” of the peasant (via instilling “want”), which later merges into a more technocratic 
approach, marked by an abiding faith in technology as able to bring about the deep 
transformations in rural society that policy had long sought—but failed—to instigate. I indicate 
that this change (the policy evolution leading to the GR) was not simply a change to make 
agricultural development more effective. Rather what began as a project of rural development 
and the upliftment of millions of peasant agriculturalists morphed into a set of policies focused on 
the question of their production of food for others. As the question of development became 
increasingly confined, the question of the rural and the peasants themselves fell out; this broader 
concern was, in effect, largely abandoned by the American Foundations working in rural India. 
The rural poor were left along the wayside as development policy deemed—in the name of 
seeking progress and advancement—that it could not afford to be weighed down by a project of 
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uplifting such a tremendously large burden of the rural masses all at once. I trace the processes 
through which this played out: (i) the making of the “modern” subject, and (ii) the prioritization 
of increasing agriculture’s yields above all else within rural development projects. 
 The fourth chapter addresses the mainstream Green Revolution narrative—a narrative that 
through a technological intervention of HYV seeds, the GR allowed India to produce so much 
more food that India became food self-sufficient. The commonly accepted case is that the GR was 
a quantitative leap in production. I suggest that this narrative both reveals and conceals the work 
of the GR. My aim is not to tell a “truer” story, but to excavate the work that this one does. I 
demonstrate that this narrative was created to transform society. These transformations were a 
revolution in “how” (rather than how much)—it was a social revolution (a top down and trickle 
down revolution), not simply a quantitative yield revolution. That said, the focus on numbers and 
on yield was key—for it was the new technology that enabled this revolution to be written as 
“natural” and as simply following the path of “modernity.” This narrative does very important 
work, in both the US and India; it allowed the core of modernizing elites in the GOI to “own” the 
GR as their own. And it allowed the US to argue for opening markets and economic liberalization 
(their view was not interested in owning the GR, but rather in securing the dissemination of its 
ideology). These two schools of narrative share an underlying assumption; this was a project in 
subject making, and the subject was to be made through agriculture (per US modernization 
theory, not through the Indian approach to development up to that point). Importantly, it is also a 
narrative that allows for a convergence of interests; both sides needed a “success story,” but this 
story plays out/is told differently by each. Again, I do not suggest that one particular narrative is 
more “true” than another, but rather I examine the work they do and their continuing power: what 
is key is the creation of the subject of development and a singular path of development through 
this approach.  
 The fifth chapter takes up the theme of aid, and specifically, the logic and the leveraging 
power (i.e. terms) of aid as a development tool in India-US relations. The Green and Gene 
Revolutions operate under the rubric of aiding and improving hunger, food production, and 
development in India through implementing “modern” agricultural techniques and expanding 
markets. Examining this discourse and the project behind it, this chapter asks: what was the work 
of US agricultural development aid on shaping the path of agricultural development in India and 
the contours of today’s seemingly “paradoxical” realities? Through the lens of aid I explore how 
our contemporary approach to agricultural development and hunger came to be. By focusing on 
particular programs, specifically food aid and then agricultural development aid, I excavate how 
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the “problems” were cast, “solutions” were naturalized, and the ways that these particular 
understandings and their material structures continue to define our approaches.  
 In the sixth, and concluding, chapter, I suggest that the chapters taken together provide an 
account that is useful for diagnosing the naturalized history behind the situation we inhabit today. 
In today’s context the question at hand is not how to “feed the world,” rather the question is one 
of policy foreclosure. I suggest that attending to how the possibilities and alternative approaches 
that we already know can allow for all to be fed have been consistently foreclosed in the course of 
portraying the dominant approach as a success and as self-evident is important in order to reopen 
the discussion and possibilities around agricultural development and food for all. The question is 
not how to feed the world but how to enable more political possibilities and autonomy. 
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Chapter One  
The Paradox of Plenty 
 
India will be unable to consume or export enough wheat and rice to 
rein in a record stockpile after another bumper harvest, a failure that 
means crops risk rotting in fields instead of being sold on world 
markets to cash in on higher prices. -NDTV, 2013109 
A senior official at the Finance Ministry, for instance, assured me that 
“people do not have the capacity to absorb more food.” -Jean Dreze, 
2001110 
The problem of malnutrition is a matter of national shame. Despite 
impressive growth in our GDP, the level of under-nutrition in the 
country is unacceptably high. -Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, 2012 
111 
 
1|  Introduction  
In 2001 the Indian Government dumped millions of tons of surplus food-grain into the ocean. 
Before dumping the surplus—which had rotted in excess—the Government had tried several 
means of disposing of it. First, they had sold the food to Iran as animal feed; however, Iranian 
authorities deemed the food stocks unfit even for animal consumption, and returned the grain 
stocks to India. Then, with massive quantities of rotting surplus grain again on its hands, the 
Government offered some of this rotting surplus food stock to India’s poor in food-for-work 
schemes. The excess was dumped in the sea.112  
In 2012 the Government again faced a disturbingly similar situation: vast surpluses of rotting 
grain, far in excess of the “demand” for it.113 
The unconsumed food stocks are held to “ensure [the] food security of [the] nation.”114 And, 
by the numbers—with one-quarter of the global stocks of rice and of wheat to feed one-sixth of 
the world’s population, and with surplus state food stocks overflowing capacity at three to four 
times the recommended levels—it does not seem out of place to conclude that the nation’s “food 
security” has been ensured. Given the apparent challenges of surplus disposal, it is clear that 
India’s major problem is not a lack of food.  
The Tenth Five Year Plan explained the situation: 
The problem facing the country today is not one of a shortage of foodgrains but of 
managing the surplus. Ironically, even as the godowns of the FCI115 are 
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overflowing, stray cases of starvation deaths are still being reported. A civilized 
society in the 21st century cannot allow this to happen.116 
 
This “problem” which the Planners articulated a decade ago continues to be a defining hallmark 
of India’s food situation. Moreover, their framing of “the problem [as]… one… of managing the 
surplus” is itself significant—it defines and explicitly depoliticizes the larger context in which 
“the problem” is understood. As the Government references, the year 2001 was plagued not only 
by rotting surplus food, but also by starvation. In fact, the year 2001 marked the first time in over 
forty years that “starvation” was registered as an official cause of death in India.117, 118 India has 
had persistent problems with under-consumption and malnutrition, but clinical starvation had not 
been a registered cause of death in almost half a century.119 Something had changed.  
At the same time as millions of tons of food rot hunger rates in India today are higher than 
they have been at any time since Independence.120 Per-capita food consumption is the lowest in 
60 years, and the majority of the population (50% to 90%) is chronically food insecure and/or 
malnourished.121 India’s hunger and malnutrition levels are among the highest in the world. 
This “paradox of plenty”—as the widespread chronic hunger amidst massive food surpluses 
is politely dubbed—makes it evident that the nature of this “management problem” is the crux of 
the issue. The problem of “management” is itself a foundational question of “government”—i.e. 
of how to best manage the relation between things and people, in this case, between food and the 
population. While this task of government is an old one, the mechanisms of this management 
(mechanisms which in this case are clearly failing much of the population) have over recent 
decades been increasingly inserted and subsumed into the reigning logic of “economic growth” 
for handling.  
As scholars and activists have widely documented, the terrain of food access in India was 
radically redefined in the 1990s.122 Today’s situation is the result of the Indian government’s 
(neoliberal) policy reorientation of recent decades. These policy shifts have manifest most starkly 
on the most recent bodies, those of the youngest people. The rate of childhood malnutrition is 
regarded as a particularly revealing metric—for children’s nutritional reality is entirely unpadded 
by previous eras’ “food security” policies—India’s youngest children viscerally reflect the dire 
reality of today’s food policies. At nearly 50% of children under-three and under-five 
malnourished,123 India’s hunger and malnutrition rates124 are the world’s highest, twice that of 
Sub-Saharan Africa and almost five times the rate in neighboring China; only Pakistan and 
Bangladesh are comparable.125 The fact that India is offered as a development model—a 
showcase of success and booming economic growth rates—makes interrogating this “paradox” 
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all the more necessary.  
That hunger and malnutrition rates have, over the last two decades, shown a direct 
relationship with economic growth—not the prescribed and expected inverse relation—confounds 
traditional explanations.126 It also begs the question: is this “paradox” of hunger amidst plenty 
really an “irony” as the government claims? Or, is it a predictable, even banal, outcome of the 
ways that our global food system is produced and regulated? I contend that it is the latter. But, 
that poses a further question: in this context how are we to make sense of the persistent cries for a 
“second green revolution” to increase and modernize India’s food production? 
In this context marked by pervasive chronic hunger amidst record levels of “surplus” food, 
we are faced with a seemingly simple question: what is food security? What is it exactly that the 
nation’s food stocks are supposed to “secure”? As it is strikingly not the security of the population 
at large, nor their access to food, what work does food security for “the nation” perform in the 
abstract?  
1.1| Accounting for the paradox: explaining the situation away 
The Government, for its part, dismisses the question and explains the situation away, 
anecdotally terming it as an “irony,” and an unexpected problem—yet one that “a civilized 
society in the 21st century cannot allow.”127 The implication is that to be “civilized” in the 21st 
century is to be able to better “manage the surplus”—to not allow there to be hunger in a society 
which has such excess. That is, the management is again the key issue—not the management of 
the surplus food itself, but the management of the population in relation to the (surplus) food, to 
make sure they do not behave anachronistically by dying of hunger in the 21st century.  
The Government’s presumption is clearly enabled by and reliant upon conventional narratives 
of development and food security, which assume that with sufficient food supplies hunger and 
malnutrition will be alleviated.128 Our conventional development theories tell us that when the 
state expands the economic base, more people will have better nutrition and hunger will be 
ameliorated, or at least addressed. Our conventional political theories tell us that people are least 
likely to go hungry in a democracy where the government is stocked with sufficient food 
supplies. And our conventional economic theories tell us that with healthy economic growth, 
more and more people will have access to an expanding basket of higher quality goods. This is 
particularly supposed to be the case in a democratic “free-market” environment.  
The problem is that this is not what has happened.  
Our conventional development, political, and economic theories fall flat when confronted 
with the facts and trend lines they purport to explain. The fact that the most recent reports 
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document not simply stagnation, and not simply a raw numerical increase in hunger and 
malnutrition, but an inverse correlation between food security and economic growth (over the last 
decade of booming growth rates and record food surpluses) makes interrogating the work of these 
theories and their assumptions all the more pressing.129 For, while it is clear that the relationship 
between development, economic growth, nutrition and food security is not following the 
presumed trajectory, the presumption of economists and government agencies—in these claims 
and in broader global discussions of the issue—is that something within India is “deviant” and 
thus producing this unexpected outcome. This is to miss the question entirely, letting the problem 
remain unexamined. Instead, we should read what is happening in India in the larger context of 
global development policy, as the lessons are relevant everywhere.130 
1.2 |  Must examine the logic of economics 
In order to address the discrepancy between the assumed and the actual relationship between 
development, adequate food stocks, and food security, it is necessary to address the work that the 
prevailing powerful assumptions perform. It is not simply that our narratives have been incorrect, 
but that even when “erroneous,” these assumptions have served particular functions, and enabled 
specific development paths. The policy work which these narratives serve needs to be 
investigated. The progress narrative of economic development theory—which promises rising 
outcomes uplifting all—does the “heavy lifting” to justify this theory. The fact that this narrative 
is so naturalized that it is largely invisible makes it all the more powerful. The “work” of this 
narrative is to take a situation that in almost any context would be appalling, and to transform it 
into the rational, moral, and necessary response to deprivation and exclusion. To understand this 
structural violence we need to back up and interrogate the “economic logic” that is at work, and 
more specifically, the relation between this logic and exclusion. 
 It is necessary to examine the logic of “economics” and exclusion because the “paradox of 
hunger amidst plenty” is deeper than its visceral manifestation in the (estimated) ten-thousand-
plus daily hunger deaths that occur alongside the rotting grain surpluses.131 For, as inexcusable as 
the fact that almost nothing is being done to redress the situation, is the fact that that what little is 
being done is largely governed by the same logic that produced this situation. The glaring 
inadequacy of this approach is clear: over the very time period when hunger should (in “theory”) 
be rapidly diminishing, it has been increasing, in acuteness and spread. “Development” as we 
know it is not only failing at its most basic task: to uplift the poor and vulnerable. Even more 
significantly (within its sequentialist metaphor), it is operating to “reverse” the life possibilities of 
the very people who are offered little other than its promise. 
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1.3 | The Problematic  
The government acknowledges that food worth nearly Rs. 60,000 crore[132] is 
destroyed every year due to poor and insufficient storage facilities. This lost 
food is keeping millions of Indians hungry. To add insult to injury, the 
government spends about Rs. 2.6 crore of the tax payers’ money to get rid of 
food grain that has rotted during storage. … 
Mountains of grain, collected over years, are stored in the open in Punjab, 
Haryana and Uttar Pradesh, covered by plastic sheets. They get wet in the rain 
and rot. In Punjab, the rotting grain is enough to feed three lakh[133]people. 
When States appeal to the Centre to release the food stocks so that the poor 
have food, the government’s economists stop this, saying it would be bad 
economics. So the grain is allowed to rot, the people get hungrier, the youth in 
the hungry heartland get enraged and their anger gets seduced by the gun. 
India’s innards are exploding to the sound of grenades as the economists 
discuss inflationary pressures and the agriculture minister complains about 
poor storage facilities, as though it was someone else’s problem to fix.  -
Suman Sahai, 2010.134 
 India’s “food problem” is far more pervasive than the “stray cases of starvation” which the 
Five Year Plan references;135 average food consumption levels are among the lowest in the world, 
only half of what they are in neighboring China. But, as Sahai136 points out, while the nature of 
this problem of hunger amidst surplus food might appear obvious or simple to an outside observer 
(i.e. see to it that the surplus food reaches the hungry), in actual practice the controversy around 
reaching a “solution” is confounding.  
 The basic task of “managing the surplus”137—properly aligning surplus hunger and surplus 
food—seems to be slipping farther and farther away from the task of “governing.” As Sahai 
indicates, the main components in this effort to “manage the surplus” are Government agencies 
and the mandates of “economics.”  
 The functioning of Government agencies has been thoroughly addressed from many angles in 
insightful and expansive ways, by academics, journalists, NGOs, and the government itself.138 My 
aim is to bring the insights this scholarship offers on distribution policies and economic 
restructuring to bear to interrogate the latter aspect of this management equation: productionism 
and the logic of economics that operates behind, and has done the significant work of producing 
and sustaining, this apparent “paradox of plenty.” For, while it is clear that the current food 
situation in India calls into question the coherence of the accepted narratives of development and 
food security, and it is also the case that the reasons behind India’s “paradox of plenty” have been 
extensively documented and debated by economists and social scientists over the past decade;139 
much of this work has focused on distribution policies, particularly the significant restructuring of 
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India’s public food distribution system (PDS). However, there are also important questions and 
disjunctures in other aspects of the food system which escape this view, in particular the 
production side. Rather than dismissing the situation as simply an “irony,” it is critical to look 
deeper to understand the ways in which these contradictions manifest the constitutive logic of 
development.  
1.4 | Exclusion 
My larger argument maintains that at the core of the paradox of plenty is the disjuncture (of 
the feeders and the fed) that underwrites modern agriculture and its project of “feeding the 
world,” coupled with practices of exclusion. To understand the paradox of plenty it is necessary 
to attend to production policies. Further, to understand the transformations in production policies, 
it is necessary to return to the GR. For, the GR policies decoupled food production and 
distribution goals, and laid the groundwork for a new logic of production.  
To unpack the paradox of plenty, in this chapter I show that the biopolitical forms of 
deprivation (i.e. let die) that we associate with “homo sacer,” are in today’s world rooted in 
“political economy.” I indicate that to understand the horrific violence inflicted on a majority of 
the world’s population today, we must understand the normalized production of exclusion. We 
must interrogate the logic underlying the accepted deprivations of billions from the most basic 
rights and entitlements. This is not simply in the juridical mode that Agamben offers (although 
that understanding of the nature of exclusion offers helpful insights). Today there is a different 
dominant logic, a logic as powerful as, or even more powerful than, legal status: the logic of the 
“economy,” of “economic growth,” or “development.” The human lifecycle becomes the 
metonym for the nation as the unit of “economic” functioning and assessment. This 
territorialization of “the economy” is fundamentally biopolitical in powerful and commanding 
ways. This understanding mandates that we interrogate the relationship between “government” 
and the level of access to resources/deprivation (that is normally associated with “economic” 
status). 
I begin with the logic of “the economy”—a logic so thoroughly naturalized and taken for 
granted that it can seem odd to point it out. I supplement an understanding of the logic of the 
economy with insights on how exclusion operates. An entry point is Chatterjee’s conception of 
“population;” this is not a legal status, or lack of a legal status like homo sacer is. Rather, it is a 
concept used to understand the contradictions of simultaneous inclusion and exclusion; 
contradictions that manifest in a way that liberal political theory cannot account for. It is a 
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category for those who are fully “included” in the nation and “democracy,” but whose ability to 
call upon their government for even the most basic needs is essentially nonexistent. Akhil Gupta 
pushes this conceptualization further, suggesting that those relegated to this category of 
population—“the poor”—are essentially “let die” (in biopolitical terms). They are “killed off” 
without objection. But, theirs is not an anomalous state; theirs is a category that the majority in 
India, and the world, inhabit. Gupta examines this “paradox” of popular sovereignty and inclusion 
in terms of the role of the state and bureaucracy. While the state is absolutely fundamental, my 
concern is the governing logic by which the state’s policy mandate operates. This is the logic of 
economic growth, a developmental neoliberalism. I insist that we must interrogate that logic to 
understand to the realities of exclusion and deprivation of the majority of the world, amidst 
plenty. 
  In section two of this chapter, I attend to how the reigning “economic” logic functions to 
produce this exclusion and I review how questions of the exclusions of poverty have been 
addressed by some scholars. In section three, I briefly review the trajectory of food security 
policies internationally and in India. These policies have operated to produce fundamentally 
biopolitical forms of exclusion–deprivation of basic life necessities as if this deprivation were 
simply a “natural” phenomenon. In section four, I examine the logic of food security. While the 
term “food security” was produced by western/ “international” development institutions, its 
creation was deeply entwined with global processes of economic liberalization. These processes 
have since transformed the landscape of “food security” policies, the contradictions of which 
manifest today. However, to understand the dynamics underwriting today’s paradox of plenty, the 
evolution of food security policies is not sufficient. We must go further back, before the 
emergence of the term “food security,” to the Green Revolution and its precursors. The Green 
Revolution reworked people’s relationship with food (how food is “governed”) in fundamental 
ways that laid the groundwork for “food security” and the paradox of plenty.  
2 | The work and logic of “the economy” 
The conception of, and belief in, “the economy” is the defining logic of our time; it is also the 
metric by which a place’s relative status is assessed. A larger and more robust “economy” is what 
the project of development seeks to attain. An improved national economy is to allow more of its 
citizens a higher standard of living. As Timothy Mitchell explains, the legitimacy of governments 
of post-colonial states in the post-war development era has been indexed to their ability to “grow” 
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their economy. This conception rests on the premise that the economy is a natural and discrete 
object, one to be properly nurtured and tended. 
The idea that the economy was an object whose basic characteristic was to grow 
transformed political language in the postwar period in both the First World and 
the Third. … Urged on by the United States, postcolonial regimes took up the 
theme of economic growth to organize and represent their relationship to the 
populations they now governed. … All these innovations in the name of 
development took the economy as their object and helped establish it… as a self-
evident structure.140 
 
The economy and—the dominant metric of its “health”—economic growth, come to represent not 
just the legitimacy and effectiveness of governments. More, this logic comes to mediate 
interactions and relationships between people and their governments. Notably though, all 
segments of society do not benefit from, or engage equally with, the terms that come to define 
this form of government. That people are differently affected is not a mistake, or a deviant result, 
but rather a logical outcome of the way “the economy” functions as a mediating relationship. For, 
“the invention [of the economy] also required a process of exclusion.”141 At the level of 
individuals, the “economic” aspect of such exclusion most often manifests in poverty. 
2.1 | The development state, poverty, and the logics of exclusion  
 “Growing the economy” is the raison d’état and defining terrain of government, and in the 
developmental state in particular this growth is to uplift the life possibilities of the populace. In 
this context, Akhil Gupta142 considers poverty from a different angle. He asks why, after 60 years 
of a government whose legitimacy rests on uplifting the living conditions of the poor, so many of 
India’s citizens (by some measures—although not Gupta’s—the vast majority of the citizens143) 
continue to live in dire poverty and in acute deprivation of the most basic necessities (food, clean 
water, and shelter). Gupta is posing a fundamental question about contemporary poverty in India: 
how to understand the fact that a state whose central claim is to foster development has failed to 
help the large number of people who live in poverty. Further, how are we to understand how 
normalized this acute level of deprivation is: the fact that “the life-denying consequences of 
chronic poverty, far from receiving too much attention, have in fact largely disappeared from 
public discussion.”144 
 Gupta’s concern echoes a question Partha Chatterjee145 poses about governmentality and de 
facto exclusion in “most of the world.”146 Chatterjee indicates that the majority of the population 
in India can be seen as de facto denied (full) citizenship, exclusions which he credits to the 
limited resources of the state. To make sense of this he suggests that there is an effective 
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distinction between “citizens”—those bearing an ethical connotation of participation in the 
sovereignty of the state—and “population”—an instrumental, manipulable category to which 
most of the people in India and much of the world are relegated. Chatterjee explains:  
Most inhabitants of India are only tenuously, and even then ambiguously and 
contextually, rights-bearing citizens in the sense imagined by the constitution. 
They are not, therefore, proper members of civil society and are not regarded as 
such by the institutions of the state. But it is not as though they are outside the 
reach of the state or even excluded from the domain of politics. 147  
The state agencies recognize that these population groups do have some claim on 
the welfare programs of the government, but those claims could not be regarded as 
justiciable rights since the state did not have the means to deliver those benefits to 
the entire population of the country.148  
 
Chatterjee suggests that exclusion (e.g. from having basic needs met or from the social welfare 
programs of governmentality) is largely a matter of (the state claiming) resources are not 
available or deliverable to the majority of the people.  
 The “economic” logic of the dominant progressivist sequential account—one that tells the 
poor “not yet” (i.e. that their rights have to wait until the state has the means to deliver those 
benefits to the entire population of the country, and they are last in line)—is clearly challenged by 
the surplus food stocks rotting at taxpayer expense. Lack of resources cannot explain why people 
are excluded from access to the vast food surpluses (for example, even in the form of food-for-
work programs).149 Bureaucratic incompetence and/or corruption (other narratives often reverted 
to in popular accounts) also clearly cannot account for this “paradox.” While the logic of “the 
market,” the functioning of the contemporary food security regime, and the need to secure food’s 
exchange value are clearly driving forces, they alone do not explain this exclusion.150  
 In this case, where exclusion is not simply a matter of a lack of resources, I suggest that 
exclusion results from (state building) projects which (re)define how, and which, subjects have 
access to resources. To approach this, it is necessary to consider the production of the subject of 
development and the effacement of vast portions of the excluded “population” from this subject 
position. The construction of who the imagined subject of development is shapes not only who 
receives the basic resources of the governmental state, but also whose needs and/or poverty are 
effaced when the government declares the nation to be “food secure.” In short, whose “security” 
counts, or is (in)visible.151 
2.2 | The sequential logic of exclusion: “not yet” and “let die” 
 To indicate the naturalized acceptance of these exclusions, Gupta points to the radically 
different, even opposing, ways that governments respond to the deprivation of different subjects. 
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He offers that if there were a natural disaster in which millions were displaced from their homes, 
did not have access to basic food, clean water, etc, it would be considered a “dire national crisis 
requiring massive state intervention to aid in relief and rehabilitation.”152 However, when the 
tragedy that inflicts a similar level of acute deprivation upon large segments of the population is 
not a single discrete event, but rather results from the continued deprivations of poverty and 
exclusion, many development institutions and experts have a profoundly different response. In the 
case of the chronic deprivation of the poor, they instead: 
…suggest that the best thing the state can do to improve the conditions of the poor 
is to concentrate on facilitating the rapid growth of the economy so that the victims 
can at least find employment and help to better their lives. How would we react to 
such a solution [if proposed as the way to help victims of a natural disaster]? 
Would we not find such a state of affairs to be appalling and even outrageous?153 
 
Gupta dubs this “the scandal of the state”154—it could just as well be called the scandal of 
“development,” or even the scandal of “economics.” The dominant consensus (around the world, 
not just in India) is that the acute deprivations of poverty merit—even mandate—a fundamentally 
different form of intervention (far more austere and punitive) than other, more sudden, causes of 
deprivation merit. Most governments’ strategies of intervention assess not the extent of the 
deprivation, but rather the cause of deprivation as the indicator of the worthiness of the subject 
and the nature of the appropriate response. 
 In the punitive austerity that tells the poor “not yet,” the stagist view of historical progress155 
not only lives on, but is flourishing—presented as the most reasonable answer. The hypocrisy is 
all too clear in the protracted debates around the National Food Security Act (NFSA)—a plan156 
to make 25kgs of rice and wheat available per month to all “below the poverty line” (BPL) Indian 
families at a subsidized rate of 3Rs/kg.157 While food security advocates critique the scheme as 
woefully inadequate,158 others, brandishing their “economic” credentials, declare that it is “India” 
that cannot “afford” the scheme. Arguing that it will bankrupt the nation, they insist it is better to 
have the poor wait, and the food surpluses rot, a bit longer—at least until the current recession 
has passed and the “economy” can support them. The fact that this stagist logic of “not yet” 
persists—even for a scheme designed to help save taxpayer funds on disposal costs as much as to 
help the nutrition of the poor—indicates that this “economic” logic of “not yet” is not simply in 
search of the “cheapest” option. For that would be to let the poor access the food stocks, even if 
only to save the cost of dumping the food into the sea. Rather, the logic guiding this punitive 
austerity seeks to teach a lesson (an expensive lesson, at that) to the poor and hungry: while 
surplus food rots in excess and is dumped into the sea, the poor are told they must literally earn 
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the food. In a context where “the economy” does “not yet” provide them with a basic minimum of 
employment nor a basic level of affordable food, they must come up with their own means to earn 
sufficient money to procure the necessary food—or, they must wait, until the economy grows, 
until it has sufficient need for their labor.   
 By rendering this exclusion sequential (i.e. a condition to be remedied, just “not yet”), the 
logic implies that the production of poverty and exclusion is not constitutive of capitalist 
relations, or liberalism itself, but rather is a legacy of other pre-existing structures; and as such, 
that this exclusion is a condition which liberal capitalist development will resolve and correct. 
The logic which tells the poor as a class “not yet” renders exclusion from life-sustaining 
necessities into the promise of liberal(capital)ism rather than a reality that exposes its brutalities 
and contradictions. This self-presentation pivots on an assumption about the relationship between 
“the state” and “the market.” The logic of “the economy” rests on the perception of the state and 
the market as each offering a form of rationality, which together manifest in effective progress. 
 The question is framed as one of management. However, the forms that the exclusion of the 
poor takes, and the punitive terms on which their inclusion could be granted, also reflect a deeper 
Malthusian perspective—the “question” of who should be excluded, or what should be cut first 
when resources are “insufficient,” apparently does not even need to be posed. This naturalized 
Malthusianism, taken up by neoliberalism, masquerades as a humanitarianism yet to come, rather 
than a cold calculation of relative human “worth.” No official statistics are even kept on deaths 
from lack of food.  
 How does the defining “economic” logic of our times allow us to accept the death of the very 
poor from lack of access to surplus food without outrage, surprise, or even as worthy of note? 
What is it that allows the ostensibly sacred norms of preserving life to be suspended such that we 
accept that the poor are denied access to food—based solely on the criteria of purchasing 
power—while access to food is a right due even to common examples of homo sacer, e.g. 
prisoners?159 That is, if the right to access food is thoroughly established and recognized, what in 
the defining logic of “the economy” allows the very poor to be relegated outside this “sacred” 
social contract? How is it that this act of “letting die” is seen not as an act of profound 
violence,160 nor as a betrayal of the social code?  
 In large part it is because this is not seen as an “act” at all, but rather, is simply the 
institutionalized, or naturalized, course of policy.161 Agamben’s figure of homo sacer provides a 
framework for thinking about forms of exclusion, however, Gupta argues that Agamben’s thesis 
that the production of “bare life” is integrally tied to the “state of exception” does not hold up 
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when confronted with the forms of exclusion and the everyday violence of extreme poverty to 
which the majority of India’s citizens are confined.162 For even as they are actively involved in 
society, their exclusion continues; it is not juridical, but economic and sequential; “the poor are 
killed despite their inclusion in projects of national sovereignty and despite their centrality to 
democratic politics and state legitimacy.”163 After 60 years of countless development projects—
possibly more development schemes than in any other country, and with the poor actively 
involved (at least in the schemes Gupta has studied), and with well-meaning bureaucrats—Gupta 
asks why is there still so much deprivation? 
 The poor are slowly killed—in clinical terms, most often “let die” of afflictions related to 
hunger and acute chronic malnutrition—for a self-evident, even tautological, reason: they are 
(the) poor. 
 Appealing to Agamben’s “homo sacer”164—the figure whose death does not upset our 
accepted norms, laws, principles, or even our sense of “justice,” in short whose death is not seen 
as a violation—Gupta suggests that we recognize the extremely poor as homo sacer. Their denial 
of access to basic food and life’s other most basic necessary conditions constitutes a policy of 
intentionally “letting die.” Gupta argues that this practice of “letting die” should be seen not 
simply as an “exposing to death,” but instead as a “killing.” That Gupta’s argument might seem 
provocative, or even initially controversial, testifies to the solidified bio-political nature of 
poverty. 
 Recognizing that poverty is the crux of the issue of (bio)political exclusion is essential, but 
does not in itself explain the logic that continues and sustains policy choices. To interrogate the 
work of exclusion under the logic of “the economy,” and the promises of liberalism’s project of 
“development,” I address the workings of the concept of “food security” in the next section. In 
mainstream “food security” discourse there has been a clear acknowledgement that at the crux of 
the issue of addressing hunger is the necessity of addressing poverty and exclusion. However, that 
understanding leaves open the question of the nature of poverty and how it is to be addressed. 
3 | Food Security: hunger, poverty, and the (bio)politics of exclusion 
The world has ample food. The growth of global food production has been 
faster than the unprecedented population growth of the past forty years … 
Yet many poor countries and hundreds of millions of poor people do not 
share in this abundance. They suffer from a lack of food security caused 
mainly by a lack of purchasing power. -The World Bank, 1986165 
 
In a 1986 paper “Poverty and Hunger” the World Bank set out to redefine how developing 
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countries understand and approach policies for food security. The Bank’s paper featured the 
epigraph above on the cover. The logic they offer is often considered to be a “liberal” argument in 
response to agribusiness’ endless push for more food production, by instead making a case for 
attending to poverty as the core of the problem of deprivation and hunger.  
 In this paper, the World Bank takes the insight that hunger, deprivation, and exclusion are the 
result of poverty. From there they insert this understanding into the reigning logic of “economics” 
and conclude that food itself is not the issue. The issue is the exclusion of some (the “poor”) from 
proper market access. Laying out this vision, the Bank’s paper continues: “There is no one 
optimal solution to the problem of food security, any more than there is one solution to the 
problem of poverty.”166 Given this understanding, they offer a macro-level solution. Explaining 
that: “Problems of food security do not necessarily result from inadequate food supplies, as is 
widely believed, but from a lack of purchasing power on the part of nations and of households. 
Economic growth will ultimately provide most households with enough income to acquire enough 
food.”167 The answer the Bank prescribes is the panacea of “economic growth” (to uplift 
individuals and the nation as a whole) and the attendant “liberalization” of regulations to promote 
this growth. Their argument is that such deregulation will enable “the poor” to access the wealth-
generating potential of “the market.”  
 In the Bank’s paper we see the emergence of a new logic of how to address hunger—one 
which rises to the fore of global development policy. In this understanding, it is “the economy” 
and not the government or direct policy interventions that will address the problem. What is 
presented here is a resuscitation of some the oldest “solutions” to hunger and deprivation: Adam 
Smith’s non-interventionist platform joins in a triumvate with developmental liberalism’s 
renewed moral imperative of ending hunger, bolstered by the reigning logic of growing “the 
economy.” Together they tell the hungry: “not yet.”  
 In attending to the functioning of the dominant food security logic (as articulated largely by 
the World Bank policy mandates for “developing” countries) I indicate why viewing hunger as 
simply an issue of poverty is a profoundly inadequate response. Acknowledging that hunger is a 
result of poverty—while a necessary step—is insufficient. For it does not require addressing what 
has just been decreed the “real” question—i.e. what is poverty. Rather, it too often simply serves 
to put the question—now one of solving poverty—firmly into the dominant framework of 
“expertise;” that of development economics. As such, this argument can—and has served to—
enable reactionary “economic development” policies which further immiserate the poor in the 
name of combating poverty. As food security policy has become increasingly subsumed within 
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the realm of the economic—under the array of policy shifts referred to broadly as neoliberalism—
the implicit battle has been over how to understand and define the question of poverty and the 
appropriate response.  
3.1 | “Food Security,” developmental governance, and market logic  
 Now ubiquitous, the language of “food security” was produced by the western development 
community in the 1970s. The term is credited as having come out of an FAO-UN World Food 
Conference in 1974 during the last major global food crisis.168 Vestiges of the post-war “food 
regime”169 are evident in the 1974 definition of food security: it included the need for an 
implicitly state-run system to “ensure adequate availability of, and reasonable prices for, food at 
all times.”170 The language and thinking of the post-war era contextualized food security in terms 
of national development; the effective management of food was necessary to facilitate and ensure 
development goals.171 In this state-centric approach, “food security” pivoted on national 
governments’ capacity to ensure food for their population through intervening in markets and 
increasing production (and using food aid if necessary). While this logic dominated in the mid-
1970s, the concept of “food security” also introduced a marked shift in the role of food in relation 
to the state, the population, and other sectors of the economy. Initially, food security largely 
replaced the post-war era’s conception of the “right to food;” and in subsequent eras, with the rise 
of the logic of “the market” as the most “efficient” tool of government, there was a shift in how 
food security was understood and what policies should be pursued to attain it. In this shift, the 
policy mandates of international development institutions (namely, the World Bank) couple with 
the rise of a new economic development regime to produce a neoliberal logic of food production, 
distribution, and security.  
3.2 | “Fighting Poverty:” Shifting the terrain of “Food Security” 
 In the name of “fighting poverty,” the role and the duty of the state in development shifted. 
The state was to move away from acting as the agent, no longer to be responsible for designing 
polices that ensure people’s food security, by directly combating hunger, guaranteeing the 
availability of affordable food, and ensuring the “security” of its population against the 
international market and exposure to fluctuations in prices as in the 1974 definition of food 
security. Now, the state was to facilitate individuals’ unhindered engagement with this same 
international market—which came to be represented as ensuring individuals against the state’s 
“interference” and “distorting” inefficiencies.172 
 The 1980s conceptual move to macro-economic interventions that focused on the 
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retrenchment of the state introduced two dual shifts in the concept of “food security.” The first, a 
shift in food security’s scalar focus: “down-scale,” from the scale of the nation to the scale of the 
household and the individual, and simultaneously “up-scale” from the nation to the global scale 
as the site of “the market” (now the mechanism of food procurement and distribution). The 
second, paralleling the above scalar shifts, was a conceptual shift in how food security was to be 
pursued—a change to focus on combating poverty, not simply guaranteeing food. With this came 
a change in how combating poverty was conceptualized and justified; efficient private sector led 
“economic growth” was declared to be the panacea. This growth was to be pursued through both 
the “roll back” of distribution and food support policies and the concomitant “roll out” of a new 
regime of production policies. These two dual shifts were defined by policy moves away from 
inclusionary welfare interventions (slashing food supports and social safety nets) and instead 
towards promoting policies aiming to stimulate the economy to “grow,” manifest in policies 
focused on liberalizing agricultural markets and promoting export agriculture.173  
3.2.1 | “Fighting Poverty,” the rise of the individual’s food security 
 The theoretical justification for the scalar shift to the individual is generally credited to a shift 
in the understanding of hunger and policies to combat hunger which stemmed from the 
publication of Amartya Sen’s 1981 Poverty and Famines. Sen’s seminal text came to be taken up 
by international governmental institutions including the UN and the World Bank.174 Drawing on 
their interpretation of Sen, in 1986 the Bank (re)defined food security as “access by all people at 
all times to enough food for an active and healthy life.”175 While this remains the most widely 
accepted definition of food security,176 the definition is silent on how the cornerstone of the 
definition—the access—is to be attained and ensured.  
 The Bank’s rendering of Sen’s concepts has received substantial criticism for the 
simplification and instrumentalization of Sen’s argument. Sen’s argument on the necessity of 
attending to the scale of the individual in food security (i.e. not simply the household, but also 
intra-household relations), in the hands of the World Bank and the FAO, was reduced to a matter 
of the individual’s free and rational micro-economic decisions about a given commodity in a 
transparent and level “market.” Thus, rather than an expansion of food security to encompass the 
individual in the context of more responsive national policies, the discursive emphasis shifted to 
the individual, but without the attendant policy focus.  
 In their food security papers the Bank decreed that the site of policy intervention for 
governments was not actually to be the individual, or even the community. Rather, states were to 
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retract the “interventionist” and “distorting” food security policies—policies through which they 
had interacted with their population and attended to food security. Food distribution supports had 
been one of the major tentacles of state interaction with their populations;177 now, states—in their 
role as “managers” of food security—were to turn their focus outward, to the global market. 
While rhetoric narrowed in on individuals, the scale of operation and intervention instead 
expanded outward to an imagined “global economy.” This, it was claimed, was not only so that 
the individual consumer and producer could have greater access to better food and markets for 
their food, but also so that they could be lifted out of the trap of poverty by the rising tide of 
economic growth.178 While effectively abandoned by state policy in these prescriptive texts, the 
individual was not left alone—she was now rendered a consumer in the “global market,” and the 
state was given an attendant mandate: its role in ensuring her food security was to liberalize trade 
policies and promote exports. In the Bank’s rendering, Sen’s potentially groundbreaking insights 
were reduced to a fetishized, symbolic individual operating in a fetishized global economy with a 
monolithic universal panacea: economic growth. The core of Sen’s argument about policy 
interventions—creating a more effective means of cross-scaling and down-scaling governments 
to better attend to and aid individual food security—fell out and disappeared. 
3.2.2 | The sequential logic of food security and withdrawal of state “intervention” 
 Alongside the scalar shifts came conceptual shifts; at the time of this redefinition of food 
security, India had the most extensive food-distribution system in the world, a legacy of colonial 
efforts that had been greatly enhanced and strengthened after Independence.179 Once celebrated, 
this food distribution program now posed a problem in the view of the Bank. Food security 
needed to be transformed in the name of fighting poverty. 
 At the national scale, the new food security logic was articulated in policy efforts to increase 
national “competitiveness.” This was a lesson which had already been taken up by the GoI at a 
broader scale. The Eighth Plan (1992-7)180 emphasized liberalization, claiming that: “There is 
today a recognition that in many areas of activity, [that] development can be best ensured by 
freeing of unnecessary controls and withdrawing from State intervention.”181 The retreat of the 
state on several inter-related fronts (regulatory, trade, fiscal etc.) claimed to open up space for 
increased private sector activity. In order to allow ample room for the anticipated private sector 
growth, the Government’s approach was evolving: “From a highly centralised planning system 
we are gradually moving towards indicative planning.”182  
 Further, the World Bank instructed India that hunger, nutrition, and economic issues would 
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best be addressed if government efforts focused on “removing controls and distortions associated 
with the ‘food security’ complex.”183 For, the Bank had earlier articulated that such policies of 
subsidized food for the poor not only “distort” the market, but also, that these: 
… policies … waste economic resources and fail to reach the target groups. It is in 
that sense as much about what should not be done as about what should be done. 
Probably no nation can be 100 percent food secure. That is all the more reason why 
resources used in the name of food security should be used in cost-effective ways. 
Each country has to decide how much food security it wants and how many 
resources it can dedicate to that purpose.184 
 
In its review and assessment of India’s extensive food distribution network (the aim of which was 
to ensure all people had at least minimal access to basic food at an affordable price), the World 
Bank deemed the support system not only “distorting,” but more, that it actually hindered the 
ability of the poor and those in rural areas to access food—decreeing that a market system would 
bring them food more efficiently, reliably, and at far less cost.185  
 In exchange for development loans, the state was required to withdraw its support for 
individuals, households, and the agencies charged with the task of procurement and distribution 
of food grains. The Food Corporation of India (FCI) and its subsidiary the Public Distribution 
System (the PDS)186—even though only 0.3% of the GDP—were targeted for “efficiency” under 
liberalization policies.187 These food support systems were deemed to “hinder growth.” Attendant 
with the World Bank’s demands, India’s PDS (Public Distribution System) was slashed, or 
“targeted,”188 in 1992 and then was restructured again for the 1997 elections.189 Under the new 
“Targeted PDS” (the TPDS), the number of people the PDS reached was halved, food-prices 
doubled, grain consumption rates fell by 70% nationwide, and incidents of malnutrition, hunger, 
and starvation became increasingly widespread.190  
 The Bank’s claims that “each country has to decide how much food security it wants” and 
how much it can afford,191 is contradicted by its requirement that India dismantle its food security 
system. With this policy restructuring, the Bank effectively told India that its people had more 
food security than they should yet be able to afford. In practice, it was not up to “Each country… 
to decide.” Rather, it was apparently up to the Bank, operating on its grid of progress, to 
determine and enforce the appropriate level of food security in the sequential logic of the 
“economy.” As the austerity requirements made evident, India was “not yet” at the point on the 
Bank’s imagined timeline where its citizens should have its level of food security. This was an 
argument the Bank made via its “economic” assessment of the resources India was allocating to 
food support; these were deemed too high. The Public Distribution System (PDS), the Bank 
assessed, was allocated more resources than India should be “choosing” to afford. The Bank’s 
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stagist scheduling of economic development was, in effect, deployed to knock down the level of 
Indians’ food security to the point at which the Bank’s implicit chart indicated “the economy” 
and “food security” should converge—via cutting 60% of the people off the lists of those eligible 
for food support entitlements. The Bank’s insight that “Probably no nation can be 100 percent 
food secure,” was becoming increasingly manifest.  
 Transpiring here is a re-arrangement of relations of government and a renegotiation of the 
state’s relation with its populace through fundamental shifts in how its basic responsibilities are to 
be managed.192 In the face of the increasingly dire nutritional realities associated with global 
“competitiveness,” the FAO reassured governments around the world to stay the course, that now 
“food security is as much about individual strategies for survival and wellbeing as about national 
programmes and public investments in food production and income generation.”193  
3.2.3 | Food Security as a “private relation” within circuits of exchange  
Phillip McMichael suggests that these shifts effectively transformed food security into a 
“private relation.”194 Extending this further, in Foucault’s195 conceptualization of “security” as the 
practice of managing risk, or negative tendencies, at the level of the population at large, 
“security” is about managing a specific population within particular territorial bounds,196 but, 
more than that, “security therefore involves organizing, or anyway, allowing the development of 
ever-wider circuits.”197 This form of “security” becomes increasingly about “inserting the 
population into expanding circuits of exchange.”198 Security is presented as achieved via, and is 
also increasingly conflated with, exchange and market forces.199 Exchange relations come to 
mediate and replace previous forms of relations; thus, the ostensible need to preemptively 
“withdraw state support”—in the name of efficiency and cost-effectiveness. 
 The World Bank’s statement that “no nation can be 100 percent food secure… resources used 
in the name of food security should be used in cost-effective ways,”200 was not made only to (in 
effect) decree that the lives of those supported by the PDS were not “worth the cost.” It was not 
simply a scaling back of welfare and resources while retaining the logic of the development state. 
Rather, the manifestation of this new approach to food “security”—which plunged millions into 
hunger and even starvation—follows a logic fundamentally different than that of the (post-war 
era) developmental state.  
 In the new food security project, the stated expectation and the goal is not to end scarcity or 
want. Rather, it is to reallocate scarcity and want: away from the “competitive” sectors and onto 
the sector(s) deemed superfluous. The results of slashed support networks make the (bio)politics 
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of this economic regime viscerally evident. As food security comes to take on the form of a 
“private relation,” it increasingly manifests in a governing logic where “doing away with scarcity 
is precisely what is not required. Instead, [the proper management of] scarcity, understood as 
managing the death of multiplicity [i.e. the sectors Chatterjee calls “population”] is crucial for the 
administration of the population.”201 The category “population, and not people, is to be thought as 
coterminous with the securing of exchange as a substitute for ties among people.”202In the context 
of the results of the “targeted PDS,” Chatterjee’s characterization of the poor in India as 
“population“ takes on a deathly cast. This management of death, or “necropolitics,” is not simply 
the result of cutbacks, but the transformation of crucial aspects of governing.  
 The paradoxical form of governing that emerges—marked by democratic “inclusion and 
unspeakable violence; [where] forms of belonging coexist with the production of bare life,”203 
reveals a governing logic where “despite their inclusion in the national community and the 
development state, their poverty does not constitute a scandal, and their death does not provoke 
national soul-searching.”204 Rather, the logic of “the economy” provides a ready answer.  
3.2.4 | The invisible hand that feeds, and starves: the Bank on not taking responsibility  
 The defining logic of “economics” and the visceral biopolitical realities of exclusion play out 
in increasingly contradictory ways in the World Bank’s (re)articulation of the idea of “food 
security.” The Bank’s early papers on FS seemed to remind themselves as much as their reader 
that: “The alleviation of poverty and hunger are, after all, the primary purposes of economic 
development.”205 Thus, when forced to acknowledge (to a limited degree) the unsettling effects 
produced by the expansion of the logic of “competition” as the most efficient means of governing 
all sectors, the Bank again reiterated that, “Hunger is the most extreme manifestation of poverty 
and arguably the most morally unacceptable.”206 Reflecting on the realities its policies had 
produced, the Bank honed in on one major effect which it found to be the most unsettling to the 
project of development: the “paradox” of plenty. They assess: 
Particularly disturbing is the recent dynamics of world hunger. During the first half 
of the 1990s the number of undernourished people decreased by 37 million, but 
over the next 5 years it increased by more than 18 million. ... In India, after a 
decline of 20 million between 1990–1992 and 1995–1997, the number of 
undernourished climbed by 19 million over the following four years.207 
 
But while “disturbed” by the “dynamics” of this “paradox,” the World Bank did not implicate 
their 1997 food security policy reforms in this “particularly disturbing” reversal nor did they take 
any responsibility for the policy direction that produced the about-turn in the life possibilities of 
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millions of people. Rather, the Bank maintained that the number of hungry people was all the 
more evidence why the Bank’s appropriate policies must not only be continued, but expanded. 
For, the Bank did not suggest a logic behind these “disturbing” dynamics, or advocate any 
changes that might imply that this was not a “worthy” and “cost-effective” sacrifice (i.e. that the 
poor are not homo sacer). Instead, in the Bank’s sequential logic, India’s booming economy 
indicates overall success, with the need for a bit of tweaking; as such, millions in hunger (and the 
hundreds of thousands of deaths) are reduced to a regrettable (and perhaps avoidable) price to be 
paid on the path to development. Surely, such robust development will conquer “the most morally 
unacceptable” “manifestation of poverty”—hunger.208 The Bank’s limited scope of concern with 
this “particularly disturbing” “improper sequence” of events is a largely predictable result of 
pursuing developmental goals within the liberal economic logic of “not yet.”  
 As security becomes increasingly defined as exchange relations, Montag reveals that in these 
relations, the logic at work is “no longer discussing individual lives…but the life of a 
population.”209 Conceptually extending the work of the poor as homo sacer (as offered by Gupta), 
Montag takes the logic of exclusion to its next step; in the operation of the (bio)political exclusion 
of “not yet,” “the market… must necessarily, at certain precise moments, ‘let die’.”210 This, he 
deems to be a “necro-economics.”211 
3.2.5 | Competitiveness as the metric of production  
 The realignment of the state’s focus away from directly addressing the needs of the 
population to fostering and aiding private sector activity received substantial promotion in the 
Ninth Five Year Plan (1997-2002). Emphasizing increasing privatization in the name of increased 
efficiency, and mobilizing the rhetoric of scarcity, the Ninth Plan claimed that the “discipline of 
competition” will “ensure rapid growth at least cost.” The Planners explicate: 
One of the strengths of our economy is that we have a strong and vibrant private 
sector ... Our development strategy must be oriented to enabling our broad based 
and varied private sector to reach its full potential for raising production, creating 
jobs and raising income levels in society. A vigorous private sector, operating under 
the discipline of competition and free markets, will encourage efficient use of scarce 
resources and ensure rapid growth at least cost. Our policies must therefore create 
an environment which encourages this outcome.212 
 
Reflecting the ascendant authority of “competition” as the proper logic by which to structure not 
just production decisions, but also social and policy decisions, the aim was to make the national 
economy globally competitive, and within this, to make relevant sectors and individuals 
competitive. Attendant with this logic, the state’s mandate for small farmers, who were not 
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competitive in a global context, had been restructured.213 “There is thus a renewed focus on 
agricultural development, which pivots on the salience of industrial agriculture (as a supply 
source) in addressing food security.”214 That is, it is not the small farmers’ “food security” which 
needs to be ensured via intervention, nor their “poverty” which needs to be combated by 
withdrawing interventions. Rather, the state must seek to help them by making the agricultural 
sector more “competitive;” the Bank offered solutions designed to ensure this: “to help 
developing countries improve their food security, the international community should: Intensify 
efforts to accelerate growth, through adjustment assistance, policy reform, and productive 
investment.”215  
 That is, before global trade could start to bring the poor in poor nations upward mobility, 
developing countries had to institute structural “adjustment” policies, ostensibly to make their 
agricultural sectors able to be appropriately “competitive.” While the poor are told “not yet,” and 
to wait for the inevitable upward movement of the economy, at the same time, “if one compares 
the complacency towards endemic poverty [and chronic hunger] with the impatience displayed 
toward impediments to growth and accumulation, the disparity is striking.”216 The key here is that 
even as the poor are being told “not yet,” this move to “competitiveness” is justified via the need 
to address their poverty.  
3.2.6 | Beyond the distribution question: the logic of food security as export production 
 The conceptual and policy shifts regulating food distribution were just the first steps in 
changing the development approach. With the goal of achieving the requisite economic growth 
for food security, the World Bank’s policy logic further restructured relations of government to 
food producers. Global restructuring of production regimes accompanied the cutting of state 
subsidized food aid. Policies that could be construed as supporting domestic agricultural 
producers, needed to change. There was mounting pressure to maintain a strong national 
agricultural sector,217 but within the new (neoliberal) development logic, this required being 
globally “competitive.”218 This conceptual shift was advocated not just by the Bank and 
development institutions, but across transnational regulations. The effects of these conceptual 
shifts were consolidated with the subsequent  
shift[s] in the ‘site’ of food security from the nation-state to the world market 
[which] was engineered during the Uruguay Round (1986-1994), anticipating the 
WTO’s Agreement on Agriculture (1995). Under this agreement, states no longer 
have the right to food self-sufficiency as a national strategy.219  
 
Developing nations were no longer were in the “right” if they set policies and engaged in efforts 
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to influence the production side of food security. Instead, the obligation of states is to create 
“through correct policies, an environment which encourages investment leading to food 
security.”220 This was based on the premise that, as the FAO explained: 
food security research ‘has highlighted the strong positive interactions between 
cash-crop and food-crop activities and innovative methods for resolving many of 
the constraints facing small-holders’. In other words, commercial farming in 
general is the appropriate strategy to increase productivity and thereby reduce 
poverty.221 
 
To increase commercial farming, developing nations needed to implement policy changes to 
attract and encourage investment. As private capital was unlikely to invest in staple grains for 
domestic consumption, in order to attract this capital it was necessary to switch to specialty 
crops—specifically, crops for export. The staple grains were to be imported. As President 
Reagan’s Secretary of Agriculture, John Block, explained: “The idea that developing countries 
should feed themselves is an anachronism from a bygone era. They could better ensure their food 
security by relying on U.S. agricultural products, which are available in most cases at lower 
cost.”222 It became the duty of the state to become more “competitive” in the global arena and 
thus enable “rural development driven by new export agriculture initiatives.”223 This was to be 
pursued through policies encouraging the production of “high value,” or specialty (i.e. “tropical”) 
crops for the global “market,” rather than the staple crops emphasized in the 1960s.224 Export of 
these crops was ostensibly to provide the financial means to finally conquer poverty and attain 
food security.225  
 Instructing India how to escape poverty and hunger in this context, the Bank explained why 
its farmers needed to move away from producing staple food crops. The Bank reasoned they had 
a cost greater than just the financial subsidies; they were harming India’s global competitiveness:  
The underlying principle of the proposed policy towards maintaining self-
sufficiency that also ties farmers to low-value rice and wheat production will 
come at the cost of efficiency. The continued large public sector role envisioned 
in foodgrain markets will crowd out private sector participation…[as it means] 
the government will continue to determine farm prices rather than the market.226 
 
Not only did growing staple food crops keep Indian farmers poor, but the government’s crop 
price supports and food subsidies for the poor distorted food prices, produced inefficiencies in 
distribution, and wasted scarce resources.227 In the context of the disproportionately agrarian 
nature of poverty and hunger, the Bank’s way out of this cycle was for poor farmers to produce 
high-value cash crops—crops they could sell to raise their income, not simply to eat. 
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 The focus of public investment on fostering export initiatives reifies and deepens the 
fundamental disjuncture and contradiction underlying the project of “feeding the world.”228 For, 
in the name of “competitiveness,” this production regime has come to be structured “around a 
politically constructed division of agricultural labour between [highly subsidized] Northern staple 
grains traded for Southern high-value products (meats, fruits and vegetables).”229 The push 
toward “competitiveness” has shifted which crops are to be grown, but there have been wider 
effects as well. Despite the promises of increased “efficiency,” as India shifted to “high value” 
crops,230 agricultural imports have increased at a far greater rate than exports.231 These shifts 
produced other changes on the ground—as an FAO study on agricultural sectors across sixteen 
nations in the global south documents: the result of these policies was “the displacement of at 
least 20–30 million rural people.”232 Uncompetitive and thus displaced, these once-cultivators 
were pushed by dynamics defined as “accumulation by encroachment.”233  
 The World Bank’s explanation that the production of staple grains is not “efficient”—“rice 
and wheat production will come at the cost of efficiency”234—is an assessment that begs the 
question: “Efficient” for whom? Who does the Bank envision as the implicit beneficiary of a 
restructured agricultural sector? Their writings dodge these questions with appeals to very real 
poverty and the panacea of “the global economy,” But this invocation, and the policies it enables, 
serves to enable the increasingly powerful stance of global agribusiness. As the chairman of 
Cargill articulated, justifying the vastly uneven WTO regulations on the agricultural sectors of 
nations of the North and South:  
There is a mistaken belief that the greatest agricultural need in the developing 
world is to develop the capacity to grow food for local consumption. This is 
misguided. Countries should produce what they produce best—and trade.235 
 
Beyond the “conversion of food into an export business [which] has been a central consequence 
of structural adjustment policies over the past three decades,”236 the scenario is further skewed, as 
the global terrain of subsidies, structural supports, and prices is highly uneven: “the World Trade 
Organization…rules (regarding agro-exporting) preserve farm subsidies for the Northern powers 
alone, while Southern states have been forced to reduce agricultural protections and import staple, 
and export high-value, foods.”237 In this context, the “comparative advantage” that is to serve as 
the determining criteria of what to grow is entirely a legislated advantage. It lies not in natural 
factors determining what can be grown, or even the level of farm efficiency, but rather in the 
hands of those writing the policies. It is highly skewed rules operating under the name of “the 
market” that are used to determine who should grow what and, in effect, who shall have “food 
security,” and who shall go hungry.  
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3.3 | Assessing: restructuring food security, logics of redistribution and production  
 The shift to “efficiency” and “global competitiveness” and the earlier scalar shift (to a focus 
on the individual in a global market) coupled to produce a “problem” that came to be called “the 
paradox of plenty” (i.e. the disconnection between surplus food and hungry people). The effect of 
the restructuring of production policies did not follow the trajectory that the World Bank had 
promised.  
 The shift to emphasize “competitiveness” and fostering the “discipline of competition,”238 
included cuts in the PDS (Public Distribution System). This left vast food surpluses at the FCI 
(Food Corporation of India)239—which were disposed of in the sea.240 After slashing eligibility 
for food aid to include only the very poorest—to realign development supports with neoliberal 
economic policy—at the end of the Ninth Plan, the Government was spending more on the 
storage of the “surplus” food alone than it spent on all of its agricultural and rural development 
programs, irrigation, and flood control programs put together.241 Just the storage of foodgrain 
stocks (even before disposal costs) required more of the “scarce resources” than the government 
had spent subsidizing and distributing these food stocks prior to economic liberalization.242 In the 
name of “efficient use of scarce resources” and the “discipline of competition,”243 the government 
incurred significant new costs while hunger and malnutrition skyrocketed.  
 This reality indicates that the overall “cost” of the food procurement and support policies is 
not assessed according to the metric of “efficiency” given as the World Bank’s initial 
justification244 for, and laudatory response to, the cuts in the PDS. Instead, “food security” has 
been reshaped to have little to do with actual food supplies.  
Rather than addressing the supply of food, “food security” evolved into a project of managing the 
population. In this management project, scarcity is reallocated, moved to segments of the 
population not “competitive” enough, and whose access to food does not “encourage efficient use 
of scarce resources and ensure rapid growth at least cost.”245 Through the shifts in “food 
security,” access to food was rescinded from the vast segments of society that were, in the logic 
of the Bank, not the “cost-effective” members (consumers or producers) necessary for a globally 
competitive economy and agricultural sector.  
 The widespread deprivation resulting from these policies was of course what the Bank 
claimed that competitiveness for growth was to fix. The poor were to be lifted up by the 
unfettered market to be able to afford their food. Instead, the application of the market as the 
mechanism governing distribution of food failed, unraveling its underlying logic. This unraveling 
reveals a different biopolitical logic: “the hidden assumption of the market’s rationality and 
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equilibrium in the notion of population itself, as that which contains within it a mechanism of 
scarcity by which individuals may not only be allowed to die, but to be pushed over into 
death.”246 As Montag, reading Adam Smith explains, the results reveal that: 
…the rigour of the market as a mechanism that adjusts the proportion of labourers 
to the fund available for wages by liberally distributing malnutrition to the social 
ranks whose numbers exceed their ability to obtain subsistence, thereby 
“destroying a great part of the children” without any agent “intending or knowing 
it,” [a process which] must be supplemented by direct human agency.247  
 
This direct intervention, which allowed the “market” to push the poor over the edge of hunger, 
even into death, is initiated under policies taking the title of “food security.” That should elicit 
pause—but it is not inherently a “paradox.”248  
Campbell explains that this 
 Instead of being a puzzling paradox, this situation, is precisely what we could expect; 
Campbell’s reading of Foucault maintains that such an outcome is presumed by “the guarantee of 
competition, which is what ‘govern the market’ means.”249 This criteria “presumes that some are 
not competitive and hence will not be ‘governed’.”250 The market’s promise of “not yet” may be 
invoked, but the outcomes clearly indict the institutional claims that food security is simply yet to 
come. For, in the logic of “not yet,” the “non-competitive” sectors of the population are “surplus” 
to the “economy’s” need for their labor. Adam Smith notes this; and Montag demonstrates that 
exclusion is necessarily human directed. It is, in short, a societal choice that the poor are “let die” 
because they—not the food stocks—are the surplus: surplus to the new “competitive” economy’s 
need for their contributions.  
 The understanding that it is human labor which is in excess, not food, presents a different 
picture of the “paradox.” It is not simply about the increasing prevalence of “hunger amidst 
plenty,”251 rather: 
The paradox of this food regime is that at the same time as it represents global 
integration as the condition for food security, it immiserates populations, including 
its own labour force. The perverse consequence of global market integration is the 
export of deprivation, as ‘free’ markets exclude and/or starve populations 
dispossessed through their implementation. In turn, dispossessed populations 
function as reserve labour.252 
 
It is because the labor of vast segments of the poor has been rendered superfluous by and to “the 
market” that food security had “not yet” been scheduled to arrive. Because the segments of the 
population where malnutrition and food insecurity are the most prevalent work in agriculture,253 it 
is clear that the root of the “paradox of plenty” extends beyond a question of the distribution 
system. It is the deprivation in this segment of the population—a result of their status as 
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“surplus”—which has been used to propel the reigning logic of the need to increase their 
“competitiveness.” 
3.4 | The staying power of the productionist paradigm for “Feeding the World” 
  It is in this context of the “paradox of plenty” that cries resound for a new Green 
Revolution, to revitalize Indian agriculture to ensure food security for the nation. The most 
obvious problem with this demand is evident: the nation as a whole is food secure. However, 
despite this reality, it is this productionist “solution” which remains the touchstone. It has 
developed a staying power that confounds logic—but also is harnessed to justify an array of 
projects, in the name of the helping the hungry—who are most often the agrarian poor. The 
“simple mantra “increase production” effaces a range of structural issues including production-
side problems of drastically uneven subsidies, support, and trade relations, as well as distribution 
side issues of slashed support and welfare nets and inadequate distribution mechanisms. The logic 
that should indict the policies is instead used to justify them.  
 The “production side” logic, which has created and deepened inequality in the name of 
feeding the world, plays out in the ways described above. First, vast disparities in structural 
support for production (e.g. global north staple crop subsidies), justified by recourse to the need 
to “feed the world,” have become naturalized and effaced. This naturalization enables the core of 
the contemporary global denomination of responsibility—as manifest in the project of 
development as well as in the current food regime—to remain unexamined. The underlying 
division is so thoroughly sedimented that even most critical scholarship proceeds via presuming, 
not challenging, the deep separations. Second, projects which expand and consolidate these 
divisions (e.g. accumulation by dispossession) continue operating in the name of “food 
security”—still the most common articulation of agricultural development policy, even while its 
regulations are exclusion-producing. Coupled with the austerity of the “targeted” distribution 
regime, the exclusion-producing nature of the dominant production regime has become 
particularly acute. While this has led to the reluctant recognition of the “paradox of plenty,” the 
recognition has not led to a re-examination of its causes. 
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Chapter Two  
The Gateway Vegetable:  
Bt brinjal and the Question of Development 
 
Biotechnology has enormous potential, and in due course of time 
we must make use of genetic engineering technologies to 
increase the productivity of our agriculture. But there are 
controversies. There are NGOs, often funded from the United 
States and the Scandinavian countries, which are not fully 
appreciative of the development challenges that our country 
faces. But we are a democracy, we are not like China. 
-Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, 2012254 
1 |  Introduction  
 
Every housewife knows the brinjal. And she knows what it is to 
cut into one only to find that it is entirely destroyed on the inside 
by a pest. When she takes the Bt brinjal she sees the difference, 
every time. It is clear in front of her eyes, and very appealing—
why would she not seek this out?   
-P. Balasubramanian (Professor, Department of Plant Molecular 
Biology and Biotechnology, Tamil Nadu Agricultural University, 
Coimbatore), 2011.255 
 
Example of a promotional image demonstrating  
regular brinjal (left) next to unblemished Bt brinjal (right) 
  
(NDTV February 09, 2010a) 
 
 On Wednesday October 14, 2009 India’s Genetic Engineering Approval256 Committee 
(GEAC) gave its approval for the release of India’s first genetically modified (GM) food crop: 
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Bt brinjal.257 Bt brinjal, an eggplant that had been genetically engineered with bacillus 
thuringiensis (Bt) was billed as “the world’s first genetically modified vegetable” (for direct 
human consumption).258 Bt brinjal was to secure India’s status as a center of “cutting edge” 
biotech research—it promised to boost India to the forefront of the emerging, and much hyped, 
agricultural biotechnology revolution.  
 Furthermore, Bt brinjal seemed to exemplify the model that proponents of “biotech for 
development,” or “biotechnology for the poor,”259 advocated: brinjal, or eggplant, is a cash crop 
grown largely by small and marginal farmers, and is regarded as an inexpensive “everyday 
vegetable,” it is the third most consumed vegetable in India, after tomato and potato.260 The Bt 
brinjal project—developed through an India-US international public-private-partnership 
(PPP)261—claimed to renew long-neglected agricultural development efforts and to offer a model 
for future projects. The partnership included the engineering of both propriety and open 
pollinated varieties. The technology’s pest resistant qualities promised to boost small and 
marginal vegetable farmers out of subsistence poverty,262 increasing their income to ensure their 
own food security, all while pleasing urbanites through the visible guarantee of un-blemished 
produce263 and the ostensible “sustainable development” status conferred by the technology’s 
promise of a reduced pesticide load.264 To advocates, Bt brinjal was “it:” a compelling and useful 
example of a familiar food engineered to meet society’s multiple needs: economic, 
environmental, food quality and production enhancing.  
 On the following day, Thursday October 15, 2009, India’s Minster of Environment and 
Forests,265 Jairam Ramesh, held a national press conference. He announced the Government was 
putting the release of Bt brinjal on hold.266 Then, Ramesh’s Ministry of Environment and Forests 
(MoEF) did something unprecedented. Following procedure as prescribed by internationally 
agreed upon global ag-biotech agreements,267 the MoEF held public hearings on the question of 
Bt brinjal.  
 Less than four months later, on February 9, 2010, Minster Ramesh would announce268 what 
came to be a highly anticipated and extensively covered decision: an indefinite moratorium on 
the specific genetic event in Mahyco’s Bt brinjal technology.269  
 Despite the laundry list of attributes, its status as a textbook example of “biotech for the 
poor,” (i.e. a crop made for uplifting small farmers and promoting development through 
improving harvests), and the committed salesmanship of a number of India’s top research 
scientists and Ministers, this eggplant will not be cultivated in India. Given all of the apparent 
benefits, its advocates genuinely puzzled as to how and “why should anyone, least of all the 
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environmental activist, have an issue with this technology?”270 
There was much speculation on what reversed the path to release of this ostensibly ideal 
biotech crop. But, more significant than the question of the moratorium is: what insight can we 
gain from the process of consideration? Bt brinjal became one of the most discussed and debated 
vegetables in modern history—it spent months in the national headlines, the Government 
received over nine-thousand written submissions about it from across India and the world, and 
over six-thousand people attended (just the “official”) public hearings on the vegetable (another 
two-thousand protested outside the hearings). The significance of these debates is not confined 
to GM crops or agriculture, but has lasting repercussions for development and policy making in 
all arenas. 
While the Bt brinjal technology was seemingly “perfect” on its own terms, the debate 
around it expanded the terms on which both the technology and its justifying rationale—India’s 
agricultural development and food security needs and problems—could and should be assessed. 
This process and the heated debate over an eggplant offer an unusual window into a society-
wide discussion about food security and agrarian development, how these fit within agricultural 
and development policies today, and their integral relation to imaginaries of democracy and 
modernity. 
The discussions of Bt brinjal, and even the process of open consideration around it, may 
seem contained to and/or inconsequential outside of quarters concerned with GM crops, 
however, I suggest the discussion process had a significant impact on broader questions of 
development and democratic decision making. An understanding of this discussion process is 
important to considerations of the politics of development, technocracy, and democracy far 
beyond the realm of agriculture. Technocracy—whether in the realm of economic policy, 
technology, development, or beyond—is framed in the literature as essentially rendering social 
choices self-evident and uncontestable by putting them outside the realm of politics. In the case 
of Bt brinjal, this technocratic positioning itself was taken-on and this façade was cracked. The 
debate that came to manifest could be summarized as turning on questions of the ongoing 
agrarian crisis in much of rural India—grappling with questions of who is the subject, or 
beneficiary, of agricultural development policy, of whose voice counts, who gets to decide 
society’s collective scientific and development futures, and on what grounds their claims are 
assessed. 
1.1 | The framing of Bt brinjal 
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If the controversy a “mere eggplant” could cause was not yet apparent it quickly became so. 
Defying the confines of its proponents, Bt brinjal exceeded the bounds within which it had 
initially been relegated: a routine decision of crop approval, a dry technicality of national policy 
regulation. Instead, Bt brinjal came to be internationally regarded as a precedent setting issue of 
significant consequence. Agricultural biotechnology (or GM crops) can often incite an array of 
hyperbolic claims, and this was particularly the case with Mahyco’s Bt brinjal. For, it was seen 
as a “gateway vegetable” promising, or threatening, to open the floodgates to new policy 
futures.271  
Bt brinjal’s advocates “maintained that ... there is a regulatory path for GM crops which 
aims to establish safety and efficacy over an accepted period and it has been diligently followed 
by Bt brinjal on the basis of which the Genetic Engineering Approval Committee (GEAC) has 
given its positive verdict.”272 They argued “thirty [of the] best scientists have cleared it…Bt 
Brinjal is absolutely safe for all mammals.”273 Raising the stakes and terms of debate, they 
invoked larger societal concerns on their side, promising that “not only is ‘it is safe for all 
humans. … adopting this technology will help thousands of farmers’.”274 As Bt brinjal’s 
potential release came to be increasingly debated, Bt Brinjal’s advocates responded by 
characterizing questioning as conspiratorial, arguing “if threats and allegations reverse this 
verdict, it will be a regulatory failing.”275 Elevating the significance of the debate, Bt brinjal was 
seen as precedent setting—it is the first of fifty-plus biotech crops slated to be coming up for 
approval—all of which are purportedly necessary for food security. Bt brinjal was to lay the 
groundwork for this policy trajectory. Its advocates continued to remind the public that 
“scientists … said that the ambitious Food Security Bill will require procurement of over 65 
million tonnes of food grain annually and that biotechnology will help meet the need.”276  
While the advocates attempted to write Bt brinjal’s process of approval as simply a routine 
matter of well-established policy,  albeit one setting an important precedent, Bt brinjal emerged 
at the forefront of ongoing debates around GM crops and their role in development and food 
security in ways quite different than how its advocates sought to frame the technology. Rather 
than the cutting-edge technology that was to demonstrate India’s innovative application of 
modern science for development, Bt brinjal became muddled with risk in the form of uncertainty 
about its safety, and came to be laced with the specter of renewed foreign domination of India’s 
agricultural sector, through the technology’s intellectual property rights. Instead of the object 
that would embody and demonstrate India’s R&D prowess, Bt brinjal came to be framed in civil 
society as a “technology Trojan Horse”—with a dual mission of using a common and 
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inexpensive “everyday vegetable” to allow US-based agribusiness MNC Monsanto (which owns 
the patent on Bt technology and owns 50% of Mahyco, the company that developed Bt Brinjal) 
to gain control over the livelihoods of millions of small and marginal farmers and to accustom 
Indian consumers for the fifty-plus GM crops in the research and development pipeline—
eventually enabling Monsanto to “colonize India’s food chain.”277 The possible approval of Bt 
brinjal was argued to be the latest battle for independence and sovereignty,278 waged with a 
“gene gun to our head.”279  
While critics characterized Bt brinjal as a savvy symbol disguising the threat of neo-
colonialism, advocates countered that the debate was “hijacked to unsubstantiated emotional 
levels,”280 making it “impossible to have a sensible discussion on GM crops.”281 The advocates 
argued that if a technology as thoroughly documented as Bt brinjal was not approved, then what 
India would be showing the world was not its practical ingenuity nor its vast R&D potential, but 
rather demonstrating that the largest democratic nation was simply another developing country 
ruled by “mobocracy,” unable to address even its most basic problems “rationally” or with 
“common sense.” They “called for a non-political and unemotional decision.”282 The advocates 
charged that not approving Bt brinjal would constitute a policy precedent derailing the nation’s 
long established and well-respected path to modernity and development based in the sensible use 
of appropriate science and technology, and that to do so would put the nation’s food security at 
dire risk—how could India hope to feed the growing population without harnessing the power of 
modern technology.  
1.2 | Technology and technocracy: confining and defining the discussion 
 These visions are reliant on different imaginaries of how today’s situation has come to be 
and what needs to be done about it. Key to all of these accounts is how the broader social, 
economic, and (geo)political arguments came to manifest through this technology: Bt brinjal as 
an object allowed a space for an array of broader concerns to come to the fore. These debates 
can be read as simply about an eggplant, a technology, but I suggest that we read them as a 
“revealing” of how the technocratic framework has functioned and made its world. To function, 
the technocratic approach defines not only its object, but, as became clear in the debates around 
Bt brinjal, also writes the world according to its criteria. Central to this project is promising 
particular kinds of futures.  
 The concerns, or the charges levied in the debates, often had little or nothing to do with the 
object of Bt brinjal in itself. Rather, Bt brinjal provided an opening in which issues that the 
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dominant technocratic framework had largely written out of legitimate discussion now could be 
voiced. The technocratic framework assembles its own understandings of society’s problems and 
means of managing them, or governing; its power rests in its ability to “write” the “world” 
according to its logic. In Chapter One I indicated that the concept of “the economy” creates 
categories and conceptual structures through which our understanding of society is channeled; to 
function, it must make a “world” according to its logic. Likewise, in this chapter I trace ways 
technology also functions as a governing formation that writes its “world”: confining the world 
into multiple isolated parts, and defining how they fit together to make a functioning whole. In 
this framework, any and all problems can be broken down into component parts, the hindering 
factors identified, and the problem solved—by improving the functioning of the relevant aspect 
of the technology. Thus, in the dominant technocratic framework, technology functions as the 
arbiter of truth and its terms form the terrain on which concerns can be voiced.  
 The discussion of this engineered eggplant and its regulatory process offer important insight 
into understandings and imaginaries of development, science, and the roles of technology 
therein. Reading the debates around Bt brinjal in India symptomatically can unveil aspects of the 
“world” that the power we endow technology with has built. Likewise, it can reveal competing 
visions of what development should look like.283 In particular, claims about Bt brinjal offer a 
lens that can reveal how its “world”—of technocratic (agricultural) development (and food 
security) policies—is constituted. This lens revealed two main manifestations. First, a discussion 
of much broader issues—issues of social and agrarian distress, poverty, economic development, 
and broader contours of food security and agriculture policy—took place, funneled through the 
discussion of this technology. Arguments both for and against Bt brinjal relied on invocations of 
larger social problems. Hence, while the “technocratic” terms of evaluation—which reduce 
everything to discrete components, and address the problems society faces through incremental 
improvements to these components—were to provide the larger context in which the broader 
social issues were to be understood, the discussion opened further, creating significant cracks in 
this framework. Second, the process through which the debate transpired—including soliciting 
commentary and holding public hearings was itself outside of the traditional path; as such, this 
process allowed consideration of  the way “technology” functions to write the world.  
1.2.1 | Technology: an object as an argument 
 Discussing the vision of technology in the Green Revolution, historian Nicholas Cullather 
emphasizes “technology … is a type of rhetoric, an argument in the form of an object.”284 
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Drawing on this definition, I suggest that reading Bt brinjal as an object mediating, and 
manifesting, a larger argument offers new insight into debates about development and the roles 
of technocracy therein. These debates also open up the GR’s legacy. The argument Bt brinjal 
embodied was, and is, about the future direction of development and agricultural policy in India, 
including how social policies and science policy should be set, and to whom they should be 
responsible. To unpack the debates over the possible futures requires understanding how they 
stake claims, particularly the representations of the past they invoke and rely on, and how these 
understandings are mobilized for their vision of the future. An understanding of technology as 
“an argument in the form of an object”285 can offer insight into the ways that technology must 
constantly write and re-write its world. As technology writes “worlds,” it also offers a lens into 
the constitution of these worlds—it offers to “unveil” them. Considering Bt brinjal as an 
argument in the form of an object, it is an object through which a world can be staged—an 
object through which a significant debate comes to be funneled. 
1.2.2 | Questions 
 The debates played out primarily around the question of food security and the politics of 
scientific expertise. My central concern is the degree to which the debate process opened up the 
imaginary of development and its Green Revolution legacy. This entails two sub-questions. 
First, what futures, or imaginaries, did competing visions mobilize? Second, what is at stake in 
the competing imaginaries mobilized in the heated debates around GM crops, particularly in 
relation to their salient and most divisive claim of being the remedy for the country’s critical 
food security situation? The first of these two sub-questions is addressed in sections two and 
three the second question in section four of this chapter. 
1.3 |  Imagined development futures 
 I suggest that we can understand the visions of development futures as reflecting two 
imaginaries, broadly conceived. The first: a technopolitical imaginary, in which modernity itself 
is development and the widespread use of “modern technology” has a cardinal role in achieving 
this state.286 The second: a pluralist democratic imaginary with a more autonomous and locally 
sustainable vision as integral to development and modernity.287 Unsurprisingly, these often come 
into conflict. Both traditions have deep and extensive roots in debates about and imaginaries of 
development in India, as has been written on at length.288 Further, both of the imaginaries are 
deeply entwined with the legacy of agriculture and agricultural modernization in India (e.g. 
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debates over the Green Revolution).  
 In the debates over Bt brinjal, those operating within the first imaginary adopted many of the 
standard claims of GM advocates: characterizing biotechnology as an extension of “age old” 
human practices of plant breeding and the next step in agricultural modernization; these claims 
formed the background for more specific imaginaries around India’s modernity and 
development. The second imaginary represented a more diverse array of alternative perspectives 
and visions of future paths, which received increased attention in the debates.289 While the 
perspectives within the second broad imaginary were not in consensus regarding the necessity or 
potential of GM food crops for India in general, there was agreement about the necessity of open 
discussion and a responsive model of decision-making in the case of Bt brinjal.  
 The two broad perspectives diagnosed the central problem with Bt brinjal from 
fundamentally different standpoints. On the one hand, the former maintained that the Bt brinjal 
decision should have been a routine matter of incremental technocratic progress. As such, the 
only appropriate question was: is it safe? On the other hand, the latter held the view that the 
technology could potentially have negative consequences which need to be taken into account, 
and more, that Bt brinjal is irrelevant to the issues its advocates are promising it will solve, and 
further, that its approval process was an unconsidered rubber-stamping—in part because the 
existing regulatory framework was not capable of addressing the social and ecological context 
which must be taken into consideration in any policy decision.  
 These imaginaries emerged and played out most clearly in two themes (1) the question of 
food security, and (2) the politics of scientific expertise.  
2 | Contextualizing the claims: food security and the Green Revolution legacy of 
agricultural science 
 
 Although Bt brinjal’s advocates insist that the terrain of evaluation and assessment must stay 
“strictly within the terms of scientific risk assessment,” the promises and justifications for Bt 
brinjal exceed the framework of bench science: they promise that Bt brinjal will solve existing 
social problems. Such promises are hallmarks of the hegemonic framework of technocracy. But, 
within their framework, the very social, developmental, and political grounds that they invoke as 
evidence of the need for the technology are not allowed to be considered in the assessment of 
whether or not to adopt the technology. This contradiction laid the framework for the challenge 
to their argument in the form of an object.  
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 The developmental promises of Bt brinjal are also clouded by the facts of the problems 
invoked. In India today there are massive food surpluses. Millions of tons of grain rot in the 
open as surpluses exceed the Government’s recommended levels and its storage facilities by 
three to four-fold.290 The recurring problem of surplus grain disposal makes India’s much more 
significant problem puzzling: India has one of the highest rates of malnutrition and chronic 
hunger in the world today.291 In this time of surplus, the rates of hunger and malnutrition have 
actually increased rather than decreased,292 childhood malnutrition293 rates have become among 
the highest in the world294 and the general population’s food absorption and nutrition are lower 
than at any point since Great Depression levels pre-Independence.295 The conventional 
assumption underlying the argument for Bt brinjal for food security—that with sufficient food 
supplies hunger and malnutrition will be eliminated or at least ameliorated—clearly has not held 
true. This recent decoupling of food security and development raises fundamental questions 
about the nature of development and who reaps development’s purportedly universal benefits. 
This deeply alarming situation is not beyond the stakes of the Bt brinjal debate. Rather, it 
elevates the stakes of that biotech for development debate, grounding it in a very real and urgent 
need, and also raising the question of the role of GM crops in this decoupling. 
 The last time that India faced such serious food and hunger concerns was after 
Independence, before the Green Revolution (GR). Today’s problems are ones that India’s Green 
Revolution ostensibly eradicated (with its application of modern technology to agriculture—in 
the form of HYVs, mechanization, irrigation, and chemical inputs such as fertilizers, pesticides, 
etc.). Credited with securing India’s food independence, the GR is invested with an exalted 
status in the popular and nationalist imaginations.296 This definitional status extends far beyond 
the historical; the GR continues to set the terrain on which considerations of agricultural 
development take place.297 Its technology-driven approach comprises the scaffolding for 
agricultural education and institutional culture.298  
 Hence, while the food security claims for an eggplant in particular may seem preposterous, 
“food security” has been a hotwire for many decades and is always summoned as the backdrop 
in discussions of agriculture. And, the way to ensure national food security is thoroughly 
established in “common sense:” through large-scale technological improvements in agricultural 
crop technology.  
 The main framework through which food security, and specifically its relationship to 
development, is viewed in India today is through the need for a “second Green Revolution.”299 
But, as the debates over Bt brinjal indicate, there is a battle to define what this Second Green 
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Revolution should look like and who should inherit the authorizing mantle of the Green 
Revolution’s expertise.300.301 Biotechnology advocates are quick to claim this exalted mantle as 
their natural history, articulating ownership of this emergent “second Green Revolution” as the 
“Gene Revolution.” Their claim for the promise of biotechnology is the dominant form in which 
the GR’s legacy is defined today. This perspective has adopted the standard rhetoric of GM 
crops, claims: there are a billion hungry people that need food and hence all options must be on 
the table, especially the most “modern” of these options: the genetic engineering of food crops. 
The view of GM crops as offering a “Second GR”—one in which the problems of the first GR 
are addressed and solved—is based on the premise that by mastering technology, social 
problems will also be solved. In this view, it is the technology itself that is the issue of concern, 
not the (inevitable) problems plaguing society which render it necessary—for these problems 
will disappear with the appropriate technology. In this worldview, technology acts as an agent 
with capacities that exceed the human: while humans are bound by society and political 
constraints, technology is outside of such constraints and yet can enact changes to humans’ 
social and political constraints.302 The power of technology lies in the fact that it is beyond such 
constraints—enabling it to act as a mere dictator. This imaginary is fundamentally one of 
technocratic expertise, wherein technology steps in to resolve systemic societal problems by 
circumventing them.  
  In reciting a development story which explicitly links the GR to GM crops as the answer to 
the re-emergence of hunger as a national problem, Bt brinjal’s advocates claim to continue the 
legacy of the GR approach of agricultural modernization as food security: using the most 
modern technology and scientific expertise to revolutionize agriculture and to overcome larger 
socio-political problems. The portrayal of agricultural-biotechnology as the natural extension of 
the GR—upgraded, safer, and more environmentally responsible—seeks to define the terrain for 
the debate, even to preclude the need for debate. The “science” that they mobilize serves their 
definition of “expertise,” declaring for example that what is at stake is simply that “Researchers 
wish to improve crops and increase their productivity”303—as “the Indian Council of 
Agricultural Research's (ICAR) Deputy Director General (Crop Science) Swapan Datta said 
[while explaining] that anti-GM protestors do not seem to understand science and that 
genetically-modified crops are an extension of modern science.”304 And as the executive director 
of ABLE-Ag (Association of Biotech Led Enterprises) Shanthu Shantharam characterizes: “The 
anti-GM lobby is fully conscious of the fact that they will lose each and every time best 
scientific principles are used to regulate GM crops, and they just don’t want that. They want a 
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“political” body that can be manipulated by decibel power.”305 
2.1 | How Technology writes its World: Producing expertise 
 We can read what is on debate through the lens of “expertise,” specifically technocratic 
expertise. By definition, “[t]he deployment of expertise requires, and encourages, the making of 
worlds that it can master.”306 In the Green Revolution the object to be made was a form of 
agricultural technology for development and national food security. The world to be mastered 
was a new (inter)national food economy.307 For example, in a 1965 report, Agricultural 
Development: Problems and Perspectives, after expounding on the seemingly endless problems 
of Indian agriculture, India’s Ministry of Agriculture explicates that what is necessary for 
“economic development in general and agricultural development in particular … [including the] 
transformation of traditional agriculture is …[a] strong injection of modern technology and 
scientific technique on a massive scale.”308  
 The role of technology in this imaginary and the development projects that it has enacted is 
“not simply politics by another name; [rather] they [have] produced systems whose design 
features mattered fundamentally to their success and shaped the ways in which those systems 
acted upon the world.”309 It is this “act[ing] upon the world,”310 or the productive power of 
technology (e.g. as manifest in what I call the GR’s “afterlives”) that enables agricultural 
technology to function as an argument as it did in Bt brinjal.  
 In the case of the agricultural technologies of the Green Revolution, a new form of “techno-
politics” (i.e. “the strategic practice of designing or using technology to enact political goals”311) 
was explicitly labored over in centers of global power312 and systematically deployed as an 
integral component of US foreign policy in many parts of the Third World.313 In this techno-
political project, the political goals were explicit: increase agricultural production without the 
upheavals of revolution or significant land reform;314 agricultural technology was seen as the 
ideal technology to accomplish this task.315 The technologies of the GR were meant to address 
social and political issues by circumventing them in order to solve them. They were not simply 
to side-step socio-political issues. Rather, the explicit effort to go around (rather than through) 
social problems is characterized, quite plainly, as one that is so effective because it is one that 
can actually be implemented (i.e. it is “realistic” or “pragmatic”—unlike many grander schemes 
calling for significant political-economic change or peasant awareness as a precondition). The 
prescribed small steps of technological (and technocratic) intervention were to be injected in 
multiple sites simultaneously in an effort to achieve the “necessary” or desired transformation, 
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and do so without the risk or messiness of questioning or disrupting existing social structures.316 
The technologies of the GR created agricultural “modernization” in this image. But the GR was 
also much more; it was a structure of belief—faith in technology as savior. As Gail Omvedt 
characterized it: 
The Green Revolution did not simply mean the use of technology applied to 
agriculture: it meant the belief that technologies could be developed at large 
foundation-sponsored centers and spread on a massive scale and be adopted by 
Asian and African peasants without any basic change in the agrarian class 
relations.317 
 
The technocratic framework is defined by its approach—breaking all problems down into 
quantifiable object parts to be conquered via a particular set of expertise developed for each part. 
As such it is not bound to any particular technology, but rather bound to the view that 
technology can conquer all problems. 
2.1.1 | How Technology writes its World: Updating its expertise 
 The second GR (or Gene Revolution) invokes the earlier GR claims, updating the context for 
today: namely, emphasizing a self-declared greater environmental awareness and an increased 
emphasis on expanding technology to small and marginal farmers (groups that were previously 
bypassed). These changes in how technology is marketed are accompanied by significant 
changes in the “driver’s seat:” MNC agribusiness corporations instead of foundations as the 
centers producing most of the new seeds/technologies. In this framework, the new ag-
biotechnologies are to solve similar societal problems of poverty and to promote development, 
but also are supposed to fix the environmental destruction wrought by the first GR.318 Thus, 
while updated, the same basic technocratic logic of the GR is deployed again. For instance, A. S. 
Kolaskar (Former Vice Chancellor, University of Pune and Former Advisor, National 
Knowledge Commission) represents the taken-for-granted reasons that there is a direct causality 
between increased use of modern technology and increased yields and increasingly prosperous 
farmers:  
Indian agriculture productivity per hectare is one of the lowest [in the world today], 
which makes our farmers poorest in the world. There is therefore a need to use 
modern technology in agriculture. These technologies should be such that their 
utilization must increase the productivity but with least damage to the environment 
and soil as well at a least input cost. Biotechnology has the potential to improve 
agricultural productivity providing all the benefits mentioned above. … I therefore 
suggest that without waiting for the approval of other developed countries, we 
should believe on [sic] our scientific data and its analysis and become at least in 
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this area the first country to commercialize the production of Bt Brinjal and help 
the farmers.319  
 
In this context of promoting development—based on the reasoning that farmers are so poor 
because productivity is low due to the lack of modern technology—coupled with a new-found 
concern for longer-term ecological impacts, advocates repeatedly make claims that GM crops 
are the only reasonable hope for the future. Hence, the commonly repeated claim that this Bt 
eggplant—genetically engineered to poison its predators—is “practically organic” (or, in the 
sympathetic reading of their claims, as close as “pragmatically” possible to organic 
agriculture320).  
 As Sen makes clear, the advocates seek to position themselves on the same side of the 
environmental imaginary as that to which they are tautologically opposed,321 a positioning which 
reveals the contradictory position of the technocratic imaginary—an imaginary which seeks to 
simultaneously invoke and expel larger social, political, environmental and developmental 
claims. Thus, the claims that Bt brinjal will help the agrarian poor, the urban middle-class, and 
the environment all the while ensuring food security, but that it should be assessed and discussed 
only on its “scientific” merits, not on its selling point—the social impacts. For example, as 
Soumitra Sen (Professor, Advanced Lab for Plant Genetic Engineering, Indian Institute of 
Technology, Kharagpur) articulated: 
First, there is an erroneous belief that GM crops confer a benefit only to the 
producer, not to the consumer. The farming communities are themselves a 
significant part of the rural consumer base, and there is not enough attention paid to 
how their productivity and their living standards will be enhanced by these 
techniques. Indeed, even the urban consumer stands to benefit from these [GM 
crops] techniques by way of lower prices, a greater shelf life of the foodstuffs, as 
well as the possibility of consuming organically grown food [sic]. … 
I conclude by saying that the GM technology is one of the most potent tools in 
fulfilling the goals of sustainable agriculture and in organic [sic] farming of food 
crops. Once the acute necessity and benefits of biotechnology and in particular 
genetic engineering for the long-term benefits of Indian agriculture is understood, 
the public's fears will be significantly reduced. As a scientist dealing with such 
issues, I fervently hope a public consensus about the topic will emerge based 
entirely on scientific facts and reasons, and not swayed by ill-informed fears.322 
 
The advocates do not question the promise and desirability of what their critics and opponents put 
forth as an alternative—a more sustainable, environmentally benign, locally supportive and pro-
poor agricultural system. Instead, they incorporate these promises, staking ownership claims for 
biotechnology on the desired future. The subtext is clear—integrated pest management, organic 
agriculture, and other “alternatives” to conventional agriculture are not necessary (or not 
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practical). GM technology will reach the same goal, more effectively and more efficiently. 
Indeed, as Nally explains, reading the OECD: 
…corporate agri-business lays claim to being a central player in the ‘war on 
hunger,’ predicting a future of increased yields, reduced biotic and abiotic 
threats, and engineered crops that target micro-nutritional deficiencies in 
vulnerable communities. In short, changes at the molecular level are seen to be 
the principal route to agrarian reform.323 
 
The focus is on a future; the technology is simply a means of attaining that future.  
2.2 | Unpacking the imaginary of technopolitical expertise 
The Bt brinjal debates were funneled into longer-running concerns about the nation’s 
agriculture and imagined futures, and the technocratic imaginary drew heavily on the Green 
Revolution narrative of agricultural technology, which deploys the urgency of a temporal and 
moral imperative. These claims deploy a theoretical perspective that writes a certain “time” and 
the “time” they write is the urgent now, in order to mobilize a dual imperative of national 
security and ending hunger. In constructing “time” in this way, this approach seeks to write 
“politics” and write what is and is not possible. How the story is written is foundational to the 
success of this project—hence the heated struggles over defining Bt brinjal’s place in the GR’s 
legacy. 
2.2.1 | Promising Doom, Narrating modernity  
As it is mobilized today in the imaginary of GM crops, the GR as the techno-political cure is 
defined by two aspects: first, a prediction of doom (with its attendant technocratic solution); and, 
second, the narrative form that structures this tale of doom averted. 
Doom is said to have been imminent.324 As C. Subramaniam explained at the inauguration of 
the National Commission on Agriculture325: 
Let me recall here the events leading to the adoption of the New Strategy for 
Agricultural Development in India in the year 1965. Population increased at a 
rapid rate, agricultural production failed to catch up, imports of goodgrain [sic] 
had to be stepped up and the target of self-sufficiency in foodgrains seemed 
elusive. Then came the crisis of 1965 and 1966 as a consequence of one of the 
severest droughts of the century. Steep falls in foodgrains production, scarcity 
conditions over large parts of the country, and rising prices led to wide distress. It 
was even predicted by some foreign observers that at least one million starvation 
deaths would take place in Bihar alone. The prophets of doom were proved 
wrong. … This was facilitated greatly by the availability of high yielding exotic 
strains of wheat and paddy.326  
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Indeed, India was heavily dependent on the US. This was a situation was not popular in the US. 
For instance, as the neo-Malthusian American bureaucrats, William and Paul Paddock,327 opined 
India was in a category where “to send food to them is to throw sand into the ocean.”328 The 
view they put forth in their bestselling book Famine, 1975! America’s Decision: Who Will 
Survive? deploys an imaginary of doom and urgency, a specter underwritten by Malthus’ 
canonical theory of population and food—in which the subject of history is the elite. It is the 
elite who must decide whether to let the poor die or to give them charity (and hence continue to 
live, at least temporarily).  
 The Paddocks take this logic a step further; updating Malthusianism to the geopolitical 
context of the 1960s, they assign to the US the role of arbiter in the impeding “triage”329 of 
nations. Explaining: 
President Johnson has proposed ‘that the United States lead the world in a war 
against hunger.’ On the battlefields of this forthcoming war the practice of triage 
will be vital because choices must be made as to which wounded countries will 
receive our food. The leadership in Washington comprises the medical staff. The 
stricken ones in need of medical attention (American food aid) are the hungry 
nations.330 
 
In this technocratic doomsday fantasy, the US will be the responsible party—the humane arbiter 
to decide which nations’ populations live and which starve and perish. The determining criteria 
they use (despite their claims of being based in “medical humaneness”) are a combination of how 
slim a nation’s “chances” are, and to what extent the nation actively complies with US 
(inter)national interests. Hence, they decree that Pakistan—a US ally, and the country which 
sought out Norman Borlaug’s new HYV seeds before India or any others—“should receive 
food.”331 On the other hand, they assess that “If we cut off food to India we are not losing a 
reliable friend. Nor do we gain an enemy able to do us serious hurt.”332 That is, India—which was 
receiving 25% of the total US wheat crop333—fell into the “can’t be saved” group and should 
receive no US food or any other forms of aid. The arbiter and subject in this “humane” allocation 
of scarcity (and life and death itself) is the white liberal bureaucratic official in a developed 
nation (a thinly disguised version of the authors themselves334), the time is now. And now. And 
now. It is a constantly updating “now,” for a constantly renewing threat. The timelessness of the 
specter of Malthusian doom is matched only by its ever-present urgency. Thus is the motor 
behind the renewed claims of a world without hunger. 
 The answer to this situation and the way out for India is recited as only through the eager 
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adoption and dedicated use of the new agricultural technology of high-yielding variety seeds. In 
fact, Subramaniam and other Indian officials insist that “India was the first nation to conceive 
and introduce this [High Yielding Varieties] Programme as an organized developmental335 
project designed to accelerate agricultural production.”336 In the imaginary of the GR as 
deployed here, the way India was able to escape the predestined clutches of doom, or sacrificial 
triage, was only through its foresight to adopt the newest agricultural technology for 
development. This imaginary—in which technology itself constitutes and brings development—
is powerful and defines the way that the GR was sold and continues to be retold and resold 
today.  
This narrative is today part of a global imaginary of development and the role of technology 
therein. Across the board, GR narratives characterize the use of technology as itself constituting 
an agricultural development policy. They credit the decision to use HYV “technology” as the bulk 
of the policy change; it was the technology that was the treatment for a dire situation of 
impending poverty and starvation. For instance, as Cullather explains, describing a NYT article 
on the Green Revolution:  
Benigno Aquino [the Philippine’s Prime Minister] showed an American reporter 
what the Green Revolution meant to the Philippines in the fall of 1966. “Here is the 
bullock cart. Here is the nineteenth century,” he said. Then, pointing across the 
road to a paddy of stubby, dark shoots planted in orderly rows, “here is the jumbo 
jet! The twentieth century.”337 Over the next ten years, Green Revolutionaries took 
credit for saving the world from a Malthusian catastrophe. India, Pakistan, the 
Philippines,338 Malaysia, and Indonesia declared self-sufficiency in food, and 
agricultural technology received praise for reversing the economic fortunes of one 
of the world’s poorest regions.339 
 
This imaginary in which HYV “technology” was not only the treatment, but the savior of the poor 
across Asia, remains deeply sedimented in agricultural policy and the popular and bureaucratic 
imaginaries. As the “Resolution setting up the National Commission on Agriculture” explicated 
several years after this drought and its attendant promises of doom: “Rapid improvement in 
agriculture is possible through advances in research and technological innovations, larger 
utilization of inputs and reduction in dependence on the vagaries on the weather.”340 In this 
narrative it is “nature’s” inadequacies and unpredictable patterns that were the problem, rather 
than the political-economic structures (e.g. those that discouraged local production, such as the 
cheap availability of US food aid making local grain production not remunerative). Given the 
construction of the problems, technology would enable them to be permanently resolved. As 
Frankel explains, the new technology was cast as that which would finally “liberate the fortunes 
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of Indian agriculture from the vagaries of the monsoon.”341 Likewise, Ramachandra Guha 
characterizes the period immediately after the GR as marked by “a feeling that endemic scarcity 
was a thing of the past. Modern science was laying to rest the ghost of Malthus. … ‘there is a 
coherence to the economic picture, for the first time an absence of feeling that the economy 
rested almost wholly on the simple success or failure of the monsoon’. The food problem was 
solved.”342 Nature—be it droughts or a pest such as the fruit and shoot borer (FSB)—could now 
be managed just like any other system of objects. This management of nature via management of 
technology was to produce a state of modernity and the capacity for self-sufficiency—a sentiment 
which GM advocates actively evoke today.  
 This sentiment, as Guha describes it, takes its success from a sleight of hand—one which 
renders impending doom (i.e. starvation) as the counterfactual. Rather than being simply the 
vengeful fantasy of a few bureaucrats, triage and mass starvation become a “reality,” a set 
national fate altered by the use of technology, a doom narrowly averted. As M.S. Swaminathan’s 
characterization – “[w]e proved them all wrong, all those prophets of doom… It’s quite likely 
that a billion people have been saved in India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh”343 – indicates, the un-
questionability of this tale as the counterfactual cements the powerful role of technology and its 
moral appeal to this day.  
 The second structuring aspect, narrative form, functions by telling of the escape from doom, 
offering logic that produces “common sense” through how it constructs the narrative. The 
dominant story of India’s GR is told in the context of mass starvation: doom, triage, stability 
disrupted, and governments at risk from the hunger of the masses. This, we are told, is what 
ushered in the GR. This narrative, with a neo-Malthusian inspired vigor, focuses on one 
moment: a now, the immediacy of which takes moral precedence over everything else, and 
serves to (re)define how these situations came to be. It makes sense only through the way it 
constructs causality, time, agency, its counterfactual, and the question of history.  
2.2.2 | Doom, urgency, and the imperative of genetic engineering  
 These understandings continue to play out today, as prestigious voices from the halls of 
academia and policy circles invoke the GR. Summoning the “success” of the Green Revolution, 
agricultural technology is cast as modernity itself and as the route to ending hunger—an argument 
encapsulated in the form of an object. This imaginary continues into the present; technology and 
Malthusian imaginaries continue to be interlaced, each providing evidence as to the need for, and 
the success of, the other.344 As GR pioneer Norman Borlaug appeals: 
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We cannot turn back the clock on agriculture and only use methods that were 
developed to feed a much smaller population. It took some 10,000 years to 
expand food production to the current level of about 5 billion tons per year. By 
2025, we will have to nearly double current production again. This increase 
cannot be accomplished unless farmers across the world have access to current 
high-yielding crop production methods as well as new biotechnological 
breakthroughs that can increase the yields, dependability, and nutritional quality 
of our basic food crops. We need to bring common sense into the debate on 
agricultural science and technology and the sooner the better.345 
 
Mobilizing a similar notion of “common sense,” in a context where there is not “time” to ponder 
questions, J. Brian Atwood (former Administrator of USAID and Dean of Minnesota’s 
Humphrey Institute for Public Policy) writes in collaboration with Allen Levine (Dean of 
Minnesota’s College of Food, Agricultural and Natural Resource Sciences and Director of the 
Minnesota Obesity Center): 
A half-century ago, when similar problems loomed, the Green Revolution—and 
the worldwide network of research agencies that grew out of it—created new 
higher-yielding, disease-resistant food crops for the areas of the world that most 
needed them. 
But today, rather than uniting in a global effort to end hunger, we're settling into 
the same old "I'm right, you're wrong" camps. Environmentalists see only the 
negatives from the first Green Revolution: heavy use of environmentally 
unfriendly pesticides and fertilizers, and fewer options for small farmers in poor 
countries. Agriculture advocates point out that hunger and starvation would be 
even more widespread today without the advances from the 1960s and '70s and 
call for more of the same.  
As with most other controversial issues, the debate is not so much about the final 
goal but about how to get there. Global food issues, however, are so urgent that 
we cannot afford the luxury of lengthy ideological arguments. With so much 
starvation and an ever increasing world population, we simply need more 
nutritious food, especially in developing countries, plus a viable distribution 
network.346 
 
The perspective they voice is a widely held sentiment among “experts”. The dominant material 
object through which these claims manifest—as Borlaug referenced—is the updated technology 
of GM crops. An updated version of the GR narrative provides an imperative for genetic 
engineering in agriculture; for example, Nobel Laureate James D. Watson, credited for the 
landmark discovery of the structure of the DNA, says ‘genetically modified foods are good’”347—
not just good but necessary—they are the “way to save the world from starvation.”348 As Borlaug 
extols, linking this to the GR: 
Thirty years ago, in my acceptance speech for the Nobel Peace Prize, I said that 
the Green Revolution had won a temporary success in man's war against 
hunger…349 
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Mushrooming populations, changing demographics, and inadequate poverty 
intervention programs have eroded many of the gains of the Green Revolution. 
This is not to say that the Green Revolution is over. … However, for the genetic 
improvement of food crops to continue at a pace sufficient to meet the needs of 
the 8.3 billion people projected to be on this planet at the end of the quarter 
century, both conventional technology and biotechnology are needed.350 
The more pertinent question today is whether farmers and ranchers will be 
permitted to use that technology. Extremists in the environmental movement, 
largely from rich nations and/or the privileged strata of society in poor nations, 
seem to be doing everything they can to stop scientific progress in its tracks. 351 
The affluent nations can afford to adopt elitist positions and pay more for food 
produced by the so-called natural methods; the one billion chronically poor and 
hungry people of this world cannot. New technology will be their salvation, 
freeing them from obsolete, low-yielding, and more costly production 
technology.352 
 
In this narrative, it is implicit that the “[n]ew technology will be their salvation”353 because it is 
to increase production to meet the needs of “[m]ushrooming populations.”354 The technology 
takes on a paternalistic moral valence in this presumption, marshalling a naturalized logic that 
we must produce more—because even if production alone is a deeply limited approach, it is the 
only viable way forward—and given the urgency of the need “we cannot afford the luxury of 
lengthy ideological arguments.”355 Rather, “We need to bring common sense into the debate on 
agricultural science and technology, and the sooner the better.”356 
2.2.3 | Unpacking the technocratic imaginary 
 In this mobilization of the GR for GM crops today, there are three main strands structuring 
the narrative. First, the construction of the GR as “inevitable”—as if there was no actual choice. 
As Subramaniam insistently reiterates: “what was the better choice between the two? We faced 
starvation or we had to import and appeal for aid”357—it was adopt the GR or “the whole nation 
will have to starve.”358 The stakes that are laid out on the side of technology overwhelmingly rig 
the assessment. This serves to efface the discussions that preceded the GR, the depth of the 
controversy over its adoption, and the responsibility for the selected path (see Ch.4). This 
construction of inevitability works with the second, and related, aspect of the narrative form: the 
construction of what I call neo-Malthusian “time,” the sense of temporal urgency that functions 
to write out consideration of how political-economic situations and social conditions are 
produced. By seeing only the results, this perspective excludes examining not only the 
production of a dominant knowledge, but contingency, possibility, and conjuncture (e.g. that the 
GR was controversial at the time). The technologies become saviors, “conquering” nature 
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through the miracles of plant breeding. The ahistoricism that renews these claims is profound 
and enabling; more than simply a limited historical perspective, in its refusal to see pasts, it also 
does not see relations, and cannot see causes. The third aspect of narrative form on which these 
accounts rely is the production of a counterfactual. I suggest that the “success” narrative of the 
GR is dependent upon taking Malthusian doom as the counterfactual.  
 This narrative form obscures the important understanding that the “revolutionary” aspect of 
the GR was in how agriculture is governed; while the rhetoric was of “miracle seeds” (and the 
work of one or two men—Norman Borlaug and M.S. Swaminathan), the most substantive and 
lasting effects of the GR were in policy. This was a qualitative, not a quantitative, shift (see Chs. 
3, 4 & 5). This narrative sleight-of-hand—in which a massive project of governing is presented 
as merely a “technological improvement”—is performed through the object in the form of an 
argument (i.e. the HYV crops). As Subramaniam explains: “[t]he fundamental departure that the 
new strategy involved was the emphasis on science and technology.”359 What is at stake in this 
narrative’s displacement of a socio-political project onto a technology is the hegemony of this 
view of science and technology rather than the particular object itself. When excavated, the 
obscured understandings challenge the narrative of GM crops as the natural lineage of the HYVs 
of the GR and offer insight into the work of GM crops. 
2.2.4 | The mindset of technology  
Underlying this technocratic imaginary of the GR—where technology steps in and solves 
social and political problems—is the assumption that technology does this by (1) allowing nature 
to be “managed” so that (2) more can be produced. The problem at the root is imagined to be 
scarcity (this is a classic concern of government—the management and allocation of scarcity (see 
Ch. 1)). These projects are considered “good” (i.e. are morally powerful) because they ostensibly 
solve social problems via increasing the size of the metaphorical pie. Implicit is the idea that 
increasing production alone is the moral imperative for action and the ethical criteria for 
evaluating agricultural regimes. Hence, Borlaug’s clear impatience with “anti-science zealots,” 
who—as he frames the issue—are not interested in ensuring that enough food is produced for 
everyone.  
“Productionism is the philosophy that emerges when production is taken to be the sole norm 
for ethically evaluating agriculture.”360 This “productionist” view is coupled with a simplistic 
self-evidence, or a “naïve utilitarianism,”361 which collapses productionist logic with the moral 
imperative of hunger, casting the “ethics” of agricultural production as simply about quantity.362 
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This formulation effaces all questions of access, ownership, entitlements, or sustainability of the 
food system. In writing out questions of how people access food, the storyline offers little 
grounding in whether the increased production comes at the cost of people’s consumption (e.g. 
through dispossession of small and subsistence agriculturalists) or whether it comes within a 
framework that can enhance people’s access to food.  
A “utilitarian” theme crosses and defines the Green and Gene Revolutions’ approaches to 
development.363 The coupling of agricultural science’s “naïve utilitarianism” (borrowed from 
economics)—in which all innovations are assumed to be for the better—with science’s positivist 
“neutrality” together “form the basis for a productionist paradigm, a world view characterized by 
total confidence in production-enhancing agricultural technology.”364 But the Green and Gene 
Revolutions are not simply techno-political projects aiming to increase production; they are 
constitutively entwined with the political threats and ethical imperatives (around feeding hungry 
populations) that they marshal;365 indeed, their legitimacy is derived from these claims.  
 The debates around the gene revolution, as exemplified in Bt brinjal, played out most clearly 
in two defining themes (1) the question of food security and (2) the politics of scientific 
expertise. In each of these what was actually on debate was “authority,” in particular the 
authority of science and technology as the solution, or arbiter of the issue. It was the 
determination of what needs to be questioned, how extensive this questioning should be, and 
who has the authority to question that the Bt brinjal discussions opened up anew. The central 
question is: to what degree did the process of open discussion around Bt brinjal reframe 
discussions of development, food security, and its Green Revolution legacy?    
3 | Bt brinjal: debating possible futures 
 
How can a lowly vegetable be an issue of national security? Is there a 
foreign hand in your belly? -Shoma Chaudhury (in Tehelka)366 
 
The first war [for Independence] was in 1857 which we lost; the second 
one we won and got independence. We would have had to fight the third 
war of independence if Bt brinjal cultivation was given the go-ahead. We 
needn’t fight it now. -Dr. Pushpa Bhargava (Founder and former Director 
of the Centre for Cellular and Molecular Biology, and the Supreme Court 
appointed observer on the GEAC).367  
 
This [the moratorium on Bt brinjal] is a very wrong signal the government 
has sent to the industry. -Kiran Mazumdar-Shaw (Founder, Chairman & 
Managing Director of Biocon Limited).368  
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 The futures, or imaginaries, that are mobilized in this debate are not only a particular state of 
being, but also, fundamentally reference an implicit (or occasionally explicit) governing 
framework that enables or prohibits that vision. Together these forge the second question of 
what is at stake—the question which the civil society debates around Bt brinjal sought to draw 
out. The array of voices that emerged in these debates made it clear that while many believed 
that food security, scientific expertise, and the nation’s development future were actually at 
stake, they did not accept the technocratic imaginary’s diagnosis of the problem nor its view of 
society’s development futures. Turning the “doom” GM advocates foresaw on its head, the civil 
society imaginary suggested that the technocratic approach itself creates the very situations it 
then seeks to escape from. And further, that there are many approaches other than this well-plod 
route and its exclusionary development futures. From this, the question arises: to whom do 
agriculture and food policies attend, and who are they aimed at. This question of who is the 
agent of development processes is key not only in creating “possible” futures, but in 
understanding the path to this point. The answers to both are deeply tied with technopolitics.  
3.1 | Bt brinjal: the decision and its process 
 The banality of the GEAC’s October 14, 2009 meeting record largely belies the controversy 
and the significance of its decision to recommend Bt brinjal for release: “After hearing the views 
of all members and special invitees, the GEAC concluded that the report of the Expert 
Committee is acceptable to all members with some minor editorial corrections except Dr. P. M. 
Bhargava. …The GEAC concluded that Bt Brinjal is safe for environmental release.”369 In a 
concluding sentence, however, the meeting notes record an unusual step—one which alludes to 
other possible outcomes: 
Since this decision of the GEAC will have major policy implications, the GEAC 
decided to forward the recommendations and report of the Expert Committee on 
the safety and efficacy of Bt brinjal event EEI to the Government for a final view. 
It was also agreed that the report of the Expert Committee would be made 
available in the public domain by posting [it] on the MoEF370 website at the 
earliest.371 
 
The eruption of massive public outcry following the GEAC’s recommendation and the MoEF’s 
prerogative to give the matter “a final view”372 prompted Minister of Environment and Forests, 
Jairam Ramesh to take an unusual approach: he acted swiftly to make the entire consideration 
and approval process transparent, pre-empting the otherwise inevitable accusations of corruption 
that plague opaque decisions, particularly ones surrounded by such controversy. 
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 The framework the MoEF put in place included the immediate publication of all documents 
related to the case online with open access,373 a period from mid-October until the end of the 
year for the public and experts to submit commentary, and a subsequent series of hearings374 on 
the issue in seven states across the country in early 2010.375 The degree of transparency in the 
process and the occurrence of such hearings was declared by many to be a landmark for 
democracy and a path-setting approach to agricultural biotech regulatory policy. The MoEF and 
Ramesh, however, framed this approach not as setting a new precedent, but rather as following 
precedent and complying with international protocols, which stipulate stakeholder hearings.376 
 The sustained attention given to the question of Bt brinjal was escalated by the array of 
prominent voices that intervened expressing their disagreement on the issue, and was prolonged 
over four weeks during which seven official regional hearings were held; together these served 
to extend the mainstream media’s attention span and keep the issue in the headlines for months. 
Many prominent figures—including the “father of genetic engineering” in India, Dr. Pushpa 
Bhargava, the “father of India’s Green Revolution,” Dr. M.S. Swaminathan, and the retired 
managing director of Monsanto-India, T. V. Jagadishan—aligned against the approval or release 
of Bt brinjal. Significantly, the ruling governments of the states where brinjal is grown also came 
out unequivocally against Bt brinjal. An array of civil society groups and NGOs377 staged 
elaborate protests outside of the hearings and in a multitude of other sites across the country. The 
tactics varied from technical to performative—including marking fields as hazard sites,378 
organizing large contingents of school children with signs imploring with (what came to be the 
familiar) refrain “I am not a lab rat,”379 and preparing record setting quantities of one of India’s 
traditional eggplant dishes (baigan ka bharta) in city centers. These and many other such events 
were meant to raise the awareness of decision makers, journalists, and middle class urbanites 
and to sow seeds of skepticism and questioning about Bt brinjal. The issue also brought in a 
stream of international attention, with scientists and diplomats weighing in (in support and 
opposition) from across Europe, the US, and Australia, again all publicized in the national 
media.380  
 By the time of Minister Ramesh’s decision on the future of Mahyco’s Bt brinjal,381 the issue 
had become a national controversy—framed largely around the possibility of a genetically 
modified version of one of India’s primary “everyday vegetables” entering the nation’s food 
system—a possibility which received widespread attention with almost daily (and at times 
sensationalized) coverage in the nation’s major English language and vernacular media.382  
  Turning now to this controversy, I present first the case for Bt brinjal as its advocates framed 
  83 
the issue and then address the primary ways that the issues were taken up by critics and/or those 
opposed to Bt brinjal—and how these conversations developed. On display in these discussions 
are two empirically grounded approaches that ask their questions of agricultural development 
and food security and follow the problems they identify through to very different levels, and that 
diagnose the issues at stake, and how to address them, in starkly different forms. It is these 
conversations themselves that offer the most insight into the larger questions at stake. My aim is 
not to be an arbiter, nor to assess the truth claims of each side or to take a judgment as to the 
beneficiary; rather, by attending to multiple perspectives the founding logics at the root of these 
perspectives can be revealed. It is the logic of these perspectives—their epistemologies and 
guiding narratives—that are my central concern. For, they imagine—and enable—very different 
political futures, and these visions and paths differently affect people’s food security and 
livelihood possibilities in multiple ways. 
3.2 | Battles over knowledge and authority383  
Considering the quantum of pesticide residues on the brinjal fruits available 
at the subzi mundies, this country must switch to Bt brinjal which sure is 
going to be more organic [sic] in terms of reduced pesticide levels.  
The Bt brinjal variety seeds would be a boon to brinjal farmers who are 
mostly small and marginal. They could save the seeds for next sowings still 
retaining the insecticidal property of their future brinjal crops against the 
target pest, the fruit and shoot borer. This enables them practically not to 
spend, forever [and], to protect their future brinjal crops from the fruit and 
shoot borer. –P. Balasubramanian (Professor, Department of Plant Molecular 
Biology and Biotechnology, Tamil Nadu Agricultural University, 
Coimbatore, speaking about the publicly developed Bt brinjal, which he 
oversaw as head of TNAU’s Bt brinjal project with ABSP II).384 
 
 The scientists’, developers’, and GEAC’s stance on Bt brinjal is that brinjal is a major 
vegetable crop in India, a “daily” vegetable, India is the second largest producer (at 20% of the 
world’s eggplant) after China, and that there is a pest that is detrimental to the crop, the fruit and 
shoot borer (FSB). Farmers lose a considerable portion of their crop385 to this pest every season, 
and in an attempt to minimize their losses they apply chemical pesticides to brinjal. Some give 
very heavy doses of pesticides throughout the growing season, in such cases making 
“conventionally” grown brinjal among the more toxic vegetables. Hence, if there is a way to 
reduce farmers’ losses, while also reducing pesticide consumption, and to do this safely: how 
could one not upgrade? This is the crux of the main argument for Bt brinjal.386 Mahyco’s Bt 
brinjal is engineered to do precisely this. It is resistant to the FSB—when ingested the stomach 
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of the FSB shrivels up and its intestines explode. The FSB cannot destroy this crop. As such, 
farmers’ yields increase and consumers gain unblemished vegetables with measurably less 
chemical residue (some chemicals are still necessary for the other primary brinjal pests).387  
3.2.1 | Making the case for Bt brinjal 
 There are two main imperatives why advocates argued Bt brinjal is necessary: to advance 
scientific research and to promote development (e.g. to increase brinjal production and food 
security). 
 Framing this invention as a simple step forward on the ladder of scientific innovation, a step 
that has been extensively tested and proven to be without demonstrated risk—there is little 
reason to question it and no basis on which to reject it, argue its advocates.388  
While the government is conducting nationwide public consultations on whether 
genetically modified brinjal should be commercially released, the [S]cience 
[M]inistry Tuesday endorsed the product, calling it ‘safe for all’. ‘As [S]cience 
and [T]echnology [M]inistry, we support the clearance of the expert group. It is 
safe for all,’ Science and Technology Minister P. Chavan said.389 
 
In the clarity of this logic, those who continue to question and/or oppose Bt brinjal simply do not 
understand: the science is clear, hence the case for discussion is (i.e. should be) closed.390 After 
all, “scientists took five years to develop a genetically modified brinjal. Regulators took another 
four years to approve it for commercialization.”391 The seeming rationality of the argument is 
essential to its project.  
 A second ground on which case is made is its potential to stimulate development and help 
poor and small-scale vegetable farmers.392 Advocates argue that Bt brinjal is necessary for India 
to keep pace with both escalating food production needs and to increase the return farmers get 
for their crops. As the director of Indian Council of Agricultural Research’s (ICAR) National 
Research Centre on Plant Biotechnology (NRCPB), and GEAC member, Ananda Kumar, 
testified to the GEAC: “With the adoption of Bt brinjal, the pesticide requirement would 
decrease and the marketable yield would increase which would be good for farmers both 
economically and from health point of view.”393  
 Further, as has been widely documented, since the 1980s the means through which 
developing nations are told to ensure their food security has shifted from domestic production to 
an increased reliance on trade.394 The rise of food security as an end to be achieved through trade 
in specialty crops (rather than in staple grains or in the now declared anachronistically autarkic 
model of “self-sufficiency”395) the selling point for Bt brinjal became all the more compelling. 396 
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This technology, they argue, is to help India “leapfrog” into development—to both catch up and 
keep up with global advances in science and the imperatives of food security.397 For example,  
Bt is a safe science and it is aimed at boosting agriculture. It is the technology of 
the future and is safe. Through varieties like genetically modified brinjal we could 
spur the agri-economy," she [Kiran Mazumdar-Shaw of Biocon] said. India’s BT 
industry is at an inflexion point, has attained "critical mass" and created a platform 
that allows it to leapfrog and deliver exponential growth, she said.398  
 
The case being made here was explicitly to demonstrate both the necessity of, and the benefits 
of, genetic engineering in agriculture. And, to demonstrate this to the average working and 
middle class consumer: the housewife, Bt brinjal seemed just the object to make that case. But 
this live advertisement was stopped before ever reaching any housewives.  
3.3 | Telling another story 
 There is another way that this story could be told—and this is one that civil society 
organizations of many stripes brought forward. The loose coalitions represented a vast array of 
perspectives and cannot be characterized under one stance on agricultural biotechnology. 
However, while the narratives of those challenging Bt brinjal are far more heterogeneous than 
the narrative in support of Bt brinjal, they can be characterized by their shared commitment to an 
open questioning of this particular product, including its place in India’s longer term 
development goals, and how such goals are to be best achieved. Citing the glaring failures of the 
current approach, these challengers drew out more complexities—whether questioning how this 
crop came to be approved in the first place (without what they held to be basic safety tests), to 
rethinking the terms of the regulatory system, to going beyond the standard approach of simply 
modernizing technology for increased production, to asking broader questions of what can be 
done to expand the possible future paths under consideration.  
3.3.1 | The cases challenging Bt brinjal 
 Two main realms of concern were manifest: (1) concerns over the technology on its own 
terms (i.e. within the terms of “science”) and (2) concerns that extended well beyond this terrain 
(e.g. social questions of development policy, agrarian support, knowledge and power relations, 
etc). Two areas of questioning formed within the former (i.e. on the technocratic terrain of 
science assessment). These were concerns with (a) “safety”—namely, the unknown health and 
ecological impacts of the crop—and (b) with the inadequacies of the regulatory process. Outside 
of the terrain of science/technocracy, questions formed around what came to be two main areas 
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of concern—(a) the structure of ownership (including property rights as well as the debated role 
of the “foreign hand” (i.e. US influence)) and (b) debates about the vision of longer-term 
development goals. While some of the points on debate may seem implicitly or directly 
contradictory, the claims I review here were made by and represent the views of a broad 
coalition of groups and individuals organized around a concern with issues in the Bt brinjal 
approval process (i.e. not a coherent perspective on Bt brinjal as an object in an abstract 
universal setting of perfect knowledge). As such, their visions of the role and appropriateness of 
GM crops are not necessarily in agreement, as discrepancies between some of these points make 
evident. 
3.3.2 | Concerns on the terrain of science 
 Many of the most prominent critics were skeptical of the merits of Bt brinjal based on the 
testable scientific measures; they argued Bt brinjal did not meet standards, that some of the 
necessary tests were not conducted, and they took issue with the fact that Mahyco had conducted 
its own (unverified) tests, arguing that as such the test results, and regulatory process itself, were 
untrustworthy and flawed.399  
 Another significant concern was with genetic contamination and cross-pollination. India is 
considered to be the “center of origin” of eggplant and continues to be home to thousands of 
traditional varieties—it is estimated that over 3,000 varieties of eggplant are currently cultivated 
in India.400 Critics maintained that Bt brinjal and the processes around its introduction violated 
the Cartagena Protocol and the precautionary principle401 against modifying crops in their 
centers of origin (for risk of wiping out our only record of genetic biodiversity).402 Others were 
concerned with the biophysical impacts on human and animal health resulting from GM crops in 
India’s intensively utilized landscape.403  
 Another area of questioning revolved around the approval process itself, particularly 
practices of the GEAC404—namely whether Bt brinjal ever had any chance of not being 
approved. P.M. Bhargava (dubbed the “Father of GE” in India, and the Supreme Court 
appointed observer to the GEAC), Bhargava critiqued the process with an insider’s view, 
arguing that “Bt Brinjal was cleared by the GEAC and its expert committees without proper tests 
and under pressure from the developer Monsanto-Mahyco.”405 He and others maintained that the 
process was rushed, unconsidered, and that the mindset was that of a “rubber stamp” approval 
agency. This concern with the regulatory process extended well beyond Bt brinjal’s critics; 
many in the sitting government, like Planning Commission Member Abhijit Sen, were adamant 
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that “[w]hen a food like Bt brinjal is introduced, the regulatory mechanism has to be above 
suspicion.”406 Such views did not necessarily take any stance on questions around GM crops 
themselves, but rather their concern was with the legitimacy and efficacy of the mechanisms of 
government. This is a stance that broader sections of institutionalized (government and 
scientists) could agree on. Those supporting GM crops had even more incentive to insist upon 
this level of certainty, for any future for GM crops in India depends on people having basic faith 
in the integrity of the approval process. 
 Concerns with the inadequate regulatory process were exacerbated by several scandals 
around the data and the blatant undisclosed lobbying practices, and even plagiarism of some of 
the scientists involved. Media coverage of these events and circumstances confirmed suspicions 
and fortified the already mounting sense of doubt among influential sectors of the public. But, 
the more significant effect was that this provided a clear moment for the mantle of objective 
scientific integrity itself to be legitimately called into question. The contentiousness and the 
heated debate around Bt brinjal escalated because the ground for discussion was opening. 
3.3.3 | Concerns beyond on the terrain of science—rethinking development 
  
 A second distinct realm of challenges concerned structural and safety questions which 
operated both within and beyond Bt brinjal’s own terms. Sectors of civil society and even state 
governments extended their questioning beyond the metrics of established expertise, and instead 
tried to contextualize Bt brinjal within the broader realities of development. First, questions 
arose around Bt brinjal’s ownership and property rights. The technology up for consideration 
was Mahyco’s Bt brinjal, not one of the publicly developed varieties. As such, there were 
significant doubts around how the intellectual property rights (IPRs) of the technology “sharing” 
between these varieties would work in practice. The arrangement, critics charged, was structured 
such that Mahyco continued to own all of the Bt brinjal varieties; hence, the supposed financial 
benefits to poor farmers (of non-proprietary seeds) would never actually arrive.407 Some charged 
this was the design of the project:  
It’s good to remember the overarching philosophy of ABSPII. The project 
document states that “to safeguard the licensor’s interests, specific strategies for 
the stewardship and monitoring of the technology by the licensees was addressed 
and formulated early in the sublicensing programme”. So while references to pro-
poor varieties sounds impressive, it’s important to remember that IPRs extract a 
price—from the licensees, sub-licensees and the customer.408 
 
Mahyco’s Bt brinjal offered what critics charged were not just “empty promises” of free crop 
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technology, but ones that came at a price. More, the technology was cast as an attempt by 
Monsanto (Mahyco’s partner) to penetrate, and eventually colonize, India’s food chain. 
As Bhargava explained his view on the process:  
“They all have business interests. I know them well, and they are looking only 
at the vast export market that the US offers… I hope the minister takes note of 
this and puts a moratorium of seven years and sets up an independent testing 
lab facility. This will also give time to revamp the biotech regulatory system 
which is essential now.”409  
 
Elaborating on this, the former managing director of Monsanto-India, T. V. Jagadishan backed up 
this understanding of the significance of the stakes involved and the difficulty of drawing a 
decision. In an interview with the investigative magazine Tehelka he explained: 
[Q:] Is the issue as big as its being made out to be? 
[A:] Yes, of course, it is. Monsanto is looking for control and with the 
introduction of Bt brinjal the control enters the bio-diversity of India. 
[Q:] What do you think the decision of Jairam Ramesh would be? 
[A:] I have a feeling that Ramesh is drawing a thin line between public opinion 
and the US. 
We don't have the strength to withstand pressure from the US. Hence, it would be 
a hard decision for him. Although I hope and pray that he decides against 
introducing Bt brinjal, I feel that he may try and maintain status quo for some 
time.  
… [Q:] If there are so many problems, on what basis has the government even 
thought of introducing Bt brinjal? 
[A:] Sadly, the government has depended largely on company-generated data. 
When a company decides to introduce a new product, the government labs 
should conduct a trial and produce believable results. 
But in this case, the government has not bothered to do so. Based on the data 
given by the company, the government committee has approved the idea [i.e. Bt 
brinjal].410  
 
Taking a clearly different twist on food security than Bt brinjal’s advocates, critics argued that 
this—handing control of India’s food supply over to foreign MNCs—was the primary threat to 
national food security. Questions of the structure of ownership expanded into broader questions 
about how agricultural development should be structured and directed. 
 In addition, pointing to the fact that this model of development is built on, and perpetuates, 
the exclusion of the majority of farmers, the critics note that this is representative of its future.411 
The discussion and debate raised fundamental questions: whether the answer is to expand this 
approach in an attempt to include more farmers, or whether it would be wiser to pursue 
alternative approaches, particularly some currently being practiced in various districts by state 
governments and NGOs.412 Such institutions have advocated for and enacted a number of 
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“alternative” approaches to agricultural production over the past decade.413 What makes these 
efforts distinct is that they are informed by agro-ecological production practices, as well as their 
emphasis on structural factors: the goals of agricultural development and food security are to be 
clearly integrated—unlike in the GR model of central government planning. That is, they take on 
the decoupling of development and food security,414 the real question is whether the successes 
among these smaller projects should be scaled up, or if the old “failed” approach should be 
revived and extended. 
Beyond this, others415 suggested that GM crops are simply not the best (or only) path 
forward for India.416 A vast array of different rationales and reasons for this emerged in the 
discussion, proffered by a range of groups, from middle class consumers’ health concerns, to 
agricultural policy experts’ concerns about the labor structure of India’s agrarian sector. Some 
policy experts offered broad concerns, holding that GM crops simply are not appropriate for 
India’s labor-intensive economic and social infrastructure.417 Other parties, including regional 
government officials, expressed concern about the social costs of the increasing use of chemicals 
in the ecosystem (e.g. long-lasting downstream health effects and the burden that the purchase of 
expensive inputs places on farmers).418  
 Hence, while some were not necessarily convinced of the ability of the scientists to fully 
know, suggesting that it is not possible or feasible to test every interaction, others maintained 
that these were not even the questions to be asking, and sought to expand the questions. The 
latter position was revealed to be far more threatening to the advocates of Bt brinjal than the 
critiques within the realm of science—such as the charges of inadequate testing—because the 
reframing of the question sought to move the discussion beyond the terrain of their “expertise” 
and into questions that have very different parameters and stakes, questions with the potential to 
reveal the work of naming technology as a development policy in itself. 
3.3.4 | Opening the confines of the debate  
 As authority in food security and development policy broke down, Bt brinjal’s advocates 
turned to science, trying to leverage the prestige of “science” itself and mobilize its near fiat 
authority in questions of setting development policy. The assumptions were that they could 
better control the direction of the discussion if the confines of assessment stayed within the 
quantifiable terms of agricultural “science,” and that the terms of authoritative expertise are 
more clearly established and accepted in such science rather than in social policy. The argument 
characterizing critiques of Bt brinjal as inherently “anti-science” did have substantially more 
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traction than the food security claims could muster. Indian nationalism, after all, is deeply 
imbued with a science-technology-modernization logic. But, limiting this effect was the very 
outspoken presence of some of the nation’s most prominent scientists who strongly voiced their 
opposition to Bt brinjal, which, bit by bit, ate away at these claims.419 
3.4 | Unpacking the discussion  
 The civil society challenges, at their best, emphasized that the decisions to be made are 
production choices—not simply technical decisions, but moral choices. In dominant framings the 
choice is written as simply between biotechnology or the status quo. GM advocates argue that 
choice is equivalent to the free market420 and the choice here should be “left to the farmers ‘to 
opt or desist from cultivating Bt brinjal as in the case of Bt cotton’.”421 Their insistence that GM 
crops must be placed in the open market—reasoning that if a crop is effective, or superior, then 
farmers will use it, and if it is not, they will not use it—the advocates argued that it is the 
activists who are denying farmers (and consumers) any choice by not even allowing Bt brinjal’s 
release. 422 This view presumes that either the crop has been “proven” to be safe, or that the 
arbiter of a crop’s safety and appropriateness (ecological, socio-economic, etc.) should not be a 
question for society or state regulatory apparatuses, but rather up to individual consumers 
(presumably homo economicus with perfect knowledge).  
 This representation of the issue effaces social questions and passes over the fact that there is 
a broader choice of production policies. Highlighting these choices—that influence or shape the 
future directions of society as a whole—was the goal of the civil society discussions around Bt 
brinjal and GM crops. 
 The questioning of technocracy and the hearings themselves allowed an opportunity for 
more views to come into wider discussion, opening this into a society-wide debate about 
development and the directions of democracy, not simply about technicalities of inputs and 
expertise, as GM scientists would define it. The focus of attention moved to a larger issue: if the 
GR and current agricultural development approaches have not ensured food security for most 
people, then these approaches should not be continued, but rather seen as choices (even if 
mistaken ones) and corrected accordingly. What became apparent through the discussion of this 
new technology’s implications for development and food security was an indictment of the 
(neo)liberal rationality. Namely, that the its long neglect of the majority of the population (both 
their livelihoods and their food security) forms the constitutive exclusions that continue to 
underwrite its functioning and serve as its mandate (see Ch. 3). Perhaps ironically, the strong 
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push for introducing the technology of GM crops served to open a larger civil society and media 
discussion about the future of food and farming. For many active segments of civil society, GM 
crops are not the answer; rather, the “answers” are to be found in attending to the distinct needs 
of the population.423 The democratic imaginary emphasizes bringing policies in line with the 
needs of the people, and in doing so, it necessarily politicizes these technologies and the 
dominant approaches (this politicization is a large part of what GM advocates condemn in civil 
society activism). But the work of civil society is not simply an effort to reinstate the liberal 
state. While policy is often a frontline in the battle, the larger struggle is to re-imagine what it 
means to be a “modern” agrarian nation and whose voices should be heard.  
3.5 | The Hearings 
 The central theme uniting the competing perspectives—articulated at the official Bt brinjal 
hearings and broader public debate—turns on the dispute over who gets to decide society’s 
collective future: is this a matter to be put before “civil society,” or is it simply a matter for the 
“experts” to most efficiently parse out amongst themselves? More basic than that, who has the 
authority to even make this call? The experts and scientists whose task it was to approve it? 
Minister Ramesh, under whose jurisdiction the GEAC and GM crop approval falls? The 
Agriculture Minister Pawar, as this is a crop? The Minister of Science and Technology Chavan, 
as this is a bio-technology? The Prime Minister, as this is a national controversy with 
international implications? Each state’s own government, as agriculture is a constitutionally 
designated as a state subject?  
 Minister Ramesh made the call.  
 The process informing the call he made attempted to open this question and to transform 
what—in India and around the world—has been an opaque backroom “expert” process, and 
instead make it a question responsible to civil society, states,424 and science. Ramesh’s 
decision—to not follow status quo “standard” procedure—called into question assumptions 
about how decisions on agricultural policy were to be made. In adopting a “sunshine approach” 
to counter the model of opaque bureaucracy, scientific expertise, and the perception of backroom 
deals, Ramesh was not choosing an answer to the question of Bt brinjal’s approval but rather a 
process to reach an answer.425 This approach made the question both a “how” and a “what.” As 
such, it made the issues around Bt brinjal something more than standard procedure, and 
reframed the possibilities of the discussion. 
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3.6 | The Decision and Reactions 
 A day before the scheduled announcement date, the MoEF released the assessment.426 
Navigating the incendiary rhetoric around the issue, Ramesh tread carefully, cautiously 
substantiating his points and the reasoning behind the ruling. In the statement he was explicit 
about the confines of the decision:  
I should like to make clear at the very outset that my concern is with Bt-
brinjal alone and not with the larger issue of genetic engineering and 
biotechnology in agriculture. The issue before me is limited to what to do 
with the GEAC recommendation on the commercialisation of Bt-brinjal.  
All states which have written to me have expressed apprehension on Bt-
brinjal and have called for extreme caution. ...this is extremely important in 
our federal framework as agriculture is a state subject.427 
Based on all the information presented in the preceding paragraphs and when 
there is no clear consensus within the scientific community itself, when there 
is so much opposition from the state governments, when responsible civil 
society organisations and eminent scientists have raised many serious 
questions that have not been answered satisfactorily, when the public 
sentiment is negative and when Bt-brinjal will be the very first genetically-
modified vegetable to be introduced anywhere in the world and when there is 
no over-riding urgency to introduce it here, it is my duty to adopt a cautious, 
precautionary principle-based approach and impose a moratorium on the 
release of Bt-brinjal, till such time independent scientific studies establish, to 
the satisfaction of both the public and professionals, the safety of the product 
from the point of view of its long-term impact on human health and 
environment, including the rich genetic wealth existing in brinjal in our 
country.428 
I believe the approach outlined above is both responsible to science and 
responsive to society. 429 
 
The Government of India was placing a moratorium on this particular form of genetically 
modified eggplant (Bt brinjal event EE1).430 To substantiate the reasons for the decision the 
MoEF released a twenty-eight page report with the basis for and evidence behind this decision, 
supplemented by four annexure431 detailing a wide variety of (public, agriculturalist, and 
scientific) perspectives on Bt brinjal and totaling over five-hundred pages; additionally, full 
video transcript of all of the hearings was made available online.432 This decision—as the report 
and its annexure detail—was significantly informed by the period of commentary (during which 
the MoEF had solicited the expert opinions of prominent scientists) and by the official stance of 
state governments and their Chief Ministers, and by the series of national and regional public 
hearings that had been held over the previous months (all of which were included in the 
annexure).  
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 The MoEF’s verdict was extensively documented and clearly circumscribed (i.e. limited to 
only this one genetic event in this version of Mayhco’s Bt brinjal).433 Yet, it was a decision that 
elicited both widespread condemnation and acclamation from across India and the world. The 
response to the decision was even stronger than the discussion beforehand. Not only was the 
issue seen as speaking to much larger concerns and policy futures, this decision was actually 
somewhat unexpected. For—despite the overwhelming public outcry and the explicit opposition 
of state governments—the ruling seemed to break with existing models of technocratic decision 
making on agriculture policy.  
 This was not an “established” policy path (such a moratorium was not the course of events 
previously in India nor in most other countries). The ruling was directly opposed to the widely 
stated position of other Cabinet Ministers in the ruling government—most outspokenly, Pawar, 
the Minister of Agriculture and Chavan, the Minister for Science, Technology and Earth 
Sciences. The ruling seemed to be in defiance of the goals of the collaborative India-US aid and 
development projects (ABSP II) under whose name Bt brinjal was being developed (and of the 
US interests that backed these projects). The ruling reversed the recommendations of the 
nation’s highest expert committee on the matter: the GEAC. But, perhaps most significantly, the 
ruling seemed directly contrary to how decisions about agricultural methods and inputs had been 
made in the past, by a closed panel of “experts”—scientists and politicians. The earlier decisions 
were framed by “experts” who characterized the oppositions’ concerns as “luxuries” that India 
could not afford to indulge when the nation’s food security seemed to be on the line.434  
 In the MoEF’s “sunshine approach” and subsequent decision to reverse the GEAC’s ruling 
and impose a moratorium, the “expertise”-led model of decision making and the unquestionable 
authority of this “expertise” was suddenly thrown open, wide open.  
 Large segments of civil society applauded this move as long-overdue and of lasting 
significance. PM Bhargava, for example, declared the Bt brinjal ruling to be “the single most 
important decision taken by any Minister since Independence,”435 However, to Bt brinjal’s 
advocates, the decision threw the established practices of national policy setting into disarray. 
Behind the condemnations, questions put forward by pro-GM interests swirled: how was policy 
set, and by whom—was it experts, scientists, senior politicians, or the people at large? What use 
was institutionalized scientific expertise if it was not going to be followed in important national 
policy decisions? The MoEF under Ramesh’s oversight, they accused, was not only stopping, 
but actively derailing, and even reversing, the path of science and the nation’s long-established 
march towards modernity.436 Critics in other Ministries and in Ramesh’s own party charged his 
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decision with single-handedly putting India’s scientific, agricultural and food security at risk, 
crediting this to the unsubstantiated panic of a few civil society groups.437 Skeptics of Bt brinjal, 
however, clearly saw this as a victory—not necessarily a victory for or against GM food crops, 
but a victory for democracy: a case where a government actually listened to its public on an 
issue generally marked by a lack of transparency, the regulation of food. Others suggested that 
this was not a decision but delaying making a decision. They saw this as offering a different 
model of governance: responsive, transparent and in line with India’s aims of building a 
decentralized democracy. 
 While Bt brinjal’s advocates claimed that the Minister caved to “irrational” and 
“uninformed” fears about GM food crops (fears they contained and dismissed as simply a result 
of Western meddling in India’s NGO sector), an even larger concern emerged: how the Minister 
came to this decision. Specifically, the extent to which this decision was based on technocratic 
criteria of “scientific risk assessment” vs. concerns cast as “political” or even public opinion. 
The former was characterized by GM advocates as the only sound grounds for consideration, and 
the latter cast as inherently uninformed and unsubstantiated. While critics of Bt brinjal 
characterized the Bt brinjal ruling as the result of a process in which India demonstrated 
governing practices at the “cutting-edge” of democratic transparency, advocates of Bt brinjal 
characterized the process as one of mobocracy and declared the ruling itself as Ramesh caving to 
“anti-science” sentiment, throwing rational policy making out the window. They argued that 
only an approach of measurable scientific risk assessment could serve as the guideline to 
determine the future of agricultural policy and food safety. 
 After Ramesh’s announcement it was not what the decision was, but how the decision was 
made that became the most heated issue of contention. This is not surprising, for a serious 
questioning of where the authority lies to ask, to reject, and the terms to do so, pose a greater 
threat to institutionalized power arrangements than (not having) a particular vegetable. It was the 
specter of potential policy futures, more than the crop itself, which inspired the deep concern 
(i.e. the seeming hyperbole) around Bt brinjal and GM food crops more generally. These 
discussions reveal that what was actually on debate was authority, and development itself, not 
simply a vegetable.  
4 | Battles over brinjal: imagining the future, fighting for the past  
 Bt brinjal debates opened broader questions about the nation’s future agricultural 
  95 
development paths. Significantly, this wider discussion exceeded the confines of Bt brinjal and 
the control of its advocates. Their technocratic imaginary is dependent on invoking larger social 
problems to produce its imperative, yet, the assessment of what is to be done must stay within its 
defined terrain—here, of scientific “risk” assessment (and the rubric of, at most, “known 
unknowns”). The process of the hearings opened larger social issues, extending the realm of 
what could be questioned well beyond the technocratic terrain. 
4.1 | Competing futures, what is at stake?  
 Returning to the two central questions of what imaginaries are invoked in these debates and 
what is at stake in these imaginaries, both of the invoked imaginaries are entwined with the 
legacy of India’s GR—the technocratic imaginary claiming the mantle of scientific expertise, the 
democratic imaginary including a range of structural questions regarding infrastructure projects, 
public ownership, and state support for agriculture. It was an amalgamation of the views of the 
second, democratic imaginary that came to feature prominently in the rationale in the MoEF’s 
report.438  
 Larger questions of agrarian distress come to be articulated in the Bt brinjal debates, based 
on439 fundamentally different understandings of the significance of the roles of production, 
distribution, support, and infrastructure policies in enabling agricultural development. These 
perspectives do not share the naturalized faith in scientific invention in agriculture as societal 
progress in itself—“the productionist paradigm,” a “world view [comprised of positivist science 
and naïve economic utilitarianism and] characterized by total confidence in production 
enhancing agricultural technology.”440  
 In the Gene Revolution appeals, in which the moral unacceptability of hunger is harnessed 
to promote production policies, these very policies are called into question as morally 
unacceptable—in that they create and perpetuate conditions of exclusion.441 Defining the terrain 
as solely one of scientific risk assessment attempts to contain the questions that can be asked and 
to assign moral questions to issues of distribution. The well-established argument—that hunger 
is unacceptable and production capacities must be harnessed to their fullest extent to conquer 
it—is wielded without interrogating the differentiated effects of specific production policies. Yet 
production policies are not only technicalities, but involve fundamental—societal, and moral—
choices. The fact that there is a choice of production policies is a question that is consistently 
passed over—even as these policies actively incentivize (and discourage) particular forms of 
production at the cost of others. Attending to the actual effects of such policies is imperative, for 
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the effects reveal a fuller picture. Attentiveness to the larger structural questions of production 
policy casts light on the work of technology and its technocratic framework in defining its 
questions to efface the reality of the majority. 
4.1.1 | Productionist paradigm unravels 
 In the case of the second Green Revolution articulated as a “Gene Revolution,” the 
imperative of the sense of neo-Malthusian time couples with neoliberalism. This coupling offers 
a useful framework for understanding how the “need for,” or “imperative of,” genetically 
engineered crops of the Gene Revolution comes to be produced. In this instance, the object is Bt 
brinjal and the claim is that the nation’s food security is at risk. This claim is interesting 
precisely because it failed, which is to say it did not “work” as desired. The public was not 
convinced by the idea that a “mere eggplant” (although a staple, or daily vegetable for many, 
and grown in abundance in some regions) was necessary for food security.  
 In addition, the standard claims of GM advocates, with their attendant promises of doom and 
scarcity of a future without agricultural biotechnology, were rendered questionable by the facts 
of the current food security situation. “Hunger amidst surplus” is a far cry from the situation (of 
rationing and food-shortages) that defined the years preceding the GR. Despite the repeatedly 
drawn analogy between the two periods, the assessment of today’s situation as the return of a 
time of dire need did not prove to be convincing. The convergence of neo-Malthusian urgency 
with neoliberalism is critical to the technocratic and technological view of the world that 
underwrites the necessity of GM crops for the Gene Revolution. Or, it was until Ramesh 
announced “there is no overriding urgency to introduce it here.”442 This time marshalling a 
temporal and moral imperative did not succeed.  
When taken off its own terrain, the argument in an object unraveled. Outside of the 
technocratic terrain of “science,” the main question asked by civil society was “why?”: “why do 
we need this, brinjal already grows in such abundance that it is fed to cattle in some parts,” why 
would we want this risk? This “why”—or the lack of an apparent or convincing need for the 
technology—continued to shadow Bt brinjal throughout the discussions. The process Ramesh 
opened served to press “pause” on this “time” and its imperative, and in this “pause” a new 
discussion emerged.  
[W]hen there is no over-riding urgency to introduce it here, it is my 
duty to adopt a cautious, precautionary principle-based approach. —
Jairam Ramesh443 
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 In declaring “there is no over-riding urgency” Ramesh in effect “paused” this imperative 
and in this (highly watched) “pause” many other conversations were able to emerge. Without an 
“over-riding urgency” to silence conversations around Bt brinjal, technocracy itself emerges as a 
subject of debate, and different articulations of the imperatives of development and food security 
come forward. Instead of the imperative of doom coupled with the productionist paradigm, civil 
society activists point to the existing food security realities. These realities clearly complicate 
the debate about agricultural development and GM and the inclination to simply follow the 
conventional path of increasing production technologies. While that path remains the defining 
approach to agricultural development, the activists’ argument pointing to a lack of reason—
beyond policy inertia—to continue this approach made substantial headway.  
4.2 | The terrain opens 
While the future of GM food crops in India is more ambiguous than ever, what is clear is 
that this Bt brinjal decision was not a ruling on the future of GM food crops in India. It was not 
meant to be. While it made a call in this particular case, the MoEF’s justifications were explicit 
that the ruling was for the particularities of this case alone, and as such reveal little basis on 
which to predict future decisions. Ramesh was unambiguous in his statement that scientists 
doing research on GM crops and other strands of Bt brinjal should continue, that they should get 
public sector support, and that a public biotech sector be pursued: 
I have stressed the importance of public investment in biotechnology for 
agriculture. But Indian private investment in this area is already a reality. .... 
Clearly, such science-based companies launched by Indian entrepreneurs need to 
be encouraged and the regulatory process should not stymie such innovation. 
Apart from this, even publicly-funded institutions like the Indian Institute of 
Horticulture Research, Bangalore too need encouragement since I have been 
informed that trials using a Bt-brinjal variety using the Cry2A Bt gene are at an 
advanced stage. Scientists at another publicly-funded institution—the Indian 
Institute of Vegetable Research, Varanasi—have developed Bt-brinjal using 
Cry1Aaa3 gene in their own cultivar IVBL-9. These public sector products need 
to be introduced first, if at all, going by the Bt-cotton experience.444 
This decision should not, however, be construed as discouraging on-going R&D 
in using tools of modern biotechnology for crop improvement and for 
strengthening national food and nutrition security, since issues of this kind have 
to be examined and decided necessarily on a case-by-case basis. I hope the 
moratorium period will be used to build a broader consensus so that as a country 
we are able to harness the full potential of GM technology in agriculture in a 
safe and sustainable manner.445 
 
The hearings on Bt brinjal were not to establish an answer on GM food crops, but rather to 
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establish a path as to how such technologies were to be considered. That this framework of 
consideration exceeded the technocratic confines of previous agricultural development policy-
making models is clear both in how it was structured and in the strong push-back from the 
biotechnology industry. The process as a whole appears to have been not a referendum on the 
technology (i.e. GM food crops), but on the technocracy; opening the technocratic model of 
agricultural “modernization” to democratic accountability.446 
 While the MoEF’s ruling itself provides little basis on which to predict future decisions, the 
hearings and subsequent discussion does allow some insight. In particular, since the Bt brinjal 
decision, multiple states have passed resolutions banning cultivation of GM food crops, making 
it unlikely that GM crops will be up for nation-wide release in the near future without further 
heated debate and questioning. 
4.2.1 | The struggle to set the terms of assessment reveal the terrain as already established 
The big question now is, does it augur a good precedent? 
An essentially technical issue which needs to be addressed by scientists was 
decided by public sentiment, though many among the public do not have the 
required scientific knowledge to appreciate the question in the first place. 
Didn’t Ramesh anticipate exactly this outcome when he planned his 
meetings? Will he follow the same practice in deciding other technical 
issues? 
These are matters for further debate. For Mahyco’s Bt brinjal, it appears to be 
the end of the road, at the moment. Kalyan Ray (in the Deccan Herald).447 
 
 The accusations and struggles over Bt brinjal and the terrain of scientific authority reveal 
that the grounds of authority had been established and show the efforts made to ensure that the 
terms of assessment stay “strictly” on the terrain “science.” As the grounds of authority 
determine how an argument can be waged, there is a battle for hegemony, to set the terms of the 
discussion and assessment. That the terms became somewhat open in the debates and the 
“pause” made questioning GM crops “dangerous.” The struggle arose when Minister Ramesh 
stretched the terms of assessment beyond the confines of fights over scientific authority, to grant 
some legitimacy to other voices and other segments of society. 
 After Ramesh’s announcement, the central focus of the technocratic GM camp became the 
(im)proper role of civil society in questions about and decisions on agriculture and food (i.e. the 
“how” rather than the “what”). In the aftermath of the ruling, the “argument” remained alone—
that is, the “object” Bt brinjal fell out of sight (for the proponents, at least). Hence, the heated 
accusations; while civil society activists around India and the world applauded India’s decision 
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as democracy in practice, or even enlightened governance, biotechnology industry groups and 
segments of the media characterized this process as one “hijacked to unsubstantiated emotional 
levels.”448 The insistent implications that the public was not qualified to hold an opinion on Bt 
brinjal, and that public concern was unsubstantiated, irrational, and “anti-science,” thickly 
deployed the singularity of scientific “expertise” to silence questioning.  
 When these tactics did not fully succeed (due in part to the controversies among “pro”-Bt 
brinjal scientists themselves, as well as the very vocal opposition of some of India’s most 
prominent scientists), the decision and decision-making process was described with contempt by 
segments of the media and corporate elite, including a dismissal of the questioning of GM crops 
as “foreign” or “western” in origin (i.e. only a result of western NGO interference). The image 
of impending doom also took on another character; it was no longer the threat of the hunger of 
the masses, but the threat of the (easily swayed) masses themselves. The act of policy makers 
giving credibility to—actually listening to, or appearing to make decisions informed by—public 
opinion was portrayed as fundamentally threatening the role of institutions of expertise. The 
complaints and response reveal that granting legitimacy to civil society this cuts to the core, 
eroding the technocratic framework. It also poses the possibility of eliminating the “need” for 
GM crops—a justification based in the exclusion of the majority. The technology does not and 
cannot offer the prospect of “re-including” the majority. Rather, its work is to enroll them in a 
governing formation. It is the capacity to frame and control any inclusion of the voice of the 
masses, more than simply the governing power of technology, that constitutes “technocracy.” 
Technocracy rests on the use of technology by an elite to govern people at large—people who, in 
turn, are often effaced. The GM interests’ strong reaction to the decision reveals the extent to 
which this system is dependent upon such effacement as a means to control potential disruption 
of the world it builds according to its terms and logic. 
4.3 | Confining Risk, Defining (what is at) “risk” 
 To define is also to confine. In seeking to define the question at stake, different camps in the 
debate sought to confine the terms of the debate. As is evident, there were also continuous 
challenges to these confines. The Bt brinjal advocates repeatedly sought to define the 
appropriate grounds for consideration. To their view, the critics of Bt brinjal were bringing up 
irrelevant “emotional” issues meant to distract the public and decision makers from the real 
questions at stake—whether this technology was safe and if farmers should be allowed to give it 
a try. The rationality of this argument is based on expelling from its core all social context, 
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enforced by setting the terms of the discussion.  
 That a rethinking of the terms of debate seemed so profoundly threatening, was not because 
the scientists were “covering up” misdeeds or engaged in intentional wrongdoing. Rather, much 
more significantly, the threat is posed by opening up the taken-for-granted epistemology to 
questioning. The “risks” to be considered are no longer strictly confined to the measurable 
results of pre-established field and health trials; they now may include the loss of the multiple 
other futures and paths that have been foreclosed. 
 While rigorous scientific safety assessment is clearly a prerequisite, the critics’ point is that 
the issues around Bt brinjal exceed the rubric of “safety.” If Bt brinjal, and GM food crops more 
generally, were to be proven “safe,” this would alleviate the anxieties of many, but it would not 
resolve the fundamental questions of the debate—including what is at stake in their use 
(cultivation and consumption) and who is vested with the authority to decide what is at stake, 
and how that should be assessed.  
 The attempts to extend the discussion of Bt brinjal “beyond” the rubric of scientific “risk 
assessment” were not undertaken to undermine the metrics of scientific knowledge as some 
claimed, and not necessarily even to question status quo decision making models; but rather, to 
include other voices and perspectives on what is at stake. This openness itself was revealed as 
the issue, as Shanthu Shantharam (Executive Director, Able-Ag) explains:  
…my biggest concern is that the whole Bt technology has been completely 
politicized. Because of the controversy there is an uncertainty on the future 
commercialization of biotech-based goods and services in India. It is really 
unfortunate that Bt brinjal became a victim of the ideologically motivated 
political campaign. The scientific knowledge, the empirical data from the field 
and the credible global scientific expertise have been neglected. It is no longer a 
fight on the safety of technology. It has become a battle of political ideologies of 
different groups on how agricultural development should take place. Some 
people claim to represent the 'public' or 'farmers' would like to shape this 
country's agriculture future by going back to old forms of agriculture. It is clearly 
conflict of ideology driven by activism of all sorts.449 
 
Bench science and decisions about society’s collective future belong to fundamentally different 
metrics. The terms of assessment of the two are of vastly different scope and are set up to answer 
qualitatively different questions. The attempt to conflate the metrics of science as able to stand 
in for social questions is a long and ongoing project—a project of technocracy, or expertise, 
marked by the production and definition of worlds that accompany such a project. While 
scientific “risk” assessment is a prerequisite for deciding such cases, the attitude that it is 
sufficient for scientists alone to decide ignores all larger societal questions. The project of 
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confining the concerns up for discussion within the framework of scientifically testable “risk” is 
an explicit goal of pending ag-biotech legislation, proposed as a response to the MoEF ruling.  
4.3.1 | Efforts to close and keep open the question of authority 
 The threat that such questioning poses is made evident by the explicit efforts to legislate the 
terms on which GM crops can even be discussed. The Minister for Science, Technology and 
Earth Sciences, Chavan, explained the effort behind the BRAI, or NBRA bill:450 
Moreover, the government is actively working on to set up [sic] a National 
Biotechnology Regulatory Authority (NBRA) in the first quarter of 2010, which 
will ensure that strict scientific assessments are followed while testing of biotech 
crops. The authority is yet to be passed by our Parliament. Once in place, it will 
help in a way that biotechnology policies are strictly based on scientific 
assessment of risk and not on any sloganeering and campaigning by public 
interest groups.451 
 
Such “sloganeering and campaigning by public interest groups”452 was diagnosed as the 
problem. It explicitly did not fit within the confines of the world as written by technology.453 
However, the proposed heavy sentences—“[j]ail and stiff fines for those who mislead the public 
about the safety of GMOs”454 and/or those who make claims outside of the terrain of scientific 
risk assessment—blatantly contradict the advocates’ claims that the purpose of NBRA is simply 
to create a clear and orderly single-window system for rigorous safety testing and approval of 
GM crops.  
 As Chavan makes clear, the need for such crops and the grounds of their assessment are not 
to be up for debate; the only question is to be one of “safety” and the only terrain of this 
assessment is to be the established “scientific” metrics of “risk assessment.” This is a position 
in which he is joined by many other prominent officials, including the Agriculture Minister 
Pawar and Prime Minister Singh. That this argument and legislation for a national regulatory 
authority criminalizing discussion of an agricultural technology in any context other than 
“scientific assessment of risk” is made in the name of “safety” and “streamlining” the approval 
process is significant.455 Safety is the international standard and “streamlining” is code for 
aligning policy with the dictates of the US and corporate agribusiness.456 While the BRAI bill 
seeks to criminalize broader discussion of GM crops neither scientists nor the GoI are of one 
mind on this technocratic framework.457  
 Ramesh’s “pause” called the structure of the technopolitical assemblage into sight and into 
question itself. It allowed for a debate more rich than anticipated to emerge, and laid the grounds 
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for a discussion that continues to grow. The commitment to seeing a larger picture and longer-
term view on the question also continues. This is made evident by the lawsuit filed against 
Mahyco-Monsanto for violating the traditional property rights of Indian farmers under the 
Biodiversity Act and Farmer’s Rights Act, by appropriating knowledge and its material form 
that belong in the public domain and copyrighting it to make it into a private commodity. This 
larger view, and the lawsuit, represent a different logic of development, one in which the relation 
between society and its “technologies” enables a different set of social relationships. 
4.4 | Summing up 
What made this conjuncture different? Many aspects going in were different. One of the 
most commonly cited is the democratic impulse of the Minister of Environment and Forests, 
Jairam Ramesh, who decided to follow a “sunshine approach” and to hold hearings (a public 
discussion) on the issue. Without appealing to a “great man theory of history” it is clear that this 
moment was significant. For, in this pause and in the discussion that ensued, time and place were 
opened for larger public discussion—both of the particularities of the crop itself and of larger 
questions of possible and desired development futures. In this democratic moment, the question 
of what is the most urgent or pressing issue was rewritten. But, for how long? That depends on 
the discussion to come. 
 A second commonly cited reason for the “failure” of Bt brinjal was its ownership.458 Had the 
name on the product been different—particularly a product from one of the public agricultural 
universities tied in with the evocative power of the GR’s legacy—the sense of urgency and the 
specter of “doom” might have played quite differently. Instead, Mahyco’s Bt brinjal was spun as 
a “gene gun to our head,”459 a portrayal in which its Monsanto-affiliated ownership was the 
major liability. The GM crops produced by the public agricultural institutes and universities and 
by certain NGOs (such as the M.S. Swaminathan Research Foundation’s efforts at modifying 
crops for “climate change”—e.g. saline resistant rice) may likely elicit very different public 
perceptions and futures. But, perhaps the largest problem with Bt brinjal was that the argument 
this object carried was not well constructed. It relied on the assuredness and authority of its own 
terrain, underwritten by the productionist paradigm and technocratic decision making; but, 
beyond the limited confines of this terrain there was no apparent need. The “why” in “why Bt 
brinjal” was not convincingly addressed; and without a compelling social context (i.e. the 
imperative of urgency to suspend questioning), technology’s argument did not work.  
 “Technology” marks a particular viewpoint, and a development path. This path is propelled 
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by technology and also propels the work of technology, keeping it afloat; to do so, it must set 
and confine the terms of its world in clear ways. These ways were the established policy-making 
approaches. When the assumed model of decision-making was upset, the struggle that erupted 
far exceeded the (bio)technology and became about the technocratic viewpoint itself, because 
the “object” (Bt brinjal) fell out. That is, when considered beyond the confines of the established 
terrain, the object faded and failed, the argument was left without an implementer, without the 
object that does its “work.” Hence, the need for technocracy to define the terrain—as seen in the 
massive international efforts to “streamline” the safety process in countries around the world—
in the name of rigor, and to rig the ground, so that the “why” question that unraveled this 
argument cannot be asked. The proposed Biotechnology Regulatory Authority of India (BRAI) 
bill can be read as an explicit attempt at this. Some other international projects460 are less 
explicit, but do similar “work,” and in technocratic terms, do it better, for they establish the 
terrain as beyond questioning; their expertise is sedimented enough that they do not have to 
resort to trying to outlaw discussion. And this matters; it matters for, as is clear, the “why” 
question is not just a technocratic question, but is about a fundamental societal choice; a what, a 
how, and perhaps most importantly, a who. Who matters and who reaps development’s “rising 
tide”—agribusiness? MNCs? The middle-class? The poor? Farmers?—which farmers? Are those 
who are least able to hold on instead swept away by this “rising tide”? Production questions are 
moral questions. Production technologies are social choices.  
5 | Conclusion 
The allure of technopolitical strategies is the displacement of power onto 
technical things, a displacement that designers and politicians sometimes hope 
to make permanent.  
But, the very material properties of technopolitical assemblages—the way 
they reshape landscapes, for example, or their capacity to give or take life—
sometimes offers other actors an unforeseen purchase on power by providing 
an unexpected means for them to act.461 
 
The Bt brinjal discussion exceeded the confines of the technology alone and the control of 
its advocates. While the technocratic approach invokes larger social problems to create its 
imperative, it also requires that consideration of how to address these problems stay within its 
own strictly defined terms. This approach creates not only a moral imperative for the 
technology, but also a temporal imperative; and as such, it constructs an orientation to time, an 
urgency. Ramesh’s decision to hold hearings, in retrospect, provided an opening for discussion 
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in which the issues went beyond the question at hand or what was to be expected and that called 
this imperative of urgency into question.  
 In this process—of opening the proceedings to include public hearings and then 
determining, based upon the discussions in that moment of “pause,” that there seemed to be no 
urgency, no need, in fact for this technology—it was no longer only Mahyco’s Bt brinjal that 
was summoned for consideration, but also the underlying presumptions of the technocratic 
approach. That is, the hearings provided punctuation in the temporal imperative, and in this 
moment, civil society members gathered to extend this into a larger opening. Hence, when 
Minister Ramesh announced “there is no overriding urgency,” he was not only allowing for the 
discussions to continue (with the indefinite moratorium); the announcement also had the effect 
of calling the functioning of the temporal imperative into question. 
 The moratorium also allows for the consideration of other pathways. What these pathways 
are is yet to be determined, but based on the vigor of the debates, such pathways could be quite 
varied and productive. However, calling this imperative into question, and displacing, or even 
opening, technocracy are not the same. Addressing the question of whether the technocratic 
model was “opened” up has several components, the most obvious of which involves addressing 
whether policy-makers seemed to listen or take seriously the views expressed. It seems clear that 
the government (articulated through Minister Ramesh and the Ministry of Environment and 
Forests) listened on the issue of Mahyco’s Bt brinjal. But, this again poses a larger question of 
who has a voice; who is able to speak. Clearly the techno-political approach has functioned in 
part by rendering many (most) voiceless. Yes, more spoke, largely the educated middle classes; 
but, the majority—whose livelihoods were harnessed on both sides (Bt brinjal will lift them up, 
Bt brinjal will make them beholden to foreign interests and lock them in debt) —while 
summoned in the debate remained largely absent. The question of “listening” thus is not only a 
question of whose voices, but also of the framework in which these voices can participate. Is the 
extent of the realm of “expertise” being expanded, or is its work is being interrogated (i.e. a 
more inclusive technocracy or a democracy)?  
 Clearly, calling into question and/or displacing technocracy cannot be expected to happen in 
a few months of discussion around one biotech crop. The discussions certainly opened many 
paths for consideration, and it appears that the critics of Bt brinjal managed to reframe the issue 
in this instance. Yet future cases are undetermined. Many prominent challenges remained largely 
within the grounds of science. Also, publically developed biotech crops might get quite a 
different reception, as the threats and imperative might be read differently. And the “time” that it 
  105 
operates in might differ as well. The other aspect of the question concerns the discussion of 
technocracy as more than a decision-making model. Addressing technocracy requires taking on 
technology’s work concealing (and revealing) who is governing whom, how. Whether that 
happened with Bt brinjal—if relations between people and things were opened up as also being 
relations between people, if the constitutive governing work of technology therein was 
addressed—is less clear. Issues that are manifestations of this relation were drawn out; however, 
the extent to which these permeate the larger social contexts has yet to play out.  
 Moving beyond the particularities of this case, the implications of these three issues—who 
has a voice, in what framework, and the role of technology in mediating relations—are clear, 
particularly in the decoupling of food security and economic growth. In order for the 
discrepancies that underwrite such conditions to be addressed, not only do the excluded (those 
without a voice) have to be included in policy, but policies have to change. As became clear in 
the case of Bt brinjal, and has become obvious in the Government’s massive surplus food stocks, 
the dominant approach of how to attain food-security is disconnected from people’s everyday 
realities, and seemingly from the realities of “responsible government.” The technologies 
mediating these relations began to be revealed, and even interrogated, in the wider discussions 
opened by the Bt brinjal hearings. 
 On the issue of Bt Brinjal, India demonstrated a more open deliberation of GM crops than 
perhaps anywhere else in the world. And it is only from such open discussions that broader 
considerations, possibilities, and debates can begin. Out of the ostensible need for this GM crop 
emerged a discussion that revitalized the democratic imaginary. And this is where the hope lies. 
It has the potential to challenge the implicit assumption that people’s livelihoods and food 
security are addressed through discussion of the “nation’s” food security, and instead pose the 
former as the real issue. In so doing, it might nurture a new greener revolution that addresses the 
livelihoods of all. As the critics of Ramesh’s decision scathingly noted, questioning the 
authorizing work of scientific narratives, and of technological progress as social progress, is 
indeed a break from established practice in agricultural policy and introduces critical new 
elements into this debate. 
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Chapter Three  
 The Development Man’s Burden: 
Subject Making, Agriculture, and the Measure of Modernity 
 
1 |  The pre-conditions: Understanding the modernizer’s “peasant”  
Proceeding ‘bit by bit’ will not add up in its effects to the sum total of the 
single bits. A minimum quantum of investment is a necessary, though not 
sufficient, condition for success. This, in a nutshell, is the contention of the 
theory of the big push. -Rosenstein-Rodan 1961462 
 
If India’s agriculture was to attain a “breakthrough,” what was needed was 
“a big push applied in short enough time span to ensure its effectiveness. 
Putting inadequate resources into the needed improvement of agriculture 
can be compared to pushing a large stone without enough concentration of 
impact—neither the production problem nor the stone may move at all.” So 
much for the origins and philosophy underlying the package program. -
Ford Foundation 1962463 
 
 Every village we looked into did not lack for any number of sturdy 
farmers, up-and-coming men ready for self-enrichment in contrast with the 
multitudes not yet in the “take off” process. If those multitudes are to be 
put on the rails and pulled toward self-improvement, we cannot conceive of 
better engine drivers that the few just referred to. –Ford Foundation 1962464 
  
 
In his now classic text, The Stages of Economic Growth, Walt Whitman Rostow465 laid out 
five stages of development.466 His template brought together economic history and theory to 
relate economic forces to social and political forces and spelled out a vision for how to extend the 
conditions for, and possibility of, these laws being exercised to transform places in the “Third 
World.” These “stages,” Rostow467 asserted, are not merely generalizations, but rather reveal the 
“inner logic and continuity” of development.468 In his advisory roles to the two Democratic US 
Administrations (Kennedy and Johnson) of the 1960s, Rostow laid out what became the 
theoretical foundations for ongoing American efforts to bring about these transformations.  
As National Security Adviser during the “Decade of Development” (1960s), Rostow was not 
simply theorizing, but was setting the trajectory of what became global development policy. The 
influence of modernization theory, and of Rostow himself, defined several decades of US 
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development policy and continues to underpin many mainstream Western development 
assumptions.469 Key to this theory (and its manifestation in geopolitical projects470) was the 
necessity of a concerted effort to produce the preconditions for development to enter the “take-
off” process. Supplementing Rostow, Paul Rosenstein-Rodan471 added the necessity of a “Big 
Push” to make this “take-off” come to fruition. 
 India’s “Big Push” is said to have finally manifest in the “package program,” but to have 
actually “taken-off” with the “New Strategy” of the Green Revolution (GR). The GR as a 
conceptual and policy approach was long in the making. The ground was being laid in these 
earlier American efforts at rural and agricultural development in India. To understand how this 
logic was formed and how it came to play out it is necessary to understand not only how 
Americans imagined the process of “development,” but also the ways Americans understood 
other places; it is particularly instructive to return to the Americans’ conceptions of India’s 
agricultural sector. 
1.1 | The concern of this chapter: a prehistory of the GR, Americans in Indian agricultural 
development 
 
 Reading the discussions and debates around rural development policy, in this chapter I 
excavate some of the significant aspects of these (largely forgotten) discussions and I trace how 
their approach eventually came to manifest in what we know today as the “New Strategy” of the 
Green Revolution. I review preceding approaches (including the Community Development 
Programme (CDP) and the Intensive Agriculture District Programme (IADP)), as these reveal 
what came to be taken for granted understandings of the problems of rural development. Tracing 
through the notes, records and discussions of American Foundations in India (the Ford and 
Rockefeller Foundations), I read the dominant narratives and themes that emerge. Initially the 
problem is diagnosed as “cultural” and the response is marked by an obsession with changing the 
“mindset” of the peasant (via instilling “want”). Later, this cultural obsession merges with a more 
technocratic approach as the answer. This approach is marked by an abiding faith in technology 
as able to bring about the deep transformations in rural society that policy had long sought—but 
failed—to instigate.  
 In following these discussions, I attend to discussions indicating this change (the policy 
evolution leading to the GR) was not simply a change to make rural, or even agricultural, 
development more effective. Rather, I show how what began as a project of rural development 
and the upliftment of millions of peasant agriculturalists morphed into a set of policies 
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increasingly focused on the question of their production of food for others. Over the course of this 
“evolution” in agricultural development, there was a clear shift in what was deemed to be the 
central concern of rural development. This new orientation away from a focus on broad rural 
social and cultural transformation toward seeing the rural as primarily a source of food production 
shifted the focus of development efforts to a very small percent of rural people deemed suitable to 
be surplus food producers. (And eventually there is a further shift, from a focus on “food enough” 
and food self-sufficiency to the articulation of a project of “food security.”) As the question of 
development became increasingly confined, it was not only the question of the rural, but also of 
the peasants themselves, that fell out of policy focus; this broader concern was, in effect, largely 
abandoned by the American Foundations working in rural India.  
 The rural poor were left along the wayside as development policy deemed—in the name of 
seeking progress and advancement—that it could not afford to be weighed down by a project of 
uplifting such a tremendously large burden of the rural masses all at once. The aim of agricultural 
development policy shifted away from the poorest and most “backward” sections of society; 
instead, agricultural development policy came to focus on lifting only the upper-most segments—
deemed the “progressive” sections—of rural society. The poor (i.e. the vast majority of society) 
were, in effect, told: “not yet.” The justification was that the realignment was implemented with 
the hope that the benefits would “trickle down” to the rest—that the poor and uneducated would 
see the success of the wealthy and seek to emulate it on their own. It is crucial to keep in focus 
the fact that while the poor were left out, it was not that the poor were entirely neglected, or 
effaced, initially. Rather, the discursive invocation of the poor remained indispensible—they 
continued to be the rallying point—as policies which focused on supporting the well-off were 
justified as absolutely imperative in the name of teaching the poor how to be modern farmers and 
(feeding) the nation as a whole. This process was guided by the modernizers’ imagination of the 
peasants’ mentality and their theoretical construction of what constituted development and how to 
achieve this.   
2 | American modernizers in India: locating the problem 
Development is an ancient concept but one which, in our modern age, has 
acquired new meaning and purpose. Its pursuit unites two strands of 
human thought: the belief in progress and the conviction that man can 
master his destiny. –Lester Pearson472 
 
 In “Notes on Indian Agriculture”—a (privately circulated) Rockefeller Foundation report—
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compiled upon the authors’ (J.G. Harrar, Paul Mangelsdor and Warren Weaver, all Rockefeller 
Foundation agricultural scientists) return from their four-week exploratory study trip to India in 
1952—the men offer their colleagues their blunt assessment of the crux of India’s agricultural 
problems and suggest the goals for the Rockefeller Foundation’s own prospective agricultural 
development program in India.473 The explanatory framework which emerges in their narrative is 
instructive—it reveals their imaginary of India and Indian agriculturalists. The narrative was 
formed in their complete inability to fit what they saw and encountered in rural India into 
categories they could readily comprehend, and their simultaneous need to control and direct the 
processes they were grappling to decipher.474 In it we can read the ways that the limitations on 
their understandings come to shape the nature of the projects they would later enact. 
They begin by painting the scene of rural India for the other American men in the Rockefeller 
Foundation: 
The villages are so overwhelmingly important in the agricultural economy of India, 
as well as in its social structure, that they merit a brief description. The villages 
may vary somewhat from region to region but within a region they are as uniform 
as so many ant hills. Indeed, from the air, where a number of villages may be seen 
simultaneously, they have the appearance of structures built by creatures 
motivated largely by inherited animal instincts, and devoid of any inclination to 
depart from a fixed hereditary pattern. The inheritance in this instance, of course, 
is social.475  
 
Recognizing that the “inheritance” is “social,” they argue that it could—and must—be 
transformed, and quickly.  
2.1 | A cultural diagnosis 
 As “take-off” was the mandatory precondition for these basic transformations, the American 
development practitioners on the ground and the theorists at home (i.e. Rostow and his 
contemporaries) sought to determine precisely what was blocking peasants’ progress toward this 
end goal. As W. Arthur Lewis476 diagnosed, and Rostow477 also zeroed in on: peasants (a term 
they often used to stand in for underdeveloped societies more generally) do not properly 
appreciate their own abilities to transform and conquer nature.478 This was a fundamental 
hindrance, for according to modernization theory “progress occurs when people believe that man 
can, by conscious effort, master nature.”479 The “underdeveloped” (largely subsistence) state of 
agriculture in the Third World was read as indicative of this “lack.” The “experts” found further 
evidence for their claims everywhere they looked. 
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 In their diagnosis of the “natural” condition of India’s villages and the villagers themselves, 
the Rockefeller men elaborate that the villagers’ condition can be defined as symbiosis with 
nature, rather than an ability, or desire, to “conquer” it for the goal of expediting progress. They 
explicate: 
The village system is a well-established ecological complex, centuries old, in 
which three elements—plants, cattle, and man—exist in a strange symbiotic 
relationship.480 
Indeed, the three elements are so completely mutually interdependent that it 
would be difficult for any one to exist without the other two.481  
 
They argue that peasants’ lack of appreciation of their own ability to conquer nature—and lack of 
any apparent desire to conquer it—was at the root of another problem. They diagnose that rather 
than seeking out “progress,” peasants instead confronted “progress” with a “long run fatalism” 
and defeatism. The modernization experts ascribed this “mindset” to peasants’ preference for 
self-sufficiency, or subsistence, and their belief in “an otherworldly philosophy that discourages 
material want.”482 All of which confirmed peasants’ status as not-yet “rational,” and in turn, 
became the metric and indicators of progress in peasants’ mindset.483  
2.2 | Locating the problem: the “orientation to self-sufficiency” 
Using these indicators as the diagnostic criteria of his own two-decades of work towards 
transforming peasants’ consciousness, the Ford Foundation’s first South Asia Office President 
Douglas Ensminger484 explains “the mindset” that he and Ford’s experts encountered upon their 
arrival in India in the early 1950s. It was a mindset they decreed to be defined by a lack of 
material “want.” Ensminger explains: 
…each individual cultivator looked upon his land to produce enough to meet his 
family’s needs if he could. He certainly didn’t look at his land from the point of 
view of trying to figure out alternatives to maximizing his production. The 
cultivator thought only of meeting his family’s needs, not producing to sell on the 
open market.485  
 
Ensminger traces the cause and location of the peasants apparent “lack of want” back to the very 
nature (or “mindset”) of peoples’ engagement with their land: they see their land and their labor 
on it as only a source of sustenance—i.e. in not conquering nature they do not see the possibility 
of surplus, or even a means of getting ahead. It was this “lack of want,” Ensminger and the Ford 
Foundation assessed, that bred the lack of ambition and foresight that the theorists had diagnosed 
from afar. 
The Rockefeller men, unsurprisingly, came to a similar conclusion. Explaining the crux of the 
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problem Ensminger also lays out (i.e. why the peasants lack of ambition and lack of enterprising 
nature is the key limiting factor on the nation’s development as a whole), they locate the biggest 
hindrance to India’s development in the fact that each of the villages function as “a well-
established ecological complex.”486 That is, the problem they hone in on is that the villages are 
only self-sufficient. It is the self-sufficient or subsistence nature of the village economy itself 
which RF scientists deem to be at the core of India’s many problems. 
2.2.1 | Addressing the problem of self-sufficiency: instilling want 
 The American experts locate the crux of the problem as “this village orientation to self-
sufficiency.”487 The problem with the peasants’ mindset, as Ensminger painstakingly elaborates, 
is that it is defined by the fundamental hindrance and limiting factor: namely, that self-
sufficiency does not inspire the requisite material want. This lack of want, the Americans 
determined, was inhibiting man’s otherwise inherently entrepreneurial and competitive nature.488 
Lack of “want” is at the heart of the many “bewilderingly complex” intertwined problems 
preventing “take off.”489 They diagnose that this is part of “a complex of problems”490 which, as 
the Rockefeller men explain: “at first glance may seem only remotely related to agriculture”491—
but which must be addressed through agriculture.  
 The crux of the problem492 and its answer are entwined. As Ensminger explains, the way to 
address and overcome:  
…this village orientation to self-sufficiency [is:]. If a cultivator is [instead] to 
[learn to] think in terms of maximizing his production potential with a market 
orientation one would assume the carrying out of these improved agricultural 
practices, giving increased income and profits, [which] would provide the income 
to get the things he wanted. …Relating increased income to buying what was a 
felt need would provide the motivation for the cultivators to carry out the 
improved practices.493 
 
However, having established their pathway forward, the Americans then found that the villagers 
did not seem to have sufficient wants or felt needs. The necessary precondition for this was first 
to instill “want.”494 For, without sufficient want, the peasants had no incentive to leave self-
sufficiency. As Ensminger explains, this as a key hindrance/problem: 
In the early period of India’s development the villagers really expressed very few 
wants, desires and needs. They had come to believe what they had at any given 
time was all they were going to have and they lived their lives on the basis of not 
expecting tomorrow to be different from today. It took a good deal of time to 
change this orientation of village people.495 
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Given the problem that the peasants’ mindset of self-sufficiency does not inspire the requisite 
material want, what progress did come to these places—as Rostow,496 following Hirschman497—
prescriptively explained, was only as a result of an “external intrusion”498 from a more 
“advanced” society teaching “them” how nature could be conquered, want stimulated, and 
society transformed. Further, as Ensminger discovered in his field work, such intervention was 
not only mandatory, it must be sustained, as it “took a good deal of time.”499  
 The modernizers’ crafting of the situation issues a (re)new(ed) moral imperative—a 
“Development Man’s Burden”—to provide the requisite “external intrusion” to save peasant 
societies from themselves.500 This guiding diagnostic framework—in which the “mentality” of 
the peasant comes to be articulated as the primary problem—is a defining theme throughout the 
notes, memos, and texts of the American development workers and agricultural scientists of the 
time.501  
2.2.2 | Self-sufficiency and the problem of surplus production  
 The crux of the problem is that the village economy as a “well-established ecological 
complex” is only self-sufficient. At the core of the Americans’ obsession with “this village 
orientation to self-sufficiency”502 was the fact that the villages were not producing sufficient 
surplus. For, it means that while: 
The villages maintain themselves on a subsistence level with respect to food, but 
[they] do not produce a surplus for the cities. India has reached a point where the 
practice of agriculture no longer serves the traditional and important purpose of 
providing leisure.503  
 
They are clear: the peasant farmers are not producing sufficient surplus to supply the cities nor to 
feed a leisure class. This necessary surplus value cannot be extracted because it is not being 
produced. 
 The RF had come to India in part because they had learned from their experience in Europe 
and elsewhere that agriculture was the original and fundamental realm of surplus extraction, and 
as such its surplus constituted the primary building block for all other development and cultural 
programming.504 The Rockefeller experts had from their earlier studies diagnosed that “until and 
unless improvements can be made in the returns obtainable from agriculture,”505 development and 
basic improvements would not be able to progress in any other sector of society. For, they explain 
“improvement in returns from agriculture have a far wider significance than the enrichment of the 
farmers and their governments”506—the surplus is what enables the transformation of society.  
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 This understanding of the fundamental limitations on development and their assured expertise 
in how to conquer these limits had led the RF to seek out new areas of the world which they 
deemed to be in the most desperate need of, and most able benefit from, their uniquely capable 
assistance. India was at the top of the list.507  
 Musing on (the inherently biopolitical calculation of) achieving “take-off,” the RF’s paper on 
“World Food Problems” explains the biopolitics of surplus production in a context of subsistence 
agriculture. They locate the major problem with subsistence agriculture in the fact that: 
…the curve relating food input to work produced does not bisect zero as in a 
machine but instead bisects zero work produced at about 1800 calories 
consumed. In other words, maintaining large numbers of people on a bare 
subsistence diet, as in parts of the Orient, is enormously inefficient.508  
 
Analyzing the logic of a system in which people live just at subsistence, the RF men deduce that 
not only is this system “enormously inefficient”—for the peasantry are consuming almost as 
much as they would be if they were producing an appropriate-able surplus, but they are using up 
these resources without producing surplus value.  
2.2.3 | Whose leisure, whose surplus? 
The question is what proportion of human effort the peoples of the world are 
prepared to devote to merely feeding themselves. -Rockefeller Foundation509 
 
The assumptions that guide what the American scientists are assessing and advocating should 
elicit pause: the problem in their narrative is not that the village people are starving. (In fact, 
statistically, villages on average consumed more calories (and more protein, lentils and 
legumes,510 then than they did during the GR or than they do to this day511). Nor is the 
“problem”—as far as the Americans assess—that villagers are unhappy or are longing for a better 
life. Rather, the Americans repeatedly puzzle over how difficult it is to instill “want” and “the 
desire for progress” in these peasants. The problem is not the peasants’ want. Rather, the crux of 
the problem as they lay it out is that the villages are not sufficiently subsidizing others—be it the 
leisure of the rural landed elite or the profits of the urban elite (via cheap food for the increasing 
and underpaid urban proletariat). The lack of surplus is the fundamental core of the problem the 
Americans locate, for this surplus is, tautologically what is to enable “development.”  
Whose leisure they seek to secure is not explicitly stated, but it is implicit throughout the 
texts that it is not the leisure of those “creatures motivated largely by inherited animal instincts, 
and devoid of any inclination to depart from a fixed hereditary pattern,” preferring their “strange 
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symbiotic relationship” with cattle and plants.512 The “traditional … leisure” is so plainly not for 
these peasants that the RF experts need not explicitly spell out that it is for others, elites and 
urbanites.513  
3 | Addressing the problem 
 The “self-evident” answer to achieving “take-off” that the RF and FF experts present is to 
restructure agriculture away from its “orientation to self-sufficiency,”514 or subsistence 
production, and into a structure that will effectively produce a surplus (which can then be 
appropriated). For this level of improved efficiency to be possible, people need to be drawn out of 
self-sufficiency and incorporated more fully into exchange relations, so that they can buy and sell 
the requisite calories to make their labor “efficient.” As the Americans’ writings had traced the 
lack of the basic “preconditions” for development to “take-off” to the subjects’ lack of response 
to the also lacking market structures and signals, in tackling the question of how to instigate this, 
the answer conveniently presented itself through unreflective self-projection: tracing “our” 
history back. The Rockefeller Foundation experts, for example, suggested an: “industrial 
revolution of agriculture,”515 a process of dispossession through industrializing agriculture, or 
bringing industry to agriculture to create industrial agriculture. The understanding of how to bring 
“industrialization” remained within an impoverished notion of culture, where cultural difference 
serves an implicit metric of progress.  
3.1 | The RF approach: the making of modern men 
Examined in greater detail, the problems of Indian agriculture become 
exceedingly complex. Not only are there too many people, but the great 
majority are illiterate and not easily reached by educational programs. 
Millions are infected with a variety of diseases, among which malaria 
predominates, and are not easily aroused from their lethargy. More 
millions are enslaved by centuries of tradition and are not truly free to try 
new methods or to exploit their own inherent ingenuity.  
Not only is there too little land, but the land has too little fertility, and is 
divided into far too many small holdings. The Indian farmer does not 
farm—he gardens—and he does so under innumerable handicaps.        
-Warren Weaver et al., Rockefeller Foundation516 
 
 Assessing the problems hindering India’s development upon the commencement of their 
four-week tour, the RF ag men declare that given that “millions are enslaved by [what they deem 
to be] centuries of tradition:”517 
The most serious problem faced by agriculture in India is not a technical one, but a 
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cultural one. The greatest handicaps which agricultural development must 
overcome are those … habits of thought which prize tradition over 
improvement.518 
 
In their diagnostic framework, the oppressive power relations and profound inequities are elided 
and subsumed into the easy category of “tradition.” As power relations and deep structural and 
material inequities are cast as simply “tradition,” the task, or problem, is not a structural one in 
their lens, but a cultural one, which they traced back to what they called “habits of thought,” or 
“mindset.” 
 Once the need to break men out of “tradition” and forge a transformation in their “habits of 
thought” or “mindset” was established, their question was how to most effectively re-inscribe 
peasants’ “habits of thought” for this modern “mindset” to take hold. Assessing their task and the 
Indian context, the Rockefeller men declare that “The problem of village agriculture in India is 
not one to be attacked piecemeal”519—only a comprehensive approach could work to address the 
situation. 
3.1.1 | The making of a successful intervention 
The Rockefeller Foundation (henceforth RF) agricultural scientists were new to India when 
they arrived in the early 1950s, but the RF had been involved in India for several decades in other 
sectors (namely health and sanitation), and the RF was not new to agricultural development work. 
The Foundation had a long experience in leading the charge to modernize agriculture for the 
purposes of ensuring “stability”—initially in post-War Europe and in Mexico.520  
In India (as elsewhere) the RF ag scientists were explicit that their own projects must not be 
anything like the numerous already failing American projects they visited and commented upon 
in “Notes on Indian Agriculture.”521 They regarded these fledgling and futile efforts to modernize 
India’s agriculture not only with deep disdain, they further argued that such failures, if allowed to 
continue, would pose much larger problems for American interests than simply not improving the 
lot of India.522 The RF President is explicit—if American development projects (public and 
private) do not overwhelmingly succeed, then not only will they lead: 
…to injury to the peoples and cultures we are trying to serve, [but also] to the 
erosion of Willkie’s reservoir of good will for us,[523] and [we will serve] to help 
Russia in her campaign to win the minds and loyalties of these people. It is not 
inconceivable that if we mess out our advances badly enough, we may become, 
as the Governor General of India recently said to a friend of mine we were 
becoming, ‘the most hated country in the world’.524 
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In this geopolitical context, the question was how to make sure their efforts succeed. Given the 
abundance of already unsuccessful American projects525 attempting to be the “intrusion” 
necessary to modernize Indian agriculture, the Rockefeller Foundation maintained that their 
approach to the problem must be distinct.526 Having produced an imperative for their own 
intervention, the RF scientists muse over how to ensure that their intervention in Indian 
agriculture is up to their own high standards for success. They assess: 
The task before us is to pick[—]out of a large number and variety of policies and 
programs[—]a few … projects so full of value and implications that still other 
gains will come from them as a natural and effortless sequence. … Our task is to 
choose the projects that will produce the largest and most significant train of 
natural consequences.527 
 
Having established that: “the agricultural problem of India is a complex of problems, some of 
which at first glance may seem only remotely related to agriculture,”528 they are adamant that the 
only way to proceed is via “activities which explicitly face up to the complex and interrelated 
problems of ignorance and tradition, and seek to attack these problems.”529  
 They focus on culture, or “tradition” as this unique tactic of approach. Their “comprehensive” 
assessment determined the problems of Indian agriculture could be divided: 
… into two main categories: [first,] cultural complexities which will yield only to 
an exceedingly broad, skillful, and patient approach; and [second,] physical 
handicaps, such as the maldistribution of water and the impoverishment of the soil, 
which can be effectively attacked only on a very large scale and with enormous 
funds.  
One must recognize that tremendous forces are already being brought to bear on 
[the second of these, the] large-scale problems, these forces being principally 
financed by the Indian and United States governments, with substantial aid from 
the Ford Foundation. … we need not and should not get directly involved in any of 
the very large-scale movements which already have tremendous funds.530 
 
Instead, they hone in on the former: the “cultural complexities which will yield only to an 
exceedingly broad, skillful, and patient approach.”531 Citing Kipling’s advice on the utter futility 
of trying to “hurry the Orient,”532 the Rockefeller ag men nonetheless insist that their four-weeks 
of studied observation made two major points evident: first, that the cultural approach offers the 
effective pathway they are looking for and that “[a]lthough it would be a folly to ignore or 
underestimate the difficulties—particularly those connected with the cultural patterns—of 
working in India, still we do not think it necessary to be paralyzed by these difficulties.”533 And 
second, that to conquer these challenges, “improvement has to occur on a broad social front at a 
simple level, and that there has to be a departure from old customs and ways of thinking.”534  
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 The Rockefeller ag men frame the central problem, or “challenges,” as “cultural patterns”535 
and “ways of thinking”536 that need to be “conquer[ed].” As they set out “to conquer these 
challenges” the ones they see and seek to address are not structural issues (e.g. uneven tenure 
relations, lack of access to land, water, and credit), and are not caste, or power structures, or 
processes of dispossession. Their categories and framework of understanding do not see power 
relations with even the basic level of nuance they would use at home. Rather they focus on the 
“culture of thought,” particularly as manifest in the material culture of self-sufficiency or 
subsistence. Their framing, and in turn their interventions, are defined and fundamentally limited 
by this understanding. It is in many ways an amalgamation of an orientalist and classically liberal 
understanding and approach, a view which sees the issue at hand “at a simple level:”537 in short: 
they do not live like us because they do not think like us, hence it is our job to teach them to think 
and to be like us. But, simultaneously, because they are not actually like us, they do not deserve 
the same treatment, assurances, or policies (not to mention protections) as we would want for 
ourselves. Those they seek to create subjects out of are in a class distinct by its difference and 
inferiority, yet similar enough to evoke a haunting sense of responsibility.  
3.1.2 | Subject-making 
The approach that the Rockefeller Foundation men advocate—of focusing on trying to 
instigate nothing less than a large-scale broad “cultural” transformation aimed at making modern 
subjects—would have seemed most appropriate and expected to their colleagues at the RF 
headquarters in New York. This was the line of the RF projects globally—as a RF conference on 
South Asia the same year laid out in its concluding assessment: 
The needs of India and Pakistan are bewilderingly numerous. It may seem trite, but 
it is not trite to say that India’s greatest need is first class men. Having been 
governed for two hundred years by foreigners Indians are not accustomed to taking 
responsibility as first-class men take it in other countries.538 
 
This focus—on making responsible modern “men”—was a defining theme and grand aim of the 
RF projects globally. The reason for this focus was based on what they deem to be the soundest 
of evidence: empirical experience. The Foundation had learned that to initiate real “success,” the 
RF must begin with the principle ingredient of change: the people and the making of subjects. As 
the RF President explained: 
A central theme which emerges from the Foundation’s 42 year experience is that 
the bottleneck to progress—in any field—is usually people … Without attempting 
to be too specific about details of the expanded program at this stage, it can be 
  118 
safely predicted that the training of leadership must play a major role.539 
 
This most essential of ingredients—the quality of the “men” [sic] and their ability to “take 
responsibility” or initiative—remains a consistent and defining theme of RF concern until the 
RF’s Indian Agricultural Program (IAP) closes two decades later.540 
 Meanwhile, the Ford Foundation (FF) articulated a similar diagnosis of the problem and 
offered a related approach: changing the mindset of “tradition” and breaking out of this 
“mindset” to achieve “take-off,” a process to be instigated through technology.  
3.2 | The FF: Endemic Traditionalism and the need for modern agricultural technology  
 
…over and over again I would ask myself the question why there was not 
greater concern and greater anxiety in India about India’s slow progress in 
agricultural development. I felt many times I, as an individual, had a greater 
concern about India’s improving its agricultural potential than the people in 
the Government.541 –Douglas Ensminger, Ford Foundation542 
 
 Having produced an (internal and an external) imperative for their own intervention in India’s 
agricultural sector, the FF experts’ writings are quick to diagnose the “traditional mindset” as 
endemic across all segments and aspects of society.  
 The effects of this “traditional” mindset, the FF discovered, extended far beyond the evident 
lack of interest in “producing for a market” or “maximizing production”543—even the most basic 
practicalities of agricultural modernization were hindered by what the FF regarded as out of date 
belief systems. Ensminger relates a series of tales detailing his case: “It was very difficult to get 
the cultivators to permit the spraying of crops [with pesticides] because in many areas there were 
very strong religious prejudices against taking any form of life. …even if there had been more 
pesticides [available,] one would have encountered difficulties in their application.”544  
 The FF texts’ recurrent narrative argues that it was because of this “traditional mindset” alone 
that development programs were being held back. Ensminger’s narrative repeatedly alludes to 
this obsession, offering instances and details of how this “mindset”—content with the way things 
were and resistant to change, or improvements—defined every level of society he interacted with. 
It was not the peasants that the FF saw as most worrying in their deep resistance to change. 
Rather, they diagnosed that this “mindset”—characterized as marked by a deep resistance to 
change and a lack of concern with instigating development—was also endemic among the elite 
and the administration.545 Ensminger paints a picture of the Indian administrative elite as largely 
unconcerned with (what he and the FF regarded to be) the most basic necessities of, and pre-
conditions for, agricultural development to be able to “take-off.” He explains the significance of 
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“mindset” in this: 
…more important than the fact that there was not a single fertilizer plant in India 
was [that] there were many strongly held views against using fertilizer. There 
were people in the colleges of agriculture; a very prominent person in the 
Planning Commission; large numbers of political leaders—even the President of 
India Dr. Rajendra Prasad; who had grave doubts as to whether or not the 
repeated and continued use of fertilizer would destroy the soil of India.546  
 
Ensminger relates his tales somewhat incredulously, seeking to indicate both how far India’s 
agricultural development “progressed” during his tenure and also the constant and significant 
challenges which modernizers like himself had to overcome every step of their way. The series of 
tales he offers are also meant to convey his adamant case that the challenges that tradition posed 
were not confined to technology—but extended to any (new path of) action itself: 
...in 1962-63 when we were in the process of trying to get greater support from 
the [Indian] Government to move forward on all recommendations of the Food 
Crisis Report … I had a conversation [with]…a senior person the in the Ministry 
of Finance. … He saw that I was considerably concerned about the lack of 
attention on the part of the government to implement [agricultural] programs. 
After a while he said, and I will quote him, “Oh Hell, Doug, until a couple of 
million people in India have died of starvation, don’t expect us to get very excited 
about what we are doing or not doing on the agricultural front.” … This I record 
simply to illustrate the great difficulties we had in working with India when the 
top leadership itself was more or less lackadaisical about implementing programs 
once they were conceived, tested and proven to be workable. 547, 548 
 
He is at pains to detail the pervasive effects of the “traditional mindset” in the 1950s and 60s. 
While the perspective above is obviously profoundly paternalistic,549 at a deeper level this 
paternalism is also enabling. That is, it is a perspective defined by the framing: they do not care of 
their own fate. Only we do. So, we can (and must) steer it as we see fit; for, no matter what we do, 
it is already better than what would have been if they were left to their own without our 
intervention. This easy coupling of orientalism and liberal paternalism enables policy suggestions 
to take the form of policy mandates, backed by implicit threats of what will happen (namely, of 
imminent famine550) without the suggested interventions.  
3.2.1 | Making modern “mindsets:” the role of technology 
 In this framework of understanding, the first thing their necessary intervention, or intrusion, 
had to do was transform the guiding philosophy through restructuring agriculture away from 
subsistence—a process of change to be instigated by, and steered via, market relations introduced 
through agricultural technologies. But, as the Ford Foundation’s experience (trying to get farmers 
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to use modern chemical inputs and the administration to approve their use) had made clear, if 
they failed to address the “traditional mindset” first, then all of the modern implements, inputs, 
and improved practices that the Americans or GoI programs could offer would be useless. Thus, 
the project targeted the making of modern subjects via transforming their “mindset” in the name 
of agricultural development and increasing production. Ensminger explains what they sought to 
teach and the corresponding pathway to this state: 
It took time for people to think of planning for tomorrow being different from 
today. Many people do not understand it was not until well along in the Sixties 
[that] we had the basis in India for relating improved agricultural practices to the 
villagers’ family life and village conditions, to where we could through an 
educational program say to the villagers, ‘if you want better education for your 
children, if you want better housing, better agricultural implements, the one way 
you can get these things is to carry out the improved [agricultural] practices, 
and with your increased profits you will then have the money to buy the things 
you want’.551  
 
Noting that it took almost a decade for these education programs to even be able to effectively 
communicate, Ensminger reiterates the difficulty of initiating any functional change due to 
“traditionalism.”552 At the same time, it seems that the FF could not see the largest hindrances to 
their agenda and programs: the limits of their own understanding of the society they were trying 
to transform.  
 They largely overlooked social and structural relations in the villages where they were trying 
to affect change. As an early FF report reflects: 
In choosing the [first] package districts, the land tenure question didn’t form part 
of the criteria upon which selections were made. Whatever the reasons, the 
omission is proving to be very troublesome. Evidence is accumulating that the 
tenants who rent a very substantial part of the cultivated land … are poor 
investors in the package program. It is admittedly difficult to deal with the land 
tenure in the package districts, but nothing is gained and much is lost by 
neglecting it utterly.553 
 
In retrospect, Ensminger explains that while India’s politicians lacked the will to enact the 
necessary changes to the agricultural sector, the American aid workers did not understand or give 
sufficient consideration to the many levels of access and deprivation, or even to the 
differentiating effects of power relations within India’s villages. Even while acknowledging the 
significance of some structural factors and inequities—like tenure relations—as “complicating” 
the picture of agricultural development in ways that they had not expected and had been unable to 
account for or address, it remained nonetheless “mindset” or “habits of thought” that was the 
central early pre-occupation of both the RF and FF. Beyond the land tenure issue they 
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(eventually) realized they were missing, they did not give consideration to even the most basic 
differences nor to the deeply embedded intricate histories of power relations that enforced the 
deep inequities. This would come to change, but more significant was what they would come to 
do with their understanding of hierarchy and inequality within the villages. 
4 | The Community Development Program  
 It was not only the Americans who assessed the peasants’ “mentality” to be the necessary 
starting place. This perspective unites Indian government reports and documents and American 
Foundations’ texts from the time. For instance, India’s First Five Year Plan in 1952 argued for 
the necessity “to create in the rural population a burning desire for a higher standard of living and 
the will to live better.”554 With this argument, the First Plan was introducing and describing a new 
concerted American and Indian joint effort to make this happen: the “Community Development 
Program.”555  
 The Community Development Program (CDP) was created to promote village 
development556 and make villagers “self-reliant.”557 As a GoI policy paper explains,558 it was 
established as: 
…a programme of aided self-help for individual and collective welfare of India’s 
vast rural population. The programme is intended to be planned and implemented 
by villagers themselves. Government offering only technical guidance and 
financial assistance.559  
 
The CDP was originally proposed to Prime Minister Nehru by the American Ambassador Chester 
Bowles,560 in 1950.561 It then came to be cast in a Gandhian discourse (and was inaugurated on 
Mahatma Gandhi’s birthday), framed as a tribute to the values of “self-sufficiency” and helping 
build each village as an autonomous entity. While the American and Indian administrative elite 
shared the view that the “traditional mindset” was the major source of the problem, and while 
both were preoccupied with the need to change mindsets,562 their respective answers of how to do 
so and how to proceed to development were often at odds. This was the case with the “orientation 
to self-sufficiency,”563 which was one of the specific policy goals of the CDP. “This new 
initiative was attempting, in essence, to overturn tradition-bound rural India, and to create in the 
process self-sufficient, confident village republics.”564 Yet, what none of the Foundations’ experts 
note in their discussions is that “this village orientation to self-sufficiency,”565 was not just the 
“natural” state (which they implicitly categorize it as), nor was it simply happenstance. The 
emphasis on self-sufficiency was just one of many points of conflict, for “American and Indian 
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officials often held conflicting views on the meaning of the term ‘development’,”566 and likewise 
had different understandings of how to achieve it.   
4.1 | The question of food production in rural development  
The view at this time within the Indian government and Indian development experts regarded 
food and agriculture (the “food problem”) as part of a much larger problem of underdevelopment 
and rural dispossession. In this vein, the food shortages were read as indicative or symptomatic of 
the need for larger rural change, as much as problems to be addressed in themselves. Baviskar 
and Saberwal of the Ford Foundation explain how this perspective came about: 
Following the Bengal famine of 1943, the government introduced the Grow More 
Food (GMF) program. Much of the focus of the GMF was on encouraging 
farmers to bring more area under cultivation, to use better seeds and green 
manure. Farmers were encouraged to use compost pits to generate manure. 
Financial support was available for irrigation. Ultimately, however, the program 
petered out, in part because it was seen as too focused on food production, and 
not sufficiently engaged on a more broadly defined vision of development.  
In 1952, the staff of the GMF was merged with the new Community 
Development Program (CDP). This new initiative was attempting, in essence, to 
overturn tradition-bound rural India, and to create in the process self-sufficient, 
confident village republics, with villagers aware of and keen to access the latest 
technology in agriculture, small-scale industry, health, sanitation and 
education.567 
 
Pushing back against this shift away from prioritizing modernizing food production, the FF 
advocated for India’s approach to rural development (i.e. the CDP) to again be more focused on 
agricultural modernization as the means to village modernization, and for the prioritization of 
agriculture above other goals, instead of addressing agriculture through larger questions of rural 
and societal development.568  
4.1.1 | A political option: increasing food production through social restructuring 
 To address the agricultural production aspect of this equation and the means of most 
efficiently increasing yields, Prime Minister Nehru and many others looked to China as the most 
clearly successful model to follow. China was able to feed more people than India with less 
arable land because they had found a way to produce yields as much as five-times higher than 
those in India, and had done so through integrated rural reforms. As such, in 1956 the GoI sent 
two teams to China to study their model of increasing agricultural production through a mix of 
using labor more intensively, land reform, and grower cooperatives. The study teams concluded 
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that this approach would work well in India.569 “The Chinese cooperative system was given 
major credit for increasing agricultural output in that country, as well as for diverting local 
surpluses out of agriculture to keep food prices low in the urban area, and for increasing 
industrial investment,”570 in short for accomplishing all of the goals that India sought to achieve 
with its agricultural development programs. “Nehru argued that if China could do it, India could 
as well--and that India could do so on a voluntary basis.”571  
To achieve these goals, the CDP together with the National Extension programs operated on 
the premise of using the abundance of rural labor rather than hard to come by financial resources 
to uplift Indian agriculture and rural development. (Beyond agriculture, the program aimed to 
construct an array of rural infrastructure--roads, irrigation works, etc.)572 The main limitation of 
the CDP, however, was not the approach in theory, but the fact that it was not financially 
supported, and hence was not ever able enact many of its basic goals. In effect, the CDP 
functioned as a way of putting agriculture on hold while focusing policy emphasis and resources 
on industrialization. This was not what the CDP was meant to do—it was supposed to offer a 
means to develop agriculture without diverting any of the scarce resources from industry. But 
with almost no resources, the former couldn’t even happen. 
The CDP was formed at the intersection of many interests and aimed to take a comprehensive 
approach, but despite its mission it did not have a sufficiently clear tactic of intervention and was 
never allocated the resources sufficient to bring its mission into fruition.573 The original goals of 
the CDP were never enacted. The program’s lack of success was in large part due to the shortage 
of financial and infrastructure support for the program and the fact that India’s Five Year Plans 
largely prioritized industrialization over rural development. Moreover, even when the goal was 
agreed upon and clearly stated, such as “increasing agricultural production,”574 the path forward 
was not. Thus, although it was initiated with U.S. government and FF support, the means through 
which the CDP sought to increase agricultural production were not aligned with the approach that 
the Ford and Rockefeller Foundations came to promote as necessary for India. While not 
explicitly attacking the program, the FF’s documents present the CDP’s approach as 
inadequate—it could not provide the rupture necessary to break with “nature” and “tradition” to 
overcome the pervasive “mindset of self-sufficiency.” The Foundations were moving toward a 
new policy focus: one which emphasized food production first and foremost. Nonetheless, the 
CDP is of note because even though it is today an overlooked and largely forgotten development 
program—commonly dismissed as “a total failure”575—the CDP was laid out in the First Plan and 
it existed as a program for over 20 years.576  
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 The push from the Foundations for a more modern and food focused project than the CDP 
and its (voluntary) cooperatives coupled with vested interested within India. The landed elite in 
India were largely opposed to efforts to enact structural changes in the social and economic 
order. As such: 
The calls for cooperative agriculture predictably met stiff resistance from Indian 
landowners, particularly politically influential, large planters. The Congress party 
organization responded by backing off from the reform agenda. While the final 
draft of the Second Plan set ambitious goals for the creation of service and credit 
cooperatives and the formation of communally owned farms, it made association 
with such institutions voluntary. Most landowners did not rush to embrace the 
social experiment. Lacking the political will to reorganize the agrarian sector, the 
government fell back upon the underfunded Community Development 
Programme.577 
 
But while the political solution to increasing yields was rejected, at the same time, it was 
clear that something more needed to be done. The Americans were in India in no small part to 
make sure that India’s path provided a model for the third world entirely different from that of 
China. As the FF’s Paul Hoffman argued “India, in my opinion, is what China was in 1945”578—
the conditions were open and the US needed to do all it could to keep India from going down the 
path of China. The last thing the Americans felt they could allow was for India to emulate the 
Chinese method of increasing agricultural production. India was to be the demonstration of better 
success with a “free market” “democratic” approach to development. Merrill explains that: “[t]he 
American effort to make India a model for capitalistic growth and non-Communist political 
evolution can be understood to have constituted an effort to implement indirect control over that 
nation’s future.”579 This move was a project that was enacted through prioritizing agriculture, and 
increasing food production more specifically (see Ch. 5 for a more sustained examination of this 
aspect). Further, Frankel580 and Rosen581 document that many of the powerful state governments 
as well as the Ministry of Finance were opposed to the CDP approach. The landed elites at the 
state level were in no way interested in such programs which they regarded as designed “to hasten 
their own decline.” Rosen explains that in this context the Chief Ministers who were against it 
and went before the P.C. to push for an agricultural policy based in price supports coupled with 
an influx of science and technology.582   
4.1.2 | The “Food Problem” and political instability 
 As the Foundations record it, the main problem was the fact that the rural sector was not 
producing an adequate surplus—whether to feed the cities, to provide for leisure, or to offer a 
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viable alternative model to China. The GoI’s recommendation of a cooperative production regime 
might produce higher yields, and even produce a surplus, but how much of the surplus would be 
appropriated outside of the rural producers, and importantly, on what terms? The rural poor 
across India were undernourished, and if agricultural production were simply increased across all 
sectors of society—without food first being inserted into exchange logic and navigated through 
market relations—there was likelihood that the agrarian poor would consume all the increases in 
production.583 This would in effect leave development efforts in the same place: still no 
appropriable surpluses.  
 Not only was the CDP underfunded and understaffed, in the Foundations’ assessment it was 
not focused enough on the mission of agricultural development to affect the necessary degree of 
change. A much more targeted development program was necessary, focused specifically on 
increasing food production rather than on broad questions of improving the rural community. The 
modernizers at the Foundations pushed for the direction of India’s rural development programs to 
be realigned, away from the articulated goal of making “self-sufficient, confident village 
republics”584 and towards what they argued were the pressing necessities of the day: increasing 
food production and the surplus yielded from agriculture.  
 Invoking the pressing needs of the nation, they marshaled the specter of shortages and hunger 
for this project of prioritizing food production above other projects and goals of rural 
development. As the RF worried: “Mr. Munshi, the Minister of Food and Agriculture, told us that 
unless the food problem is solved within the next five years, at least South India will go 
Communist.”585 Noting that a major problem with hunger and malnutrition is not just that it is 
“enormously inefficient,” but also that there is a threat of political instability that accompanies 
food shortages, the Americans also crafted a moral and political urgency specific to India. While 
they maintained that the impetus for change and modernization as a general rule comes from 
outside, the impetus for change was not necessarily solely external. Instability—resulting from 
population growth and hunger—itself threatened to be the necessary “disruption” to prompt a 
shift from traditionalism on its own, but not in the direction that the Americans wanted.586 The 
“development experts” project was to control and direct this shift. This threat is particularly 
salient in the era of Independence with its the promises of a democratic government and 
developmental state. They explain: 
The problem of food is so acute that practically all government officials are 
preoccupied with it. During our stay in India there was scarcely a day in which 
the newspapers did not have a front-page story on some aspect of the food 
problem or upon measures initiated to solve it. … India will remain a world 
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danger spot so long as she has an acute food problem. The people of India, 
although accustomed to famine in the past, have come to look to their 
government to guarantee them freedom from hunger. If the government fails it 
will undoubtedly change.587 
 
The specter of hunger was not as much a moral problem as an explicitly (bio and geo)political 
one. Their concern with hunger lay in the perceived threat it posed to the stability of established 
local power structures and American interests (rather than in a concern about marginalization 
itself or the neglect of the poor). Even more, the threat itself was mobilized as self-evident and 
sufficient justification for intervention. “Foreign assistance” and the project of development in 
India were deeply entwined with fighting the specter of Communism (represented by the Soviets, 
the Chinese, as well as a generalized faceless but persistent threat).588 The gravity with which the 
Rockefeller Foundation, Ford Foundation, and US Government took this threat is difficult to 
over-emphasize.   
 As attention to the “the food problem” increased, the CDP came to be re-cast, as primarily 
concerned with dramatically increasing agricultural production. The state government of Madras’ 
“Field Manual for Village Level Workers” in the CDP lays out the situation:  
The basic problem is twofold. Agricultural production is not keeping pace with 
the ever increasing population and village people need opportunities to greatly 
improve their level of living and learn how to become effective useful citizens in 
a new independent India.589  
 
The task for the CDP’s Village Level Workers was explicitly spelled out as: to “stimulate the 
desire for a better life”590 and teach the means to this goal—namely through “increased 
agricultural production.”591 The CDP remained a FF-GoI joint project, and with American 
Foundation support, the re-defined CDP provided the beginnings of a policy emphasis on 
quantitative yield increases as a development goal, even though the targets were not met.592  
 Articulating this concern, the Americans advocate two major shifts in how development is 
practiced in India. The first is a move away from a comprehensive approach to the rural, to 
instead prioritize agriculture, and the second was a shift in the imagined subject of development: 
to not address all rural people, but instead focus only on those ready for “take off,” the elite. In 
the evolution of the CDP593 lie the roots of what came to be the “Green Revolution” approach, 
known as the New Strategy.  
4.2 | To instigate transformation: Before all else, Agriculture   
Prime Minister Nehru has much to say on a recent occasion on how difficult it 
is “to rouse up the hundreds of millions of our people who live in rural areas, 
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to make their minds work differently.” He concluded that “that is the basic task 
in India.” In effect, Mr. Nehru is saying that their thinking must be attuned to 
greater productivity. We should add that particularly and immediately this 
[need to transform their thinking] applies to the package districts. –Douglas 
Ensminger, President, Ford Foundation India Office594 
 
Ensminger’s (re)interpretation of Nehru’s modernization mission as first and foremost concerned 
with agricultural productivity is indicative of an emerging consensus among the American 
modernizers—if they were to reach Indian peasants to transform their “mindset” and introduce 
them to market relations and the logic of economic maximization, they would have to begin with 
the realm that peasants already inhabited and understood: agriculture was the keystone of larger 
change. The programs they developed are indicative of this emphasis. In this project the reasons 
for targeting agriculture first and the methods were intertwined: beyond producing more food to 
prevent hunger, transforming the agricultural sector was to produce the necessary pre-conditions 
for development and was to tie all of these changes (the conquering of nature, the creation of 
subjects with a new “modern” consciousness, and a “rational” responsiveness to market signals) 
together into a coherent project. Expanding and marketizing agriculture was the necessary base 
for development’s “take-off.”  
4.2.1 | Making rational subjects: agricultural modernization  
 To unpack the Americans’ push for a realignment of the path of development away from the 
CDP and towards increasing food production for the market, it is instructive to return to their 
discussions of approaches that could yield the desired results. Given the nature of the problem 
they had already laid out: insufficient surplus production in the agricultural sector and a lack of 
“want” to drive a desire to change this, they deduced that the means through which they could 
most effectively change the people involved in order to forge these modern subjects was through 
changing their engagement with their own labor, in agriculture. As A. T. Mosher (the head of the 
Allahabad Agricultural Institute595—one of the first major projects which the RF Indian 
Agricultural Program funded in 1952596—at the time and later the President of the Agricultural 
Development Council) argued, agricultural modernization is fundamental to instigating the desire 
for, and cultivating the growth of, a new development consciousness. Laying out the project of 
“Getting Agriculture Moving,”597 Mosher explained that targeting agriculture first had the effect 
of targeting both peasant and national consciousness—making peasants rational development 
subjects (then able to grow into market subjects) while also transforming the nation’s self-
perception, aiming to guarantee that its leaders and people felt they had a stake in ensuring the 
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“forward progress” of the “free world.”598 He expounds: 
We are likely to think and talk of agricultural development as being valuable 
only because it makes more farm products available for human use. In fact, it has 
an additional, and perhaps more important product: it changes the people who 
engage in it. 
For agricultural development to occur, the knowledge and skill of farmers must 
keep increasing and changing. As farmers adopt more and more new methods, 
their ideas change. They develop a new and different attitude towards 
agriculture, toward the natural world that surrounds them, and towards 
themselves. Their early success in increasing production increases their self-
confidence. Their increasing contacts and transactions with merchants and 
government agencies draw them into closer acquaintance with the world beyond 
their villages. They increasingly become citizens, full members of the nation.599  
 
 Through targeting and transforming the agricultural sector, peasants, society, and the nation 
as a whole could gain the conditions of possibility for market conditions to be able to take hold 
“as a natural and effortless sequence.”600 The proper agricultural projects were necessary for the 
“significant train of natural consequences” to result.601 Such projects of agricultural 
modernization “will be able to effect a total transformation of the economic picture in the 
developing countries.”602 Because, as the Nobel Peace Prize Committee later explained: 
The increased earnings of agriculture will ensure ‘ring-effects’ in the form of 
growth impulses in all the activities created by more productive agriculture. It will 
be possible to increase employment: sowing, fertilizing, hoeing, harvesting, 
marketing will have to be carried out several times a year. Seasonal unemployment 
will be reduced: a balanced economic policy, correctly pursued, should make it 
possible to provide work for the large surplus of available manpower in the 
developing countries.603  
 
While agricultural modernization was the keystone of larger societal change, the FF, RF, and 
others saw the role of the agricultural sector in this larger transformation (of subjects and 
societies) as largely instrumental—it was the “black box from which people, and food to feed 
them, and perhaps capital could be released.”604 
5 | A strategy for change: the IADP 
 Creating the proper agricultural development program was the most challenging aspect of the 
plan to produce a modern “mindset” through changing the methods of agricultural production. 
During the 1950s as teams of American agricultural experts toured through vast areas of the 
Indian countryside, they not only recorded notes and observations, they also wrote up reports 
recommending exactly what India needed to do to address the problems they were concerned 
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with.605 Most prominent among these reports was the publicly circulated (published by the GOI 
and FF together) 1959 Ford Foundation’s “Report on India’s Food Crisis and Steps to Meet It.” 
This 239 page “Report” set about to transform Indian agriculture with the focused expertise of an 
international coalition of scientists.606 At the time of the Report’s publication, the Ford 
Foundation and the GoI were already working together on several agricultural development 
programs, most notably the Community Development Program. Following the 1959 Report, the 
FF and GoI introduced a new program, largely eliding the underfunded CDP in popular memory 
(the CDP did also continue). This new approach was the Intensive Agricultural District Program 
(IADP).607 The IADP, popularly known as simply “the package program”608 was created based on 
the understanding, as the FF put it: that “If India’s agriculture was to attain a ‘breakthrough,’ 
what was needed was ‘a big push applied in short enough time span to ensure its 
effectiveness’.”609  
 As the FF consultants explain: the package program was conceived to confront the 
fundamental limitation that “the multitudes [are] not yet in the “take off” process.”610 The CDP 
had failed to instigate or achieve this necessary process. They sought to transform this barrier into 
a condition of possibility for a modern “mindset” to take root. The fundamental difference was in 
how this was to happen. 
5.1 | Securing success, Selecting subjects  
 The “foot soldiers” in the metaphorical war to rewire the “traditional mindset” and modernize 
India’s agricultural sector had only one task: to succeed. The dual goals (changing mindsets and 
the modernization of agriculture) were intertwined, and the method of attacking them was 
unambiguous. The Rockefeller men’s diagnosis of the habits and nature of “village man” details 
what is necessary—they assess that while “the ‘demonstration effect’ is clearly active”611 in the 
rural areas, nonetheless, from earlier experience they learned that “demonstration of the new 
crops and techniques is not enough” to instigate the farmer to change or to adopt the new crops 
and techniques. Rather, the demonstrations must be both more sustained and more explicit than a 
simple series of lessons; what is necessary is that “one man must come forward and employ the 
new technique and succeed. His success acts as a spur for others to follow him.”612 This, the 
American modernizers explicate, is because of the “village orientation to self-sufficiency.”613 
“Man at village level lives insulated from the values, drives, incentives of urban life. He responds 
to minimum requirements for food, clothing and shelter.”614  
 Thus, while the stability of the village’s “well-established ecological complex”615 served as 
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an insulation barrier against modernization, during their ethnographic tour the American 
scientists’ had gleaned another insight into the “mindset” of “village man”—that “man must have 
a felt psychological need to change his behavior otherwise he will refuse to deviate from the 
traditional patterns.”616 The American modernizers operated from the premise that what needed to 
be instituted was not a cooperative approach to increasing production, but a competitive society, 
with clear and visible rewards for those who set out to break with “tradition” and who “succeed.” 
Toward this end the modernizers identified another tactic through which they could instigate a 
rupture in the “mindset:” jealousy.617 Reading peasant consciousness they explain: 
Beyond this [i.e. basic subsistence] he has need to maintain his social prestige in 
the community. It is only when these minimum requirements or social position 
are threatened that he is moved to change his ways. If one man in a village sinks 
a bore well or builds a stone house or buys a tractor, the whole village becomes 
restless and awake and will not be content until they equal the success of the 
pioneering individual. There are innumerable instances where lands were 
pledged, jewels sold and the whole life style changed to accomplish what one 
man has done.618  
 
But this does not simply happen. There must be an instigating force to “rouse this spirit.”619 
 To instigate and steer the process of change, they suggest that they must be the agents to 
intervene and ignite this “spirit of emulation, sense of competition, feeling of jealousy [which] is a 
powerful motivating factor in village life.”620 Operating from the presumption that in order “[t]o 
rouse this spirit and release fresh energy for development in rural communities it is necessary that 
one from among the group raise himself slightly above his original social position.”621 They 
explain that given the need “[f]or development efforts to succeed, agricultural graduates, bank 
agents, and researchers must begin to penetrate into the rural communities and convert 
demonstration programs into living examples among the people.”622 That is, given the persistent 
difficulties of trying to get local cultivators to adopt the logic-rewriting technology of their own 
accord,623 then if “village man’s” jealousy is to be “aroused” it must be by the “external 
intrusion,” if necessary in the form of an expert pretending to be an ordinary village cultivator. 
 Operating within this profoundly paternalistic view of villagers as essentially simple 
puppets—rational in a way that is predictable and easy to manipulate but not fully “rational” in 
that they refuse to abide market logic as the decision making criteria—the American modernizers 
devised to animate the villagers out of their “lethargy”624 and into action—by inducing one man 
in each targeted area to demonstrate the certain success of adopting these changes. In cases where 
the “living example” was actually from the village, it was imperative to fully support him so that 
he could not but succeed. The farmers that were selected to “succeed” were—as per the IADP’s 
  131 
(and the New Strategy’s625) stipulated criteria—the established farming elite of the village. These 
men, the FF reasoned, already garnered the respect of the “the multitudes [who are] not yet in the 
‘take-off’ process,”626 and hence, they rationalized, “the multitudes” would be more likely to 
respect and try to emulate the success of the elite627 (than they would the success of a lower class 
or lower caste person).628  
 Arguing for the necessity of this new top-down approach, the Ford Foundation justified that 
they were helping the whole of rural society. Their logic is of the irrefutable visuality of the 
“living example,” they explain: “the results gained and examples set—by involving those in the 
top layer are bound to affect favorably the rest of the village.”629 As the FF consultants laid out: 
“Therein lies one of the important services rendered by the program. To corral the cultivators and 
move them another step and yet another step is, of course, the problem of problems facing the 
package program.”630 To do this, “The package [program], unlike any other program in India, 
attempted two pioneering ventures: [1] to divorce agriculture from its past where necessary, and 
[2] to provide the catalyzing resources to make that possible.”631 As Ensminger explains: “After a 
decade of attempts [in which] other organizations in the field have failed to create it; the package 
program has initiated it,” the IADP is finally the program that will “introduce the notion that there 
is more to farming than what they [farmers] have been used to, and in an observable way.”632  
 To make sure that the observable effects succeed, the IADP was to select only: “sturdy 
farmers, up-and-coming men ready for self-enrichment in contrast with the multitudes… If those 
multitudes are to be put on the rails and pulled toward self-improvement, we cannot conceive of 
better engine drivers than the few just referred to.”633 The IADP, the Ford Foundation assessed, 
was “it:” the long sought after “intrusion” that would finally lead to the “significant train of 
natural consequences” and to “take off.”634 Where the CDP had failed—in fostering initiative 
among the rural people635—the IADP was to initiate. The Americans were explicit: under the new 
approach, the “success” of the landed elite was to be supported in the name of changing the 
mentality and lot of the poor “multitudes.” The modernizers’ reading of village psychology 
dictated that the “success” be on a massive revolutionizing scale, that the “success” be led by a 
few farmers from the established elite, and that the state guarantee the elite the material 
conditions for their success. Those selected in the IADP had to see the value of progress on their 
own, as only then would development finally be able to “take off.” 
5.1.1 | “The problem of the small farmer”  
 The theory of peasants as resistant to change licensed the IADP (and the New Strategy of the 
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GR after it) to be conceived of and enacted as projects that explicitly “singled out small farmers 
as one group which may suffer relatively to other economic groups.”636 In effect, the Americans 
come to the realization that the small farmers were not worth trying to extract more surplus from 
directly; rather, the strategy instead became to ignore them and focus on those who could produce 
a surplus, and ideally the others would observe, learn, and follow the lead. Justifying the 
exclusionary policies with the logic that the poorer farmers could not be induced to adopt modern 
methods if their “role models” (presumably the elite in their villages or experts posing as local 
farmers) did not change first, and reap great success, they argued that the more comprehensive 
approaches to agricultural development—e.g. approaching it as a part of rural development, 
rather than simply increasing food production among a tiny segment—could not work given the 
“realities” of the Indian villages. Beyond the hurdle of trying to instill a modern mindset in the 
small and marginal farmers, they offer practicalities to bolster their position of targeting the elite. 
It is necessary to modernize farmers—and even get them off of the land if necessary to allow for 
surplus production. They assess this exclusion as necessary because the small farmers inhabit an 
anachronistic and  
…antiquated system of land tenure and land inheritance [which] leads to smaller 
holdings in each generation. The fields are already pitifully small. … There is 
little possibility of the widespread use of modern agricultural machinery under 
present conditions.637  
 
As technology cannot be used under these conditions, the conditions need to change, and at 
minimum cannot be extended. Arguing that, given the pressing needs of “national welfare,” land 
reform needs to be “practical,” the FF insisted that “[c]are should be exercised, however, so as 
not to break up farms that are efficiently and productively operated.”638 If appropriate care is 
taken, then their development efforts could focus on those farmers who are able to properly use 
technology—in the name of “maximizing resources.” 
 They argue for a change from the existing approach which tried to address the mindset of 
“the multitudes not yet in the ‘take-off’ process,”639 for, these multitudes were likely to have 
small, marginal, or rented plots, or to work as agricultural laborers. Invoking the problem of 
“agricultural production of the country as a whole” as making it “imperative”640 they focus the 
new project on only the: 
…20 percent of the famers, [who] own, or control in one way or another, 65 to 
70 percent of the land. These are the people who produce the bulk of the 
marketable surplus. Theirs are the more viable units of cultivation with respect 
to size, water facilities, equipment, and investment potential. And it is in this 
group that farmers will generally be found who can and are prepared to take risks 
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with new programs and practices.641 
 
Supplementing their arguments regarding plot size and other resources needed to make efficient 
use of technology, they offer an even broader justification: he specter of looming scarcity as an 
imperative of raising agricultural production rates above all else.  
 In this context, The GoI was, however, very reluctant to actually implement what the 1959 
Report recommended. Despite the fact that the Ford Foundation funded the vast majority of the 
IADP,642 the approach of “concentrating scarce resources in a few districts at the inevitable 
expense of others”643 was deeply unpopular. Feeling he was making little headway, Ensminger 
threatened to resign. In order to prevent that from happening and to ensure the continued flow of 
Ford Foundation funding–which went to many other development projects as well—the GoI 
stepped up progress on implementing the recommended agricultural concentration and 
modernization programs (appointing a chair to oversee the process).644 Beyond the central 
government, at the state level there were also strong objections to this approach of “concentrating 
the ablest officers and such scarce inputs as fertilizer in one district out of the many in a state,”645 
for the state’s CDP workers were transferred to the district getting the funding.646 That said, the 
IADP went forward, setting the path for agricultural development over the next several decades at 
least.647  
 As the Ford Foundation’s review of the IADP explained, citing the insights of its own 
definitional 1959 Report as the guideline for the forward path of agricultural development:648 
This overriding fact of shortages and of the need to make the best use of what is 
available dictates a different approach, well stated by the Ford Foundation 
Consultants, [the] IADP, in these words: 
These scarce resources should be combined and used consistent with 
the objective of maximum production of the higher priority item. 
Scarce production resources should be channeled to the areas and 
farmers that are producing or have the potential of producing 
marketable surplus of the higher priority item.  
Our own observations lead us to the same conclusion. The proposal to 
concentrate on farmers who produce the marketable surplus of grain and cash 
crops raises the questions as to the size of that group and the acreage they 
control. …  
Practical considerations suggest that the number of new programs must be 
tailored to the availabilities, at the same time concentrating on the top layer of 
the farm communities, at least during the early period of its operation.649  
 
Deploying this logic,650 and asserting that this top-down approach is the only “practical” one, the 
FF’s American experts genuinely insisted that they were not favoring the elite for the sake of 
further consolidating well-entrenched inequalities—but rather, they made the argument that this 
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was necessary for all to take off. (This is an argument that, in India, eventually comes to be re-
articulated as necessary to not starve651 (see Ch. 4).) The “cultural” and “social” justifications, 
however, are kept at hand, never far. Invoking the need to be “practical” in times scarcity, the FF 
and its consultants explain: 
We recognize the need for considering programmes of relief for those who have 
no land, and for those who cultivate too little land. But it is imperative to achieve 
this objective in ways that will not retard the increases in food production which 
are vital to national welfare.652 
 
What they are seeking to articulate are acceptable justifications for the exclusions—in who shall 
be chosen as the subjects of development, and in the exclusionary structures of support for these 
new subjects—that are being built at this time. These are justifications which over time cease to 
be so labored, and become self-evident. The exclusions, they explain, are enacted not only in the 
interest of “national welfare” 653 but also in the name of lifting up and benefiting “the rest of the 
village:”654 
The problem of the small farmer is fundamentally a social rather than an 
agricultural problem. This is not to suggest that their needs are to be neglected. 
On the contrary, it is anticipated that, in addition to normal assistance 
Government extended to farmers, the results gained—and examples set—by those 
involving the “top” layer are bound to affect favorably the rest of the village. 
Our assumption about the role of leadership which underlies our second proposal 
should hold good in this proposal as well. 
We noted in the preceding paragraph why the contemplated program must be 
progressive-farmer oriented. We should also note, and at the risk of saying the 
obvious, that the agricultural production of a country as a whole, especially in the 
past two years, makes such a move imperative. … a program so oriented may 
indeed bring about larger and faster advancement to less fortunate areas and 
cultivators than one spreading India’s resources too thinly all over the place.655 
 
This is the logic which guided the reasoning and recommendations of the Ford Foundation’s 1959 
Report titled “India’s Food Crisis and Steps to Meet It.” The selling point to the GoI was not the 
exclusionary logic itself, but the increase in yields it was to produce. This, as Dayal explains, was 
why the GoI adopted: 
…the [Ford] Team’s suggested Intensive Agricultural Approach to solve our 
food problem. The Government of India accepted the suggestion of the team. The 
intensive Agricultural District Program (IADA [sic—IADP]) popularly known as 
the Package Program was accordingly initiated in 1960-1 in seven districts of the 
country. 
It was proved by the various tests that the output in these areas will go up by 40 
to 60 per cent during the Third Plan, as against 31 per cent elsewhere. The then 
Union Food and Agricultural Minster, Shri Patil, declared in the Parliament that 
the Package Programme was the only way in which the agricultural output of 
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Indian farmers could match with that of the farmers of advanced countries.656 
 
The IADP realigned the question of rural development. This realignment was not just a move to a 
policy of “concentration,” focusing on the well-off at the expense of the rural “multitudes,” based 
on the premise that the “the multitudes” were “not yet” ready for these changes. More broadly, 
understanding produced the IADP (and the NS after it) as programs that did not address the vast 
majority at all—rendering them outside the position of the subject of development, and 
eventually, in effect, excluding them entirely from the question of development. The IADP 
realigned development away from the question of rural development to focus on the question of 
increasing food production above all else. The other aims (of rural change) were largely left by 
the wayside, and when nodded to, served primarily as justifications for why this approach was 
necessary—i.e. the beneficial effects of helping the elite were to “trickle down” to assist the rest 
of rural society. Rural development policy came to be seen as best achieved through the trickle-
down effects of “the results gained—and [the] examples set—by those involving the top layer 
[which] are bound to affect favorably the rest of the village.”657 These far-reaching favorable 
effects were to come through the introduction of the modern mindset via the “practical” 
deployment of agricultural technology.658  
 The claim that lies behind this policy transition is that CDP did not instigate cultivators, or 
rural people more broadly, to take initiative and to adopt change (i.e. it did not manage to get 
them “on the rails” to “take-off”). The IADP, on the other hand, would initiate this process by 
focusing exclusively on agriculture, introducing the use of modern ag-technology, irrigation and 
other forms of mechanization more extensively, and addressing a target group—only those 
financially able to implement these new technologies. However, the latter—the status of the 
subjects who participated—is generally glossed over in celebratory accounts of the IADP and the 
GR. While the CDP, by most accounts, did not benefit the poorer sections of society as much as 
the middle and upper sections, its stated aim was specifically to help uplift the lower segments of 
society. The IADP and NS approach after it, on the other hand, were designed specifically to 
uplift the upper segments of an already deeply stratified rural hierarchy. In this process the rural 
people (the “multitudes”) are rendered into the paradoxical subject position of being effaced—
even as they are indispensible and are relied on for their labor to increase food production and 
provide the surpluses to be appropriated for other segments of society.  
 What emerges is the prioritization of agricultural production above all else, a distinct shift 
from the industrialization-focused development path in which food production had been part of a 
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broader agrarian and village development programs. Food production now had its own place, 
outside and above rural development, and even more than that, the GR’s perceived success was 
dependent on choosing “guaranteed winners” (i.e. the wealthy farmers).659 This, in short, is the 
making of industrial agriculture.  
5.2 | IADP to the New Strategy 
 The FF had declared that the IADP was the program which would finally bring success “after 
a decade of attempts” and failed programs,660 and there had been high hopes. The projections of 
the IADP’s increases in production—of increasing output “by 40 to 60 per cent during the Third 
Plan”661—were set based on the Third Plan’s targets, which were 100 million tones. However, the 
results of the IADP fell far short of the promises. Not only was this target not met, agricultural 
production actually declined during the period of the Third Plan—from 80 million tonnes in 
1960-1 to 72.3 in 1965-6.662 In (only) two cases were IADP districts actually higher than adjacent 
districts that did not receive the funds, attention, and “modern” implements. The program, in 
short, did not meet expectations. Nonetheless, none of the parties involved were in a position to 
give up on the project. Even when none of its goals were met, the IADP was still declared as the 
only way to progress and as the only path to success in agriculture. Despite falling far short of 
target, many more districts were included and the IADP was expanded into a larger program, the 
IAAP: 
The [IADP] package was provided initially to a set of 7 pilot districts, later 
expanded to 15 districts—one in each state, and 2 in Kerala. Subsequently, in 
October 1965, with food production levels not showing much of an increase 
during the period 1960-64, this was extended to 114 districts (out of a total of 
325)—known as the Intensive Agricultural Areas Program (IAAP). The districts 
were to be provided with a package of services, as recommended in the Food 
Crisis report—including credit, modern inputs, price incentives, better access to 
markets and technical advice.663 
 
The question of what set of policies should be adopted to best address “the food problem” and 
promote rural and agricultural development was not posed again. Instead, the perspective 
adopted, as illustrated in the draft outline of the Fourth Plan was unquestioning: “Evaluation areas 
done so far has shown that with the exception of some districts, progress has not matched 
expectation. All the same, there is no doubt either about the validity of this approach or the 
impact it is making on production.”664 The IADP’s advocates note that India seemed to have few 
options. But, of foremost concern here is the fact that despite the IADP’s failure to meet the 
desired production results,665 it nonetheless had significant effects in terms of how it realigned 
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development and in laying the groundwork for transformations to come. 
5.3 | The New Strategy’s appeal and the legitimate realignment of development  
 Four years later a Government of India pamphlet “Towards a Better Life: The New 
Strategy”666 reiterated the exclusionary logic the Ford Foundation had put forth. While the 
changes were extensive, the subjects to be forged were limited to a very small elite of the farming 
population, for that was how this extraordinary revolution was to finally “take-off.” Explaining 
that “…the new food strategy is not a departure from earlier policies, but a follow-up of what has 
already been done:”667 the pamphlet lays out the logic of why the New Strategy (NS), like the 
IADP before it, targeted the upper segments of society.  
What is this strategy? In simple terms, it means that we concentrate our efforts on 
the best cultivatable areas all over the country, areas which have assured 
irrigation, and do not have to depend on the whims of nature. We make available 
to farmers of these areas the right kind of seeds, enough fertilizers on time, 
pesticides and technical know-how as well as other inputs, so that they can get 
out of the land three to five times the grains they do at present.668 
It can be spelled out in one brief sentence: To get from [the farmers on] about a 
tenth of our cultivated area (i.e. 32.5 million acres out of 330 million acres under 
food grain cultivation) nearly 25 million tonnes of extra food over the next five 
years.669 
To sum up, the new food strategy is not a departure from earlier policies, but a 
follow-up of what has already been done. It is the first step towards making 
agriculture a profitable and stimulating enterprise.670 
 
The operation will be on a vast scale, vaster than many a war fought in history.671  
 
That these significant shifts in approach came to be implemented is indicative of the fact that it 
was not only the American modernizers who held this view of how to address tradition and 
change village mentality. To the Americans’ relief, a number of India’s administrative elite 
shared this modernizing perspective and deep impatience with impediments to it.  
 This larger project allied with the vision of several “responsible” “first class men” in the elite 
of India’s administration. Most prominently, C. Subramaniam,672 India’s Minister of Agriculture 
during the period of transition from the IADP to the New Strategy (i.e. the GR), negotiated the 
NS and ushered it in. US government cables, USDA FAS records,673 the RF, FF, and Ensminger’s 
files indicate that they viewed Subramaniam as a singular exception among the leadership.674 Not 
only was Subramaniam a “resolute modernizer,” when transferred from Minister of Steel and 
heavy Industry to Agriculture Minister he proved to them to be a person concerned enough with 
India’s “food problem” to take decisive action. As Ensminger explains: 
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During the 19 years that I was in India the Ministers of Food and Agriculture 
were rather representative of the political leadership of India in their 
understanding and orientation to agriculture as being necessarily traditional. 
The only exception to this was C. Subramaniam who, more than any other 
individual in India, gave leadership to the designing of agricultural programs to 
move the nation from traditionalism to modernism.675 
 
Ensminger argues that all of the other Ministers simply were not concerned with the food 
problem, simply assuring the nation that everything was fine.676 He and others assessed that 
Subramaniam bore the burden of overseeing the transition from “tradition” to modernity and that 
others were at best “lackadaisical,” if not opposed to it. 
 Ensminger also notes that many of staunchest critics of the IAD and the NS were eventually 
convinced about the approach. While the most significant differences were over the privileging of 
the elite, there was clear agreement about the need to address and transform peasant’s mentality. 
Despite this, how to accomplish this remained debatable. However, the IADP and particularly the 
New Strategy after it, provided a clear object which could be endowed with the task of instigating 
change in the traditional mindset: the modern agricultural technology used in the package 
program. Technology was not simply a product of modernization, it was to bring modernization 
through its use. This shared commitment to producing a “modern outlook” laid the conditions for 
change, but—as one of Ensminger’s staunchest opponents turned supporter, V.K.R.V Rao of the 
Planning Commission677 explained—this alone was not enough. For this revolution to actually 
“take off” across larger areas of India, Rao stated that “something has got to be done to change 
the psychology”678 of farmers, to make them willing and able to engage in and benefit from the 
transformative effects of modern agriculture’s exchange relations.679 The adoption of agricultural 
inputs would require the farmer to re-calculate the nature and “value” of his own labor and his 
engagement with his produce. Resonating with Mosher’s explanation of the use of technology to 
transform peasants into modern subjects, Rao explains: 
I shall go on now to list the policy requirements for implementing a programme 
of increased agricultural production. Motivation is the most important condition 
for maximization of agricultural production. … The farmer’s motivation, which 
really turns upon what profit he makes, becomes particularly important because 
the moment he begins to use fertilizers and other modern methods, his inputs go 
up and agriculture becomes an expensive job and not something where you just 
sow the seed and let god and nature do the rest. When agriculture becomes 
scientific and modern, it involves investment.680 
 
The spark that could trigger the requisite “psychological change” took the form, again, of an 
“external intrusion”—this time, in the form of an object, specifically a commodity: agricultural 
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technology. Modern inputs and mechanized implements carried, with their adoption and use, a 
logic that was to re-inscribe the fundamental calculus of agriculture, transporting the farmer 
entirely outside of the logic of subsistence.  
 As Ensminger had found in earlier efforts to introduce the package program changing the 
conditions by spreading a program was not sufficient for success—the FF reported that the 
farmers were not “invested,” it was only the GoI keeping the program properly afloat. A more 
effective way to get farmers’ mindset to change was to alter the conditions they navigate, or 
better yet, have them literally invest in the process of transition. This is why Ensminger and 
others were so deeply concerned with the resistance to fertilizer and pesticide use at all levels of 
society—it was not just about the inputs, but about the fundamental role of technology in 
requiring an “investment” necessary to produce the proper modern mindset—that is, the mindset 
of surplus production.681 This project aimed to forge modern, rationally-motivated, scientific 
subjects through modern, investment-intensive agriculture. The metric of “rationality,” as 
indicated by subjects’ responsiveness to the market, was the terrain on which these new subjects 
were chosen.  
 The essential difference between package program, or IADP, and the New Strategy was what 
the IADP did not have: a new technology to put a name to, to sell the strategy. The emergence of 
a new agricultural technology: the high yielding variety (HYV) seed, was the key to what made 
the NS different. The HYV was the enabling difference between the IADP and the NS; it is what 
made the NS “the miracle story of modern development”682 and is why the NS is considered not 
just a “success” to be remembered, but a “revolution.”683 As the Nobel Peace Prize Committee 
explained: 
Dr. Borlaug was in India in 1963 in order to find out whether the breed of wheat 
he had developed in Mexico could be used in this country too, and history 
repeated itself. The highest results in the history of India were achieved in 1968 
with a crop of seventeen million tons. This event was celebrated in India with the 
issue of a new postage stamp bearing the inscription “The Indian Wheat 
Revolution 1968.” 684 
5 | Conclusion  
 The Green Revolution was designed to bring peasant production into circuits of regional, 
national, and global capital, prompting larger necessary societal transformations. The GR was 
planned this way in order to transform society. These transformations focused on creating the 
modern subject for these development projects, and did so through shifting to prioritize 
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agriculture above all else. This was a prescriptive narrative rather than a diagnostic one. Tracing 
this narrative in Chapter 4, I demonstrate that the exalted place of technology is itself 
prescriptive; agricultural technology enabled this top-down social revolution to be written as the 
“natural” path of “modernity.” Technology was to be the “trigger,”685 launching countries into 
takeoff.686  
 The way that technology is understood and the causal role that it is given in the project of 
forging a “modern” consciousness makes it much more than a mere tool; it is the indispensible 
agent of and for this project. This view invokes the idea that injecting technology into sectors 
dominated by “traditional” production methods and mindsets will, in itself, bring modernity in the 
form of exchange relations. It is not that a “modern mindset” must come first, but that technology 
in its commodity form itself restructures society in accordance with its logic of exchange. Thus, is 
offered is not just an appeal for technology, but an appeal for the commoditization of peasant 
life—agricultural technologies offered as the tool that could subsume the workings of life itself 
and force a transition from subsistence agriculture to surplus production. Subject-creation was 
constitutive of how the GR operated. The creation of the development subject in the GR 
processes was not superfluous, but integral to its success as a “development” project; it 
underwrote the GR as a coherent (ideological) project. In so doing it created a world-view and an 
understanding of what development is and how it is to be pursued. 
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Chapter Four  
Promising Doom, Narrating Success:  
Writing the (Afterlives of) India’s Green Revolution 
 
It is axiomatic that a well-fed world is a peaceful world. -J. G. 
Harrar, President of the Rockefeller Foundation687 
 
1 |  Introduction: legacies of the Green Revolution 
We proved them all wrong, all those prophets of doom. Borlaug brought a 
revolution in ideas, a revolution in thinking, a revolution in technology. It’s 
a totality. It [the Green Revolution] was a great social change. It’s quite 
likely that a billion people have been saved in India, Pakistan, and 
Bangladesh. -M.S. Swaminathan688  
There is no way to escape the fact that, notwithstanding highly visible 
increases in production and yields of a few crops in a few areas, both 
agricultural production and agricultural productivity in the aggregate 
showed a lower rate of growth after the Green Revolution technology was 
introduced. Even if one doubts the statistical significance of small changes 
in the trend rates, it is still impossible to maintain that there was any 
improvement in the growth rates of aggregate production and productivity. 
There definitely was no revolution in the Indian agriculture with the 
introduction of the new ‘revolutionary’ technology -J.K. Bajaj689 690  
 
 In any contemporary discussion of international food policy, agricultural development, 
hunger, or even genetically modified crops, specters of the Green Revolution live on, writ large. 
The dominant narrative of the GR casts a larger shadow than almost any other aspect of the 
revolution. 
 In the quote above M.S. Swaminathan, the “father of India’s Green Revolution,” recites the 
well-known narrative of India’s Green Revolution: that new high yielding agricultural 
technologies came in and revolutionized India’s approach to agricultural production, and with it 
redefined their “thinking” itself. As the story goes, these “revolutionary” ideas released 
momentous changes, breaking India’s peasantry out of the shackles of “tradition,” allowing 
farmers to spectacularly raise yields, liberating the nation from its dependence on US food aid 
and the increasingly onerous conditions on this food. In the logic of the meta-narrative of 
development, it was the Green Revolution that demonstrated that India was to be taken seriously 
at the “table of nations,” for—in the metric defining the metonym of development in the 1960s—
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India could now “feed herself.” The Green Revolution (henceforth GR) holds a significant 
position and responsibility in the national imaginary, but what M. S. Swaminathan is referencing 
also extends far beyond the popular national imaginary.  
 The imaginary of the Green Revolution’s success is also very much a global imaginary of 
success—the GR cannot be understood outside of the geopolitical context of the time—as Dowie 
explains in his book tracing the history of American Foundations “the Green Revolution … is the 
single largest and longest-lasting initiative of the American Foundations.”691 The Green 
Revolution continues to loom large in the imaginary of American projects—“in development lore 
only the Marshall Plan rivals the Green Revolution’s achievement,” as diplomatic historian Nick 
Cullather692 explains summarizing the lasting legacies of post-war international intervention.  
 India is widely considered a poster-child of the wholesale transformations that such 
agricultural modernization and development offer.693 It is India’s GR that is most often appealed 
to as the template in contemporary calls for a “new Green Revolution for Africa.694 The 
imaginary of India’s GR is of a transformation that was much more than simply an agricultural 
revolution—it is a story of transition: from poverty, dependence, and stagnation to growth, 
development, and success. In short, the GR remains the quintessential story of “take-off” (in its 
Rostovian sense).  
 The collective imaginary that has produced and that peddles this view is widely shared—from 
applied texts in agricultural science to popular bestsellers—in India and around the world. For 
example, Jeffrey Sachs’ rendition of India’s GR reflects the international mainstream and widely 
repeated perspective: 
India’s first major economic breakthrough came in the late 1960s and early 
1970s with the introduction of the Green Revolution into the country. … The 
resulting rise in food yields freed India from the chokehold of famine. After the 
Green Revolution, India was able to feed itself even in years when the monsoons 
failed. The seemingly endless saga of India’s fighting mass starvation came to an 
abrupt end, well before its market reforms triggered a sustained acceleration in 
economic growth.695 
 
The representation of the GR as the key spark for India’s subsequent 50 years of transformation is 
largely—and surprisingly—uncontroversial. Those critiquing liberalization reforms also offer a 
similar diagnosis of the GR’s role in transforming India’s fate—both agriculturally and 
economically. As Majumdar explains: “Thanks to the green revolution, India attained self-
sufficiency in foodgrains in 1970 and what is more, has emerged as a major exporter of 
foodgrains in more recent years: Exports of rice and wheat soared to 10 million tonnes in 2002-
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03.”696 As is clear, in this narrative’s imaginary, the transformational power of the GR was 
underpinned by a revolution in the yields of food-grain crops.  
1.1 |  The GR as “Narrative”  
 Much lies behind these narratives of the GR; they offer a telling that both reveals and 
conceals—they reveal and conceal what the GR project consisted of as well as the continuing 
work of its success narrative. The GR in popular narrative is regarded as incontrovertibly a 
success: that it “worked” is not a matter of question today. In this narrative, the central 
component of this transformation and success is modern technology.697 In this chapter I examine 
the work of this success narrative, I draw out the conceptual, political, and policy lineages 
underlying the Green Revolution approach and I trace the production of the certainty of the GR’s 
success.  
 In pulling apart the narratives of the GR-as-success, my aim is not to write a “truer” narrative 
of the Green Revolution.698 Similarly, simply showing that narratives “do work” is not my point; 
we know that narratives do work, and that narratives of the GR do work. It is what this work 
allows and enables that I excavate: through examining how this narrative came to be produced, 
how it defined the problem that needed to be addressed and the necessary means of addressing it, 
how it told its story of progress, and what was, and continues to be, effaced in this telling.  
 Further, as the GR’s success narrative is one of the key forces sustaining the drive for 
continued agricultural “modernization,” an (re)examination of this narrative also allows a means 
to open and attend to questions including: if the GR made India food secure, how are we to 
understand why the majority of the population is food insecure and/or malnourished today? Do 
today’s high rates of hunger have anything to do with the GR and if so, what is the relationship? 
In excavating the work of this success narrative and attending to these questions, I step forward 
and back, navigating the gaps of various renditions of the GR’s success. I read the success 
narrative of the GR symptomatically to expose its operation and work. I unravel its explanations 
to construct an account of how: how this dominant narrative came to be, and what: what is at 
stake in this rendition of the GR, and what work does this narrative of the GR’s success do?  
I suggest that the narrative of the Green Revolution-as-success was itself fundamental to 
enacting its changes in the 1960s and that it remains the key aspect of the GR’s continuing 
productive power to this day. For example, contemporary calls for a renewed “second Green 
Revolution”—including the Gene Revolution’s advocates’ attempts to summon the Green 
Revolution as its natural history—are premised upon the foundational certainty of the (first) 
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Green Revolution’s success. The GR-as-success narrative serves a justifying and enabling 
function. In the story it weaves, the logic and the empirical terms it mobilizes are co-productive; 
as such, many critiques do not adequately separate them. Attentiveness to narrative is necessary 
not only to understand these questions; more than that, narrative is a necessary tool in the project 
of liberal-capitalist development and geo/political-economy. I suggest that a symptomatic reading 
and a genealogy can help draw out the stakes of how this narrative operates.  
 I aim to indicate the necessity of a method of reading in order to understand the stakes of the 
Green Revolution for the future of development, agriculture, food, and exclusion there from. The 
work of narrative itself cannot simply be overlooked or dismissed, as most approaches do. I 
demonstrate that this success narrative (which relays the GR as a quantitative yield success) was 
forged as a tool—in battles over what “development” should be and what path of development 
India should adopt. The success narrative was constituted in and by the GR’s deeply controversial 
new tactic—an approach which many saw as an about-face from previous development 
commitments and an approach which suffered from repeated “failures” to deliver as promised. 
The GR narrative was a device to bring closure and forge a structure of necessity—a sleight of 
hand to stand in as an answer to critiques of the highly indicted “New Strategy.” As such, the 
“success” which it “reports” is not an empirical state, nor an originary condition of this 
“revolution;” rather, the narrative account was forged in these critical moments, as a response to 
its controversies and failures. Yet, it also became a fundamental narrative that both invokes and 
writes what have come to be comfortably familiar tropes—of what development is, of what the 
GR brought, and of what was there before.  
1.2 |  Building a successful “revolution”  
This volume, a report on more than ten years of cooperative work 
between the [Rockefeller] Foundation and the Government of India 
toward [food] self-sufficiency … reports a success in a field where 
success is relatively rare. –Streeter, for the Rockefeller Foundation, 
1969.699 
 
Accounts of “development” projects, it often seems, chronicle a series of schemes that have 
consistently not reaped or delivered anything like the promised or the theoretical results. These 
failed projects are considered to offer insight; in the context of a larger imaginary of simplistic 
mis-understandings of people and societies, people look (back) to these schemes for an 
understanding—of the time, of what went “wrong” etc. In this imaginary of development projects 
the “successes” and the “failures” are clear. It is because this is such a well worn and familiar 
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story that the GR stands out so tremendously among the 60-plus years of development efforts; the 
GR is regarded as one of the few exceptional successes. The question is how an approach widely 
critiqued and rejected not only came to be policy, but came to be regarded as the most widely 
recognized example of a successful development project in history.  
1.2.1 |  The (Success) Narrative  
 The opening pages of the Rockefeller Foundation’s “A Special Report from the Rockefeller 
Foundation: A Partnership to Improve Food Production in India”700 offers an example of the 
“natural history” of the Green Revolution, i.e. of how the transformation is widely narrated:  
India’s farmers are breaking out of centuries-old patterns of subsistence 
agriculture into a new day of commercial food production. Given demonstrably 
superior seed and a price incentive to produce, they are impressing the world with 
their enterprise. The result is that India approaches self-sufficiency. 
In moving from food shortage to an approach to plenty in just a few short 
years, India is not only winning the battle to feed herself—that has had to come 
first—but is also breaking out of a centuries-old bondage to mere subsistence into 
an era in which her hundreds of millions of people can face the future with 
confident self-reliance. 
Until very recently, most of India’s farmers were tilling the soil behind slow-
moving bullocks, with the kinds of tools used in biblical times. Under the British … 
[and after independence] both farming and research were primarily defensive, 
aimed at reaping at least some harvest under even the most unfavorable set of 
conditions; they were neither aggressive, expectant, nor innovative.  
Then, in two successive years came the terrible droughts of 1965-66 and 1966-
67, the worst in 40 years. Crops were ruined, and millions of people in parts of 
India were even in imminent danger of running out of drinking water. They had to 
be fed from government food stores, which were supplied out of 10 million tons of 
grain rushed from the United States and other developed countries. Quite literally, 
India’s people at this time were living from ship to mouth. … 
But today, only two to three years later, India has more than beaten back the 
threat of hunger; she is now producing close to enough of the major cereal crops to 
supply her daily needs and is even trying to build a buffer supply (the latter still 
with some US help). … 
In just a few short years, in a country where agriculture has been geared for 
centuries to an ox-cart speed, India’s farmers have begun to move from the level of 
subsistence farming to that of commercial agriculture. Whereas until recently most 
farmers aspired to little more than feeding their own families and their own 
animals, millions of them now have something to sell, and can thus acquire the 
means to farm still better and also enhance the quality of their lives. In other words, 
they are moving from existence to living. 
India’s turn around in agriculture occurred in the season of 1967-68, but this 
did not happen overnight. … 
The speed with which India’s farmers and scientists, with some materials and 
counsel from the outside, suddenly gave their country an approach to an abundant 
  146 
food supply has never been duplicated on an equal scale anywhere else in the 
world, including the agriculturally sophisticated United States. And they did it 
under great handicaps, from almost a standing start. Their story has romance, color, 
and drama of which this report attempts to give some small glimpse. … 
Much has been said about the ‘agricultural revolution’ in India, and one has 
certainly taken place as it relates to crops—at least in those parts of the country that 
can get enough water. But the real revolution is one that has happened, not to 
farming, but to farmers—the revolution of hope. It has meant a new concept of self, 
in which the farmer can believe he may fulfill his destiny as a liberated human 
being. Not only agriculture but also all the businesses dealing with agriculture have 
quickened as a result and indeed, the whole national economy has been 
strengthened.  
The educator, the plant breeder, agronomist, entomologist, pathologist, 
agricultural engineer, economist, and the Indian farmer going about his day’s work 
and causing the ‘land to yield her increase,’ may not always appreciate the full 
impact of their labors. … [but,] In doing so they are adding stability to the whole 
world.701 
 
C. Subramaniam, the Minister of Agriculture during the Green Revolution offers a somewhat less 
sweeping narrative of the events in the Government of India’s National Commission on 
Agriculture Report:   
Let me recall here the events leading to the adoption of the New Strategy for 
Agricultural Development in India in the year 1965. After an impressive increase in 
agricultural production during the first two Five Year Plans there was a spell of 
stagnancy in the early 1960s. Population increased at a rapid rate, agricultural 
production failed to catch up, imports of foodgrain seemed elusive. Then came the 
crisis of 1965 and 1966 as a consequence of one of the severest droughts of the 
century. Steep falls in food grains production, scarcity conditions over large parts 
of the country, and rising food prices led to widespread distress. It was even 
predicted by some foreign observers that [there would be] one million starvation 
deaths in Bihar alone. The prophets of doom were proved wrong. … it was during 
this period of crisis that we decided to step up our food production through the 
adoption of the New Strategy. … This was facilitated greatly by the availability of 
high yielding exotic strains of wheat and paddy. … The pace and progress again 
proved the skeptics wrong and ushered in the beginning of an agricultural 
revolution. And this is not confined to India; it covers the whole of South and 
South-East Asia.702 
 
Each rendition of the narrative poses the questions: how did this narrative come to be? What work 
does this story do? What does it enable?  
 As is evident in the narratives above, the GR’s “natural history” and success narrative picks 
as its “origin” the drought of 1965-66. The drought’s severity703 provides a powerful foil for the 
transformations yet to come and supplies a “self-evident” referent allowing the dire food situation 
to be ascribed to “nature,” by association. Causality is written in, implicit—aiding the narrative’s 
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evasion of acknowledging structures, or of even mentioning any reasons for the situation leading 
up to the 1965 crisis. The structural factors contributing to or producing this situation are 
effaced—collapsed into a “centuries-old” problem of low yields and subsistence or into a 
temporary challenge of scarcity and stagnation. Constructing the problem as such provides a clear 
thread and a singular obvious solution: the new agricultural technology. With theatrical flourish, 
the HYVs (or in the RF narrative Sona Kalyan, the “Golden Savior,” specifically) enters to finally 
save India from “centuries-old” farming practices and a lack of local technical capacity or ability 
to improve agriculture.704 As this narrative constructs the problem as entirely outside of any 
political, economic, social, or even structural factors, addressing such factors is made to seem 
almost out of place, even presumptuous. Only (an impoverished and instrumental notion of) 
“culture”—old and new, as embodied in subsistence and in technology, respectively—fits in this 
storyline.705 
 The narrative’s framing, the powerful story of the “Golden Savior,” clings to this day, its 
simple narrative cohesion buoying it along, such that its connection to actual events or realities it 
(claims to) narrate becomes increasingly irrelevant. Such is the power of narrative: the tale, an 
un-tethered empiricist account, functions to write the record of events, for a popular national 
natural history.  
 Although this narrative is unapologetically “spin,”706 it should not be discarded—the 
representation is productive of lasting power which must be unraveled, not simply cast aside as 
untrue, dated, or irrelevant. Through a symptomatic reading this chapter interrogates the 
construction of the GR’s success narrative—a “natural history” taken up by the second Green 
Revolution.  
1.3 | Method of Inquiry: Reading the Green Revolution Narrative  
There is no important difference between stories and materials. … stories, 
effective stories, perform themselves into the material world—yes, in the 
form of social relations, but also in the form of machines, architectural 
arrangements, bodies, and all the rest.707 
HYVs (high yielding varieties) were to be the ‘engines of change’ that 
would modernize and radically transform traditional agricultures; they 
would be… ‘to the agrarian revolution of the poor countries what the 
steam engine was to the Industrial Revolution in Europe’.708 
 
 I attend to narrative in an account of agricultural development and hunger because—as the 
GR’s sedimented success narrative makes evident—representations (of situations, events, and 
problems) become inseparable from their “reality.” Representations are not only productive of 
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“reality,” representations are co-productive of, and come to co-constitute, that which is at stake. 
With the GR it is clear that the way in which the technologies and the events are discussed does 
not exist in a realm separate from or “outside” of the event itself. Rather, accepting that “language 
is a material practice… in the sense that textual and linguistic constructs are… reified or 
transformed into material things and practices in the world,”709 it is not that events and their 
discourses become muddled or inseparable, but rather that language is productive. Narratives do 
material work. The “things” that language becomes are not just stories, but also the subjects made 
and the policies constructed. The ways that we understand the world around us and events therein 
are produced through narrative as much as through their materiality.710 As such, to understand the 
GR and its success narrative, representation(s), material practices, and on-the-ground occurrences 
must be read as constitutive of one another. 
 Further, how we understand such “things” frames the conditions of the (im)possible; that is, 
our conception of how things operate informs what we think can and should be done. Discussions 
of “world hunger” provide an example: some argue that to address hunger it is necessary to grow 
more food while others argue it is necessary to address poverty and distribution and in the 
meantime give food-aid to the poor. The “answer” in each case is written by how and what the 
“problem” is understood to be. Like most problems, the problem of addressing hunger exceeds 
the visceral state of physical deprivation and takes on another existence entirely, one defined by 
its many competing understandings. Hence, tracing how particular understandings come to be, 
and how they produce and/or define particular problems in specific ways can help reveal how 
particular forms of knowledge come to be; this in turn informs how policy approaches come to 
be. To construct an account of this relation, its underlying enabling narratives must be carefully 
excavated and attended to.  
 To execute this, the methods I employ are inseparable from their theoretical underpinnings—
which has implications for how we conceive of possible futures. I seek to tell a historically 
contextualized account that is not linear or historicist. “Reading” is the method through which I 
proceed via dwelling in and “revealing the mechanics of representation and reading the archive 
as literature.”711 I suggest that a method of reading matters centrally—in this case in taking apart 
the narratives of GR success to construct an account of agricultural development, the specter of 
hunger, and the continuing work of the GR.712 
1.3.1 | Reading: multiple texts to form the narrative 
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Reading is, of course, tied in with narrating; the symptomatic reading in this chapter of the 
Green Revolution success narrative includes, for example: the Green Revolution made India food 
secure (as Majumdar invokes, above); the Green Revolution warded off the Malthusian specter 
(as Swaminathan insists, above); the Green Revolution was the “take-off” stage in Indian 
agriculture (as Sachs claims, above). These representations, cliché in any mainstream account of 
the Green Revolution are examples of the GR’s self-evident “common sense:” they assert claims 
but do not have to go through the work of actually proving these claims. While a myriad of 
individual accounts and narratives make up and reinforce this overarching narrative, my approach 
does not seek to conduct a symptomatic reading of each individual text, rather my focus is on the 
construction of the overall narrative of the Green Revolution-as-success. As such, I read multiple 
texts and narratives together.  
The texts I read include (i) modernization and development theorists writing at the time, (ii) 
published accounts of actors involved, (iii) transcripts of hearings, conferences, speeches, 
Parliamentary records, and (iv) (declassified) archival records from the Government of India 
(GoI) and the US Government (USG), and (v) archival records of the private US foundations 
involved: the Rockefeller (RF) and the Ford Foundation (FF). As this chapter is concerned with 
the success narrative of the GR, I invoke material largely from (ii), (iii), and (v).713 (Chapter Five 
relies more heavily on (iv) the “official” government documents.) 
2 |  Literature Puzzle: Navigating narratives contesting the GR as success 
 While the dominant and widely held narrative of the GR is that it astronomically increased 
India’s level of food production—securing the nation from the threat of hunger, enabling India to 
be independent of US food aid, and spurring development’s “take off”—this popular rendition of 
the GR has been thoroughly examined and critiqued. However, these critiques have been largely 
confined to empirical and statistical grounds. This is understandable given that the success 
narrative rests on the understanding—as M.S. Swaminathan articulates in the epigraph at the 
start—that via the new GR seeds and modern techniques, India produced a much greater quantity 
of food. As J.K. Bajaj (also in the in the epigraph at the start) explains, the government’s own 
production reports and agricultural statistics do not support such claims.714 Given the “gap” 
between the field reports (i.e. the official data) and the popular discourse, a number of scholars 
have taken up the question of how this disconnect between the facts and the story of the Green 
Revolution came to be. 
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 This literature interrogates the veracity of the GR’s claimed results and asks what work the 
GR’s significant social, economic and political changes brought, but it generally lets the narrative 
itself off the hook—as “just a story.” It fails to account for the fact that the GR narrative itself 
was then, and still remains, deeply important to the work of the GR—in fact, the narrative of the 
GR as a quantitative success not only lives on, it is the “healthiest” part of the GR today. To let 
the narrative itself off the hook is to allow its work to slip by, unexamined—which was and is the 
purpose of the narrative. Rather than rejecting the quantitative success narrative out of hand, it is 
necessary to ask how to understand it.  
 The literature poses the situation as follows: overall nation-wide production levels did not 
increase (according to GoI statistics and RF reports, the latter actually indicate a decrease715). Yet, 
the GR is told as a story of modernization through increased food production rather than any of 
the many other possible presentations of its approach.  
2.1 | Examining the Literature Puzzle: Where is the success? 
 In unpacking what is at stake in the axiomatic understanding that the GR was a yield 
revolution that made the nation food self-sufficient and able to feed itself, the common response 
in the literature is to declare that the GR was in fact not a revolution, that it was simply an over-
hyped narrative created for a particular (geo)political conjuncture at a time when a “success” was 
desperately needed by all parties involved. This is a well-argued case that has been made with 
varying levels of complexity and analysis since the late 1960s. Mainstream (agricultural and 
economic) academic analyses of the GR continued well into the 1970s and more critical, or 
theoretical, scholarship on the GR has continued to address it over the last thirty years.  
 Transcripts of conferences on the GR in the mid-1970s and a number of academic authors 
insist that the only real conclusion about the GR that anyone “prone to take their homework 
seriously”716 can make is that “the Green Revolution remains a Chimera or a non-event.”717 
Others probe the reasons why this “non-event” is so hyped and look for other causes behind this 
pervasive narrative. Some refocus the analytic lens, arguing as Sen does, that: 
It may be held that it is quite wrong to look for revolutionary changes in a 
quantitative, and even more so, in a statistically rigorous sense. … One can run into 
entrepreneurs who rotate their crops to face the nuances of change in relative 
prices, quite as well as their urban counterparts do, if not better. If this is the Green 
Revolution in action what fool would look for it in a statistical time series?718 
 
That is, since changes do not appear in national level yields or agricultural output, many were led 
to initially conclude that the “revolution” at hand is qualitative. It involves technological and 
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social shifts: for while it is the case that “[o]n the whole then, Indian agriculture cannot be said to 
have been through any green revolution… At the same time, it is true that hybrid varieties are 
receiving the attention of our researchers and administration and hence reaching the field.”719 
Others indicate that the introduction of these technologies themselves answers the widespread 
question of “why now”?—why has this talk of revolution suddenly appeared, given that “India’s 
food production has been steadily on the increase since the last two decades, almost keeping pace 
with her population. Why is it then that we hear of a green revolution only in the recent few 
years?”720  
2.2 |  Producing the Narrative: accounts of a quantitative leap in yields  
 To work through the representations of the GR, a key entry point is how the narrative 
operates to transform incremental changes into the clear break of a transformative event. It takes a 
situation which by a quantitative account (in 1974, well after the GR had ostensibly occurred) 
would seem deeply ambiguous: 
All the time, the Green Revolution remains a Chimera, particularly to the economic 
statistician, or rather the ones who are prone to take their homework seriously. The 
figures show fluctuations and growth. But no structural breaks in the series can be 
discerned, even for wheat in Punjab. What is even more disconcerting is that for all 
the series almost any kind of a curve gives a fairly good fit. A straight line, an 
exponential curve with rising or falling rates of growth.721 
 
Or, at best, uninspiring, as Sen explains in 1974: 
The expectation is that since the Green Revolution represents a sharp break from 
the past, it will have raised the long run trend rate of growth of foodgrains output 
considerably over the rate of the 3.05 per cent per annum established during the 
period of 1949-50 to 1964-65 [but, there was] an improvement that can be termed 
at best nominal. It appears that in terms of rates of growth of foodgrains output, the 
achievement of the GR has been grossly overrated. The long run trend growth rate 
improves from 3.05 to 3.26%.722 
 
And renders it as a clear break marked by phenomenal change, as Norman Borlaug relates in 
1970: 
Yield increases of 15 to 20 percent will convince no one. Demonstrations showing 
increases of from 200 to 600 percent, that is, from 10 bushels to 75 bushels per 
acre, as have been widely demonstrated in Pakistan and India the past two years, 
have caught the peasant’s imagination, built a fire or set a bomb under the 
politician and have triggered off an agricultural revolution of fantastic 
proportions.723 
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The work of these sample demonstrations had the effect of producing the perception and 
discourse of a monumental event, a perception that not only remains, but one that performed 
significant work for decades to come. As Hansra and Shukla explain in 1991: 
The sample surveys have amply shown that the transformation of the agricultural 
economy, which has appropriately been termed as the Green Revolution, resulted 
in phenomenal increase in production of foodgrains and income in the farm sector. 
It has saved the country from grave social, economic and political crisis and helped 
it to become not only self-sufficient in the food production but enabled it to join the 
food exporting countries of the world.724 
 
 The ideal test plot, or sample survey, comes to capture not only the national and global 
imaginary, but more, its seemingly miraculous results come to stand in for the results of national 
agriculture itself in the GR success narrative. Conflating these various levels feeds a master 
narrative of transformation via revolutionary yield increase. 
 To be very clear: I am not taking issue with the question of, or the representation of, the GR 
as transformational. It was. My concern is to excavate the nature of how its narrative and policy 
transformations came to be sedimented, written as natural, inevitable.  
2.2.1 |  Quantitative and qualitative change 
 Many scholars of the GR have concluded that the revolution was a qualitative phenomenon—
not a quantitative change. The inputs (hybrid seeds, chemical fertilizers and pesticides, etc), were 
changing and re-orienting agriculture, changes which were actively transforming social 
structures, incentives, and political-economic relations, pushing them to be in line with an 
emerging regime of development.  
 This literature reveals many important insights about the historical moment, geopolitical 
relations, imaginations of modernity, and perceptions of political threats; in fact, they turn many 
conventional understandings of the GR on their head. However, while I rely on these insights, I 
do not take their argument as sufficient. Instead I suggest that there is more at stake than this 
analysis reveals: first, there is the question of how the narrative itself came to be; second, there is 
the question of how to account for the significant political and economic changes which the GR 
era ushered in; and third, there is the question of what work this narrative does. I agree with the 
earlier authors who argue the only apparent conclusion that can be made is that the “revolution” 
was not in the quantity of food produced, but in the qualitative aspects of food production. But, 
while building on their insights, I maintain that the framing of the story as a quantitative yield 
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success narrative itself does indispensible work and must be held onto and interrogated to 
understand the transformative work of the GR then or now. 
 The GR narrative is quintessentially a narrative of modernity—it is a narrative of the 
triumphalism of science over the “natural” and naturalized problems of hunger, population 
growth, and poverty.725 Framing the problems as “natural” rather than as social and political 
problems (i.e. a result of nature, rather than a result of inequality, exploitation, agrarian policy 
neglect, or social repression) constructs the issues at stake as problems that “development’s” 
interventions can and will solve, not deepen, and serves to define out all else. This narrative 
functions to produce both the desired image of “development” as well as a path to this 
“development:” the GR. While this narrative produces the conditions of its own reality, it cannot 
make them complete; holes remain that threaten to expose its narrative architecture.726  
2.3 |  Chapter Argument: The work of narrative 
 Reading the narrative with and against itself, I point to four main insights. First, this narrative 
was prescriptive: it set about to induce change and modernization by revealing tradition’s “price.” 
Second, it worked to legitimate the realignment of development (producing “higher” and more 
urgent stakes—immanent famine and the future of the nation—to serve as an imperative for 
inequality). Third, it functioned to silence the ongoing critiques and controversy (efface the 
alternatives). Fourth, it functioned to efface the continued effects of the structural and 
institutional shifts instituted by the GR. 
 The GR was indeed a revolution—but it was a revolution in how food was produced and 
governed, rather than a revolution in how much food was produced.727 The nature of this 
“revolution” is not that which it is most often represented to be; it was a “revolution” with much 
more extensive effects than simply increasing yields. It was, in fact, a revolution of the type that 
M.S. Swaminathan claims: “a revolution in thinking… a totality”728—but not in the way that it is 
commonly represented. The narrative representation in the popular imaginary of the GR—as 
simply a revolution in level of output, or a quantitative leap in production—conceals the 
significant work that the naturalized interpretation of the GR as “revolution in thinking”729 
does.730 While it is tempting to assess the GR as merely a construction of success (given that it 
has been written as a quantitative revolution), to do so is to miss a larger point: the quantitative 
aspects of the success narrative were fundamental—but again, not in the way commonly 
represented. Unpacking the ways in which these discourses were produced and what types of 
changes were envisioned as necessary for this qualitative revolution (marketed as a quantitative 
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leap) to successfully take hold, I argue that the quantitative aspect (the imaginary which has since 
come to be dominant) came from how this revolution was sold to the people involved (initially 
administrative decision makers, planners, economists, farmers, and later politicians, bureaucrats, 
and the population at large). The quantitative narrative was designed to induce people to adopt 
the larger qualitative shifts: shifts in the government of food, and in how development is 
structured and managed. Though presented as a quantitative shift, the GR was more significantly 
a qualitative shift—in how food is governed, fundamentally in how development was structured 
and on whom development focused. These shifts were inaugurated through changing how food is 
produced, hence necessarily changing the social relations of production. 
 The GR is a project that in the name of securing “food enough” fundamentally reworked the 
nature of food (and “food security”) itself—via the way that development entitlements were 
restructured under GR policies. The GR not only re-worked agricultural production itself away 
from subsistence relations into market relations, but with this, also instilled a separation whereby 
(access to) food also increasingly came to be subject to market relations—a fundamentally 
biopolitical move (see Ch. 1). The narrative of the GR as a quantitative yield success was 
introduced to induce change based on both an assumption of resistance to change and actual 
considerations and rejections of the approach for various other (social, political, and economic) 
reasons, instilling a fundamental separation with the idea of (what later came to be called) food 
security: between food production and access to food. This severing—which underwrites the 
possibility of market relations, and what comes to be understood as “development” itself—
continues to produce fundamental disparities, for instance, as manifest in the contemporary 
“paradox of plenty.” But the idea of how subsistence is moved away from: i.e. who is allowed to 
participate in this migration, on what terms, what their roles in the new market relations are, and 
what their place is on the path to “development” is crucial in attending to how this severing of 
food production and food access produce dispossession, hunger, and surplus—all in the name of 
feeding the poor and securing the nation. 
3 | Instigating change: the work of “tradition”  
 India’s Minister of Food and Agriculture, C. Subramaniam, was one of the New Strategy’s 
staunchest advocates. He and others writing at the time detail their encounters with, and ongoing 
efforts to overcome, the stubborn resistance to change and “tradition-bound” thinking that they 
diagnosed at every level, from farmers, to planners, bureaucrats, other Ministers, scientists, 
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experts and political leaders. In the narrative he weaves of his protracted battle against 
“tradition;” the problem, as Subramaniam frames it, was with the farmer’s “traditional 
mentality.” Subramaniam’s strategy was cast as one of how to break farmers and other decision 
makers out of their attachment to tradition. The “science” of development policy became focused 
on how to do this—how to create the simple steps to progress and to make people see a value in 
this progress—when, in the development experts’ view, those people did not want to improve 
their condition and seemed perfectly content to live at a subsistence level poverty (see Ch. 3).  
3.1 | Giving “tradition” a “price”  
“I have met farmers all over the world who could not read and write, 
but I have never met a farmer who could not count.” -Orville 
Freeman, US Secretary of Agriculture731 
 
 Tradition, Subramaniam argued, could be overwhelmed through a narrative of a revolutionary 
quantitative yield increase, which would prompt awareness of the costs of not taking action. The 
only catch was that the promised yield increase must be sufficiently overwhelming enough to 
inscribe a new logic. As Subramaniam explains: 
It is said, particularly in relation to the developing countries, that it is very 
difficult to persuade illiterate farmers with small farms to adopt new 
technologies. I agree with this if only a small change is envisaged. For a marginal 
change in productivity you cannot make such a farmer change to new methods 
and technology. But if it is of the magnitude of 200 or 300 percent, and he 
considers that it is possible on his own farm, then even the most traditional man 
may decide to devote at least a portion, if not his entire area, to a test of the 
technology. Why did we not go step by step, increasing production by 25 per cent 
… so as to increase productivity in a phased manner? It was our view that with 
such small incremental improvements it would be very difficult to influence the 
attitude of the farmer to adopt this new technology.732 
 
The “experts” had decreed that these massive promises would be sufficient to break 
“peasants” out of tradition and prompt them to try a new approach. However, the issue was not 
(re)solved. The appropriate or effective mechanism to make farmers see it this way, to believe in 
this view, was still not entirely evident. Subramaniam suggests that he presented the missing key: 
not only must the yield increase be overwhelming enough to inscribe a new logic. More than that, 
the logic itself was foremost; the introduction of the logic of calculation itself was critical, the 
logic of price and exchange relations. As Subramaniam lays out: 
How can the farmer be persuaded to accept this new technology and take the 
risks involved in it? After much discussion I offered them [the panel of experts—
scientists, economists and administrators] an idea for action: ‘If the technology 
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we were offering the famer gave only a marginal increase in productivity, of 15 
per cent to 25 per cent or even 50 per cent, the farmer might not have sufficient 
incentive to take a risk, to discard their traditional practices and adopt new 
practices. But if productivity was increased by the order of 200 or 300 per cent, 
even tradition could be shown to have its price.’ If this scale of increase was 
demonstrated to him, I thought that even the crust of tradition could be broken 
and farmers might be prepared to take a risk. The important initial action was to 
demonstrate to the farmer that productivity increases on this scale were 
possible…on his own fields.733 
 
To write this logic and break “tradition” the modernizers had to demonstrate that this was not 
simply a risk worth taking, but that the larger risk was to not pursue the particular path. This was 
to be done by giving tradition a clear and calculable “price,” or showing farmers the price they 
paid for refusing to modernize. This was meant to demonstrate that it was not merely adopting a 
new technology that was the decision in question. Rather, it was the choice to not-adopt the new 
technology that was the decision; with the mindset of “scientific” progress, “change” was to 
become the status quo. In the case of the GR this was demonstrated by showing that the 
quantifiable yield jump was so significant that they could not afford to not take this approach to 
production (accompanied by the contradictory promise that it was simply using an improved seed, 
and it would not transform any other aspect of society, or their way of life).  
 In this re-inscription, the framework of “price” and exchange relations was to enable the 
reversal of the “traditional mindset:” after placing “traditional” understandings within the logic of 
exchange relations, peasants would (in the process of understanding this) already enter the terrain 
of exchange value. From there it was a small step to get them to think about “maximizing” their 
resources.734 The appeal and transformational power of narrative was to be self-evident.  
 The leap into “development,” or “big push,” is what the quantitative yield narrative was 
designed to guide—the narrative itself was to perform the essential work of transforming 
subjects—transforming their “mindset” and their engagement with farming by forcing them to re-
interpret each of these through the logic of exchange relations. And, in the narrative this is what 
happened, as Norman Borlaug summarizes: “Demonstrations showing increases of from 200 to 
600 percent … have caught the peasant’s imagination, built a fire or set a bomb under the 
politician and have triggered off an agricultural revolution of fantastic proportions.”735 Building 
on this, Subramaniam explained to aid donors at a conference in New York: “the response of the 
allegedly tradition-bound Indian farmer to the new agricultural technology is ‘one of the miracles 
stories of modern development’.”736 
  157 
3.1.1 | Convincing the Planners 
 In Subramaniam’s rendition of the policy process, this narrative was invented (or 
collectively stumbled upon) in a collaborative meeting between a number of administrative 
officials and himself, together scheming how to pull peasants’ strings and animate them 
into rational action. However, reading on, another story begins to emerge. The nature of 
how this quantitative yield narrative was formed and solidified had little to nothing to do 
with “peasants” at all. For, it was not “peasants” that were holding back implementation of 
the New Strategy. Rather, as Borlaug complains (in a private letter to Glenn Anderson of 
the RF, India Agriculture Program): 
It seems almost unbelievable that after you have nearly broken this program [the 
New Strategy] out into the open as far as wheat production is concerned, and after 
you have so completely captured the imagination of the peasant farmers and 
broken their resistance to change, that this approach should be opposed by over-
sophisticated economists. 737, 738  
 
It was not just the Planning Commission that was opposed to the New Strategy; there was 
widespread opposition and plenty of controversy. As Subramaniam explains: 
I came to the conclusion that there was no use trying to rush it [the New Strategy] 
in time for the 1964-65 season. I told my friends I was sorry to lose one year, but to 
avoid being confronted with opposition from all sides, I would give more time for 
this controversy to settle down, and prepare the ground for the introduction of the 
new strategy in 1965-66.739  
However, after waiting a year for the “controversy to settle down,”740 the New Strategy was still 
deeply unpopular and remained caught at the level of the policy implementation and resource 
allocation.  
 The narrative of the GR’s success came to be forged in the battles around the introduction of 
the New Strategy.  
Deeming it “almost unbelievable” that the Planning Commission could be holding up the 
New Strategy, Borlaug insists that the Planners have no place in these “technical decisions.”741 
Yet, pertinent to the decisions that Borlaug is referencing is the fact that the new HYV test crops 
were not yielding the desired results. In fact, they were not yielding any better than the local 
varieties.742 The trial data from 1964-65 was “not good:” the Mexican varieties, even with all the 
inputs, were barely better than local varieties. The Planning Commission was understandably 
skeptical, questioning the Ministry of Agriculture’s policy of “concentration.”743  
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The Planners did not agree with the logic of the New Strategy’s central requirement; they did 
not agree with the argument that all the fertilizer and inputs should be concentrated on only 
farmers growing the new exotic HYV varieties, especially for such meager improvements in 
yield.744 On behalf of RF IAP, Borlaug is asked for any data he can pass along to RF and Ministry 
of Agriculture that they could use to convince the Planning Commission of the policy of 
“concentration” and HYVs, i.e. their ability to increase yield significantly enough that all of the 
NPK inputs should go to the big HYV farmers alone. 745  
 The promise of a several hundred-fold yield increase was to give the seeds—these seeds 
being the fundamental and driving difference between the NS and the IADP—a much greater 
weight within the exchange logic that the NS proponents sought to guide the assessment of 
options and dominate the debates. The promise was meant to influence the Planners and officials 
in the administration—not the peasants at all. The logic of giving a “price” to the previous path—
sidelined under the title “tradition” or “tradition bound thinking”—was to offer administrative 
decision makers a new framework in which to assess the “costs and benefits” of the HYVs.  
While the immediate issue at hand was the necessity of the policy of “concentration,” this 
questioning was deeply worrying to the New Strategy’s advocates. For, the policy of 
“concentration” was the pivot of the GR. Given their failure to yield, the RF IAP deems the 
Planners “understandably” reluctant to go forward with the New Strategy at all—as it required 
them to re-allocate a significant portion of India’s development resources and to sextuple the 
foreign exchange allotment. Moreover, this discussion was but one issue. The debate did not 
hinge on the results of these HYV test crops, but the huge yield increases were the HYV’s selling 
point. The decision to go with HYVs and the NS had a significant “price”—not just the large 
financial “price” but also, and no less significant, analysts predicted very large societal costs of 
opting for the NS—namely increased social tensions and the deliberate production of inequity.  
 There were many significant large-scale policy changes that adopting the “New Strategy” 
would involve. The New Strategy’s staunchest policy advocate, Subramaniam, lays out the 
context and some of these changes:  
The Fourth Plan was under preparation at the time and the full financial 
implications of the new strategy came to be discussed in this context. The new 
strategy implied that (a) the agriculture-industry balance of Plan allocation would 
have to change drastically and (b) because of the finances required, particularly 
foreign exchange, the Plan would have to change the development strategy, giving 
it a new ideological orientation. A greater role would have to be given to private 
investment, both domestic and foreign, which would lead to greater reliance on the 
world market. … New inputs like fertilizers and plant protection chemicals would 
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be used in a few areas with assured rainfall and irrigation in order to get the 
maximum protection. This would mean favoring areas which were comparatively 
well developed with regard to irrigation. This aspect was attacked, saying that it 
was against Nehru’s strategy to give priority to the development of backward 
areas. The foreign exchange requirement of the new strategy also created 
problems. The requirement was projected to be Rs. 1114 crores over the Plan 
period. This was six times more than the Third Plan allocation. Fertilizers, seeds 
and pesticides were the main items to be imported.746 
 
The Planners consideration of the issue did not stay within the bubble Borlaug wanted. Far from 
it; the policy was immensely controversial. Its wider social implications and likely socio-
economic results (regardless if wheat yields were phenomenal or unimpressive) were predicted—
the resultant inequities and social tensions were not “unknown” or a surprise.  
3.2 | Debate + objections to the New Strategy 
 Given the extensive debate at the time, many scholars had carefully documented what they 
expected would result from the GR policies. Policy makers, government officials, Ministers, 
scholars, and many others knew very well that the New Strategy was predicted to increase 
inequality and produce other social tensions (which up to that time agricultural planning had 
deliberately aimed to avoid). One reason the New Strategy’s allocation of resources was facing 
such sustained opposition was the widely shared assessment that this policy would necessarily 
increase inequality (even if at the same time boosting production among the best-off farmers). 
This policy choice was one that many found deeply objectionable and counter to the very idea, 
and socialist ideals, of development that India had been pursuing. The (more Nehruvian) path of 
development—defined as “growth with equity” for the aim of promoting social justice—was now 
seemingly cast aside in favor of the type of growth that it had been meant to counter. This policy 
choice was thus a clear change from the previous and existing policy approaches; the choice to go 
with the “New Strategy” signaled a decisive right turn away from the status-quo consensus 
around a Nehruvian approach. This abandonment of the goals and ideals of Nehruvian planning 
and development was a key contention of disagreement.  
3.2.1 | Debate + objections: favoring those who need it least 
 Academics, economists, members of the Ministry of Agriculture and the Planning 
Commission predicted the results and were determinedly opposed to the significant change of 
policy course. Beyond the issue of land reform, the objection was to the overall approach—what 
Subramaniam had called the “new ideological orientation.” An orientation, which as Dr. 
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V.K.R.V. Rao747 explained, “amounts to giving benefits to some at the cost of others.” 748 Rao 
details: 
 The selective approach we are following [with the New Strategy] certainly has 
its logic in production economics, but it is also going to increase inter-personnel 
[sic] and regional inequalities among our farmers. … This approach is an 
extension of the principle of unbalanced growth as against balanced growth to 
agriculture. Therefore, it is not justifiable from a welfare point of view, because 
the scarce resources are diverted to the most productive areas at the cost of the 
benefits which could have accrued to other areas if these resources were 
distributed equitably. … This situation is not such where the share of one is 
given to the other to save the latter’s life without adversely affecting the health of 
the former. On the contrary, it is a case which adversely affects the growth of one 
in order to add layer of coating to an already healthy face of the other. … It 
seems unlikely that intensive areas will constitute growing points from which the 
impulse towards growth will spread to the economy, on account of scarcities and 
bottlenecks inherent in our economy. This approach may decelerate the growth 
process instead of accelerating it.”749 
 
Dandekar further builds on this critique of the NS’s “new ideological orientation,” criticizing the 
privileging of the already privileged at the expense of the rest—arguing that it is not only 
neglecting them, but putting them further behind.750 This is a policy result which Subramaniam 
himself acknowledges, explaining that: 
Once these new varieties were introduced it would be the big farmers who would 
take the advantage of this while the small farmers would be left behind. This was 
likely to lead to social tensions within rural areas and it would thus be dangerous 
to introduce this new strategy unless land reform legislation was fully 
implemented.751 
 
Subramaniam echoes the predictions of academics, scholars, planners, and agricultural experts of 
what the effects of the New Strategy would be. This was a shared diagnosis; they differ not on the 
outcome of this policy, but in their value judgment of it; that is, to what extent this potential for 
rapidly increasing inequality and further marginalization of the poorer and smaller farmers was 
considered to be a problem, versus simply a necessity for development.  
 This “new ideological orientation” deployed an argument which invoked a framework of 
knowledge relations that—contradictorily—presumed an absence of power relations, inequities 
and power differentials. While the justifying rationale for the project was the necessity to focus 
on the best endowed farmers, the way the policies were created, deployed, and justified was 
ruptured from the start by conflicting assumptions. The presumption was that favoring the elite 
was necessary to feed the poor and the nation, and that the elite would provide a “demonstration 
effect” which was to help the poor to “learn” to become better farmers (see Ch. 3).  
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3.2.2 | Debate + objections: it is based on unworkable presumptions  
 Another critique that academics and other members of the administration leveled against the 
New Strategy—and perhaps part of the reason why the HYVs and the approach of the New 
Strategy were unlikely to produce as much as hoped for—was based on insights they had gained 
from the IADP.752 The proponents assumed that after a few demonstrations among the farmers, 
knowledge about and practices of “modernization…would flow like water over a dam 
automatically,”753 however, this did not happen. Critics of the New Strategy indicted the 
(imaginary of) “knowledge” which the modernizers relied on, pointing out the realities on the 
ground which complicate the case of agriculture and rural development. Farmers often do not 
even know about the demonstrations, or are not in contact with other farmers outside their 
vicinity to know that they are taking a new approach.754 Documenting that the “demonstration 
effect…will not automatically flow to other areas, as is claimed,”755 their critique undermined the 
enabling assumption of the New Strategy’s trickle-down benefits. The assumption that knowledge 
will simply flow across the fields is a highly detached technicist assumption, and while essential 
to enabling the New Strategy’s policy approach, it is also an assumption that had already been 
proven empirically false both in practice and in studies.756 For rural development to occur, the 
program’s approach had to systematically reach out to all, especially to the most disadvantaged—
rather than simply assume knowledge of modern technology would reverse course and begin to 
flow away from power, and towards the marginalized and excluded.  
 Additionally, critics pointed out that experiences with the IADP showed that “despite 
strenuous efforts, it has not been possible to step up the rate of application of fertilizers 
significantly except in a few of the Intensive Agricultural Development Programme districts.”757 
Since this was the case even among the best-off farmers, there was little reason to think that this 
plan could succeed at the scale desired. On top of the failure of the HYV new seeds to yield much 
difference, the consistent failures of the IADP (which never met its production targets) brought 
into question the demand to reallocate development’s resources to the elite and increase 
inequality, while spending down the nation’s foreign exchange for these seeds (and some 
fertilizers). The Planners and the Finance Minister became arch-opponents of the New Strategy’s 
policy of “concentration.”  
3.3 | The New Strategy comes up short 
They [the Planning Commission] put forward all facts and figures with regard to 
the available resources, domestic and foreign, and made it clear that the new 
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agricultural strategy was unworkable and therefore recommended a return to the 
Nehruvian Model with the coordinated development of the Community 
Development Organizations, Panchayati Raj institutions and Cooperatives.758 
 
Subramaniam explains the Planners response to the New Strategy, but as we know, this was not 
the end of the GR story. But what is of interest is that these long debates have been cleansed from 
the contemporary version of the GR narrative. How was this insistent opposition to the GR as bad 
policy, bad for India, bad for development, not only overcome (such that the policy was 
implemented), but more, how was it that this policy came to be renowned, regarded as the most 
celebrated and successful achievement of India’s development trajectory.  
 The story of the transformation of the GR narrative is indeed one of “a success in a field 
where success is relatively rare,”759 as the Rockefeller Foundation book expounds. But, it is a 
success that echoes through the chambers of Parliament and the media elite, a story of success 
that has little (if any) relation to conditions in fields across India; for ordinary farmers were not its 
intended recipients. While the debates have been largely effaced, replaced with a success 
narrative and the structure of necessity, it is clear that this narrative was written not for peasants 
but for the elite (administrators and officials in the GoI, academics and policy analysts) whom it 
was designed to convince with a logic of overwhelming yield increases.  
 It was in these moments of debate that the success narrative of the GR was solidified. Thus, 
while Subramaniam explained that “Ultimately many came to the conclusion that perhaps it 
would be better to raise output in India even though it might create other problems”760 and Dowie 
likewise explains that the GR eventually convinced its many critics that it was necessary, despite 
its massive costs,”761 the debate and how it was settled—how it closed off the question of 
agricultural development—has been largely effaced.  
3.4 | Framing the question for success 
Lamenting that Planners must be appeased, Norman Borlaug replies to the RF IAP, 
expressing his deep frustration with the Planners who as he sees it know nothing about actually 
growing food but want to set the terms of how it should be done.  
If these economic planners would confine more of their energies to obtaining a 
rapid expansion in fertilizer production capacity, to establishing and maintaining 
stimulatory prices for wheat grain, to providing transportation and warehousing 
facilities, and if they left the technical decisions in the hands of capable 
agronomists, the world would be much better off.762 
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Borlaug frames the question not as one of how to feed India and ensure development, but rather, 
elides the question and replacing its urgency with his solution (HYV crops). He declares that 
technical experts,763 not the Planning Commission, should make development decisions, i.e. the 
issue is not one of weighing policy options, but carrying out the specifics of one already adopted 
technical fix. Borlaug ends the letter stating that he is “confident that you are on the threshold of a 
world startling revolution in wheat production.” He assures the RF IAP that the satisfaction will 
be even greater when they reflect back and see all the foot dragging, lack of vision, and road 
blocks that they overcame—he offers consolation and guidance that they just need to “Close your 
ears to all of this bickering and get on with the job. I am sure that you will have the great 
satisfaction of seeing a real revolution in wheat production materialize before your very eyes.”764  
  In answer to concerns about the failure of the new HYVs to produce the promised “miracle,” 
the RF IAP is offered a promise—not the requested “data,” but—an approach, a narrative to bring 
to the Planners: the promise of a history-making revolution in wheat yields. Armed with the 
promise that even though the field statistics do not show it, a major breakthrough is just around 
the corner—a promise that it will happen if the Planners allocate sufficient resources—they are 
urged to charge ahead. In a later memo, Borlaug simultaneously credits and panders to the 
administration—“[t]he dynamic action that has been taken by India during the past two years to 
greatly expand its wheat production cannot be matched by any other nation”765—and then 
reminds the Planners of their duty to lead development and enlighten the masses. He reiterates 
their responsibility: “It is all important to India’s economic and agricultural development that this 
target is achieved. The Indian farmer is rapidly awakening.”766  
3.5 | Building a successful revolution: guaranteeing success to the “tradition” minded 
Reviewing the factors that distinguished unlikely development successes from failures, Albert 
Hirschman argued that decision makers had to be promised that any potential project was merely 
the implementation of a clear program that had already been tested, tried, and succeeded in many 
other places.767 Dubbing this phenomenon the “Hiding Hand,” Hirschman explained that the 
leaders must be assured that in adopting a new approach, they were simply taking their societies 
one established step up the ladder of progress.768 For, any uncertainty of results could keep the 
project from even being considered, much less making it through the process of resource 
allocation and implementation.  
For a development project to succeed, its trajectory (including its eventual success) had to be 
written in advance. In this script the implementation was to be simply a matter of local 
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technicalities. Hirschman’s significance and influence on American development policy overseas 
was far-reaching. As “John P. Lewis, former head of the India USAID mission, told Congress in 
1969 Hirschman had written the history of the Green Revolution in advance. ‘He taught many of 
us to realize that this is the way you expect successful development to happen’.”769 
The potential for any uncertainty of results, Hirschman assessed, was why agricultural 
development lagged behind industrial development—in industry the sequence of steps to 
modernization was more clearly demarcated and (hence industrial modernization appeared to be 
more) transferrable than agricultural modernization. The difference between the stages of 
industrial development and agricultural development also was mobilized to serve as evidence 
demonstrating the successful work of the “Hiding Hand.” Hence the necessity to “industrialize” 
agriculture—to delineate it into a clear sequence of steps toward modernization. As B.P. Pal, the 
director of ICAR (the Indian Council of Agricultural Research), explained in the lead-up to the 
New Strategy: “It is only through the adoption of science and technology that we would be able to 
transform agriculture from predominantly a traditional way of life to an industry.”770  
3.5.1 | The necessity of certainty for overcoming “tradition”  
The necessity of certainty and the hesitation to make unknown changes, applied foremost to 
leaders in “traditional” societies, but not uniquely to them. Such hesitation also marked the 
decisions of Western politicians and funders. It was equally necessary to convince the latter, as 
they had the power to make development programs possible or relegate them to being merely 
untested, unimplemented ideas.  
USAID Administrator William Gaud—famous for coining the name “the Green 
Revolution”—consolidated the emergent agricultural changes under the title “the Green 
Revolution” in a speech to funders.771 He was promising that there was a new possibility for the 
Third World, a possibility which would allow them to revolutionize production, eventually feed 
themselves, and build a safeguard against the specter of a “Red” revolution.772 Pronouncing: “The 
story of the Green Revolution is not a story of failure, it is a story of success.”773 Gaud pleaded 
that this approach would work—the funders just needed the resolve to fund it—if given a chance, 
this program was certain to transform agriculture in “backward societies.”774 When Gaud 
“invented” the Green Revolution in 1968 it had not “succeeded” yet—the promised “success” is 
yet to come. This declaration of success was a strategic rhetorical device in his plea imploring 
funders and decision makers to finance foreign agricultural aid, promising that if the support is 
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continued, India “hopes to achieve self-sufficiency in food grains in another three or four years. 
She has the capability to do so.”775  
Likewise, in a speech in New York less than one month later, Subramaniam776 assured 
American funders that what India was achieving under the New Strategy (now known as the 
“Green Revolution”) was unparalleled: “[a]s a feat of human engineering, this has scarcely an 
equal in history.”777 He implored them that for continued funding for the New Strategy, stating 
that via the New Strategy, India was changing—no longer to be regarded as “a patient without 
hope, deserving to be abandoned.”778 It was this “New Strategy” that was working—that was 
finally succeeding in “changing India from a sick man of world agriculture into a dynamic food 
producer.”779 Further, he assured his audience that they could not decline to continue funding the 
project at this late point, just when “the response of the allegedly tradition-bound Indian farmer to 
the new agricultural technology is [proving to be] ‘one of the miracles stories of modern 
development’”780—how could anyone allow the long-awaited miracle to be cut-off before its 
culmination. 
3.5.2 | Defining risk, Assuring success  
In India the promises Subramaniam had been making over the previous three years of intense 
debate were of a somewhat different nature. In his battles with the rest of the administration 
Subramaniam claims that he repeatedly assured the rest of the administration, the Planners,781 
prominent Ministers,782 Parliament, and other government agencies, as well as independent 
academics and scientists, with the argument (the same one that he claimed to use on the peasant) 
that there was no risk—the risk was of not acting. The risk in acting, if any, he insistently 
maintained, was worth taking, in fact, India could not afford otherwise. As Subramaniam 
recollects: 
…many well meaning friends came to me and asked[:] ‘Why do you take this 
unnecessary risk? … we have to take the realities of the situation into account 
therefore, let us not plunge into these new ideas which have not been fully 
tested.’ But I told them that Jawaharlal Nehru once said: ‘Success comes to those 
who dare and act, it seldom goes to the timid.’ This was an area where the risks 
were two fold—one was a risk of continuing scarcity, the other was that in trying 
to remove scarcity something would go wrong. Thus both choices involved risk. I 
thought facing scarcities was the most dangerous and therefore wanted to take 
this risk and launch the program.783 
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In his recollection, Subramaniam clearly turns the argument of his “well meaning friends” on its 
head: insisting that the “risk” at stake is not the “New Strategy,” but rather the risk lies in doing 
nothing.  
 Further trumping Gaud’s promises of success, Subramaniam offered not just a guarantee, but 
a tangible insurance policy that the GR would succeed: he insisted that if anyone lost any money 
on the strategy they would be repaid in full and that if even one person died of hunger because of 
this New Strategy he would immediately resign as Minister of Agriculture.784 The flourish of his 
claims lasts to this day—not because they were carried through785—but because they fortify a 
larger narrative of the GR’s status as an indisputable success for all.   
3.5.3 | Circumventing the Planner’s focus on equity with the “natural law” of efficiency 
Guaranteeing the certainty of success still left unresolved the question at stake in this ongoing 
debate: how resources should most effectively be allocated. This was the question Borlaug was 
upset about—not the “yes or no” to the New Strategy itself, but rather—that the New Strategy 
was caught on the terms of its central “technical” requirement: the question of “resource” 
allocation (i.e. the policy of “concentration”).  
The criterion of assessment was “maximizing the output with limited resources in the shortest 
possible time.”786 It was not this logic that was in question; rather, the debate came to turn on the 
means of maximizing resources: what should this look like, how to most effectively maximize the 
resources in limited time (i.e. who to attend to, how, how much, and when).  
The New Strategy’s advocates insisted that given the “scarcity,” the only way for the nation 
not to starve was if resources were allocated “efficiently”—by which they meant concentrated 
among only a very limited group of the best endowed farmers. This was a technical rendering that 
allowed them to invoke necessity as an alibi. That is, they could claim that while this might not be 
the most equitable—a fact which they could then acknowledge was unfortunate—it simply was 
not a matter of “choice.” Instead, it became the “nature” of scarcity and efficiency that demanded 
this sacrifice of the nation, all for its own good. While the NS’s advocates insisted that the NS 
was the only way for the nation to meet its food targets, opponents insisted that “[o]ur aim is 
maximizing the output with limited resources in the shortest possible time. The principle of 
selection of areas runs contrary to this purpose.”787 That is, they suggested that the NS’s 
fundamental premise of selecting only the few best endowed farmers was fundamentally in 
conflict with the logic as well as the mathematics of how to most efficiently maximize resources. 
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3.6 | Outside of debate, it comes into being 
 While the claims that forge the success narrative did important work, it was not these 
promises that pushed the NS through into policy in the end. Instead of becoming mired in policy 
debates, Subramaniam narrates, the problem was resolved without the need for debate: when 
Indira Gandhi became Prime Minister there was a top-down initiated change of Planning 
Commission leadership. Subramaniam was appointed to the Planning Commission and the 
Commission’s stance changed accordingly—the New Strategy and supporting policies were 
adopted: 
A year later, in August 1966, with me [Subramaniam] in the Planning Commission, 
a new draft outline of the Fourth Plan was formulated which read as follows: 
‘If our dependence on imported foodgrains has to cease, it is necessary to 
make far greater use of modern methods of production. A new strategy or 
approach is needed if we are to achieve results over a short span of time. 
During the last four years, as a result of the trials conducted in several 
research centers in India on exotic and hybrid varieties of seeds, a 
breakthrough has become possible. These varieties are highly responsive to a 
heavy dosage of chemical fertilizers. The long term objective is to organize 
the use of high-yielding seeds together with a high application of fertilizers 
over extensive areas where irrigation is assured.’788 
 
But just because the New approach was approved by the Planning Commission and was funded—
and despite the fact that “[u]ltimately many came to the conclusion that perhaps it would be better 
to raise output in India even though it might create other problems”789—the issue was far from 
resolved.  
4 | The narrative’s form consolidates 
 It is at this point that the success narrative fully takes form. Subramaniam’s appointment to 
the Planning Commission is not what created the quantitative yield narrative; that narrative had 
already been put to work. But, while the core issues in contention remained much the same, the 
work of the narrative shifted towards supporting the tactics or “technical” aspects of achieving 
this success—in the name of the poor and the nation’s in/dependence.  
 As the debate increasingly shifts to one of technicalities, the narrative also comes to take on a 
moral righteousness—the invocation that the NS is necessary as the only means for “the nation” 
to retain its sovereignty. As Subramaniam explains: “Even if … there was a certain amount of 
social tension, the new technology provided the prospect of self-sufficiency for the country in 
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foodgrains.”790 Some segments of the administrative elite were still not convinced about the 
necessity of the NS; the answer to getting the elite “moving” was related to, but distinct from, the 
approach to get the farmers to adopt change. The guaranteeing of success was important as a pull 
factor, but there also had to be a clear necessity, a push factor, for the decisions makers and 
administrative elite. The threat of imminent hunger and the nation’s starvation performs this 
work. In the discourses constructed to convince decision makers “the nation” itself is harnessed 
as the imperative for the New Strategy. These claims also come to forge the agrarian elite as a 
subject. This becomes evident in the discourses of liberal responsibility; the argument that the 
NS’s approach of privileging the best-endowed farmers is necessary to help the poor becomes 
more clearly articulated. As Subramaniam maintained: “There has been a cry that it is only the 
better-off farmers who have been using the fertilizer so that we have been only subsidizing them. 
But, you have to strike a balance because if they do not use the fertilizer they will not produce 
and the whole nation will have to starve.”791 
4.1 | Defining the terrain of debate: a moral imperative  
 Responding to widespread opposition and insistent critiques of the New Strategy, 
Subramaniam’s answer aims to define the terrain and to raise the stakes of the question of input 
distribution. His insistence that if the best endowed farmers are not provided the subsidies to 
increase their production, the poor, and the nation as a whole, will not even eat792 relies on a 
division between the feeders and the fed. In this move, he fortifies the nascent realignment of 
development as a project of subsidizing the elite in the name of “the nation” and “the poor,” and 
forges the subject of this development project; further, he creates a moral imperative for this 
realignment.  
 Subramaniam acknowledges that the NS would increase inequality only to immediately 
dismiss this as not the issue of concern; he centers his argument on the necessity of the GR in the 
name of the poor, and on the inequitable approach as mandated by “nature” (as manifest in the 
materiality of the seeds and the urgency of famine.) He is certainly aware of the need to attend to 
the poorest in society; the question is how this should be done. He answers this question 
implicitly, by (re)defining who the subject of development action is. This answer has had lasting 
significance.793 He explains:    
Our agricultural programme should be such that it gives new economic strength 
to these poorer sections. How to do it is the question. These are the four aspects 
which will have to be taken into consideration. It is not as if by a marginal 
increase of 5 to 10 per cent we would be able to bring about this change. What is 
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important to realize is that only a massive increase, by 100 or even 200 percent 
will solve the problem. Is it possible? That is the question. Fortunately today 
developments have taken place in science which can make this possible.794 
 
Given that Subramaniam had already made clear that the “poorer sections” will not be the ones 
using this new technology, his answer should elicit pause. He is implicitly arguing that the well-
off farmers must be given access to technology to produce more—a lot more—for the poor to 
gain the trickle down effects of this “new economic strength.” While he claims that the 
agricultural changes need to be for the poor, the question of poverty is left unasked and 
unaddressed. As is the question of how modern science and agricultural technology will be used 
to actually aid the poor. The project, enacted in the name of the poor, harnesses and exploits their 
material exclusion to promote projects that then consolidate their marginalization. That said, the 
purpose of these projects was certainly not to intentionally reinforce poverty nor to further 
entrench or produce marginalization. Rather, the GR proponents argued that this approach was 
simply the “most efficient.” Given the imperatives of feeding the nation, while the intention was 
“not to hold some areas back for the benefit of others,” at the same time, the shifts this approach 
introduced made it clear that “[t]he slogan of balanced regional development should not be taken 
seriously.”795 
Hence, while the “New Strategy”796 consolidated the marginalization of the poor and 
produced the elite as the subject of development, the process was more than one of exclusion. It 
was also, less explicitly, a project of naturalizing the exclusion (and eventual dispossession) of 
small and marginal farmers—in the name of efficiency and “food enough” for the nation (the 
language of food security would not emerge for another ten years).  
While the NS’s advocates represented it as the most rational project for producing 
development with the most efficient allocation of resources,797 in doing so, they also position the 
NS and this development process against the realm of politics. That is, while the claim is that the 
NS is only a change from the previous Nehruvian approach of “passing up growth for the goal of 
equity and social cohesion,”798 in producing a new ostensibly objective criteria of maximizing 
limited development resources, the NS advocates establish a new criteria of assessment. The 
Nehruvian approach comes to be cast aside, dismissed as “tradition” and resistance to rational 
progress. The socialist ideals are not rejected, they are still seen as “ideally” good, but 
“impractical”—an ideological quest for an essentially impossible dream of economic equality—a 
quest which in the emerging zero-sum logic would come at the expense of the nation’s progress 
and autonomy. 799 
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4.2 | Defining the terrain of debate: invoking nature and the technical 
The question of the distribution of resources remained the pivot of the NS. The narrative 
framed the problem as a “technical matter” of what the seeds required, i.e. an issue best left to 
“experts” to resolve, but this rendering of the discussion into one of technicalities did not shut 
down debate or determine what path should be taken. Some of those who had come around to be 
supporters instead of critics of the GR continued to push for what Subramaniam had promised: 
adjustments to make agricultural policy and development more equitable. Discussions continued 
on the issue of intentionally increasing inequality—as a direct result of how the distribution of the 
scarce resources (e.g. seeds, inputs and support prices) were allocated. Thus even if, or when, the 
Planning Commission accepted the request for increasing the allocation of government resources 
to new seeds and inputs, the central question of how (i.e. to whom and in what proportion) these 
resources should be allocated was still not agreed upon. 
In the narrative of the GR’s success, this question was to be understood as a “technical 
question” of what the nature of new seeds themselves required. The question of allocation of 
resources, Borlaug maintained, should not be in the hands of the Planners at all, but should be 
based on factors which were clearly not up to the Planners to decide (i.e. the nature of the seeds). 
Hence, Borlaug’s insistence that all such “technical decisions” should be made only by experts, in 
this case “capable agronomists.”800 This argument was key to the effort at writing out resource 
allocation as a social choice (by rendering it simply “technical”). Such a writing effaces the 
massive social costs of allocating resources in the proposed deeply skewed manner. However, 
making this case proved difficult. For while the “economics” of “resource maximization” was the 
terrain of debate and the metric of assessment, the statistics on the most efficient allocation of 
these resources became hotly debated.801 
4.2.1 | Debating technicalities—the needs of the seed  
A discussion of “maximizing scarce resources in a limited time” and drawing lines of 
distinction between questions as both social and technical vs. purely technical offers insight into 
the work of “nature” in the success narrative. The Statistical Institute of India took up the 
question of input distribution and determined that if the same limited quantity of fertilizers were: 
(i) equitably distributed or (ii) distributed selectively according to the New Strategy’s criteria, the 
former would produce higher yields than the latter approach of allocating all of the fertilizer to 
the “progressive farmers” using the new HYV seeds. As Subramaniam explains: 
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Among other inputs required for making this programme a success, fertilizer was 
perhaps the next most important [after the seed]. …Given our domestic supply 
situation it was a matter in the first instance of approaching the Finance Minister 
for the allocation of foreign exchange. At that time, however, the Statistical 
Institute of India took up this problem of fertilizer distribution and came out with 
a devastating paper on my strategy. The new strategy depended upon intensified 
fertilizer use at the level of 60 to 100 kilograms of nitrogen. Technical 
statisticians worked out the utilization pattern of fertilizer which would yield the 
best results. In particular they examined the question of whether intensified use in 
limited and specific areas at the level of 60 to 100 kgs/h [recommended as 
necessary for HYVs] or a widely distributed use at 10kgs/h would yield 
economically better results. Statistically they proved that if we distributed and 
applied the available supplies at 10 kg/hectare in an equitable manner or even at 
a lower level of 5 kg/h, [the] total yield would be higher that using the same 
quantity, at that time a limited quantity, of fertilizer in a concentrated way in 
these specific areas.802 
 
Other academics took up this question as well. For instance, Harpal Singh803 calculated “that the 
total aggregate return of the scarce resources is maximized by dispersing them over wide areas in 
small doses rather than by concentrating them in fewer areas in high doses.”804 His findings were 
“If fertilizer returns are to be maximized, it will be [the] economically rational” thing—based on 
the existing science of fertilizer marginal returns—to spread the same fertilizers over 333% more 
area, producing a much greater economic benefit.805 This would have greater marginal returns, 
because:  
…the lower the [current] level of total input, the greater would be the marginal 
physical product with the use of fertilizers, pesticides and improved implements. 
Therefore, inputs should be spread over areas with the lowest input levels. Thus, 
a much greater area can be benefited and a much larger increase in aggregate 
output obtained with the same quantity of fertilizers than appears to have so far 
been visualized.806 
 
The interpretation of the question as Singh poses it presents the issue as both a social and a 
technical question: how to find the best path to maximize output over all. 
Subramaniam on the other hand, continues to frame the question as an issue of technicalities. 
Writing out of all social relations (even exchange relations) he appeals instead to a construction 
of “nature”—manifest in the seed or in “scarcity” and famine—as the final determining criteria. 
But, the studies on maximizing resources begin to unravel his argument. In response, he 
mobilizes the new seeds to re-write “maximizing resources” according to a new logic—there is 
“no use in analyzing the question in terms of the limited quantities of fertilizer available.”807 He 
invokes a set of logics outside of the economics and statistics of fertilizer input, explaining away 
the calculations against allocating resources only to the HYVs: “I think statistically they were 
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correct, but what they failed to note was the difference between the fertilizer response of 
traditional varieties and the fertilizer response of the new varieties.”808 With the HYVs, the 
material conditions of [the] modern technology could be framed to provide the needed substance 
for his argument to set aside equity.  
Up to the 10 kg level the yield gain from the new varieties was almost 
imperceptible, whereas there is a much better response from the traditional 
varieties up to this level. Once above 10 kgs [of fertilizer], however, the yield 
response curve for the traditional varieties flattens out and becomes negative 
beyond a certain point as the crop lodges …For high-yielding varieties the yield 
curve above 10kgs slopes upwards steeply to, say 60 kgs, where it too flattens 
out. If fertilizer applications are considered at the low level of 10kgs, naturally 
the traditional varieties have the advantage, but at higher dosage levels, 
production from the new varieties is 200, sometimes 300 percent more. So there 
was no use in analyzing the question in terms of the limited quantities of fertilizer 
available [as the question had previously been framed].809  
 
Without proving that the “natural advantage of 60kgs vs. 10kgs to actually produce more,” he 
asserts that the question itself is now irrelevant.  
 The quantitative yield narrative was not just offering a promise, it was rendering the existing 
science of fertilizer distribution useless, and offering a new logic. “Nature” (the drought and the 
requirements of the seeds’ inputs) was enlisted as enforcer of the necessity of this controversial 
New Strategy. The “nature” of these seeds is used to forge an argument for the necessity of the 
policy of “concentration”—the magic number of 200-300% yield is to render all the analysis of 
“no use.”810 The “nature” of the growing requirements of the seed decides which farmers can 
succeed. Since “success” in the GR policies was a status produced through significant state 
investment and resources, being relegated outside of this category (i.e. cast as the non-
“successful” development subject) as the vast majority were, had significant material effects.  
 Like “success,” the narrative of “miracle seeds” was also essential to the work of the 
quantitative success narrative. Not only was the “nature” of the new seeds deployed to nullify 
questions of whether equitable distribution should be a goal—it also functioned to eradicate the 
question it could not answer: that the NS could not be shown to be more “efficient” at 
“maximizing” resources than the other more widely distributed approaches to input allocation.811  
 While it is acknowledged that this approach will increase inequality and upset the “socialist 
pattern of society,” the imminent changes are decreed as unavoidable—a status ascribed to 
“nature” (the nature of the seeds), or perhaps more correctly, to the limits of seed science at this 
point in time.812 More accurately, this should be assigned to policy: the policy choice to not 
incorporate the poor. This strategic exclusion of small farmers—or “the problem of the small 
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farmer,”813 as it was referred to at the time—was part of the social and political questions that 
were too difficult to tackle directly. The injection of new technologies was to circumvent and, in 
effect, resolve this difficulty. The work of the narrative of the GR as a quantitative success 
(numbers and the spectacular yields in a few plots) provides the material justification to argue for 
a shift in development from focusing on all to focusing on the few. After acknowledging why 
critics were challenging this new strategy and the necessity of social and structural change for 
effective and equitable development, Subramaniam invokes urgency to further the GR narrative, 
arguing that regrettably, there simply is no time for this: “Unfortunately we could not wait” 814—
the stakes are too great.  
4.3 | A push factor: harnessing “the nation” itself as the imperative  
 This approach, the skeptics and critics are assured, is simply necessary—while it might be 
undesirable that many lose out, that inequality will increase and that the bulk of the nation’s 
development funds and foreign exchange subsidize solely the most successful surplus-producing 
capitalist farmers (who it might appear are the least in need of assistance)—there is no 
alternative—“because if they do not use the fertilizer they will not produce and the whole nation 
will have to starve.”815 
 The New Strategy’s predicted inequalities were not necessary or inherent to development or 
increasing agricultural production. They were a choice, were socially produced: a result of the 
type of agricultural development, the type of technology, and the type of subject, that the 
approach selected. While the Planners and others advocated supporting smaller farmers with a 
more broad-based approach, Subramaniam was insistent that this was not the way to go. The 
production of increased inequality (and dispossession) could be avoided through a different 
policy, but that path was not chosen.  
 Responding to critics, Subramaniam reframes the argument again, taking the focus away 
from increasing inequality. This is not the issue India should be concerned about—that, he 
dismisses, can be easily managed with proper policy—instead, dependence on US food aid is the 
most pressing policy concern. In framing and presenting the issue in this way, Subramaniam 
harnessed Western neo-Malthusian fears and Indian popular resentment of the humiliating strings 
tied to food aid. He created a dichotomy—between dependence, hunger-starvation-poverty, and 
stagnation, or outsmarting these via the Western technological way—and presented this zero-sum 
choice to decision makers. The GR was reframed—for the risk averse. Subramaniam argued that 
it was either: this approach or dependency on the Americans. And, as he knew that the Americans 
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were demanding this approach as a precondition for food aid (see Ch. 5), it became this approach 
or starve: 
Again, I posed the option available. I did not agree that we would have to depend 
upon America for either fertilizers or research, but for argument’s sake, granting 
there might be some dependence on the West (not necessarily on America), what 
was the better choice between the two? We faced starvation or we had to import 
and appeal for aid. Accepting the latter, I asked would you rather continue this 
dependence on American food grains? Was that preferable to raising domestic 
production? Instead of importing food, was it not better to import fertilizer and 
plant protection chemicals to help raise production?816 
 
The zero-sum choice he presents is not a choice at all, but a threat of what will happen (promise 
of doom) if this policy is not adopted. In constructing the view that the biggest risk is to not act, 
Subramaniam invokes the specter of hunger and scarcity to construct an imperative for the GR.  
 Subramaniam did not rely only on threats of doom and guarantees of success. For, the 
Planners, it seemed, were not content with promises of certain success if they thought it also 
meant inequity and the certainty of social tension and conflict. He offers the additional promise of 
redistribution, complementing this promise with a trump card—the detrimental outcomes of other 
policy options.817  
I put forward the choice: Would you like to have such high productivity and 
attain self-sufficiency within the country and face these tensions by distributing 
these foodgrains on an appropriate welfare basis, or would you prefer to 
continue dependence on foreign imports indefinitely? Unfortunately we could not 
wait until land reform legislation was implemented effectively. We had been 
trying for the last ten years but owing to political and other factors it had not 
proved possible to implement it properly during this period which would mean 
we would have to postpone this new strategy indefinitely. Ultimately many came 
to the conclusion that perhaps it would be better to raise output in India even 
though it might create other problems.818 
 
Subramaniam repeatedly explains that this approach is necessary—he reframes the question at 
stake, invoking a nationalist cry and a moral imperative for the realignment of development’s 
focus away from the Nehruvian approach819 He puts India’s sovereignty on the line in this 
question. With the stakes re-weighted, the confines of the debate are accordingly realigned.  
5 | Counterfactual: the challenge of the 80% and “the problem of the small farmer”  
 In the success narrative, scarcity and Malthusian doom are written as natural and the GR as 
the way to conquer nature—hence the need to concentrate on the best with a “war-like” 
urgency.820 While the language of wars, battles and the urgency of imminent famine deploys a 
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weaponized Malthusian imaginary, the question is: what work were these images doing? It is 
against such a scenario of doom that the GR can be held up as the success. 
The success narrative’s account of the NS as a quantitative yield leap conceals that the 
counterfactual at the time was not Malthusian doom, but a more equitable approach. In popular 
representations today, that alternative cannot even be seen—it was effaced by the work of 
conflating “the problem” with “the solution.” This conflation functions to write out not only that 
there were, and are, other ways of addressing the problem, but also any consideration of the 
problem itself. Instead, the concern is with “managing” something else entirely: the 
implementation of this one technological response as a stand-in for the larger problem.821 
Attention to other possible paths is effaced once existing counterfactuals disappear (be they land 
reform or broad-based agricultural support policies that included all segments of the population). 
Rather than Malthusian doom, the actual “counterfactual” to the naturalized tale of the GR is 
evident in the discussions preceding and throughout the GR debates. There were repeated calls 
for the need to include the vast majority of (small and dry land) farmers and to pursue more 
equitable policies—either alongside the New Strategy, or in place of it.  
 The New Strategy’s failure to produce expected yields after several years led to renewed 
demands for reallocating the state’s financial resources to include supports for the majority. It is 
in this context that redistribution and welfare policies step in—as “answers”—to quell the debate 
about the massively controversial realignment of subsidies to the uppermost layer of rural society. 
It is also in these discussions that the argument that “the problem of the small farmer” is first and 
foremost a “cultural problem”822—and the subsequent logic that thus the small farmers need to 
learn and benefit from the success of the elite—unravels. These discussions illustrate how the GR 
success narrative responds to ongoing critiques and covers up the diverse array of alternative and 
complementary approaches. 
5.1 | The GR’s Approach is Called into Question and Restated  
 
Recently several newspaper reports have appeared with titles such as “The Green 
Revolution Abortive: Critics call for a Fresh Agricultural Strategy” and “Fresh 
strategy on Food Front Vital.” These stories report that recent downward 
revisions of estimates of 1968-69 foodgrain production have brought to the 
surface doubts about the long-term usefulness of a food strategy based mainly on 
high-yielding varieties. Comparing the differences in foodgrain production in 
1964-65 and in 1968-69 (anticipated) with growth in productive inputs such as 
fertilizer consumption, irrigation, and area under high-yielding varieties leads 
these critics to conclude either that the yardsticks are wrong or that “the high 
yielding varieties have not produced any results.” They, therefore, argue for a 
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“fresh strategy” giving greater focus to the nearly 80% of the cultivatable land 
now dependent solely on rains and to small farms.823 
 
While the RF notes in this discussion paper that their approach is being critiqued and rejected, 
what they do not note is the enabling role of their portrait of smaller and poorer peasants as 
inefficient and resistant to change in licensing the IADP and the New Strategy to be enacted as 
projects that explicitly “singled out small farmers as one group which may suffer relatively to 
other economic groups. In a country which is dedicated to developing a Socialistic Pattern of 
Society… the implications of inter-personal distribution cannot be ignored.”824 The RF’s internal 
memo notes this only after, and in response to, a resurgent crisis and growing controversy around 
the failures of the New Strategy.  
 At this time the GR policies were implemented, but were not meeting their production 
goals825 nor increasing yields. Calls to abandon the GR approach were mounting across multiple 
segments of society and gaining prominence. Seeking to put to rest the resurgence of critiques 
and calls for abandoning the controversial New Strategy, Cummings and Ray (of the RF India 
office) suggest that the critiques are wrongly focused. They assess that while it is clearly the case 
that: 
…some groups of people and areas of the country have not participated as fully as 
others from these technological gains. Rather than indict a program for failure to do 
what it was not intended to do … the production and [the] welfare targets of [the] 
agricultural program should be explicitly recognized [as separate] and instruments 
best suited for these two purposes should be advocated on their own merits. An 
accelerated New Strategy, itself, is the most promising base on which to add these 
newer [welfare] programs.826 
 
Thus, while the RF India office acknowledges that the small farmers were by design excluded 
from the original approach of the NS, they suggest that they can now be incorporated back in, not 
as subjects but as dependents. If this is what is necessary to sustain support for the NS, then 
welfare programs should be designed for this end. They did not and do not advocate that small 
farmers should be excluded from all benefits of development. Rather, they advocate for an 
explicit shift in approach, one based on (implicit but) distinct subject positions in development 
policy for the feeders and the fed.  
 The RF response that advocated a continuation of the NS—but coupled with more explicit 
welfare measures—should not be confused with a response advocating production support for 
poor or small farmers in the way that the larger GR farmers were supported. Rather, this response 
advocates a clear decoupling of questions of food production versus access to food (food 
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distribution). The two goals, the RF paper maintains, should not be confused. They argue that if 
these goals could be understood as entirely separate social and economic projects, then an 
acceleration of—not the abandonment of—the NS would provide the strongest base upon which 
programs of social inclusion and redistribution could be built and expanded, so that the poor 
could be re-included into the nation’s development imaginary. The role, or status, assigned to the 
poor upon their re-inclusion is not as development’s subjects, but its object.  
 The logic of this argument rests on two key presumptions: namely, that the poor will be re-
included, but first (a topic less interrogated today, but much more controversial at the time) that 
the GR will actually increase production. It should elicit pause that they invoke this claim 
immediately after recognizing that this very question is at hand only because the field statistics 
indicate that the GR approach did not increase production. But, there is no pause. Their answer—
keep going, there is no problem at all, in fact, this is the “most promising” tactic—reveals the 
indispensable work of the success narrative in concealing the dispossession of an entire class of 
“small farmers.” This defense for a “New Strategy”—one that was not producing increases in 
yield sufficient even to provide for the farmers it was driving out—is a legacy that continues to 
this day.827 
The GR advocates were not oblivious to the effects their policies were to instigate. They 
simply thought of them as inevitable to modernity, and the problems as par for the course. Such 
issues were best addressed by moving away from subsistence and into a more diversified 
economy, including welfare and other redistributive schemes if necessary to make the transition. 
In essence, the goal was to move away from subsistence agriculture by any means necessary. It is 
based on the presumption that the peasants’ labor would be absorbed in other sectors of the 
“economy,” but, this also tautologically means that all are not allowed to sustain themselves. 
And, if “the economy” cannot (or can not yet) support them in other sectors, they are rendered in 
effect superfluous, unnecessary to development (see Ch. 1). This is, after all, what a success 
narrative presumes and demands: not everyone can be a success.  
 In response to their critics, the GR advocates add that the peasants can be helped out, fed, 
dragged along to take-off. The development project goes around—not through—them. It does not 
even need their labor to produce surplus, if the “economy” is not (yet) ready for them. This is the 
technocratic approach at work—not wanting to deal with complicated “political” questions, 
allowing the “nature of the seed” to stand in as the criteria determining development’s path—
effacing the political nature of the choices enacted in its name.  
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5.2 | The narrative functions by writing its counterfactual 
 Success always has (and is defined by) the trace of failure. Through the narrative of 
impending doom, the GR’s architects seek to confine the ever-present trace of failure so that it 
can be managed—failure would be clear: famine and starvation. Thus, the actual results of the 
New Strategy—no improvement in the food situation while the cost of the required inputs uses up 
all of India’s foreign exchange828—is not “failure” on the radar. Likewise, the mounting demands 
to focus on the 80% of farmers not just the elite—given that the New Strategy produced no 
increased results—is not a question of “failure” either. Having defined the trace of failure into a 
Malthusian doom scenario, the “success” they narrate need not be an empirical state, but rather is 
defined by, and is an effect of, what it is not (i.e. Malthusian doom).  
 The attempt at defining and containing failure was an attempt at writing the counterfactual, 
an effort at writing the story of the GR as a success. It allowed the quantitative yield narrative, for 
all its factual limitations, to be used as an agent of success. The “success” narrative was forged in 
response to the challenges to, and the failures of, the NS approach. It grants one possible course 
of events the structure of necessity, buttressed with an assurance of certainty, to avoid impending 
doom. The narrative was solidified in the continued controversies over, and opposition to, the 
New Strategy.  
 But while this narrative reigns today, the actual counterfactual was not Malthusian doom. 
Rather, at the time there was a healthy debate about alternative options, discussion of which (as 
the RF records reference) was dominating the headlines. 
5.3 | Voices to expand the focus of agriculture policy beyond the New Strategy 
 In a speech to the Planners in 1968, V.K.R.V. Rao first sings the praises of this New 
Strategy’s approach, but then he reminds the Planners that—despite the well-off visible subjects 
of the New Strategy—success is not the reality for the vast majority of the agrarian population.829 
Rather, summoning another vision, he reminds them that “our agricultural economy today 
presents an integrated, though tragic, balance between starving peasants, starving bullocks, light 
ploughing, practically no fertilizers, and a low yield per acre.”830 This is the context in which the 
vast majority are ignored in favor of attending to the “successful” GR farmers. Rao insists, 
despite the representation of the dominant GR approach as the solution, that it is not the only path 
forward. That most small farmers work under harsh realities “does not mean however that large 
farms are needed.”831 Rather, better policy for small farmers is what is needed. Rao counters the 
imaginary of modern agriculture that the Americans have constructed;832 instead, he cites Japan’s 
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highly modern agriculture on small family farms. The notion that all agriculture must be large-
scale and highly mechanized is the clear subtext of the Americans’ arguments for the 
“unfortunate necessity” of excluding small farmers from the benefits of targeted agricultural 
development. It was not just a question of small farmers, but of the vast majority of the farming 
population, dry-land farmers and those in most areas of the country. Rao lays out in this speech, 
arguing that the Planning Commission cannot simply abandon the vast majority of India’s 
farmers, that they must also be attentive to the question: “what are we doing for those whom we 
cannot provide assured supplies of water?”833—“we have to do something for the farmers who 
work in areas where they do not have either irrigation or any assured supply of rain-fall.”834 
Reminding the Planners that “[t]hose farmers who have the misfortune of cultivating land in the 
dry areas and the smaller farmers cultivating 2 or 3 or 4 acres” are not going to see the benefits of 
this massive and expensive New Strategy, he maintains that it is imperative to also attend to 
society as a whole, including the small and marginal farmers—rather than only to the well-off 
farmers. And this is a major issue as:  
these [farmers] constitute the vast majority of India’s farming population. I feel 
strongly therefore that the objective of our agricultural planning should not 
merely be one of maximizing production in overall national terms, but should 
also include considerations of rural social stability, which means deliberate 
minimization of inter-personal and inter-regional production of disparities and 
equalization of opportunities among our farming population. … In short, the goal 
of agricultural planning should be maximization of production along with 
diminution of rural inequalities and the continued maintenance of rural social 
stability and not maximization of production at the cost of worsening inequality 
and eroding social stability in rural India.835 
  
The vision Rao offers lies in clear contrast to the development prescription of the RF. Here, 
agriculture and food are not separated from the questions of rural and national development, but 
constitutive of how development is to be pursued, what it is to look like, and how it is to be 
achieved. 
 Agriculture policies, since the New Strategy of the Green Revolution, have abided by the GR 
maxim of “maximizing resources,” pursued through the separation of these development goals. 
The perspectives voiced in debates, newspapers and speeches of the 1960s, which are still 
articulated today by a number of NGOs working on agrarian issues in India,836 have long been 
rendered thoroughly outside of mainstream agricultural policy. The RF and other advocates of the 
NS argued that the two major goals of food production and access to food should be understood as 
entirely separate social goals, with GR as the base of production upon which programs of social 
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inclusion could be built and expanded—and in this manner the poor would be re-included into the 
development imaginary. Despite many voices advocating that agricultural policy should shift and 
attend to the vast majority of producers—the 80% of farmers who till without irrigation—
agricultural development policy to this day remains largely stuck in the top-down model, where 
this vast majority of farmers remain effectively invisible. The GR narrative succeeded in assigning 
It the question of allocation—where, to whom, and how these “scarce” resources for production 
are to be “maximized”— to “nature.” 
5.3.1 | Writing out: producing inevitability  
 It took a sustained campaign for the GR promoters to delegitimize the perspective that 
development must proceed by supporting the (bottom) 80% of farmers, not the (top) 8%. This 
was the work that the narrative of the GR as a quantitative success performed: authorizing, even 
mandating, a perspective previously widely regarded as reprehensible, and even appalling, in 
terms of the outcomes it was predicted to have and processes it would initiate—and after enabling 
this shift in “mindset” and policy, naturalizing this approach as inevitable.  
 In telling this narrative it was not “reporting” on an external or already existing (or originary) 
success, but rather the successful nature of the GR (and the criteria of this success) were forged in 
the telling of the narrative itself. Despite Paarlberg’s justification to the RF that his narrative of 
the GR as Norman Borlaug’s personal story is because it “comes through better to the reader [or 
listener] in this form,”837 the “simplifications” were far from innocent. The narrative was not just 
a story, simplified. The narrative of a quantitative yield success deployed the logic of numbers, on 
the non-debatable terrain of “nature,” to naturalize the idea that technical questions be the only 
questions and, that decisions best be made by those with the relevant “technical” expertise.  
 While the process of naturalizing this stance was not as easy, quick, or “inevitable” as the GR 
proponents had hoped, the quantitative success tale as constituted continues to perform; it casts an 
egalitarian hue over a fundamentally disparity-producing project. And it does so through the 
narrative of a quantitative leap and a “miracle seed”—concealing that the seed alone did not 
perform any better than the traditional seeds, the narrative harnesses the materiality or “nature” of 
the seed to deliver its “miracle” status. Thus, this technology performed important work: effacing 
the actual qualitative agricultural revolution (the collaborative work of technologies of 
government and a project of technicizing) at the same time that its materiality provided the 
justification for a highly skewed allocation of resources.838 In this context, it is clear that that the 
declared “success” of the GR was not tied to the amount that was produced as much as it was to 
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how this food was produced. It was a qualitative, not a quantitative, revolution. But within this 
project, the predictions of quantity yielded remained of principal importance: its promise was 
absolutely necessary to instigate this transformation.  
5.4 | The work of the seed  
 In the GR narrative it is the “nature” of the seed which is to decide who is to succeed. The 
demarcation of these subject positions has clear and lasting effects to this day—90% of rural 
people in India spend over 90% of their income on food. They were not to be “living examples” 
or the subjects of “success,” and as was widely predicted by critics at the time, the effects of 
concentrating all resources on the elite did not trickle down. The subsidies did not trickle down to 
small farmers, and the policy focus on the upper crust of farmers did not change. The rural poor 
today, more than ever, are not the subject of “India shining”839—and more significantly, the 
debate around whether they should be is more muted than it was in the 1960s. But, the reason that 
80% of the rural poor are malnourished and chronically food insecure is not only because of the 
GR production policies—it is the result of pairing those policies with the decoupling of food 
production and food distribution policies. Yet given the necessity of showing “success,” these 
effects, while documented in publicly available reports and statistical collections, are not widely 
recognized. “The GR is not a story of failure—it is a story of success. India hopes to be self-
sufficient, and in a few years she will” the vision Gaud had earlier prophesized came to be, even 
if not in the way originally implied.  
 This narrative conceals the work that the GR did and that it continues to do: dispossession 
was dismissed as simply the “efficiencies of maximizing resources,” and the concomitant shift to 
prioritize development aid to the best-off was cast a collective moral imperative: to save the 
nation from hunger. The “success” of the GR was declared before it even began: those involved 
sold it as a success, promising that it would work, that it simply needed to be given a chance. That 
“success” came to be consolidated over time, using narratives that mobilized a counterfactual of 
doom averted. 
 The GR-as-success narrative was presented in this form in order to transform society. These 
transformations focused on creating the modern subject for these development projects, and did 
so through shifting to prioritize agriculture above all else (see Ch. 3). This was a prescriptive 
narrative (rather than a diagnostic one). The exalted place of technology is itself prescriptive; 
agricultural technology enabled this top-down social revolution to be written as the “natural” path 
of “modernity.” 
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6 | Conclusion: the afterlives of the GR success narrative  
  To address (and even to condemn) the injustices of today’s Paradox of Plenty (as MS 
Swaminathan, Norman Borlaug, and most other GR advocates very much claim they want to do), 
larger structures must be attended to, but, the narrative they expound must be interrogated as well. 
For, this narrative produces the framework of reality in which we operate and determines 
perceptions of the problem, its causes, and possible solutions.  
As this chapter has detailed, this narrative of success was invented before the GR began and 
continues long after, sustaining the afterlives of the GR. Initially, the narrative ostensibly served 
to induce farmers to adopt changes in order to make the leap into exchange relations (that is, to 
adopt the new seeds); it was also to serve to convince deeply skeptical policy makers to follow 
this new path. Second, at a broader scale, the narrative functioned to provide a justification (to 
these policy makers) for realigning development (away from a Nehruvian approach) in a way that 
increased inequality. The narrative was to serve as “natural” evidence of why a development 
policy that supports only the best-off farmers was necessary (for national sovereignty and food 
security). Third, throughout the ongoing discussions and debates during implementation, this 
narrative was deployed to silence critics and snuff out ongoing controversies around the GR’s 
approach, amidst its failure to meet its promises of significantly increased yields. Fourth, this 
narrative enabled ignoring the structural institutional shifts—then and now—by ascribing these 
shifts to a discrete event, rather than to an ongoing project of realignment, which determined who 
development policies attend to, or even acknowledge.  
 Narrative is not an “innocent story”—it is a fundamental tool of governing liberal capitalist 
development which allows the constitutive contradictions thereof to be papered, to avoid full 
examination. Across the board, the GR advocates condemn today’s situation: this is not where it 
was supposed to lead, this is not what was supposed to result. But clearly, the condemnation of 
today’s situation is not sufficient (no matter how prominent the speaker) to do what they claim to 
want: to address and change the situation. The production of more food alone will never change 
what is fundamentally a political-economic reality. The fact that hunger and the production of 
food are consistently conflated is not a coincidence, but a sleight of hand—one that has become 
thoroughly naturalized and has performed, and continues to perform, significant work.  
For changes to occur, what is considered to be “the problem” must shift. The step of moving 
beyond defining a shortage of food as “the problem” is necessary but not sufficient. 
Acknowledging that people are hungry because they are poor, while better than crass 
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Malthusianism, is still far from understanding or addressing today’s paradox of plenty. For almost 
three decades the World Bank has held this position, arguing that there is plenty of food and the 
hungry are deprived of food only because they are poor, because they do not have adequate 
purchasing power.840 Their conclusions from this assessment have not redressed the paradox of 
plenty—if anything, they have exacerbated the crisis (as even their own reports acknowledge (see 
Ch. 1)). Acknowledging that hunger is an economic and political condition, a direct result of 
poverty, if taken alone, can lead to simply transferring the responsibility to a different set of 
“experts”—in this case to the logic of (neo)liberal economists that dominates global economic 
policy. Handing the task of “solving the problem” to the economists has served to reproduce and 
further entrench the inequities at the core of the issue. That the policies they have created have 
failed spectacularly should be evident in the “paradox” itself; that this failure is not glaringly 
apparent is a testament to the tremendous power of narrative. The overarching global capital/ist 
narrative of development has isolated this paradox of plenty as an anomaly, has anecdotalized it 
as an “Indian” problem, rather than recognizing that it is a predictable, even banal, result of 
(neo)liberal economic development policies.  
 Yet, the ongoing results of the GR policies should not be a surprise. The Nobel Committee’s 
award speech for Norman Borlaug in 1970 recognized that: 
Dr. Borlaug realizes, however, that even though the new varieties of grain will 
involve a considerable increase in the crop harvested by the peasants, the green 
revolution may also create social problems of a negative kind. Social injustices 
may well occur if politicians in the developing countries should fail to ensure the 
requisite conditions by means of equitable taxation, a system of agricultural 
credits at reasonable rates of interest, a properly adjusted price policy, and a 
defensible employment policy.841 
 
That these insights accurately predicted much of what was to come is indicative that the 
restrictions of the technocratic approach have long been evident; but at the same time the 
limitations of these insights are clear. They did not foresee the degree to which the “politicians in 
the developing countries”842 alone cannot set the trajectory and conditions of development 
policies. While the politicians have varying degrees of authority, the confines in which policies 
are conceived and made possible, or are declared impossible or impractical and left aside, are set 
by much broader forces. Ideally in political theory those forces would be the demands of their 
constituents. But, (as the next chapter addresses), all too often these trajectories are set instead by 
the larger trends in the epistemic project of liberal capitalist development, which are sold through 
the power of narrative, and enforced through the structures of aid, loans, and expertise. Reading 
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the policies of the last six decades, it is evident that the demands of these structures rarely align 
with the demands of the constituents. Instead, these power structures deploy a narrative to sell 
those constituents a vision, and when that falls short, to silence controversy with claims of 
inevitability, necessity, national sovereignty, and/or a moral imperative. Narrative is malleable, 
offering promises of liberal equality even as conditions are structured to produce a different 
result, and then declaring that result a “paradox” (such as the “paradox of plenty.”) The narrative 
thus writes over the existing vision, logic, or “facts” of the situation, inserting its own story into 
public consciousness as the naturalized understanding of history.  
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Chapter Five  
Making Modern Markets:  
The Work of Food and Agricultural Aid 
1 |  Introduction 
The real goal, therefore, must be to produce more food in the nations that need it. 
Know-how is not the problem. For the first time in the history of the world we do 
know how to produce enough food now to feed every man, woman, and child in 
the world, enough to eliminate all hunger completely. Farm production has 
undergone a scientific revolution which is dwarfing the industrial revolution of 
150 years ago, but this means that agricultural departments and ministries and 
governments and citizens must make a greater and more systematic effort to share 
this knowledge. For the first time to know how to conquer the problem and [to] 
not conquer it would be a disgrace for this generation. We need to help transmit 
all that we know of farm technology to the ends of the earth, to overcome the 
barriers of ignorance and suspicion. The key to a permanent solution to world 
hunger is the transfer of technology which we now have to food deficit nations, 
and that task, second to -none in importance, is the reason for this Congress.   
- US President John F. Kennedy, 1963.843 
 
We do not insist that developing countries imitate the American system … But 
progress has been greatest where governments have encouraged private enterprise, 
released bureaucratic controls, stimulated competition and allowed maximum 
opportunity for individual initiative. A.I.D.'s mandate will be directed to this end. 
… I propose a strong new emphasis on technical assistance … [i.e.] the adaptation 
of U.S. technical knowledge to the special needs of poor countries… The main 
emphases of technical assistance must be in agriculture, education and in family 
planning. … One basic lesson is the critical importance of releasing the brakes on 
development caused by low agricultural productivity. A few years ago, mass 
starvation within a decade seemed clearly possible in many poor nations. Today 
they stand at least on the threshold of a dramatic breakthrough in food production. 
The combination of the new "miracle" seeds for wheat and rice, aid-financed 
fertilizer, improved cultivation practices, and constructive agriculture policies 
shows what is possible. They also demonstrate the potential for success when 
foreign aid, foreign private investment and domestic resources in developing 
countries join together in a concerted attack on poverty.   
- US President Richard Nixon, 1969844 
 
India's economic reforms must be seen in this light: they may appear slow, but I 
assure you they are durable and irreversible. … 
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To fully exploit potential areas for cooperation between our two countries, we 
need to make special efforts to bring our private sectors closer together… 
The bulk of our population still depends upon agriculture for a living. The United 
States was an early partner in this area, helping to establish agricultural 
universities and research institutions in India in the 1960s. …  
This was the start of the Green Revolution in India that lifted countless millions 
above poverty. 
I am very happy to say that President Bush and I have decided to launch a second 
generation of India-US collaboration in agriculture. …It seeks to take 
information and know-how directly to the farming community.  
- Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, 2005845 
 
 
 Development aid has been a defining aspect of India-US ties, and—as the previous chapters 
have explored—food and agricultural projects have constituted the bulk of this aid relationship. 
Development aid projects are not simply projects of humanitarianism, but have been the strategic 
tool of expanding the geopolitical project of the “free world.”  
 There has clearly been an evolution in approaches to aid, development, and how its projects 
are implemented; but, as the speeches spanning more than forty years indicate, there is also a 
remarkable continuity in the logic of aid. What is less clear is how US agricultural development 
aid has shaped the path of agricultural development in India. To excavate the complex ways that 
these aid projects (to which the elected leaders refer) have worked to influence the course of 
India’s agricultural policies as well as its economic development policies more broadly, it is 
necessary to draw out both the continuities and the changes, and in doing so to unpack the 
relation between these aid projects and the contours of today’s seemingly “paradoxical” realities. 
The naturalized assumptions of contemporary agricultural policy underwrite today’s hunger 
amidst plenty, making it is necessary to understand the lineages of these policy approaches. For, 
agricultural policy remains deeply informed by vestiges of earlier defining aid projects and 
relationships. In order to understand how our contemporary assumptions about food, agriculture, 
and hunger, and their material structures, have come about (and how these can be addressed or 
un-done), I trace the logic, terms, and conditions of US food and agricultural aid to India 
spanning the last 60 years. This chapter excavates how aid programs have come to be, how 
“problems” were cast, and how “solutions” were naturalized.  
 Through an examination of texts and archival materials I show that the project of aid was one 
of teaching the way (to development)—and in the process eliminating alternatives. This project’s 
lessons harnessed the visible and symbolic power of science and technology to create a “modern” 
agricultural sector—industrializing agriculture in the name of teaching India to “feed herself.”  
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 Perhaps the most significant event in this relationship—and certainly the most significant for 
food and agriculture—was securing the “New Strategy in Agriculture,” which came to be known 
as “the Green Revolution”. The agricultural production methods, inputs, and knowledge relations 
laid out in the “New Strategy” quickly became the dominant approach to agricultural 
development policy and were part of an early push toward significant economic liberalizing 
reforms. In popular memory, the Green Revolution (GR) operated under the rubric of aiding the 
hungry, increasing food production, and accelerating development in India. Its projects operated 
through implementing “modern” agricultural techniques and expanding the reach of “the market” 
into agriculture, displacing subsistence farming with industrial food production. 
 Aid projects (including food aid, technology assistance and transfer, and educational 
programs) have been the key drivers behind the introduction and use of new agricultural 
technologies. Likewise, aid programs have been a primary means through which the transfer of 
not just commodities (such as new seeds and inputs) has occurred, but also knowledge—manifest 
in policies, practices, and technicalities. It is these knowledge practices together with the inputs 
that constitute the “Long Green Revolution.”  
 US agricultural aid to India is a uniquely relevant case because it is generally considered to 
(be among the very few aid projects to) have accomplished its goals and “successfully”846 
(re)directed India’s path of development in accordance with US interests and aims.847  
 While literature recounting the US side of the tale celebrates the success of this as an aid 
venture, literature from the Indian side is quick to critique the terms of these US aid projects and 
to take credit for the realignment of development priorities and its resulting project—the Green 
Revolution—as an Indian initiative and effort (a path that the US simply assisted—as Singh 
notes). There are many volumes accounting the details of the case and offering each side’s 
(unofficial) perspective. My concern is not to account for initiative or tally points, but rather to 
unpack the ways in which knowledge and development practices are produced and circulate to 
create a singular, self-evident path to (agricultural) modernity. Aid was not centrally about the 
disbursement of goods, but rather, the dissemination of an ideology in the form of a development 
path. The New Strategy would not have come to be in the form that we know it without American 
aid. But, the political machinations behind the scenes were not transparent to critical or 
enthusiastic observers at the time.  
  188 
1.1| The Political Work of Agricultural Aid and Technology  
It had been widely believed that private industry, relying on the profit motive, 
would be an impediment to economic development; government, it was 
thought, must supply the needed goods and services. But the green revolution 
advanced at a rate more rapid than government could readily service. The 
pressure for fertilizer and insecticide became so great as to weaken and 
overcome the ideological commitment to government-run industry.   
Much more is underway in Asia than the adoption of new wheat varieties.
  
The green revolution has a profound influence on established institutions. … 
There is no economic or social change more profound than the change from 
self-sufficiency to an exchange  system.848   
-Paarlberg849 
 
 
Johnson dispatched one fifth of the U.S. grain harvest to Calcutta in the 
largest flotilla “since the allied forces crossed the English Channel on D-
Day.” He … used PL480 food aid, doled out in monthly increments, to place 
a “short tether” on India… compelling them to divert national resources into 
the agricultural sector and adopt Green Revolution protocols.  
-Cullather850 
 
   851   
“I’m sure you won’t mind a li’l old string to go with that wheat, pardner…”  
printed in The Hindustan Times 1965 
  
 The transition “from self-sufficiency [or subsistence] to an exchange system”852 was the aim 
of the GR era aid projects (see Ch. 3). What these efforts were trying to demonstrate is summed 
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up succinctly by Paarlberg of the Foreign Economic Development Service, USDA (in a 
publication co-produced with USAID). Paarlberg here is not describing what happened, rather he 
is prescribing how to interpret what the GR supposedly did. His narrative does this by rendering 
the meticulous technical and policy changes into changes something that just naturally happened, 
and by their inherent nature overwhelmed policy commitments, disproving older theories of 
development. This narrative of transformation that the US aid agencies sought to instill as the 
lasting legacy of the GR (the GR as the natural, inevitable path joining India’s period of “take 
off” with a state of modernity), is belied by the tedious and belabored aid negotiations micro-
managing the Indian government’s development policy.  
As historian Nicholas Cullather hints, there were exacting negotiations that enabled this 
“natural” path to transpire. While the details of these conditions were (largely) confidential, the 
blatantly political use of food aid as a “tether” for significant policy change was deeply unpopular 
in India—a 1965 cartoon in the Hindustan Times represents commentary on the stringent terms of 
American food and agricultural aid. More stingingly, a Bombay newspaper the Blitz the leaked 
terms of the confidential agreement placing a “short tether” on food aid under the headline “Text 
of Yankee Moghul’s Fatwa.”853 
 As Paarlberg explicates, the role of the GR was to bring modernity to supposedly backward 
areas. In doing so, the GR was to make the way to approach development clear before observers’ 
eyes (see Ch. 3). Paarlberg’s account is not just a simplified misreading. His text (published by 
the US government for the USDA and USAID pamphleting purposes) is not to wash the US’s 
hands of the GR, not by any stretch; rather, it seeks to construct a particular economic 
configuration as “natural”: when it takes hold, things grow. That is in contrast with other ways of 
approaching development, which stagnate or fail, because they are not the “natural” path—and 
hence despite how strongly they may be forced by government policy, these other paths cannot 
take root, or ultimately succeed.  
1.2 | The “Terms” of Aid and the “Logic “of Aid: My Approach  
 Agricultural development assistance and agricultural technology transfer are generally 
presented (along with medicine) as archetypical realms that are “outside of politics” and 
implicitly free of even the politics of knowledge. Expertise in the disciplines of agricultural 
modernization and economic development is portrayed as not just apolitical, but as above the 
fray. Likewise, the use of such expertise to aid others in need is presented as transparently 
humanitarian, advancing progress and improving basic living conditions. In international 
  190 
development over the 1950s and 1960s, agriculture and economics came to replace medicine as 
the primary realm of philanthropic need and foremost in the development toolkit, to help people 
help themselves.854 Thus, the presumptions within these realms of expertise and their operation 
need to be interrogated as they continue to underwrite international development aid projects.  
 The project of US food and agricultural aid to India has been written on extensively. Most of 
the “critical” accounts published in India critique the uses of food aid as a leveraging tool for 
American aims, or critique the terms of the aid (e.g. that the food had to be shipped on expensive 
American flag carriers, etc). Although there is much worthy of examination in the terms of aid, to 
focus on the terms alone is to miss the lasting significance of the project of aid. The significance 
and even the “point” of the aid projects are not revealed by most celebratory, critical, or 
documentary accounts. It is to confuse a geopolitical strategy with the many bags of grain 
delivered. The details may offer insight, but to attend to the larger and long-lasting significance 
and work of aid, it is necessary to understand aid as a knowledge project, and to understand the 
ideology at its base. 
1.2.1 | Aid as a knowledge project: the work of ideology in the GR narrative 
 While Indians were critical of the role of U.S. aid conditions involved in initiating the Green 
Revolution, the overall narrative of the GR in India is laudatory. Far from being viewed as a US 
geopolitical project of consolidating its own legitimacy through tinkering in India, the Green 
Revolution in India is and was (told as) a revolution with important effects not only on food 
production, but also, for (perceptions of) national autonomy. In this rendering, the GR was not 
only locally made, it was cast as in explicit opposition to reliance on American aid and on 
international aid more generally. The GR was the event that finally broke India out of the micro-
managed shackles of US food-aid dependency through demonstrating that India could “feed 
itself,” or ensure its own food self-sufficiency. Moreover, the ideas behind this effort were 
characterized as a “purely Indian initiative from top to bottom.”855 
 The significant aspect of this account of the GR is how its logic became the dominant 
approach; that is, how this logic came to take on the status of “common sense”—or, in short, how 
it came to be an ideology to anchor this problematic. To unpack this ideology, or the problematic 
that anchors this understanding, it is necessary to attend to the distinction between the terms and 
the logic of aid projects. For aid’s “logic” (or ideology) to be understood, aid’s function as a 
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knowledge project must be excavated and addressed. As I attend to aid practices and the terms of 
specific aid projects I also unpack the conceptual lineages behind these aid efforts.  
 The Long GR must be read as a power-knowledge project— which disseminated a very 
explicit logic, with terms that were meant to facilitate this logic. Both the “terms” of aid projects 
(e.g. the leveraging or tethering of aid disbursements to particular ends) and the “logic” behind 
aid projects and practices aimed to instill this vision. The two (terms and logic) were deeply 
entwined. Hence, while it is the logic of aid that is my foremost concern, to excavate the logic it 
is necessary to attend to the terms of aid projects to highlight the discrete efforts through which 
this logic was deployed, disseminated, and implemented. Together the logic and terms can reveal 
the guiding ideology. This is a dialectical relationship—the terms and the logic of aid projects 
reinforce each other. But, the point is that over time what remains is the logic; not a specific 
project. Ideology helps unpack this logic (and how it has played out over time).  
1.2.2 | Ideology: The Making of Subjects 
 Taking the understanding of ideology as itself a “material practice” of “subject making,” I 
read the shift in India’s approach to development as part of a larger ideological project; this was a 
knowledge project that US aid was key in expanding (both official US government aid and 
private US Foundations, namely Ford and Rockefeller). To read how aid operates as a power-
knowledge project, I first address its grounding in ideology. 
 A classic US social science understanding approaches ideology as something “that it is as 
easy to step-into as it is to step-out-of.”856 I do not adopt this understanding; not only because it 
deploys a gods-eye-view of the world, but also because it is enabled by, reliant on, and reinforces 
an understanding of objective knowledge within the very modernist ideology it ostensibly seeks 
to critique.857 Instead, I suggest that ideology cannot be easily contained—one cannot simply 
extricate oneself from ideology as if it were a complicated costume. Rather, it is the work of 
ideology itself that defines this simplistic, extricable view of ideology. This is not a circular 
argument; rather, it is to take ideology seriously: it is not easy for subjects within it to see the 
scaffolding of their ideology—for, ideology functions through the process of making them as 
subjects. Subjects are constituted by ideology, and as such, cannot shed and step outside of 
ideologies in the way that social scientists often imply;858 ideology is far more pervasive and 
pernicious than the standard social science view of it allows. Ideology is a practice and a practice 
cannot exist without its object. In this case, the object is the subject itself859—“the subject is the 
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constitutive category of ideology.”860 Ideology must be understood as functioning in and through 
its practices and mechanisms; the relation between ideology and acts/action is regulated through 
material practice. All practice is ideological (for ideology is necessarily practiced through making 
subjects). 
 Given that ideology is a process that operates through subject-creation, we can unpack the 
work of aid as an ideological project (in and since the GR), to understand how subject-creation 
was constitutive to how the GR operated (as explained in the previous chapter). It is clear that the 
creation of the development subject in the GR processes was not superfluous, but integral to its 
success as a “development” project; it underwrote the GR as a coherent (ideological) project. In 
so doing it created a world-view and an understanding of what development is and how it is to be 
pursued. The devotion to modernization, technology, and economic liberalization are the tools 
through which development itself came to be defined. The agent that renders the vision of 
development coherent is technology, not just any technology: specifically, it is the operation of 
technology as a commodity (i.e. as a private good to be traded in a market). The exchange 
relations are key; technology is the vehicle.  
1.3 | My Approach: Navigating the Logic Underlying Aid Projects 
 My approach moves between aid’s day-to-day operations and its broader geopolitical 
structures. The logic of aid (or “ideology”) is embodied and visible in “the lived relation between 
men [sic] and their world.”861 I examine first, the ways aid projects have portrayed and affected 
the relationship between the state and the market (i.e. their respective structuring); second, the 
teaching that science (and with it implicitly “modernity”) will conquer will conquer “backward” 
agricultural practice to render India independent from food aid; and finally, the practices that are 
emphasized in these projects, and what these can tell us about the forms of knowledge which 
these programs operationalize.862  
1.3.1 | A Note on Materials and Methods  
 I examine these projects and their narratives through (i) archival material from these 
programs—files, records, letters and diaries of aid workers, internal reports, speeches, and 
unpublished media (from the Rockefeller Foundation and the Ford Foundation’s India office 
President, from the US government (USDA, USAID) at NARA and the GoI (largely the ministry 
of economic affairs) archives in the NAI); (ii) the published (promotional) literature of the 
various programs themselves; (iii) secondary literature about aid (academic and popular, written 
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by bureaucrats involved, academics and activists, this literature varies from documenting, to 
critiquing, to celebrating US food and agricultural aid programs and their effects on India); and 
(iv) interviews with people working in agriculture and in the aid industry or on issues around 
agricultural development. 
1.3.2 | Examining Specific Aid Projects 
I navigate these questions through an examination of two themes of aid: first, the case of food aid 
commodities and their leveraging power and second, the case of agricultural development aid; 
specifically, the role of agricultural technologies and aid as a form of power-knowledge. I explore 
these cases through four specific historical instances over the era of the “long Green Revolution 
to draw out how knowledge was produced and disseminated.   
1.3.3 | Chapter outline 
 I explore how these aid projects functioned through tracing the linkages of four cases. Section 
2 addresses US PL 480 (Food for Peace) aid in the 1960s which laid the groundwork for the “big 
push.” Section 3 indicates how this aid manifest in the “New Strategy” which came to be the 
Green Revolution. I suggest that these aid efforts also operated as projects of liberalization. In 
Section 4, I trace the continuities and disjunctures in contemporary calls for a “second Green 
Revolution” as they manifest in the USDA and USAID food security and agricultural 
development programs (2005-2010). I suggest that this logic continues in the two contemporary 
bilateral aid projects, indicating areas of continuity as well as new emphases. I conclude that the 
project of the “Long Green Revolution” as a project of accumulation continues to push forward, 
using the inequalities it produces (manifest most visibly in increased hunger) as the justification 
for expanding this development regime and further liberalizing India’s economy, from food 
production to food retail outlets.  
2 | Food for Peace 
 
US foreign policy and Indian development policy objectives initially converged on the issue 
of food and hunger. The US had vast grain surpluses, and India was facing grain shortages and 
offered a large market that could absorb the extra US grain.863 These coinciding concerns first 
congealed in 1949864 and then formed into a sustained agreement from 1954-1970 under Public 
Law (PL) 480, Food for Peace.865  
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Initially PL 480866 functioned as a means of disposing of the massive US foodgrain surpluses, 
and securing their “value” by keeping the surplus grain out of official trade, all while extending 
the US sphere of influence in Europe, and then beyond. The offer of food was seen as a material 
means of security against Communism in nations of the “free world.” When post-War Europe no 
longer wanted the US’s massive surpluses, India was one of the first nations to receive this food 
aid and quickly became the largest recipient.867  
2.1 | Food for industry, food for rupees 
US food exports to India grew steadily over the next decade868—a relationship that the 
political elite of both nations saw as broadly favorable. It alleviated the US’s record surpluses 
(which helped justify farm subsidies domestically) and enabled a focus on prioritizing industrial 
development in India.869 Much more than food alone secured this relationship. The food aid was 
one component of a larger vision and project that sought to guide India’s development path. From 
the Government of India’s side, PL 480 food offered a development convenience and a strategic 
alliance but was also out of necessity a financial arrangement. The primary reason why India 
imported such vast quantities of foodgrain from the US in the 1950s and 1960 was not (as is 
popularly held) because the US was the only nation with surplus foodgrains, nor because US food 
aid the cheapest foodgrain available.870 India became so heavily reliant on the US and PL 480 
food aid because other food exporting nations required either barter or the expending of foreign 
exchange. There were not enough countries willing to barter for the quantities of food India 
needed,871 and India did not have sufficient foreign exchange to be able to afford to buy food to 
meet its needs. The US provided a perfect development solution—guarantees of vast surplus food 
at a reasonable price,872 but even more importantly873—the US accepted the Indian Rupee as 
payment.874 This seemed to offer an ideal solution, for while the GoI simply could not afford to 
buy enough food on the international market with its extremely limited foreign exchange, the 
Government could print as many Rupees as needed (which was considered to be sound monetary 
policy).875  
2.1.1 | Food aid as a development tool  
The massive imports of cheap foreign wheat, however, had the undesirable (if predictable) 
effect of depressing domestic foodgrain prices in India. As grain prices fell, domestic production 
declined and imports increased—by 10% a year over the 1960s.876 Thus, while PL 480 
temporarily filled a need (in that it provided sufficient food stocks) US food aid comprised 60% 
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of India’s wheat by 1965, and the decline in domestic production that resulted was increasingly 
unsustainable. This was not necessarily unexpected: the choice to rely on imported food aid was 
an important part of the government’s balancing act in pursuing development. Since the 
administration and Planners prioritized industrial production, the allocation of limited resources, 
foreign exchange, and capital was heavily skewed to industry. Further, relatively lower food 
prices were instrumental to enabling low wages in industry for development in all realms (other 
than food production).877  
The GOI’s main route of trying to increase India’s food yields had been by addressing rural 
issues, promoting community development, and taking on the highly uneven distribution of land. 
This was in line with most approaches in the 1950s. There was a widespread obsession among 
experts—around the world and across the political spectrum—with changing the mindset of 
peasants (see Ch. 3). Likewise, (some degree of) land reform was held to be necessary for 
political stability and to increase food production in nations coming out of colonial rule.878 
Comparing India’s slow agricultural improvements with China’s apparent 30% increase in 
agricultural production (induced through reworking rural social relations) the GoI aimed to 
achieve 15%—just half as much—through similar rural development programming.879 The 
proposed fifteen percent increase proved difficult; village development programs were not as 
successful in modernizing rural mindsets or agricultural methods as planned. On top of this, land 
reform—the necessary ingredient for any real rural change—was proving deeply unpopular with 
India’s landed elites and thus faced staunch challenges in Parliament. The political mechanisms 
for increasing agricultural production were coming up short.  
2.1.2 | Fostering Dependence, Signaling a Shift  
 Food aid as a development tool had initially seemed like an ideal solution to the American 
leadership as well. In the geopolitical shadow of the rise of Communism in China, it was helpful 
for spreading US power880 whilst ensuring the “value” of the massive grain surpluses. However, 
this means of enacting aid did not continue in the same form. Mainstream understandings of how 
to enact development, the geopolitical context in which development projects were to intervene, 
and the domestic politics of “aid” in the US were all shifting.  
 By the mid-1960s, US agricultural subsidies had shifted, and as a result grain surpluses were 
decreasing. Development aid, even food aid, was becoming increasingly unpopular in the US 
Congress.881 Beyond this, given the lack of tangible “success” stories in food and development 
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aid projects in advancing Cold War aims, the theory of how to approach development and the 
terms of aid disbursements were shifting. The emerging changes were several years in the 
making. 
2.2 | Poverty as an issue of national security 
 
… whether additional millions ... become Communists will depend partly on 
whether the Communist world or the free world fulfils its promises. Hungry 
people are lured by promises, but they may be won by deeds. Communism 
makes attractive promises to underfed peoples. Democracy must not only 
promise as much, but must deliver more. 
- RAC, Weaver et al 1951a882  
 
Democracy alone can supply the vitalizing force to stir the peoples of the 
world into Triumphant action, not only against their human oppressors, but 
also against their ancient enemies—hunger, misery and despair. 
-Nelson Rockefeller, 1951883 
 
 
In a Rockefeller Foundation paper “World Food Problems,” Warren Weaver and his 
Rockefeller colleagues muse how to ensure against Communism. Hunger was widely considered 
to be the most urgent threat.884 A strategic paper of the Rockefeller Foundation attended in 
particular to the threat of hunger in instigating revolution and concluded that “Americans... must, 
in their own enlightened self-interest885 and not motivated merely by generosity or sentimental 
humanitarianism, do everything within their power to raise the living standards of their 
neighbors.”886 Emphasizing the central role that the modernization of agricultural science could 
play in guarding against communism, it was recommended that the Rockefeller Foundation 
expand the reach of its agricultural programs to Asia, and specifically to India (see Ch. 3).887 This 
understanding was to form the backbone that underwrote the Rockefeller Foundation’s 
international development efforts for at least the next two decades.888  
 The means of incorporating the “neighbors” whose poverty America saw as a security threat 
was not simply through aid. Aid could be a stepping stone, but, as Nelson Rockefeller explained, 
the necessary incorporation occurs through trade. The first step to conquering ancient and new 
oppressions and bringing “development,” he argued, is to integrate places into a “trading system.” 
Eliding “democracy” into those “peoples who elect to belong to the free-world trading system,”889 
Nelson Rockefeller positioned this “free-world trading system” as both the key to “democracy” 
and as the most important safeguard against its antithesis, “communism.” Diagnosing that “the 
policy of Soviet Russia and her dominated satellites is to organize a tightly-contained economic 
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area having the least possible trade with free-world areas,”890 Rockefeller argued that the 
threatening appeal of Soviet Communism could be neutralized by ensuring that “ancient 
oppressors” and basic human needs were met through securing “underdeveloped” poor nations a 
place in the free world trading system.891 The continued prosperity of the US was integrally tied 
with the fate of the poor, and trade was to serve a crucial geopolitical function—not just because 
a nation’s involvement in this system was deeply important in establishing Cold War alliances, 
but also because market logic was viewed as having inherently transformative powers. The 
expansionary logic of “the market” comprised both a solution, via incorporating peoples into the 
“free world,” and a tool within this geopolitical project. The form of “trade” being promoted is 
not specific; rather, it is the utility of “trade” as the thread suturing a political alliance.  
 Nelson Rockefeller892 and others argued that development could win the battle against 
conditions of “instability” (i.e. hunger and want) far more efficiently than military intervention 
could.893 Similarly, arguing that communism could not be simply “contained” forever, Millikan894 
and Rostow895 appealed to “modernization” as the crucial solution to America’s Cold War 
strategy.  
 US President Truman’s “Point Four Program” famously articulated what has since come to be 
regarded as the post-war/Cold War US development agenda. But, it was not until the late 1950s 
that the “science” of implementing this vision gained significant emphasis. This approach became 
codified in policy to fight a “soft war.” Through this approach, the conditions in which people 
lived had to be changed to make communism irrelevant to them; the most concerning and 
threatening of these conditions was hunger.  The unquestioning faith in this path, and in the 
universal power of technology to drive it, underwrote the production of knowledge relevant to 
these new nations. 
2.3 | Creating Policy Science, Making Knowledge   
 In the late 1950s, highly aware of the US role as the leader of the “free world” and its trading 
system, “modernization experts” were deeply concerned with establishing the proper steps to 
effectively transform subsistence sectors into market economies. To oversee this process 
American “modernization experts” sought to create a new form of science: a “policy science” that 
would deduce the exact procedures necessary to remedy the problems of underdevelopment. This 
new science was premised on the view that for their transformations to be effective, the 
procedures (or steps to modernization) needed to be identified, enumerated, and made into a 
codified science.896  
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 The new “social” science focused on “decision making processes” it was to be applied around 
the world in the project of transforming “subsistence societies” into market economies and 
integrating them into the “free world” via its “trading system.” In this new social science, 
knowledge was objective, complete, and existed entirely outside of its application (in specific 
places); questions were reduced to formulas. 
 Examining the conditions in these “new nations,” modernization theorists argued that in these 
places, “we” were essentially looking into “our” own past, lived as another’s present.897 
Delineating the steps to modernization, they suggested the US was to provide the model. The 
procedures for how to ensure that the newly independent countries’ development was successful 
were to be drawn from the (historical fiction of the) US progress narrative.898 The US represented 
the original “new nation,” and as such could offer a template for the new nations emerging from 
Europe’s recently independent colonies in Asia.899 The imaginary of American history as they 
crafted it offered a template of an anti-colonial revolution leading peacefully to capitalist 
development. On this universal trajectory, the US was not only “more advanced,” but was also 
the most obvious “success story.” The goal of their project was clear: the path out of poverty was 
to become a consumption society made in the image of mid-century America. The project was 
one of codifying US expansion into discrete policy steps to be uniformly implemented around the 
world through development aid. Technology was the means, as it offered a transparent reflection 
of knowledge. Technology could bring development, and when integrated with “market” 
mechanisms, could also be used as the metric to assess and accelerate places’ level of 
development.   
2.4| Cold Warriors: Navigating Technology’s Contradiction 
 According to this model, to promote development and ensure stability, poor countries were to 
be thrust out of their age old “stagnation.” The US development experts’ task was to make sure 
the changes went in the “right” direction: toward “free market integration.” There was no question 
that technology was to drive this development,900 but there was also a deep tension inherent in this 
faith in technology: while the “right” path was to follow in the image of the US (not the USSR), 
the persistent problem with this lay in the fact that the USSR was clearly demonstrating very rapid 
modernization, and was also doing so through the use of codified development steps, harnessing 
modern technology. As such, it seemed the USSR was doing essentially what the US was 
advocating, but more quickly than the US model could.  
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 Indicative of the worry the US felt in the Cold War context, the widespread consensus was: 
“It is now accepted … that economic planning in the USSR ... has led to a far more rapid rate of 
industrialization than had been achieved in Western Europe and the United States in the past,” as 
Indian Planner Mahalanobis noted.901 This consensus on the rapid rates of growth was a point 
which the Americans were increasingly also having to concede. This assessment threatened the 
US’s reigning explanatory framework.  
 On top of that, over this period the USSR was directly aiding India in its industrialization. The 
situation this Soviet aid produced was later summarized by the US Ambassador to India, Chester 
Bowles. Bowles relayed to Washington his deep concern about India’s future and the vital 
importance of not allowing anything “to reverse the present trend [in India] toward a dynamic, 
market-oriented economic operation within a free society.”902 But, he continued, the USSR’s 
generous aid programs and the West’s “stinginess” were threatening to do just that.903 Reviewing 
the situation he suggested that “there is a gradually increasing affinity with the USSR which has 
many worrisome aspects.”904 Beyond economic aid, he suggests, the Soviets are winning the 
cultural war as well: 
The USSR has somehow managed to emerge in the minds of millions of Indians 
as the world’s most peace-loving, responsible, middle-of-the-road great power, 
striving patiently in the face of great difficulties to hold in check the extremist 
Chinese to their left and the ‘extremist’ Americans to their right.905  
 
The US clearly had its work cut out, as Bowles repeatedly insists: to give up on India would be to 
give up on the third world at large.906 India is one battleground that cannot be lost—“If Indian 
democracy fails there is very little chance that democratic methods will succeed elsewhere in the 
developing the ‘third world’.”907 Success in India is not only in “America’s long-range national 
interest;”908 it is the right thing to do for a “measure of social justice.”909 More than that, India 
could be the model—through American aid, India could “also provide a persuasive demonstration 
that developing nations do not need to follow in the bloody, totalitarian steps of Communist 
China to achieve political stability and rapid economic growth.”910 
 US development success in India had a significant symbolic role and could serve as a model 
for poor nations across the world—“On the positive side, India’s success in achieving political 
stability with an adequate rate of growth will be enormously encouraging to similar efforts 
elsewhere. The contrast between a viable Indian democracy and the angry confused Communist 
dictatorship in China will have a major and perhaps decisive effect in the worldwide balance of 
power.”911 Development aid to India was unquestionably necessary for the US’s project of 
  200 
democracy and a “free world trading system.” However, Bowles continues, alarmingly, the USSR 
also realizes that “India is not just another nation like Kenya or Peru; it is a strategically placed 
continent with a population greater than Africa and Latin America combined.”912 And as such, 
“the Soviets are not only helping India to build factories but are guaranteeing a ready market for 
total output.”913 To counter the Soviets’ approach—of helping India to build (state-owned and 
run) factories (including subsidizing the factories and guaranteeing a market for the goods the 
factories produced)—and in direct contrast to that path, the Americans offered a different path to 
development success. 
2.4.1 | Constructing a path via agriculture 
 Reflecting on the clarity of the USSR’s model at fostering greater and more rapid success in 
industrializing poor nations, confounded American experts located an alternative path. As Rostow 
explicates:  
The most important conclusion at which I have arrived from three years’ 
immersion in the study of Communism is this: it lies within the capabilities of the 
United States and the Free World to shatter the belief in Communism as the 
unique method for rapid development. And we can do this over the next 
decade—by, say, 1965.   … 
In short, the fact that Marx was a city boy gives the Free World the chance to 
destroy in the next decade the myth that only Communist brutality can raise an 
underdeveloped area into self-sustaining growth. And if that myth is dissipated, 
the chance that Communism will gain power in the underdeveloped areas, whose 
destiny will determine the long-run balance in the world’s power, will be much 
reduced, if not once and for all eliminated.914 
 
The secret weakness that the American experts’ careful study had located lay in agricultural 
production. Rostow explains: 
The faith and judgment which lie behind this conclusion stem not only from 
knowledge of how the peasant’s human response to Communist methods has 
[adversely] affected agricultural output. This conclusion is supported by results 
already achieved in the Free World, notably in India, by the techniques of 
freedom, the method of individual consent [in agricultural production].915   
 
He argued that Communism’s focus on industrialization came with an inability to feed its people.  
 Rostow hyperbolically offered China and India as representatives of opposite paths to 
development. Explaining that “India has begun its attempt to industrialize in a way exactly the 
opposite of Communist China,”916 Rostow was not describing, but rather prescribing, the path that 
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the US would come to argue as necessary. He continued: “China is investing in heavy industry. 
India has plowed its scarce capital for the first five year plan primarily into agriculture.”917  
 Despite the fact that agriculture received little resource allocation in India’s development 
vision, and that its meager allocation was consistently cut in the Second and the Third Plan, 
Rostow proposes that the US should see in India an opportunity for the methods of the “free 
world” to demonstrate greater success and outpace communism by producing more food. He 
emphasizes the contrast, explaining that while: 
China is forcing its peasants into collectives, by threat and force. India is trying 
to induce the peasant to improve his methods, to increase the use of chemical 
fertilizers, to double-crop his land. All this is done painstakingly by education 
and example. The results thus far are remarkably hopeful. The substantial 
increase in agricultural output planned in India for the First Five Year Plan has 
been achieved in three years; and evidence is that a constructive chain reaction is 
sweeping the Indian countryside, far beyond the demonstration villages. …the 
method of consent is not only morally right, it is right technically as well.918 
 
The emphasis on the agricultural sector, and the application of modern technology to agriculture 
specifically, offered a clear distinction from the USSR’s path and from India’s status quo, both of 
which emphasized the industrial sector first and foremost.919 Thus, while India was pouring its 
resources into prioritizing industrialization, this allocation of capital was not that which the US 
experts thought would best demonstrate the strengths of joining the path of the “Free World.”  
While Soviet development aid to India was helping to foster industrialization, the US sought to 
transform India’s fields into factories.  
 The Rockefeller Foundation, Ford Foundation, and US Government shared this mission and 
established complimentary agricultural development programs in India (see Ch. 3); George 
Harrar, then President of the Rockefeller Foundation, considered by some to be the “father” of 
“industrial agriculture”920—and who better to lead India’s agricultural industrialization than the 
US Foundations. They did not intend these to be simply “buying” a place against the threat of 
communism,921 but more, to be teaching development, or guiding India’s development path along 
a specifically “non-communist” trajectory.  
 The central lesson they reiterated was that the key to successful change could only take place 
through the use of technology and be guided by the eventual expansion of private capital.922 As 
US Ambassador to India John Kenneth Galbraith explained the lineage of this assessment:923 
What we had decided were the causes of poverty with which the Indians and we 
sought to contend was [were] derived … from convenience. There were, broadly 
speaking, only two things we could provide to lessen the deprivation—we could 
supply capital and, in principle, useful technical knowledge. The causes of 
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poverty were then derived from these possibilities—poverty was seen to be the 
result of a shortage of capital, and an absence of technical skills. The remedy 
included the diagnosis. Having [the] vaccine, we identified smallpox.924 
 
While in retrospect, the assessment of the primary means to expand the market and the reach of 
private capital in the “free world” were as much out of lack of ready options as anything else,925 
this perspective was a continued theme across the Kennedy, Johnson, and Nixon Administrations, 
but the means of procuring these technologies shifted.  
 The Americans pushed forward in the field of agriculture, in which the American method 
could better feed hungry people than the Soviet method. If the ability to feed people was the 
terrain of assessment, the US’s “free world” model could outpace the Soviets. If industrialization 
was the metric, the “free world” could not “succeed.” Thus, the terrain of development needed to 
move to the realm in which the US could demonstrate the superiority of “democratic” and 
“trading” methods to enact development in poor nations. A USDA Foreign Agricultural Service 
promotional booklet declared: 
The image the US is building among the hungry people of the world is 
tangible. It cannot be blotted out with propaganda. By using food as a major 
instrument of foreign policy we are doing what the communists would like to 
but can’t. 
Our agricultural science is superior to Russia’s. Our system of agricultural 
knowledge is better. Our farmers have more overall know-how than their 
Russian counterparts…Most important, private ownership—which brings 
with it the profit motive and freedom of decision gives our farmers a much 
stronger incentive to increase production.926 
 
The US plan sought to use technology to inject exchange value into agriculture as a means to 
rework the relationship between food, the state, and the market in order to spur “take-off.” As 
more significantly, it sought to outpace the Soviet model of technology-driven industrialization. 
Injecting technology was to be the key to speed up “time” and also offered an effective way to 
spread market foundations throughout more segments of society than industrialization alone 
(particularly state-run industry).  
 The understanding of history as universal and stagist became key to this theory of 
modernization. Like European imperialisms before it, a race for territory was on, but the US 
explicitly contrast itself to its European predecessors, reiterating that Americans did not seek to 
directly control or “rule” these foreign lands. The project was something far more ambitious: to 
transform these places in the image of the US and enable this transformation simply through the 
superiority of US knowledge, approach, and the universal validity of this method of development 
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itself. Success in their projects was nothing less than the confirmation of the universality and 
inevitability of this path.  
 The focus on agricultural technology as the solution came to be a defining aspect of official 
US Government aid. This resonated with the Ford and Rockefeller927 Foundations, which pushed 
“a ‘technology first’ approach to transform India’s fields into factories. This view was marked by 
‘the firm belief that new technology is the leading factor in the process of desired social change 
because technology is also the locomotive of economic growth’,” as an American agronomist 
working for the Ford Foundation during the GR explained/recalled.928  
2.5 | The project: Reorienting India’s development priorities  
 As Americans on the ground in India quickly discovered, for modern technology to become a 
reality on any scale, the Indian government would have to allocate significantly more resources to 
agriculture. The push for the (re)allocation of development resources to agriculture was initially a 
significant aspect of aid’s “leveraging” work—both publicly and behind the scenes.   
 The first public report explicitly advocating this shift was the Ford Foundation’s 1959 
“Report on India’s Food Crisis and Steps to Meet It.” The Report insisted “that ‘food enough’ 
[must] become a central objective in the crusade for the new India visualized by its leaders.”929 
“Hunger” was used as the primary threat to push through the codification of the steps the 
American experts enumerated as necessary for change. The seminal “Report” advocated a top-
down technology-driven approach and the restructuring of India’s economy—away from a 
prioritization of industry to favor agriculture—to meet the goal of increasing food production. 
The prioritization of the agricultural sector alone was not sufficient; they insisted that such efforts 
to produce more food had to be organized on an efficient “war footing.”930 
 Mobilizing the threat of imminent hunger, and their own self-evident expertise in solving 
hunger (as non-hungry Americans), Ford’s consultants insisted that a “far-reaching, centralized 
authority with a clear line of command and execution, alone can meet the challenge of growing 
more food.”931 The modernization theorists promised that if this project failed, the threat of mass 
hunger and instability was a live wire.  
 The approach justified the necessity of the significant restructuring of India’s development 
path by appealing to a food crisis to come (predicted for 1966, seven years in the future). This 
diagnosis—of the need to restructure development priorities, or even that there were any 
impending food shortages, much less a food crisis—was not a common view and was not agreed 
upon. For instance, denouncing Ford’s Report as creating a “strategy of Terror” by producing an 
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imagined and false crisis to manufacture the urgency to push their drastic change of agenda, 
Daniel Thorner argued that: 
Proponents of so drastic and unpalatable a measure could scarcely expect their 
suggestions to be seriously entertained in the normal course of affairs. Only in a 
setting of panic might such counsels conceivably prevail. The function of the Ford 
Team's statistically contrived food crisis is to shatter public confidence. Unless 
demoralized by a hobgoblin of hunger, India could hardly be persuaded to plough 
under the Second Plan.932 
 
Thorner points to a key aspect of Ford’s proposed “agricultural revolution:” it pivoted on the re-
prioritization of their comprehensive national economic plans (in which they enumerated their 
detailed objectives and outlay for agriculture and industry), to emphasize agriculture. The 
enormous pressure from Ford and others to “plow the plan under,” as Thorner put it, stemmed 
from their geopolitical assessment more than from any objective evidence of a food shortage. For, 
as Rostow notes, India seemed to be an agricultural success at the time. In 1955 the nation was 
declared to be food “self-sufficient” and it seemed that the hunger problem had been fixed once 
and for all.933 Thus, when Ford revived this problem just a few years later—with promises of 
impending shortages—it seemed anachronistic at best, or simply coercive. This time the 
“hobgoblin of hunger” did not (yet) prevail. 
2.5.1 | Enacting Liberal Responsibility: Agro-Technology as Mechanism   
 The 1959 Ford Foundation plan for India, while not initially embraced, outlined the direction 
in which the US would come to increasingly push India. In 1963 US President Kennedy extended 
the reach of the approach underlying Ford’s prescriptions at a global level.  
 Laying out America’s role in promoting a global “agricultural revolution,” Kennedy 
unequivocally pronounced that the problem of hunger could be solved and prescribed how: 
through the transfer of knowledge and technology produced by America’s recent “scientific 
revolution” in agriculture and “[f]arm production,” a revolution which Kennedy hyperbolically 
characterized as “dwarfing the industrial revolution of 150 years ago.”934 In his speech to the 
1963 World Food Congress, Kennedy mobilized the moral imperative of addressing hunger to 
create a geopolitical and “security” imperative for the increased dissemination of agricultural 
technology.935 Constructing a manifest destiny for American agricultural technology, he argued 
that “We need to help transmit all that we know of farm technology to the ends of the earth, to 
overcome the barriers of ignorance and suspicion.”936 In this paradigm, technology was to 
introduce the requisite spark to remake subjects and society.937 The year 1963 was also the first 
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year that “high yielding varieties” (HYVs)—which would come to define the GR—were used to 
increase yields in any developing country.938 
But, the focus on agricultural technology as the driver of development or the most effective 
means of addressing hunger was not self-evident. At this time the US government’s primary 
means of assisting India was, after all, via massive quantities of PL 480 food aid—so that more 
resources would be available for industrialization.939 Further, only a few years before, US policy 
had been to discourage India from growing more wheat—as to not export it and depress global 
grain prices.940 The focus on technology and modernization in the realm of agriculture and as part 
of economic development represented a marked shift from the US government’s previous stance 
encouraging India’s prioritization of the expansion of its industrial base to create the conditions 
for uplift of all. 
2.5.2 |  Increasing conditionalities 
 As the PL 480 food aid program continued, the conditionalities placed on sending the food 
grew941—in the name of “self-help.”942 Food aid came to be tied to specific terms, crafted to 
produce national food “self-sufficiency.”943 The increasingly stringent conditions on aid served as 
a justification for continued aid in an embattled and unpopular US political context; these 
conditions also came to serve as metrics of aid’s “success.”  
3 | The short tether: muscular paternalism 
 As India grew to become dependent on US food aid in the 1950s and 60s (for as much as 
60% of its wheat supply),944 food aid was used as a stick, both to write out other possible avenues 
of increasing food production (e.g. via political change) and to force India out of what US 
politicians characterized as an “ungrateful and lazy” reliance on the US for food.945 They 
characterized India as “ungrateful” because despite “feeding India,” as they saw it, US policies 
still were not taken on wholeheartedly,946 and as “lazy”  based on the belief that without US 
enforcement of stringent “modernization” requirements, India would not take its own “best 
interest” into consideration, and would not bother to institute policies to improve agricultural 
production. Thus, Johnson argued, the US must use the stick for “the Indians’ own good.”947  
 The question is how this project was understood and enacted.948 Johnson insisted the requisite 
food production increases would come only from heavy-handed enforcement of the step-by-step 
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route to progress as laid out by the US. By all accounts, Johnson became personally obsessed 
with the quest to modernize Indian agriculture and eliminate hunger. Driven by a sense of 
“personal responsibility” both for “millions of hungry and starving people” and for the 
effectiveness of development policies of foreign governments, Johnson saw India as the chance 
for the US to test a new policy model. Convinced that success could come only through very 
specific changes, Johnson aimed to create a model in India to replicate around the “Third 
World.”949 At the same time, to Johnson the issue also had far more importance than as a 
universal principal—he became deeply personally involved in monitoring India’s steps toward 
“self help.”  
What was unusual was not so much Johnson's support for a change in Indian 
farm policy as his intense, obsessive personal involvement. For the next two 
years, Lyndon Johnson, in effect, became the US government's "desk officer" for 
PL 480 food aid to India. According to Walt Rostow, “It is hard to recapture how 
deeply Johnson felt about getting the Indians to do a better job in producing food. 
The India food question went right to where he lived. It was part of Johnson's 
fundamental concern for human beings and his hatred of poverty.950 
 
Evoking a liberal responsibility for the poor and malnourished, the US’s dual edged role was 
justified as both a bold paternalism and a means of advancing US interests, ensuring “stability,” 
and expanding markets for US capital.951 This dual-edged approach manifest in policies aiming to 
teach the method of increasing food output and attaining food security: by increasing the use of 
the new agricultural chemicals—via forced compliance based on leveraging food aid.952  
3.1 | “Self-Help:” From Food Aid to the New Strategy 
 
A November 1965 confidential agreement, between US secretary of Agriculture Orville 
Freeman and India’s Minister of Food and Agriculture C. Subramaniam, laid out in more detail a 
program along the lines of what the Ford Foundation had suggested in 1959.953 This time, the 
threat was not just a statistical promise of impending hunger. The demand to implement 
agricultural modernization had teeth: the continued disbursement of US food aid was directly 
linked to measured steps of agricultural “modernization.” 
 Freeman and Subramaniam’s agreement, popularly called the “Treaty of Rome” (as it was 
written at a meeting of the Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO) in Rome), detailed the 
exact steps that India would take to increase its food production. The requirements stated that 
food aid disbursement was contingent upon terms which were specified down to: the amount of 
fertilizer to be used per hectare per year, how much would be imported and domestically 
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produced, what the minimum support prices for farmers using these inputs and the new HYV 
seeds were to be, and India’s liberalization of its agro-input production sector to allow increased 
foreign investment (specifically, changing the policies regulating fertilizer companies owned by 
foreign private interests—now, the private companies, not the Indian government, were to be 
given full control over pricing and distribution, so that production could be reoriented on a 
“profitable basis”). The measured enforcement of these steps, it was argued, was necessary for 
production to take off. In the name of “self-help” and promoting economic development,954 the 
agreement directed how much money the GoI would allocate to the measured steps955 as the 
condition to continue to receive the (now absolutely essential956) US food aid disbursements.957  
3.1.1 | The “Big Push” 
The “New Strategy” in agriculture, a program that was to become known as the “Green 
Revolution,”958 was the substance of the “Big Push.” 
This agreement subsequently referred to as the “Treaty of Rome,” was hailed by 
John P. Lewis, Minister of Embassy in New Delhi and Director of the AID 
program in India, in a December 28 memorandum to Komer [Johnson’s aid] as 
more solid in content and promise “than any comparable program since 
Independence.” Lewis’ assessment was that the United States “has helped 
engineer what could be a breakthrough for Indian agricultural expansion.” 
Lewis saw that expansion as an important part of an effort to speed up Indian 
economic growth, an effort being described by AID and the World Bank as “the 
Big Push.”959 
 
The “Big Push” for “take-off” was to be the moment of ignition,960 where vestiges of past beliefs 
and “old blocks to and resistances to steady growth”961 were finally to be shed, giving way to a 
new forward-looking mentality, driven by the rational development subject, whose new 
rationality was communicated first and foremost by responsive engagement with “market” 
signals. The US’s goal was nothing less than speeding up history (and its stagist advancement) to 
create the fundamental changes necessary to restructure society in accordance with the principles 
of this model—and in so doing to outpace the Soviets.       
 The significance of the conditional terms of food aid went far beyond geopolitical tools in the 
US’s fight for moral legitimacy and developmental success against communist models. They also 
explicitly (re)defined India’s approach to agricultural development along the path of increasing 
yields via modern technology. The leveraging power of food-aid962 (via the conditionalities of PL 
480) and the shifting frameworks of international development (towards a focus on “self-
sufficiency”) were key to instigating the Green Revolution.963  
  208 
3.2 | The singular work of food in extending aid’s logic 
 The shift in the geopolitics of food and agriculture from strategic commodity goods to 
components of a larger knowledge project was integrally tied in with the US’s modality of power 
and the liberal paternalism in which the US964 packaged its food aid.965 The geopolitical 
imperatives which ushered in the Green Revolution can be read as operating within food’s dual 
functions—as the use value of food is singular, food’s role in geopolitics is never based solely in 
food’s materiality nor simply in food’s exchange value. Food is also always strategic; the use 
value of food can exceed the materiality of food. That is, the use value lies not only in the fact 
that it can be eaten, but also in the many other purposes and metrics which food serves—in this 
case, for instance, as a way of teaching a development path. Food becomes a product of success 
on this path, an indicator of a government’s abilities and/or worthiness. 
  The geopolitical rearrangements ushering in the Green Revolution harnessed this material and 
strategic split in food’s use value. Food-aid was used (offered and tethered to conditions) in a way 
that reinforced the role of food in geopolitics and reproduced its dual functions. This “aid” policy 
harnessed the materiality and the singularity of food to produce a regime of development, writing 
how food would be produced from then on and securing US hegemony over food and agricultural 
production. This power was secured even without the trade of actual food stocks—but rather, 
agricultural inputs and a trade in knowledge of modern production techniques. Hence, the use of 
food in geopolitics cannot be approached within the realm of the economic alone. The ways in 
which epistemic and economic power co-articulated are necessary to understand this. What is the 
knowledge to produce, what is the knowledge project?—it is more than simply how to increase 
agricultural production, it seeks to provide definitive and naturalized answers to questions of what 
constitutes economic development and how to pursue it: through trade and the expansion of 
private capital. “Take-off” was to arrive via the shift in India’s approach to agriculture—resulting 
from the tethering of food-aid disbursements to India’s steps toward industrial (chemical-based) 
agriculture.  
 The above mandatory changes, enforced by the “short tether” policy, or the “strings” on aid, 
were certainly contentious, but since the exact terms of the “strings” were confidential, the “New 
Strategy” itself was not as deeply controversial with the general public and Parliament as it likely 
would have been.966 The contention and debate (in Parliament and society more broadly) focused 
on the idea of “strings”967 in the abstract (i.e. the fact that there were implicit and unclear strings 
on food aid) but significantly, not agricultural modernization itself as a “string.”968  
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3.3 | Technology-driven approach aligned with the interests of elite in India 
 While the conditions on aid deployed food as a “political sanction” to guarantee compliance 
with the US agenda, the emphasis on pursuing national food “self-sufficiency” through an 
“injection of technology”969 to increase production aligned with the interests of political and 
landed elite in India.970 The New Strategy offered a technical alternative to the redistribution of 
land, which was tremendously unpopular with landed elites and thus with Parliament. At this 
juncture, when the low rates of agricultural growth had “convinced the [restructured] Planning 
Commission that the continuation of shortfall in agriculture would jeopardize the entire program 
of industrial development” and the future of India’s development, agriculture was reborn.971 With 
food aid directly linked to how much India spent on fertilizer and agricultural-technology imports 
or domestic manufacturing, India largely abandoned its fledgling land reform efforts and instead 
opened its fields to the Green Revolution and US agri-business.972 The “Treaty of Rome” and the 
“short tether” were only the beginning of this technological approach to becoming “self 
sufficient”—a much longer and larger knowledge project that as enacted through the terms on aid 
projects.  
3.3.1 | Consolidating “Self-help” into nascent economic liberalization 
 The logic of the push for “self-help” to achieve “self-sufficiency” can be read in the texts of, 
and letters regarding, loan agreements and negotiations. These loan negotiations provide the bulk 
of the records on the nature and understandings of aid during this time. A significant portion of 
the USAID loans were designated for the construction and operation of plants to produce the 
necessary new “modern” inputs—agricultural-technologies from fertilizer to pesticides. These 
inputs, together with irrigation, were fundamental to make the new HYV “miracle” seeds work. 
The loan documents also reveal a persistent tension that manifests in negotiating how the 
fertilizer plants should be managed and under what ownership model (i.e. the GoI, the private 
sector, or a collaboration of the two). The role of and the relation between the private sector and 
the state was a constant tension and defining aspect throughout aid negotiations; while each party 
subscribed to a schematic view of development, the views of how “take-off” should be efficiently 
managed had distinct roles for the state. 
 In the loan negotiations the US was particularly concerned that the new and rapidly growing 
ag-input sector provide ample opportunities for the private sector to grow. Justifying this, USAID 
argued that the GoI could not possibly expand its operations fast enough to meet the demand for 
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agricultural inputs. What is at stake is not just who owns the factories, but what model of state-
market interaction underwrites the GR as a development model. The aim is for this to 
demonstrate “the green revolution [as a project that] advanced at a rate more rapid than 
government could readily service. The pressure for fertilizer and insecticide became so great as to 
weaken and overcome the ideological commitment to government-run industry,” as Paarlberg 
narrated.973 
 The GoI’s finance ministry, however, insisted that publicly owned plants could ensure the 
goals of national development and the rapid increase in food production if the GoI could oversee 
and direct the production in accordance with national goals and economic plans. But, they walked 
a fine line, as USAID financed the fertilizer plants and had significant leverage over whether any 
more plants could be built. As Guhan of the Ministry of Finance, Aid Division, explains in a 
memo to his colleagues:  
[US]‘Aid would prefer that these two fertilizer projects should be built with 
private capital.’ AID’s stand appears to be compounded of (a) basic 
disinclination to finance public sector fertilizer projects in India. To my [Guhan; 
Ministry of Finance] query whether this was an ideological inhibition, I was told 
that it was on the “sound practical experience: of our public sector fertilizer 
plants not being notable success and (b) the anxiety that in any event we should 
fully explore the possibility of working out a joint venture with private foreign 
investors before going ahead with these two projects as 100% public sector 
plants. In other words, AID would want us to bear the onus of convincing them 
as to why we desire to have these two projects in the public sector. …. In view of 
the importance and priority of these two fertilizer projects, it is necessary that we 
should avoid any possibility of delay arising from GoI and AID not being on the 
same wavelength.974, 975 
 
While USAID sought to have the GR demonstrate the “natural” growth of private capital as the 
most rapid development path, the reality that all the plants still needed state financing 
complicated this narrative.   
3.3.2 | Negotiating the means of “self help”  
 John Lewis, USAID’s India country director, related the importance of the US approach for 
achieving aid and development to S. Bhoothalingam, the Secretary of the Department of 
Economic Affairs in India’s Ministry of Finance.976 In a private letter, Lewis offered the US 
government’s appreciation of India’s concerted efforts at promoting the expansion and 
deregulation of private sector functioning. Continuing, Lewis explained that the USG still needed 
commitment from the GOI on several concrete steps, implemented on a stricter timeline. He 
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assured the Secretary that the Americans were seeking these terms not in an effort to single out 
India, or even South Asia, but as part of a broader move to ensure the conditions are in place for 
development and private enterprise, by requiring nations to actively demonstrate their own level 
of commitment to private sector development to receive continued aid disbursements. He 
explained that the move “illustrates our increased concern, worldwide, that A.I.D. financing be 
associated with maximum self-help efforts by the borrowers. … Our intent is to assure…the most 
rapid progress possible will be made toward our mutual objective of self-sufficiency.”977 
Continuing, he asked for specific actions and dates: 
The [Indian] Governments’ recent statements and actions indicate a 
determination actively to encourage foreign private firms to invest in fertilizer 
production in India appear to us eminently sound. …would you be able to give 
me your assurance that it is the Government’s intention to do whatever it 
reasonably can to reach agreements by next July 1 [1966] with foreign private 
companies for the establishment of 1 million tons (nitrogen equivalent) of new 
fertilizer production capacity?978 
 
The success of India’s development, in USAID’s view, rested on not just increased use of agro-
inputs; the means by which the inputs were produced and attained was an integral part of this. 
The increase in supply of inputs was to support “the rapid and vigorous expansion of the reach of 
private enterprise.”979 The US stance maintained that the agro-input sector was growing rapidly, 
and that expediting its deregulation and privatization was essential to ensuring that development 
kept apace. Lewis expressed particular concern with one of the first plants, the Coromandel 
fertilizer project—which was to be a model and would serve as an indicator of these policies’ 
success. He repeatedly asked India for committed assurance that the plant “make good progress 
and, in particular, be able to engage the kind of seeding program originally provided—especially 
because of that project’s bellwether significance for other private investment in fertilizer.”980 
3.4 | Food production as a knowledge project 
The perspective articulated in these exchanges reflects an emergent shift in the role of food 
and agriculture in geopolitics. This is a dual move. It moves away from food being a tool in 
itself—where food itself is development aid by meeting basic needs and hence allowing for 
“higher” level concerns, like industrialization. It moves toward food production, and the “know-
how” transferred with it, as the focus, constituting a knowledge project integral to the geopolitics 
of “development.”  
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 While food, hunger, and the desire to control the agro-food system have long been driving 
forces in imperialism,981 with the Green Revolution, food and the inputs for (industrial) 
agricultural production became more than strategic commodities. They were also a means of 
deploying knowledge.982 
 The USAID stance maintained that the only way that India could ensure that the necessary 
technologies were procured was through economic liberalization and the nourishing of private 
enterprise.983 Explicit from the 1960s on, this push continued, expanding the realm of what is to 
be moved outside of the state’s control and, into the “market.”984 In the 1960s, the focus was on 
agricultural inputs; by the 1980s, on food itself; in the 1990s, on any state involvement in 
food/distribution at all. That USAID credits the ideological differences articulated to the 
empirical proof of “sound practical experience” offers a concise take on the functioning of this 
ideology—a functioning that was solidified during the GR and continues to be understood in 
much the same way today. As Brian Atwood former USAID Administrator (during the Clinton 
Administration from 1992-1998) explained: 
I don’t think this is ideological, I think there is some empirical evidence to show 
that if you privatize your land and give people incentives and privatize the inputs 
that aren’t state and broaden seed and fertilizer and everything else and create a 
market, that then you are going to generate a lot more activity and higher yields 
for food security and everything else.985 
 
That is to say, in explicitly naming “ideology” only to then insist that this is not ideological, 
whether in the 1960s or today, is to say that it is not a “dupe,” or that there is no hidden agenda, 
but this is actually the way to achieve development “take-off” and the affiliated gains—from food 
security to tackling hunger. This understanding continues through aid and development projects 
until the present.  
The politics of this knowledge project are markedly absent from these narratives, swapped for 
a reverence of technology. This reverence is shared by the nationalist and developmentalist 
narratives of the era. The faith in “Science for Economic Development”986 binds the two, and the 
absence of the politics of knowledge (not to be confused with “technical know-how,” which is 
very much discussed) cements the tale. It is not simply knowledge, but contingency, possibility, 
and conjuncture that are written out: the GR was undoubtedly controversial at the time, with other 
paths under consideration, and its existence owes to fairly significant political shuffling (see Ch. 
4).  
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3.5 | Self-help’s Lessons and Legacies 
 The terms of continued aid for the Fourth Plan required changes not only to agriculture but 
other realms as well. For, the GR was not just instilling an “economic” mindset in farmers. This 
revolution was at heart an “economic revolution,” both in the policies that it sought to implement 
and in the conditions it put on aid. As Bowles assessed: “No observer who has recently visited the 
rural areas of India will question the assertion that an economic revolution of major proportions 
is underway.”987 He credited these significant changes to “the positive response of millions of 
farmers to the prospect of higher prices, and their willingness to adopt new techniques which 
sharply increase their yield per acre.”988 But, while the revolution was promoted under the name 
of farmer self-help, the stipulations on aid (by this time) were of a very different nature, including 
changing monetary policy.989  
 By this time, to pay for the PL 480 food aid, the Rupee had been inflated; additionally, with 
subsequent the requirements of the “New Strategy,” India had drawn down almost all of its 
foreign exchange to pay for the massive the import of agricultural inputs.990 Together, these 
realities put India’s economy on a course that was increasingly leveraged to aid.991 In this context, 
it became increasingly significant that India’s development path still was not what the US 
development “experts” deemed it should be—especially “to attract foreign private investment. 
This set the course for monetary policy to come.  
 The “self-help” policies of the 1960s covered vast swaths of development, economic, and 
social policy. They could be considered to be intellectual predecessors of the IMF’s “structural 
adjustment policies” (SAPs) of the 1980s and 90s. The premise was that once India removed “the 
breaks” causing stagnation, economic development would finally “take-off.” USAID, the WB, 
and others saw their role in this process as to monitor, to steer, and to keep India on the most 
effective path forward.  
 The self-help package was an effort to realign the goals of state development planning—away 
from a focus on publicly run enterprises towards “unshackling” the generative potential of the 
“free market.” By this time, in development policy, trade had come to mean more than simply the 
incorporation into a global alliance (i.e. the earlier era’s free world’s trading system). India’s 
balance of trade was excessively lopsided. As the next necessary step in “self-help,” India had to 
increase its exports. A major component of the discussion came to focus on locating “the most 
expeditious and efficient manner to exploit India’s comparative advantages in international 
trade.”992  
  214 
 The lopsided balance of trade (leveraged to pay for inputs993) was damaging India’s economic 
growth potential and was now what was decreed to be preventing takeoff. India needed to 
increase exports to bring the balance necessary for more rapid growth; as USAID administrator 
for India, John Lewis explained in his newsletter: 
India is not new to the planning process. Indeed it was a trail blazer in adopting 
economic planning techniques to a democratic society. Much of its development 
plans have reflected the kind of careful analytic work for preparing a 
development strategy. The same kinds of techniques are applicable to the 
preparation of an export strategy.994 
 
Arguing that this is simply a new kind of development strategy, the understanding of 
“development,” as much as the path to it, were in the process of changing.  
3.5.1 | Promoting trade: bringing the Rupee in line 
 The Fourth Plan required significant foreign funding; as laid out, it was almost twenty-five 
percent aid and loan funded.995 This meant that the international aid committees held significant, 
and disproportionate, leverage. Concerned with the pace and direction of India’s development, 
the US and World Bank had jointly dispatched a Committee (The Bell Mission) in 1964 to assess 
India’s overarching development strategy, and specifically its fiscal policies, before agreeing to 
an aid package.996 This leverage was explicitly used to steer India’s development path.997 It also 
ushered in changes in fiscal policy.  
 In a 1966 Memorandum from the President's Special Assistant (Komer) to President Johnson 
the logic of this project of “self-help” is laid out. The project extended beyond food and 
agriculture—into broader regulatory and financial indicators of economic progress/takeoff—it 
equated roughly to economic liberalization policies. The keystone of the policies in the “self-
help” package was declared to be the devaluation of the Rupee. The justification that the US, 
World Bank, and Consortium of funders provided for the necessity of devaluation was that it 
would make India’s exports cheaper and thus spur economic growth. 
George Woods is eager to start working over the Indians on a self-help and aid 
package as soon as he knows where we stand. Therefore, if you are satisfied as a 
result of your talks that Mrs. Gandhi intends to adopt the major economic reforms 
that we and the World Bank have been seeking, the best way to move ahead might 
be for me to tell Woods on your behalf. State, AID and I suggest we tell him the 
following, which protects us with plenty of caveats: 
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1. You have concluded from your talks that she is prepared to liberalize 
India's import control policies as well as internal price, marketing and other 
business controls which have been inhibiting economic growth, provided the 
necessary financial support is forthcoming. Additionally, she is prepared to 
adjust exchange rates and tax policies to support liberalization. 
2. In order to move more rapidly toward self-sufficiency in food production, 
Mrs. Gandhi has assured you that India will follow through in emphasizing 
agricultural development, making adequate fertilizer available to the farmers 
and vigorously seeking to attract foreign private investment in fertilizer 
production. … 
This package is the real McCoy—much more so than emergency food. If George 
Woods, with our backing can drive the tough bargain which he contemplates, we 
will have accomplished more in moving India via our aid leverage than in the 
last six years combined. And we will have done so at little if any greater out-of-
pocket cost than in 1963 or 1964. I stress again that this is a self-enforcing 
bargain—if India doesn't make the reforms we and the Bank want, it doesn't get 
most of the dough. This puts the choice squarely up to them. I may be over-
enthusiastic, but I see this as a major foreign policy stroke, affecting 500 million 
people in the largest country in the Free World.2 [A handwritten postscript 
by Komer reads: “We'd keep all of this very quiet for the time being, leaving it to 
the Indians to make the first move.”]998 
When Bowles addressed the nation, praising these liberalization reforms, India had already 
complied with international conditions and devalued the rupee by a staggering 57 percent.999 The 
terms clearly went much further than agricultural policy deregulations; as USAID had been 
pushing, the reforms also included changes to monetary policy to “expedite rapid progress” on 
trade liberalization schemes. He applauded the changes as sure to expedite economic growth: 
In recent weeks the Indian Government has made particularly bold vigorous 
efforts to speed its economic development. 
 
Imports have been liberalized, the value of the rupee brought into line with world 
values, farming techniques further improved, industry encouraged, badly needed 
schools and hospitals constructed and the population problem attacked on a 
massive scale. … 
 
The US hopes that this assistance will enable Indian industry to operate at a much 
higher rate in the coming months. It should also increase both imports and 
exports and enable India to further advance its agricultural and industrial 
production while expanding its family planning programs, building a strong, 
free, and self-sufficient India.1000 
 
However, the stated goals and intended benefits did not result. Instead, despite the economic 
rationale that the devaluation and policy liberalization would promote exports and boost foreign 
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exchange, the massive devaluation had no effect on exports. However, predictably, the cost of 
importing goods into the country increased dramatically.  
 Given the other US demands that India had agreed to—including allocating almost all of its 
foreign exchange to inputs for agricultural modernization in a few small districts1001—the GR 
project took on increasingly high costs for the average person, making it increasingly contentious. 
Further, the decision to “revalue” the rupee had dramatic political and economic effects. The 
confidential nature of the terms of aid heightened the effects and greatly escalated objections to 
them—for the 57% devaluation was kept secret until after the devaluation was the official 
exchange rate. Even some Cabinet Members, the Planning Commission, and Parliament learned 
of the change in the newspaper headlines. As Nath Pai complained in Parliament: 
Shri Nath Pai: Three times during the last budget session, the question of 
devaluation was raised in this house and on one occasion the present Planning 
Minister categorically assured that Government did not contemplate devaluation. 
I had raised this issue on three different occasions and this thunderbolt was 
delivered to an unsuspecting nation when Parliament was not in session. In the 
official communiqué issued on devaluation it was stated that all future prospects 
of aid hinged on devaluation[,] that was the word used in the communiqué by 
your worthy predecessor. Has this expectation at least been fulfilled? What is the 
Bell Commission’s recommendation with regard to the Fourth Plan? I have these 
two simple questions. 
Shri Morarji Desai: the questions maybe simple but the replies cannot be simple. 
The Bell Commission’s recommendations are confidential and cannot be given 
out. That is the arrangement between the World Bank and the Government and 
therefore, I cannot make a breach of that arrangement.1002 
 
But, having leveraged the economy and popularity of the government to increasingly 
controversial and unsuccessful liberalization projects, the Finance Minister, Morarji Desai, 
simply explained to Parliament—implicitly articulating India’s highly constrained bargaining 
position—“I can only say that devaluation has not done the good that it was supposed to do.”1003 
3.5.2 | Owning the controversy, Convergent interests 
Despite—or, perhaps, in part due to—the nature and cost of USAID and WB demands, and 
the growing controversy over the results of their policies, its Indian officiators repeatedly insisted 
that the GR, was “only our own idea” and its terms “not at the behest of any outside party.”1004 As 
Minister of Food and Agriculture C. Subramaniam explained to the Lok Sabha (the lower house 
of Parliament): 
What I want to impress upon the House is that there is no question of pressure 
from anybody. We have voice enough and we have intelligence enough to see 
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what is in the best interest of the country. I do not think we are going to take any 
policy decision through any pressure from any quarter, which is likely to be 
against the interest of the country. That much bona fides at least should be 
granted to the Government and to those who are in charge of the Government 
today. … There is no question of pleasing this country or that country. It is a 
question of safeguarding our own interests, particularly safeguarding the interests 
of agricultural production which alone would give us the capacity to feed the 
millions of our people.1005 
 
To Subramaniam this was not a “lie” in that it not intended to “mis-lead” or simply placate. He 
consistently maintained that the terms of the “Treaty of Rome” were his own terms, terms that US 
Agriculture Secretary Freeman agreed to, but that they were suggested by Subramaniam. In his 
eyes this was the surest route to successful modernization of the agricultural sector and a bit of 
motivation to make it happen wouldn’t be turned down.  Freeman’s memory corroborates this 
story to some degree. He explained: 
We had them over a barrel and we squeezed them, but he didn’t object very much 
to being squeezed. And I found this true with other ministers of agriculture who 
in the last analysis had had such a difficult time getting any resources from the 
Finance Minister that they welcomed the fact that there was pressure from 
outside to help them get some of the resources they needed … He had a pretty 
wide mandate [i.e. Subramaniam], and seemed fairly confident that if this [i.e. 
US demands] did not leak that he could get it through the Cabinet and through 
the Parliament.1006 
 
 The concern here is not to determine whose idea the New Strategy with all its stipulations 
“actually” was, but rather to attend to the way that a singular idea of modernity and development 
is produced in these interactions. For, while it is obviously impossible to definitively assess 
motivations, Subramaniam and Finance Minister Desai both present themselves as resolute 
“modernizers,” and enforcers of attendant modernizing commitments; and, the US leadership 
specifically pointed to these two men as allies among a larger hostile Indian administration, more 
sympathetic and more inclined toward “market-oriented” policies.  
 The US demands, by Subramaniam’s account, operated more as a force by which he could 
leverage the GoI to do what he had already laid out.1007 Subramaniam further explains that the 
New Strategy was his idea, not the idea of anyone in the United States:  
But unfortunately Johnson always had a sense of self-importance. If anything 
good or important was happening in the world, it should be a Johnson initiative. 
Therefore, he thought the Indian farmer, the Indian minster and the Indian 
scientist were not adequate, and that he should take a hand in the initiation of 
this strategy. He reiterated in speeches that India should adopt this new 
technology, which, as a matter of fact, created problems for me in India. The 
speeches gave ammunition to those who were attacking me on the grounds that I 
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was following American advice and American technology. We had already 
announced and taken all these steps and I had to tell people that President 
Johnson was telling us nothing new, and that we had already launched a 
programme of this kind, he was only emphasizing that this should be done 
effectively. But still it created problems.1008 
 
In seeking to account for how development paths have evolved and been defined, it is essential to 
understand how particular perspectives come to be adopted—not only through explicit leverage 
and coercion, but also how they come to be owned and regarded as “local” ideas and/or as 
policies that ensure against outside influence (regardless of the initial policy conditions). Aid was 
not simply a coercive project; while there certainly was a component of “geopolitical arm-
twisting” and leverage,1009 far more significantly, aid is a knowledge project: the production of an 
understanding of what development is and how to achieve it. As Subramaniam explains: 
Unfortunately it must be recognized that America gives generously but does not 
know how to give. I reached the conclusion that they would give and still create a 
feeling of enmity even through the process of giving. It still happens in many 
areas, for they do not know the psychology of the people of developing countries. 
We were able to get over the [political] difficulties at home [of Communists 
charging that they were simply following US dictates] because we were able to 
demonstrate that it was not an American initiative but purely Indian initiative 
from top to bottom.1010 
 
An understanding of the events that came to secure the GR’s inevitability through ideology leads 
to a more nuanced reading—one that takes the constitution of the ideas and its claims seriously 
(i.e. rather than dismissing them as false consciousness or concealing a larger plan). An example 
is the nationalist claim that the Green Revolution project was an Indian project of ensuring and 
safeguarding independence. To take seriously what such a perspective means—for “agricultural 
modernity,” for “independence,” and the way that “development” has been (re)defined—it is 
necessary to recognize the certainty with which this path was seen (by some) as the only way to 
independence. However, it is also important to ask what is at stake in one’s vision of 
“dependence” and “independence.”  
 The knowledge project of agricultural development comes to be solidified in the repeated 
insistence, the ownership and the laying out the terms of how this path was arrived at and 
assessed. As Subramaniam testified in Parliament:  
 
This is the new strategy which we have evolved and I can assure this House that 
this has been decided upon not by politicians but by technicians, by the scientists, 
by the agricultural economists, by the agricultural administrators. It has been 
reviewed and then decided upon on a pilot scale and I am assured by the 
  219 
technicians and by the scientists—and I have confined myself not only to our 
own scientists and technicians but I have consulted others also from foreign 
countries and everybody has assured me—that this is a worth while programme 
and this agricultural development programme will assure us success in our quest 
for self-sufficiency.1011 
 
3.6 | Revealing Ideology  
Ideology is difficult to excavate. But, to address the work of aid as a knowledge project it is 
necessary to unpack the workings of ideology. One way that the work of ideology can be seen is 
in the reaction to an articulation that is against or outside of, or that unsettles, our naturalized 
ideology. Such an articulation can be unsettling because its referent is not the expected referent, 
and the discrepancy jolts the subject. The reaction that even a simple switch can prompt, for 
example, on the relationship between poverty and economic growth, is illustrative: “We were 
wrongly taught that we should take care of GDP and it will automatically take care of poverty. 
Let us reverse it. We need to take care of poverty and it will automatically take care of GDP.”1012 
The response of finding this “unsettling” (or simply dismissing it as “political”) can begin to 
expose ideology at work. A logic is so engrained that we do not see it as ideology—until we 
notice that if one of the rungs is removed, or if two are switched, there is an unsettling effect. In 
that moment, we can glimpse the work of ideology. Such a simple inversion can reveal the 
ideology that 60 years of development projects have instilled: that there is only one path along 
which India can “move rapidly toward self-sufficiency in food production,” and that is to increase 
agricultural production, “to liberalize its import control policies and its internal price, marketing 
and other business controls and to adjust its exchange rate and tax policies to support such 
liberalization.”1013 In this understanding, food self-sufficiency is naturally a market relation, as 
are production and distribution. However, when success requires more than a simple commitment 
to “market relations,”—i.e. a level of demonstrated commitment able to inspire “confidence on 
our [USAID’s] part that India will press forward aggressively to accelerate its economic 
development through liberal economic policies and emphasis on agriculture”1014—it reveals that 
achieving food self-sufficiency is not only a matter of a market relation, nor only a production 
relation. Rather, it is a development project that requires navigating geopolitical imperatives—the 
most obvious of which is the definition of “self-sufficiency.”1015  
 To explain the evolution of aid and its demands, I characterize aid as a “power-knowledge 
project,” and I understand the changes it produced through the lens of ideology and knowledge 
production. A framework of simple “coercion” is vastly insufficient to understand aid’s 
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continuing effects decades on. Ideology and knowledge production are indispensible to 
understand this policy evolution, for the approach pushed by the US was not vastly different from 
what some segments of the Indian administrative and laded elite and capitalist class already 
supported. That said, the confidential US ultimatums, followed by continued steady pressure for 
liberalization, solidified this approach to agriculture into the planning and policy-making 
processes more rapidly, thoroughly, and with less room for negotiation, than would have 
otherwise been possible—given the tremendous political opposition among some other Ministers 
and some Parliamentarians.  
 The consolidation of this approach and definition of “self sufficiency” confined the policy 
options and produced a more widely accepted understanding of the nature of agricultural 
development. These understandings have continued to function today (see Ch 2), in the context of 
repeated calls for expediting the approval of GM crops in the name of increasing production, 
raising farmers’ income via the market, and ensuring India’s food security. The power of these 
claims, and the appeal to GM crops as providing the answer, cannot be understood without the 
context of US agricultural technology aid over time. 
4  | Harnessing liberalization’s (self-evident) success for a second GR 
 The economic liberalization reforms were condemned in Parliament in the 1960s, and some 
were reversed, with the result that liberalization stagnated until the 1980s. Today, these reforms 
have been thoroughly revived. The GR era’s nascent liberalization is celebrated by the 
contemporary cadre of transnational liberalizing elite in quite a different light: these reforms, or 
“strings,” on aid, are regarded as the cause of GR’s self-evident success. The reforms petered 
out, but they introduced an understanding of “what works;” what this narrative maintains must 
be revived today for progress on the food and agricultural front. As former US Commerce 
Official Raymond Vickery1016 explained.   
Whether the impetus of this change was wholly Indian or benefited from the 
strong-arm tactics of President Johnson is now irrelevant. The essential point is 
that the needed economic reforms took place. Nowhere is this more evident than 
in the reforms that provided agricultural nutrients during the 1965-71 period. 
Unfortunately, the agricultural economic reforms that were so much a part of the 
first Green Revolution largely did not continue to evolve. In fact…after the 
immediate goal of food self-sufficiency was obtained, there was a politically 
motivated economic regression.1017 
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The revival of the view of the GR as essentially an “economic revolution”1018 is not out of 
innocent historical interest. This story serves a renewed project of global economic restructuring, 
again in the name of democracy and development, again featuring agriculture, and again putting 
the “liberalization” of India’s national economy at the fore, as the lynchpin of this “development” 
project. As Prime Minister Manmohan Singh made clear to the US Congress in July 2005: 
India and the United States have much in common that is very important to both 
countries. You are the world's oldest democracy, we are its largest. Our shared 
commitment to democratic values and processes has been a bond that has helped 
us transcend differences. … 
Democracy is one part of our national endeavour. Development is the other. 
Openness will not gain popular support if an open society is not a prosperous 
society. This is especially so in developing countries, where a large number of 
people have legitimate material expectations which must be met. That is why we 
must transform India's economy, to raise the standard of living of all our people 
and in the process eliminate poverty. … 
The economic policy changes that have been made in India have far-reaching 
implications. They have liberated Indian enterprise from government control and 
made the economy much more open to global flows of trade, capital and 
technology. …enabling India to participate in the global economy as an equal 
partner. …  
India's economic reforms must be seen in this light: they may appear slow, but I 
assure you they are durable and irreversible.1019 
 
The understanding of the proper relationship between the state, the market, and technology has 
evolved over the decades of development projects. During the New Strategy, the Nehruvian 
approach of state-led management of technology and development for equitable growth was 
eroded and slowly came to be replaced by nascent liberalization in the name of modernity and 
independence, tethered to a natural disaster (drought) fuelled food-shortage. The framing of this 
“crisis” had been in careful production for almost a decade before the drought and before HYVs 
were developed.1020 The drought and development of these new agricultural technologies 
provided the perfect storm for restructuring agriculture.1021 Likewise, today, the conditions of 
what India needs to change, and how, have been framed since the 1980s and 90s (see Ch. 1). 
Thus, Prime Minister Singh’s assurance that “India's economic reforms… may appear slow, but… 
are durable and irreversible.”1022  
 A commitment to “the market” as the most efficient mechanism of growth is claimed to be 
the underpinning assumption of the GR. Operating on this understanding, the projects to be 
enacted in the name of a “second Green Revolution”1023 invoke the “original,” or “first,” GR and 
the US-India (liberalization) relationship as central to India’s progress. As Singh continued, 
explaining: 
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To fully exploit potential areas for cooperation between our two countries, we 
need to make special efforts to bring our private sectors closer together… 
The bulk of our population still depends upon agriculture for a living. The United 
States was an early partner in this area, helping to establish agricultural 
universities and research institutions in India in the 1960s. …  
This was the start of the Green Revolution in India that lifted countless millions 
above poverty. 
I am very happy to say that President Bush and I have decided to launch a second 
generation of India-US collaboration in agriculture. …It seeks to take 
information and know-how directly to the farming community.1024 
 
Similarly, addressing the public in 2006 on the progress of the first meeting of the well-publicized 
Indo-U.S. Civil Nuclear Cooperation Initiative, Singh’s counterpart, President George W. Bush, 
announced a confidential agreement they had reached in the nuclear negotiation meetings. This 
was the “second generation of India-US collaboration in agriculture” that Singh had referred to: 
the 2005 Indo-US Agricultural Knowledge Initiative (henceforth, the AKI).  As President Bush 
stated:  
America welcomes India's economic rise… In a free economy … trade is such a 
powerful engine of prosperity and upward mobility. When markets are opened 
and the poor are given a chance to develop their talents and abilities, they can 
create a better life for their families, they add to the wealth of the world, and they 
can begin to afford goods and services from other nations. Free and fair trade is 
good for India, it's good for America, and it is good for the world.  …     
The United States worked with India to help meet its food needs in the 1960s, 
when pioneering American scientists like Norman Borlaug shared agriculture 
technology with Indian farmers. Thanks to your hard work, you have nearly 
tripled your food production over the past half-century. To build on this progress, 
Prime Minister Singh and I are launching a new Agricultural Knowledge 
Initiative. This initiative will invest $100 million to encourage exchanges 
between American and Indian scientists and promote joint research to improve 
farming technology. By working together the United States and India will 
develop better ways to grow crops and get them to market, and lead a second 
Green Revolution.1025   
 
This agreement was to instigate India’s “second Green Revolution;” like India’s “first” Green 
Revolution, the terms of the agreement to “improve and modernize” Indian agriculture were 
adopted as part of a confidential bilateral project tangled with the geopolitics of “national 
security.”  
4.1 | Confidential Agreements: Treaty of Rome, forty years on?   
 Signed alongside the well-publicized nuclear deal, the confidential agricultural agreement 
received relatively little mainstream press. Its confidentiality belies the repeated invocations of 
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democracy, freedom and an “open” society in both President Bush and Prime Minister Singh’s 
speeches and clearly harkens back to the “first” GR. Like the “Treaty of Rome,” the secrecy in 
which the terms of the AKI were shrouded indicates the depoliticizing work of the project. The 
secrecy, and the plain justification that disclosing the terms of the agreement would “disrupt 
Parliament,”1026 produced significant speculation among some circles of policy experts and 
watch-dog groups about the nature and terms of the agreement.  
 The unclear terms and confidentiality also prompted widespread critique of the agreement 
from across the political spectrum, with skeptics and critics charging that the secrecy of the AKI 
made it “apparent that India has agreed to pay in the agricultural sector for the concession that it 
has sought from the US in the nuclear field.”1027 Observers and critics argued that the “second” 
aspect of the AKI’s “second GR” was secretive nature of the agricultural agreements.1028 
4.2 | Changing forms of governance   
 Promoted as a means of targeting rural poverty, increasing Indian agricultural output, 
addressing the ecological havoc of the [first] Green Revolution, and forging a new step in both 
rural and in corporate bilateralism, the AKI promised to continue the GR project of ensuring the 
“welfare” of the citizenry and the nation itself.1029 But the “security” and food situations are very 
different from the 1950s and 60s’ shortages of food-grain production and heavy reliance on US 
imports of food aid. The AKI did not refute the Indian government’s claims that the nation is food 
secure, yet it mobilized a staple political device in India’s colonial and postcolonial history—
development interventions in the name of managing and thwarting the specter of hunger1030—to 
justify forms of privatization in the name of transforming India’s agricultural sector.1031The new 
improved approach the AKI’s public private partnership (PPP) was to usher in—dubbed 
“environmentally sustainable, market-oriented agriculture”1032—aimed to boost the “knowledge 
economy” of Indian agriculture through reducing barriers on American biotechnology 
corporations.1033 The (initially undisclosed) board featured major American corporations 
including Walmart and Archer Daniels Midland.1034 
 Though the methods and terms of agricultural production have been a recurring theme in 
bilateral Indo-US relations for over 40 years, the AKI promoted itself as distinct from other 
bilateral agreements on agriculture and national security.1035 It had a unique governing structure: 
as a bilateral agreement crafted by Heads of State, enacted through corporations, universities, and 
governmental agencies, it signaled a new stage in [neoliberal] national “development” policy.1036  
 No longer about state-to-state development “aid” or transfer of technology, this was proposed 
  224 
as an initiative funded largely by those it was supposed to “aid” (Indian taxpayers), while the 
priorities and agenda were to be driven largely by corporate interests—in the name of the 
“expertise” they were offering in modernizing India’s agricultural sector and improving its 
“competitiveness.”1037 Its critics argued that this “second Green Revolution” was not a 
continuation of bilateral or international development aid and transfers of technology of the first 
“Green Revolution.” Instead, they characterized it as simply a commercial project, defrayed 
largely by Indian taxpayers and driven by multinational and domestic corporate interests. But, it 
cannot be dismissed so simply. It must be understood as a new model of governing and read for 
its knowledge dissemination and ideology of how “growth” and “modernization” happen. While 
some of the players were different than four decades earlier, and the technology promoted was 
new, the stated aims bear a surprising similarity .The US Department of Agriculture (USDA), for 
example, was clear that “the US goal [in this initiative] is to make sure that Indian biotechnology 
markets remain open—”1038specifically, open to American agri-business corporations’ products 
and to American technology and grain exports, a goal that has changed little in four decades. 
 By either representation (its own or that of its critics), the AKI can be read as a project that 
was to be at the “forefront” of neoliberal shifts in governing access to food, agriculture, and 
agricultural technology.1039 With the stated goal of promoting agricultural development through 
corporate-academic PPPs (public-private partnerships), the AKI invoked concerns about the 
recently increasing prevalence of hunger, and summoned the comfortable assurance of names and 
personalities from the “original” GR (the committee’s co-chairs were M.S. Swaminathan and 
Norman Borlaug). 
 The AKI was a polity marked not by the withdrawal of the state, but rather by the increasing 
withdrawal of policy initiatives—in this instance, agricultural policy—from the realm of electoral 
control and public accountability.1040 As proposed, this configuration could be read as a form of 
“transnational governmentality”1041—power relations which are forged of corporate, state, and 
non-governmental alliances that re-spatialize the way power is deployed. 
 The AKI was not fully implemented as planned, but it is still significant in that it offers a 
location from which to read the intended logic of agricultural development policies today. While 
there are various explanations as to why it didn’t flourish, the question of concern is not whether, 
or why, the AKI “failed” to implement the projects it initially laid out. Rather, the question is 
whether (and if so, how) the AKI changed understandings of the terms of agriculture, 
“development,” or bilateral relations. What is seen as successful agricultural development? How 
is agricultural development differently imagined and enacted in this era of the “paradox of 
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plenty” than it was during the scarcities of the GR era? What is the role of the state in relation to 
the private sector in pursuing the goals of development? Is there a place in these projects for 
addressing poverty directly or only via the elusive promises of “economic growth”?  
4.2.1 | Rostow’s moment of arrival: consumption as development 
 Explaining what would instigate this second revolution, Bush offered: 
India needs to continue to lift its caps on foreign investment, to make its rules 
and regulations more transparent, and to continue to lower its tariffs and open 
its markets to American agricultural products, industrial goods and services. … 
By enforcing its laws and educating its people and continuing to open up its 
economy, India can assure that prosperity and opportunity of a growing 
economy reaches all segments of India's population.1042  
 
Filling in some additional details, Bush explained what this vision would look like: India will buy 
our “McCurry Meals from McDonald's, home appliances from Whirlpool … planes … from 
Boeing. Also … [goods from] businesses like General Electric and Microsoft and Intel … 
America will trade with confidence”—and we, in the US, will get to buy their mangoes.1043 
 In hindsight, Lester Brown (the USDA’s Administrator of International Agricultural 
Development Service during the Green Revolution) seems to have predicted the far-reaching 
powers of aid as a knowledge project and the work of ideology in transforming development. As 
Brown characterized it in 1968: 
We should not overlook the role of the agricultural revolution in developing 
viable economies in the less developed world or the significance of this, in turn, 
for U.S. farm exports. It is difficult to give away farm products to people living at 
the subsistence level, much less sell them anything. Only as they enter the 
marketplace and develop some purchasing power can they be expected to buy our 
products. As Dorothy Jacobson, Assistant Secretary of Agriculture for 
International Affairs once put it: 
That market is a sleeping giant, with an almost endless capacity to 
consume. But this sleeping giant will awaken, and this market will come 
to life, only when economic growth brings higher incomes and greater 
buying power.1044 
 
The captivating allure of the “almost endless capacity to consume”1045 has played out over the 
decades, from vast (dumping) of food aid, to the deployment of this food to pry open markets for 
US capital (from agro-inputs on). 
 The logic of “competitiveness” (see Ch. 1), when coupled with a Rostovian imaginary of 
development’s arrival point as “high mass consumption” leaves us with this question: what does 
the logic of consumerism as the end-state of development mean for people who are marginalized 
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by, and excluded from, participation in these systems? What roles do they play in an economy 
that does not have a place for them as producers or consumers, at least “not yet”? What work 
does their marginalization, and effacement, do? 
4.2.2 | Harnessing Poverty, Anew: technology and markets for poor farmers 
 In the policy documents of the Gene Revolution addressing food insecurity,1046 the exclusion 
and hunger of this large sector of the population are naturalized as before the fact, as a pre-
existing condition. And, technology again offers the answer.  
 As the AKI wrapped up in 2008, USAID introduced the ABSP II, the Agricultural 
Biotechnology Support Project II (the ABSPII). This project takes an even more targeted 
approach, explicitly defining how the second GR should come into being and which technologies 
it should use: 
ABSP II focuses on the safe and effective development and commercialization of 
bio-engineered crops as a complement to traditional and organic agricultural 
approaches in developing countries. The project helps boost food security, 
economic growth, nutrition and environmental quality.1047  
 
Just as the World Bank articulated 23 years earlier—market access is to raise income. With the 
ABSPII, the “lessons” of the GR come together with the “lessons” of economic liberalization: as 
necessary as markets are, an effective new technology is key to ensuring the desired 
transformations. HYVs allowed the stringent terms of economic reforms to be credited to 
“nature,” or to scientific progress and advancement (see Ch. 4). GM technology is cast as the heir 
of this legacy, another natural “miracle” which will allow small holders to revolutionize their 
production methods and thus earn more for their crops in the global market. ABSPII proclaims 
this prosperity for the poor to be the mission of its development work.  
 The small farmers “natural” status as “outside of the market” is summoned to provide the 
justification for continued market expansion. Just like the large GR farmers before them, 
marginal and small farmers need to be reached and encompassed within the embrace of the 
market, so that they too can be uplifted.  
Helping Reduce Poverty and Hunger: The increase in crop yields during the first 
Green Revolution relied heavily on… Large-scale farmers, however… Today, 
agricultural bioengineering allows for genetic improvement of seeds and has the 
potential to benefit all types of farmers and consumers, including those who are 
resource poor. … ABSPII expects to secure…increased farm productivity and 
improved market opportunities [to] also expand rural economies.1048 
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In the development story that ABSP II weaves, GM crops will provide the market access that will 
lift the small farmer out of poverty, up into the ranks of the developed.  
 “ABSP II-supported projects are conceived and executed to ensure sustainable impacts to 
resource-constrained farmers.”1049 The logic promoting Bt brinjal—ABSP II’s flagship project—
as a technology of development and food security rests on the idea that it enables the small 
farmer to harness the unlimited potential of “the market” to secure a larger profit (see Ch. 2). As 
the ABSP II newsletter explains, laying out—the thoroughly naturalized connection underwriting 
the non-sequitur logic—the project is that this: “help[s] reduce poverty and hunger through 
agricultural biotechnology.”1050  
 The view that is harnessed to propel the argument to secure a second GR is this:  the “lesson” 
of the first GR is that economic liberalization and market access coupled with technology 
constitutes development. 
4.3 | Harnessing the (“first”) Green Revolution 
 The most significant effects of the long GR are not increasing food output, but engineering 
this shift: to food as simply a commodity available in “the market”—like plastic buckets, or any 
other. Its implicit metric is that if there is enough food in the market, there is not a shortage. The 
shortage of purchasing power, or the prevalence of poverty, that renders the majority unable to 
afford to acquire or consume the abundance they see in the market, is not part of the new GR’s 
equation.  
 Dr. Balasubramiam, lead researcher and director of the ABSP II Bt brinjal project at TNAU 
(Tamil Nadu Agriculture University), drew the line of continuity between the GR of the 1960s 
and today’s projects. Balasubramiam repeatedly invoked his own life as evidence—from growing 
up with lines for food, common shortages, and rationing (as did most middle class Indians at the 
time) to the unlimited plenty he finds every time he goes to the market today.1051 In this story, the 
edifice housing a local food market and the abstract concept of a “global market” are conflated.  
 This story makes one point as a personal anecdote of a plant scientist, related in a one-on-one 
conversation (as it was). The same story serves quite a different purpose when such anecdotes 
come to stand in for policy. The two are not to be conflated. For, when coupled with a 
technocratic progress narrative, this story serves to efface the very purpose the ABSPII is 
ostensibly created to serve: eradicating poverty. “Food enough” becomes simply enough food to 
fill the shelves, enough food for sale. Access is rendered invisible. Policy makers invoke such 
anecdotes to sidestep responsibility for creating actual policies related to their stated goals—at 
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least when invoking poverty—seeming to prefer anecdotes and non-sequitur logic. .  Instead of 
addressing poverty directly, the various projects enacted in the name of a second GR have 
thoroughly digested and rendered permanent the RF’s solution—of separating food production 
and distribution goals (see Ch 4).  
 The projects claiming the mantle of being the “second” GR do not address food security 
except through indirect (and often non-sequitur) invocations of productionist logic and economic 
growth. The ABSP II framework, for example, is inserted with an international knowledge 
project, the latest technology as the object that will finally enable the poor to successfully bring 
the fruits of their labor to “the market,” trading in their poverty for plenty. That this is not a 
common result for small farmers is so clear it even has a familiar name—the paradox of plenty. 
4.3.1 | Projects deepening, not resolving, the paradox  
The AKI sought to initiate significant changes in both the production and distribution arenas. 
On the production side, the project promised to launch (yet another1052) “second GR,” via markets 
and the latest technologies and updated inputs. On the distribution and food resale side, the AKI 
liberalized regulations, including laying the groundwork for FDI (foreign direct investment) in 
retail (the entry of Walmart a few years later, etc.). Proponents claim this project will increase 
efficiency in supply chains and lower the cost of food to consumers, while critics insist it will 
realize any possible savings at the cost of tens of millions of jobs and the loss of millions of 
locally owned small businesses.   
The fact that the project misses the basic nature of the problem it claims to address—
poverty—is clear in its casting of retail liberalization as equivalent with addressing “the 
distribution problem” itself. Despite this glaring gap in logic in the era of the “paradox of plenty,” 
this liberalization continues to be strongly pushed as the next necessary step toward development 
via an efficient economy and distribution system. As Vickery argued: 
Systemic economic change for the agricultural production and food distribution 
sector is now needed as the primary support for a second Green Revolution. … 
Achieving food security cannot mean simply self-sufficiency… [and] cannot [be] 
achieve[d]...if agriculture and food remain fenced off from market disciplines 
that have increased prosperity in other sectors.1053 
 
What he means by the “food distribution sector” is not the PDS and not the government at all, as 
he clarifies: 
Although the economic reforms…in 1991 have continued to evolve the economy 
at large, the economic system governing Indian agricultural production and food 
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distribution has not kept pace. … Systemic economic change for the agricultural 
production and food distribution sector is now needed as the primary support for 
a second Green Revolution. …economic reform must start with the consumer and 
the retail systems. The full participation of the United States and other foreign 
retailers will provide the needed capital and know-how that will support 
immediate upgrades in the entire system.1054 
 
Vickery takes a somewhat different lesson from the GR than TNAU plant biotechnologist 
Balasubramiam. Vickery argues that the one indicator of whether such projects will succeed is the 
degree of “market integration.” Echoing Nelson Rockefeller’s “free world trading system,” of 
sixty years earlier, he argues that: “The immediate goal of using international trade to support a 
second Green Revolution must be in the liberalization of trade for the inputs that are necessary for 
increased production.”1055 Vickery sees the market itself as unleashing production and prosperity.    
4.3.2 | The work of depoliticizing  
 Postcolonial and development scholars have argued for examining the state through its 
conjunctures and reconfigurations.1056 Following Gupta and Sharma’s conception of the 
neoliberal state as a “conjunctural phenomenon”1057 of political, economic, socio-structural, 
institutional, and everyday practices necessarily situated in transnational contexts, I argue that the 
ways that food and agriculture interweave with development and governance in these 
convergences (re)produce the deep divisions that underlie food “security” and vulnerability. The 
workings of the AKI and ABSPII, as condensation nodes of the geo/domestic politics of hunger 
and agricultural trade, provide an entry into the shifting logics and governing practices of 
agricultural development in India’s two Green Revolutions, and questions of the production of 
hunger and vulnerability. As with the earlier work of the HYV, agro-inputs today work to 
depoliticize questions of access to food, land, agriculture, labor, and markets, closing off political 
discussion about necessary societal choices by reducing them to “technical” issues (and hence to 
areas of expertise), rather than viewing them as fundamental to and productive of the terms of 
power. 
4.4 | Technocratic Faith as the commonality, the continuity is ideological 
While there is a certain ideological continuity between the GR era and today, there are 
significant differences in how the projects and policies of the two eras are enacted, particularly in 
regard to the technologies, the terms of control over them, and who is seen as the target 
beneficiaries. Probably the most commonly cited distinctions are that the HYVs [high yielding 
  230 
varieties] were non-proprietary crop technologies, and the Green Revolution was a project 
facilitated through public sector institutions and private “philanthropic” foundations operating 
through engagements and partnerships with the GoI. In the international consensus at the time, 
the state was the agent of development, and had a significant role in enacting, overseeing and 
directing development projects. There has been a clear shift. Today’s technologies are by and 
large privately owned, and the focus promoted by the agriculture-for-development “experts” has 
shifted to emphasize growing high value or “affluent” crops—not staple crops for the masses (see 
Ch 1).1058 Moreover, inputs are today the most profitable part of the agricultural commodity 
chain.1059 The commonality between the two eras thus lies neither in the food and agrarian 
situations, nor in the projects designed to address these crises;1060 rather, it lies in the legacy of 
agricultural development initiatives as power-knowledge projects.  
 The thread of continuity is ideological. The eras’ shared faith in a development narrative 
resting on the power of technology to solve social, economic, and development problems, an 
authority it marshals by wielding the specter of hunger on the one hand and the promise of 
development on the other.1061 As scholars have widely noted, this confidence in the promise of 
science and technology has defined India’s modernity and path of development.1062 Their promise 
is part of the sustaining power of the “passive revolution” (see Preface) as itself a knowledge 
project.  
4.5 | Navigating development’s contradictions 
 The GRs have redefined development and have (re)oriented India’s approach to development, 
food production, and food distribution; today, GM agriculture is painted as the way to renew the 
GR. As Prime Minster Singh explained after the moratorium on Mahyco’s Bt brinjal: 
“Biotechnology has enormous potential, and in due course of time we must make use of genetic 
engineering technologies to increase the productivity of our agriculture. But there are 
controversies. …[and] we are a democracy, we are not like China.”1063 That is, our growth cannot 
be as fast because we must worry about appeasing our constituents as well.  In this vision 
democracy is necessary but is also, once again, the problem, slowing everything down, just as it 
did with economic liberalization after the GR era reforms. Likewise, Vickery characterized 
“democracy” not as integral to, but rather as often hindering, almost inimical, this process of 
growth—as it did after the GR and as it threatens to prevent another GR today: 
The political difficulty of achieving further liberalization of the agricultural 
production and food distribution systems in democracies like India and the United 
  231 
States should not be underestimated. However, any strategy for a second GR in 
India that does not take into account the critical role of such reforms will not 
succeed. 1064 
The question he seeks to leave in his readers is how to (re)create the sought-after situation of a 
“self-enforcing bargain” that initiated the “Big Push.” This is a place where segments of the 
administrative elite have also been pushing India, and the place where the corporate class 
maintains is necessary for “progress.” The “passive revolution” is maintained by this belief—
marked by feelings of “widespread resentment in the cities of … gaining votes at the cost of 
ensuring the conditions of rapid economic growth. There is no doubt that this reflects the 
hegemony of the logic of corporate capital among the urban middle classes.”1065 The necessity of 
abiding by democracy, as Singh and Vickery note, also offers an opening. Thus, Vickery’s 
diagnosis could also be read as foreshadowing—for, as with Bt Brinjal (see Ch. 2), GM 
proponents came to blame “democracy,” not the crop, not its property rights regime, not the 
allegations of mismanaged regulatory and approval processes, or any of the other shortcomings of 
the product itself, but rather “democracy” that was not behaving properly technocratic as 
hindering progress. In this vision of exclusion as progress, democracy can perhaps hold potential, 
at least for questioning the nature of the growth being promoted and what interests it serves. 
The agricultural development projects of the first and second GRs can be read as attending to 
and working through the contradictions of development. Agricultural development policy (as 
manifest in these two periods) is formed at the crux of the conflicting imperatives of ensuring 
food security for the nation and managing the specter of hunger, on the one hand, and abiding by 
principles of an increasingly globalized ‘free-market,’ on the other. I suggest that in the legacy of 
the two GRs, hunger has become neoliberalism’s enabling exclusion. The prescription offered for 
addressing poverty and the specter of hunger is one of increasing agricultural competitiveness and 
specialty production for export.  
5 |  Conclusion 
The myth of “the market” does such significant work for American Modernization theory and 
contemporary mainstream approaches to development in both the US and in India in part because 
it deploys a myth of abstract egalitarianism where advancement is mediated through a metric that 
we understand to be transparent and self-evidently meritocratic (i.e. that hard work leads to 
success and reward for all who try). This ideology (premised upon the “universal” subject) 
underwrites claims of the market’s liberatory powers —as Nelson Rockefeller argued—to 
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unshackle people from ancient hierarchies and oppressions (e.g. feudalism, family ties) with its 
constructive leveling powers. But, the GR project itself was not premised upon the universal 
subject. It was premised upon a top-down conception of development, with the elite running 
development and the gains and knowledge supposed to “trickle down” to the smaller farmer and 
common person. Today’s aid projects aim to engineer this trickle down. As the GR and its 
legacies clearly demonstrate, existing socio-economic hierarchies cannot simply be ignored or 
circumvented; instead, they are built upon and solidified.  
 In the case of the GR such positioning provided the sole basis of eligibility for participation 
in the program. As privilege was compounded, inequality increased. This was not an accident nor 
was it an unexpected result. The disparities and the social tensions that were expected to result 
from a program fostering such inequality were the primary initial objections to the “New 
Strategy” of the GR. These debates may have briefly stalled its implementation, but more than 
that, they also make plainly evident that this exclusion was a deliberate policy choice. Since that 
time markets have become increasingly liberalized: policies which have resulted in increased 
inequality and decreased access to food and basic necessities for the poor.  
Taking on the larger logic behind these projects is essential because this logic underwrites 
and perpetuates the myth that these are inherently egalitarian spaces, places where access is 
transparent—conditions such that liberalization would necessarily increase access and equality. 
The fact that this has not been the case has been exhaustively demonstrated. But, the idea of “the 
market” as an imagined egalitarian realm that abolishes previous hierarchies remains powerfully 
captivating—in part by mobilizing the exemplary anecdotes as evidence of its universal 
teleology. The GR story is not told as a story of privileging the most well endowed while 
increasingly neglecting the majority of the producers. If the GR story were told in this way, both 
the market logic of the “free world trading system” into which the small and marginal peasants 
are being woven, and their role in subsidizing others’ tremendous gains, would appear quite 
differently.  
The production of inevitability, of a singular modernity propelled by forward and upward 
progress, is the promise and the ultimatum of this economic liberalization and market integration. 
The framework of this logic is so convincing that when things do not go this way—when, as is 
the case in India for example, hunger and malnutrition skyrocket during the exact same time as 
the highest economic growth rates, and this dynamic is most pronounced in the states and regions 
with the highest economic growth rates1066—we are assured that this is a puzzling or 
“paradoxical” situation, rather than a result of the necessary exclusions on which this system is 
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premised. Referencing Rostovian universal stagism, it is because something locally is lacking or 
broken—that India’s economic integration with the rest of the world is not yet sufficient, or a 
mechanism is faulty (whether corruption, or callous disregard, or an inadequate social welfare 
net)—but there is no recognized correlation between these trends. What it cannot be, we are 
assured, is causal; economic growth cannot cause hunger—for that violates the unidirectionality 
and universality of capitalism’s and modernization’s historical narrative. It violates the very 
rationale of market integration itself.  
 The era of the “second” GR, the Gene Revolution, is defined by “surplus” food, increasing 
inequality, and “superfluous” hungry populations. As many point out, at no time has the world 
produced as much food as it does today, nor have there ever been as many people malnourished 
or in chronic hunger. Farmers and agricultural laborers are more than twice as likely to be hungry 
than any other segment of the population. In the market-centric logic propelling GM crops in 
India, this paradox of hunger amidst plenty is indeed taken up—to serve to justify and enable 
“market competitiveness” as underpinning development. While it is the functioning of food as a 
commodity which produces exclusion (i.e. hunger), the manifestation of this exclusion: hunger, is 
neoliberalism’s enabling denial. That is, hunger is the enabling exclusion of the neoliberal gene 
revolution: the prescription offered for addressing the specter of hunger is one of increasing 
agricultural competitiveness and specialty crop production for export. In this iatrogenic project 
perhaps biotechnology can, at best, offer the potential to expose the constitutive contradictions of 
this market logic, pushing its exclusions beyond its own ability to suture them.  
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Chapter 6  
Conclusion: Tracing Policy Foreclosures 
1 |  Introduction: the path is known, the question is how is it foreclosed 
The world needs a paradigm shift in agricultural development: from a ‘green 
revolution’ to an ‘ecological intensification’ approach. This implies a rapid 
and significant shift from conventional, monoculture-based and high-
external-input-dependent industrial production towards mosaics of 
sustainable, regenerative production systems that also considerably improve 
the productivity of small-scale farmers. We need to see a move from a linear 
to a holistic approach in agricultural management, which recognizes that the 
farmer is not only a producer of agricultural goods, but also a manager of an 
agro-ecological system that provides quite a number of public goods and 
services (e.g. water, soil, landscape, energy, biodiversity, and recreation). 
  
–UNCTAD (United Nations Conference on Trade and Development) 
20131067 
 
The 2013 UNCTAD Trade and Environment Review, titled “Wake Up Before It Is Too Late: 
Make Agriculture Truly Sustainable Now for Food Security in a Changing Climate” focuses on 
agriculture; its recommendations break with decades of conventional mainstream wisdom as 
promoted by international development and financial institutions about how to achieve food 
security. Instead, its argument rests on the premise that to address poverty and food security (in 
the context of a changing climate), agriculture, food, and the needs of small farmers must be 
addressed as ends in themselves, not simply the means to “take-off” to a higher state of 
development.  
 In 2009 the World Bank and partners released the IAASTD (International Assessment of 
Agricultural Knowledge, Science and Technology for Development), a massive undertaking that 
came together in a published report: Agriculture at a Crossroads. The report, compiled by over 
400 scientists1068 asked the question how we are going to feed the world in 2050.1069 Despite its 
funders, the researchers came to the conclusion that the way forward is not via large farms, or the 
heavy use of technology; rather, small scale, agro-ecological methods need to play a much more 
prominent role, in a restructured system where, importantly, farmers have autonomy and control. 
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1.1 | Policy foreclosure 
 These reports gained little attention in the mainstream media. If their results had been that we 
need to have large-scale monoculture industrial farms across developing nations, and/or to 
drastically increase the use of GM crops, one could have predicted a very different (celebratory) 
reception from the established media. But that was not the conclusion that the natural and social 
scientists were able to reach on the basis of evidence. So, while these reports made headlines in 
sites of agro-food discussion, the findings and recommendations of these reports did not penetrate 
far outside of these circles.  
 The reports and their findings are important. The results they came to were not unknown. 
They are important not because they offer a scientific breakthrough in understandings of 
sustainable food production for all. Rather, they are significant because they point to the deep 
fractures in the mold of current policies of “Feeding the World” through which we ask and 
understand questions of agriculture, hunger, and food. The findings of these and related reports 
pose the question: if this “alternative” path provided the best answer, and still provides it, why do 
official “development” bodies and development polices pursue such a different approach to 
agricultural development and food security? That is, if “what works” is established (as it has been 
for decades), the question to proceed with is not what approaches will succeed in ensuring access 
to adequate food for all. But rather, the questions are: Why do we not implement these policies? 
And, how is it that the policy approaches that are more likely to actually bring change and 
meaningful access to food for the majority of the world’s people consistently come to be 
foreclosed? 
 While telling us how to proceed to “feed the world,” the reports do not tell us how we got 
here, nor do they address how to build the political structures that would allow these policies to 
actually be implemented. Such options (i.e. supporting the majority of farmers) have been 
articulated throughout previous policy debates. Hence, an understanding of what has blocked this 
route in the past is necessary to understand how to enable requisite changes today.  
 I have sought to provide such an account, one useful for diagnosing the history behind the 
situation we inhabit today. As has become evident, finding a way to “feed the world” and ensure 
that the poor have some degree of autonomy (and are allowed to support themselves) is not the 
most difficult aspect of this equation—the politics of enabling such a policy approach is. Not only 
must the claims that this is “impossible” and “impractical” (i.e. that only large scale mono-
cultures and modern technology can “feed the world”) be countered—much more than that, it 
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requires challenging the naturalized, “common sense” stories of agricultural development and 
hunger that the GR success narrative deploys, by examining how these stories operate and what 
work they do.  
1.1.1 | Rethinking policy foreclosures 
 As I stood at the library check-out counter with the November 1965 issue of the journal 
“Indian Farming”—the cover features a picture of a man walking through a vibrantly green field 
wearing a power sprayer of liquid pesticides on his back, barely clad and completely without any 
protection against the chemicals he is using—a university librarian working at the circulation 
desk said to me: “Wow. This used to be such a good thing.” He paused to stare at the image 
again, and then continued, more quickly: “Now it’s a bad thing.” The September 2013 UNCTAD 
“Trade and Environment Review” bears a similarly striking and vibrant photo of another Indian 
farmer. A young man walks through fields, behind two oxen which bear a yoke made of split 
wood wrapped with rope, tilling the soil (see endnote1070 for both images). The picture, not meant 
to be clearly “good,” (i.e. showing obvious “progress”) nor “bad” (i.e. showing what was once 
thought to be obvious “progress”), instead aims to represent the reality of hundreds of millions of 
small farmers around the world—who till without mechanization. It is such conditions and 
farmers that the report addresses. The stark and often brutal economic realities of such small 
farms have for decades been discussed by “experts” only in the context of the need to get these 
farmers “on the rails” for the “take-off process” where they can reap its “train of natural 
consequences.” The authors of this UN report—which argues that this dominant approach of the 
last 60 plus years is inadequate—provide a different vision of development. The findings and 
conclusions of scientists and social scientists are important: advocating policies that address the 
“multi-functionality of agriculture [and], its pivotal importance for pro-poor rural 
development,”1071 the take-away message emphasizes “pursuing a fundamental transformation of 
agriculture”—one which “take[s] into account systemic considerations.”1072  
The world needs a paradigm shift in agricultural development: from a ‘green 
revolution’ to an ‘ecological intensification’ approach. …towards mosaics of 
sustainable, regenerative production systems … a move from a linear to a 
holistic approach in agricultural management, which recognizes that the 
farmer is not only a producer of agricultural goods, but also a manager of an 
agro-ecological system.1073  
 
The approach which the UNCTAD summary endorses sounds eerily similar to the image of 
India’s villages as “complex ecological systems” hindering development in their “orientation to 
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self-sufficiency” that the American Foundations encountered in India in the early 1950s (Ch. 
3).1074 Does the fact that the UN has published a “Trade and Development Review” recognizing 
such an about-face from the last sixty years of dominant approach mean the knowledge of such 
small scale agriculturalists is to be validated, or that they are to have a greater autonomy? The 
articulation of such stance is deeply important, just as the debates during the GR were important, 
with their insistence that agricultural policy shift to focus on the 80% not the 8%, and that the 
state seek ways to support small and marginal dry-land farmers. These demands regarding the 
most appropriate policy approach are still alive in India today. In fact, the Ford Foundation today 
supports civil society groups working toward this end and has a very different vision of what 
agricultural development should look like than it did in the 1950s, 60s, and 70s.1075  
 The alternative perspectives and challenges to the dominant view have been pushing back, 
pushing for a more equitable, efficient, productive, autonomous system—with a continuity that 
may seem surprising—over this time. But, the dominant power’s view still wins out far too 
often—operating not just to close off alternatives, but to efface them, write out their story. As if 
they did not and do not exist. The workings of these processes—how a policy consensus is 
formed, and how a path is determined—are political questions. This makes it all the more 
important to attend to how policy possibilities become foreclosed, written off, shut down, often 
before they even begin. Such policy foreclosures also foreclose the livelihood possibilities of 
billions of people, and are enacted all too often in the name of food security, in the name of 
addressing hunger, and in the name of helping the poor, while servicing the interests of capital. 
 It is this closing off, effacement of some paths, and (re)writing of a favored path as inevitable, 
which I have sought to address. I do not attend to the alternatives or answers—there are 
thousands of pages (well researched, substantiated, and written by those better qualified than I) 
enumerating factors and policies important to actually ensuring access to food for the majority of 
the people. The question that remains is not why are people hungry, not why people do not have 
access to the over-abundance of food, not why people are deprived of basic entitlements, not why 
they are excluded, or poor. We know the answers to these questions. The question is how and 
why this continues to be the policy choice that we elect—a policy of fundamental exclusion from 
the most basic necessities of life itself—and how this policy of exclusion wields (or has come to 
be wielded) as a moral imperative and battering ram in the name of the very possibilities which it 
repeatedly forecloses.  
 What path will we follow? Will we seek to “feed the world” within the framework of 
industrial agriculture or will we seek to finally allow for autonomy—to grow and access food—
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not on the terms of corporate agri-business and empires of moral responsibility, but on terms 
entirely outside of this techno-political logic. The prospects might not seem promising; indeed, in 
a context of land-grabs, contract farming, biofuels, and a debt cycle of agricultural technology, 
where the World Bank offers governments “exit loans” to get their small farmers out of 
agriculture entirely1076—rather than to build a sustainable means of supporting themselves and 
their community—the prospects in many ways are bleak. This is the naturalized “progress” 
narrative that we are told to push for—in the name of development and ending poverty. But, this 
narrative is only one side of the story. 
 On the other side, the array of voices that insist, demonstrate, and report that the above path is 
not the road to progress at all—it is not the road anywhere but to greater immiseration of the 
majority of the world’s people, increasing hunger amidst increasing plenty and increasing 
inequity—is growing. These reports, like the discussions of Bt Brinjal, and Minister Ramesh’s 
move to actually allow a moment of “pause” to enable a discussion to take place (Ch. 2), add 
important weight to these alternatives. 
2 | Hunger amidst plenty and the production of common sense  
 
The oft-repeated proverb about India is ‘Scarcity Amidst Abundance.’ 
The proverb is self-explanatory and needs no elucidation. It is a paradox, 
nevertheless true, that India predominantly being an agricultural country 
should face the dire shortage of food supply.  -Dayal 19681077 
Scarcity, it would seem, is responsible for a crisis greater than any the 
world has recorded in its collective memory. Nearly 500 million persons, 
most of them children, are close to starvation. Tens of thousands will die 
this week. Before the [global food] crisis resolves itself, countless 
millions—perhaps as many as 1 billion persons—will perish. 
Yet there is no scarcity. Food is plentiful. Whether it will be shared 
depends upon how successful we are in penetrating the myths of 
development strategies that have failed in the recent past—and how 
effectively we counter the masters of triage.   
-Simon 19751078 
 
 
Despite significant increases in agricultural productivity and the fact that 
the world currently already produces sufficient calories to feed a global 
population of 12-14 billion, hunger has remained a key challenge. 
Around one billion people chronically suffer from starvation and another 
billion are mal-nourished. Some 70 per cent of these people are 
themselves small farmers or agricultural laborers. Therefore, hunger and 
malnutrition are not phenomena of insufficient supply, but results of 
prevailing poverty, and above all problems of access to food. Enabling 
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people to become self-sufficient or earn an appropriate income through 
agriculture to buy food needs to take center stage in future agricultural 
transformation.    
-UNCTAD 20131079 
 
 The nature of the “food problem” of India (and much of the world) has changed over the last 
60 years. If quantity produced was the problem, it no longer is. Though the nature of “Scarcity 
Amidst Abundance”1080 has shifted over the decades, today this “paradox”1081 is manifest more 
than ever: in the highest hunger rates since India became independent, alongside the highest food 
production levels and massive food surpluses. Today, the majority of the world’s hungry and food 
insecure are agriculturalists.1082 That agriculturalists are twice as likely to be hungry and food 
insecure can seem surprising,1083 as hunger and inadequate access to food are sometimes thought 
to be greater issues for the urban poor. To understand the structures producing agriculturalists as 
disproportionately poor, malnourished, and in chronic hunger, it is necessary to examine the 
processes of exclusion that write people out of economic structures of access and visibility 
(outside of the subject position of development and its structure of entitlements).  
 In the preceding chapters I have established why simply acknowledging that people are 
hungry because they are poor is insufficient. I have argued that to understand the contemporary 
situation of hunger amidst plenty (and today’s agriculturalist bias of hunger), it is necessary to 
understand the GR: how the GR reworked food, and the ways that food is produced and 
governed. To draw this out, I have asked how this has come to be—and more, how our 
explanatory narratives and “common sense” ideas of what to do about it have come to be. I 
explored this through systematically pulling at strands of this narrative, via a genealogy and a 
symptomatic reading—not to show its origin, but rather to call its self-professed origin story into 
question and to expose the work of that story. 
 I have sought to draw out the constitutive relationship of hunger in modern agriculture, 
specifically how the moral unacceptability of hunger is harnessed to projects which—in the name 
of “development,” “responsibility,” and “growth,” under the slogan of “Feeding the World”—
enact exclusionary economic structures and processes that produce the very conditions of 
deprivation and exclusion (in this case, from basic adequate food) that they claim to redress. This 
is to provide an account of: how and what we understand as the history of agricultural 
development in India came to be. I have offered an account, a genealogy, not of the GR itself, but 
of how our common-sense story of the GR has come to be.  
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 I have indicated that this understanding is consequential not only because of what has since 
transpired in India. While India does house more hungry and malnourished people than anywhere 
else in the world, while the malnutrition rates in India are almost double what they are in Sub-
Saharan Africa—despite these facts, India is seen as a “model” because it has something that 
most Sub-Saharan African nations do not have: vast food surpluses, more widespread use of 
agricultural technology, and a greater penetration of “market” logic in the agricultural sector. 
India has as much as a third to a quarter of the world’s surplus food grain—and it has one-quarter 
to one-third of the world’s hungry people. The production of surplus food and superfluous 
populations can be traced to the policy strategies of the 1960s, though the effects were muted at 
the time—redressed with redistributive welfare measures—but later were ratcheted up under neo-
liberal policies.  
 This account as a genealogy can offer insight into how our “commonsense” understanding of 
the GR came to be. Unlike history, which tells an origin story, a genealogy seeks to shatter that 
“origin.” I have indicated that there is no single origin, but many forces at play, some contingent 
and idiosyncratic. While the GR narrative tale, as written, has a sense of inevitability, of being a 
natural progression, as I have documented, a lot of work went into making it (appear) that way. 
Further, I have asked what work does our “commonsense” understanding of the GR continue to 
do today? I have approached this question with a symptomatic reading of an array of texts. I 
maintain that addressing this question is necessary because this narrative allowed for a common 
path to emerge, at the intersection of many different interests.  
 Through a symptomatic reading and a genealogy I have sought to expose the contradictions 
and defenses of the texts (e.g. understandings, theory, policies, speeches, and memos, and 
reports)—fissures it must paper over in order for it to have a meaning that is self-present; I have 
attempted to open the breach with a genealogy and then, with a symptomatic reading, to trace the 
making of the text that resolved contingency into necessity. I have maintained that these methods 
offer a different insight into the nature of the problem of hunger amidst plenty and how we 
understand its relationship to what is commonly accepted as the history of agricultural 
modernization in India.  
 In this, I have sought to take on an account that is stratified, settled, a history that is “known,” 
written, and even iconic, and to unsettle the dominant account of this history—not on my terms, 
but on its own terms, through its texts, files, and according to the logic of its narrative. I have 
sought not to dismiss it, not to indict it from the outside, but to tug methodically at strands of this 
narrative, pulling apart its weave, and as it unravels, to show how it was formed in uncertainty, 
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how it was formed out of, and in response to, that which it sought to exile and silence: the 
dissenting opinions, the inclination for an array of different policies, policies structuring the 
development process in favor of broad equality. This narrative was formed out of the very options 
which it declared not possible—options which were cleansed from the map of possibilities. There 
was nothing inevitable about it. It is in the telling.  
 Each chapter has sought to expose this work in a particular vein to build a larger case for the 
necessity of interrogating how these projects create (an implicit) subject of development and how 
the structures (of exclusion) are built around this subject. As such, simply acknowledging that 
people are hungry because they are poor is deeply insufficient. For, (as discussed in Ch. 1) this is 
simply to put the question into the dominant framework of the “expertise” of “development 
economics” and agricultural technology—a framework, which over the last thirty years has 
produced these very structures of exclusion (for the ideology of (neoliberal and neoclassical) 
“economics” has its own set of questions and calculations). The framework within which 
economics disciplines the questions that can even be asked effaces what it cannot address and 
elides that what is necessary is structural change—as the UN Review and the IAASTD, for 
example, indicate—changes to the structures which produce surplus food and superfluous 
populations as simultaneous processes. To recognize this is to recognize that these processes are 
a policy choice, one that mobilizes a moral imperative in the name of conquering hunger to make 
a case for the very choices which have produced increased hunger. It is necessary to move 
beyond the moral imperative of a productionist paradigm, and to do so it is necessary to address 
how this approach has come to be. I have adopted the perspective that to understand today’s 
realities it is necessary to understand how the GR forged food and agriculture in new ways—both 
how it created a framework of agricultural policy that continues to define the trajectory of 
agricultural development to this day as well as the subject of this policy.  
3 | Feeding the World: Industrial Agriculture  
 Named “The World’s Greatest Fix”1084 and “The World’s Worst Idea”1085 the development 
and industrialization of modern agriculture and agricultural technologies is without question one 
of the foundational keystones of the “modern” world. Every aspect of life as we know it would be 
unthinkable without “modern” agriculture. The essential role that agriculture plays in making 
possible all other “modern” realities is clear. We all depend on and are enabled by “modern” 
industrial agriculture, but we rarely stop to ask: who is the subject of this modern agriculture? 
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How did one particular approach come to be so universally accepted, defined, and spread around 
the world, and what are the implications of this?  
 Though agriculture has developed over the course of millennia, in the last sixty years the 
world has seen a profound transformation in food production. The industrial revolution, itself 
enabled by the agricultural revolution ~10,000 years prior, was in turn to be brought to bear on 
agriculture. Agriculture in the West began to be transformed by the Industrial Revolution’s 
effects about 100 years ago; these practices were spread to the rest of the world in the last sixty 
years. Dissemination of a particular set of practices, which came to be known as the “Green 
Revolution,” has come to stand in as shorthand for many of the transformations brought by 
modern agriculture. Agriculture was revolutionized; but the industrialization of agriculture—or 
agriculture’s “green revolution”—means much more than modern implements and chemicals 
introduced to fundamentally transform the way that agriculture is practiced. Just as the industrial 
revolution completely transformed social relations, relations of production, relations of 
ownership, and relations of hierarchy and influence at all levels in society, so has the 
industrialization of agriculture.  
3.1 | Industrial Agriculture for Development: The Long Green Revolution 
To examine the long GR project and its many continuing legacies, I have drawn upon 
literature addressing the political economy of food and hunger, pulling it together with 
development studies and insights of postcolonial studies. While agro-food studies (based largely 
in political economy) has carefully documented the ways the global food system has been 
produced, these insights can be deepened with the incorporation of the careful attentiveness 
postcolonial theory offers to textuality and questions of representation. Likewise, this coupling 
can be substantially enriched with insights from development studies; development studies has 
established that the nature of geopolitical and power relations in the “post”-colonial era, and the 
legitimation of particular ways of ordering the “progress” that “post”-colonial nations could not 
not want,1086 exceed both the framework of political economy as well as that of representation and 
knowledge production. Together, these bodies of thought offer complementary ways of 
approaching the workings of international economic relations, of ties between nation-states, of the 
workings of power and knowledge, and of the ways that policies get caught up in particular 
conjunctures and matrices thereof. In addition to broaching a conversation between these trans-
disciplinary literatures, through a genealogy and symptomatic reading I have staged an encounter 
between these literatures that is absent in each of them, and that deepens the insights that each 
  243 
body of literature offers. I have not set aside the many important insights that agro-foods 
literature and political economy offer and have accomplished, but have taken on these questions 
in a different manner, tracing more deeply sedimented histories and pursuing the logic behind 
these policies.  
 Postcolonial studies and development studies, each in their own way, attend to the reality that 
the afterlives of colonialism reside in the ways that forms of knowledge are taken up and come to 
be organized around certain subjects, the “economy” being predominant among these.1087 Despite 
thorough attention to these long-lived and widely circulating afterlives and the forms of 
knowledge production that have emerged over time, the deeply evocative power of food, the 
affective call of invocations of hunger, and the work of agricultural development as a site of 
subject production and knowledge legitimation has been largely overlooked. As I have indicated, 
the invocation of hunger has served as a device for world making—this geopolitical project and 
the global denomination of responsibility produce specific sites with particular subjects. To 
understand this production it is necessary to trace the ways that these affective connections have 
played into the hand of (now) established social science concepts. This is the task of the 
postcolonial critic. Yet, postcolonial studies has not adequately interrogated these social-science 
concepts, their formation or continuing salience. And, the important work that has been done on 
social-science concepts—such as that on our political imagination, the subject, and the 
economy—has not pushed these inquiries into agricultural and development science and/or other 
applied sciences that navigate between social science and the natural sciences. Reams have been 
written on agricultural development policy in India. But, while documenting many important 
facts, trends, and perceptions, these accounts do not offer a reading—of these processes and the 
ways that its legacies carry over into contemporary debates. I have documented how the affective 
power (and political threat) of hunger comes to be articulated in a development agenda centering 
on productionism; and, how while these categories have contingent origins, once deposited, they 
function as a force-field to organize objects within their universe.  
My focus in the above chapters has been to trace the workings of power, and in doing so to 
interrogate the work and sedimentation of the “social science” concepts at work therein—
including in the realm of discourse, the production of “the economy” as an object to be managed, 
development policy and its creation of subjects to be managed, and (the conceptualization and 
implementation of) social and agricultural policies governing technologies and food. While each 
of these realms has a specific focus, they are co-produced. In particular, I have explored how 
effacements happen and the effects such moments of closing-off of possibilities have had on our 
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current dominant conceptions of how to address problems. For, in closing-off alternative routes, 
favored paths have come to be rendered “common sense.”  
The Green Revolution was a global project, but an effort spearheaded (and named) by 
American “development” institutions. The GR had a number of “successes” (well-remembered 
and celebrated—Mexico, Turkey, and India) and a number of unsuccessful ventures (failures 
largely effaced—Africa, the Philippines). I have focused on the case that is today the most 
internationally celebrated success: the transformation of Indian agriculture. The story that we are 
told of India’s GR is of a nation transformed: on the brink of famine, with political stability held 
hostage to chronic food shortages, India solved its problems, became able to “feed itself,” 
stabilized the government, and retained its status as the world’s largest democratic nation. Food 
shortages did not topple the government, we are told, because the application of modern scientific 
expertise was able to intervene just in time, and India was saved—narrowly escaping the clutches 
of Malthusian disaster and the clutches of Communism.1088 The narrative of this global success 
story differs in India and in the US in the details, but the overarching narrative of independence 
being attained through the production of food is shared.  
The deep threat that a shortage of food poses to the stability of governments and the 
“security” of the elite is not new. The need to secure sufficient food was a driving rationale 
behind imperialism;1089 England’s colonies were used as a critical source of food staples and 
agricultural goods.1090 While the out-sourcing of food production to its colonies underwrote 
England’s Industrial Revolution, by the time Asian and African nations were becoming 
independent the global flow of food was no longer so lopsided. By the mid-twentieth century, 
these newly independent nations were embedded in regional and global relations of production 
and trade, overseen by colonial empires. Despite decades of neglect and a punitive tax structure, 
British India produced more than enough food to “feed itself.” The terrible famines that occurred 
were not due to food shortages1091—vast grain surpluses were locked away from people during 
the massive 1943 Bengal famine; price speculation drove prices so high that it put this food out of 
people’s reach.1092 The British Government of India was adamant that they could not intervene in 
the market to stabilize prices; to do so would violate the principles of laissez-faire and free 
trade.1093  
Today, in India more people experience hunger and chronic malnutrition than at any time 
since that Famine of 1943, and the ideologies of laissez-faire are ascendant once again. India 
today produces far more food than its citizens actually consume. Newspaper headlines over the 
last decade and again during 2012 and 2013 have pointed to the profound “paradox,” a tired one 
  245 
by now, of hunger amidst plenty. Yet, global institutions of power, operating in the name of 
“development” ask not how to create effective polices to target poverty, or the most basic issues 
of deprivation, but rather acknowledge the poverty and deprivation and use it to reiterate the 
urgency of their case to rapidly reduce regulations on FDI, MNCs, or to increase state subsidies—
not to the poor but to international capital. This complete non-sequitur is so naturalized, made to 
seem so self-evident, that it does not even stand out as lacking the most basic logic, or without a 
link between cause and effect.1094  
 It is necessary to dismantle this logic, for the reach of this ideology and the paradox is more 
complex—the Indian Government today does not abide by the laissez-faire non-interventionist 
principles as fully as the British Raj. Rather, even while partially dismantled (as the TPDS), and 
partially re-instated (with the NFSM), India still has one of the most extensive food distribution 
networks in the world.  
3.1.1 | The Long Green Revolution: subject production + exclusion   
 To understand the situation of widespread food insecurity in India today, it is necessary to 
understand how the Green Revolution reworked the nature of food itself and hence how the 
Green Revolution reworked access to food (i.e. relations of the market, and food as a commodity 
within these social structures). The Green Revolution’s principal achievement was not that it 
increased agricultural production, but that it changed how the agricultural sector is structured in 
relation to the state, the market, and industry, and as such, how development is organized. I have 
suggested that in these processes it was not only agriculture and food that were affected, but 
more, that the subject of development was (re)defined as a market subject.  
 The Green Revolution was more than an agricultural initiative; it was a state-run project that 
initiated economic liberalization as part of geopolitical demands to prevent a “red revolution.” 
The (first) Green Revolution’s agricultural development policies emphasized increasing 
production through technology-intensive methods to achieve (what has since come to be called) 
national food security. At the time, the increased emphasis on output was complemented with 
social programs aimed at increasing the population’s access to food. These were part of broader 
development policies aimed at attaining sufficient food for both the nation and the population 
through increasing production and building national reserve stocks alongside expanding welfare 
and food distribution programs.1095 The second Green Revolution—while like the first in that it is 
also entangled with national security and geopolitical imperatives—differs in its structure and in 
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the explicitness of who the policies are meant to attend to and are accountable to.1096 As a 
neoliberal era revolution, the second Green Revolution promotes privatization and centers around 
“the market” as the catalyst of development and the agent of efficient allocation of resources.1097  
 The Cold War era problematic which provided the context for the Green Revolution—
concerns with de-escalating the political threats of the disenfranchised and preventing the threat 
of Communism—has arguably given way to a lack of political will to even address or govern 
“superfluous” populations, which has led to their increasing dispensability and invisibility. To 
return to the food “surpluses” that haunt this situation, it is clear (even to neoliberal institutions 
such as the WB) that the food supplies are not in “surplus” to the needs of the population—only 
to their financial means. Consistent access to sufficient food exceeds the purchasing power not of 
a minority, but of the vast majority of the population (between 50% and 90% of the population 
are food insecure and between 30% and 50% are malnourished or experience chronic hunger). 
With neoliberalism still in full swing, this “paradox” of mounting hunger alongside mounting 
state food surpluses became a defining theme of the first “long” decade of this century. This 
situation raises questions of: how the functioning of the liberal state and governmentality are to 
be understood when so much of the population is excluded even from being subsumed within the 
functioning of the market—as consumers or producers?  
  I have suggested that the seemingly “paradoxical” realities of contemporary postcolonial 
neoliberal development can be more fully understood by a return to the Green Revolution era to 
trace the roots of processes of exclusion that today manifest in forms that are anecdotalized as 
“paradoxes.” I have argued that these conditions are not “ironies” at all, but rather, are the 
constitutive contradictions of liberalism and its project of development.1098 That is, when the 
contradictions which form the foundation of agricultural development policies manifest in 
material conditions, these conditions are asserted, and simultaneously dismissed, as simply 
“paradoxes.” This dismissal allows a level of comfort and serves as alibi, implicitly testifying for 
naturalized progress narratives and against the need to interrogate the deeper processes at work. 
3.2 | Feeding the World 
This deteriorating [food] situation poses a dilemma for the wealthy, food-
surfeited citizen of the developed world. He must decide whether he has a 
moral obligation to feed those who are starving even if the food shortage in 
the poorest countries could have been prevented by population control. 
Morals aside, out of sheer self-interest he must ponder whether the hungry 
half-billion will allow him to live peacefully, enjoying his wealth. He must 
realize that there is the chance that the impoverished might resort to war to 
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take his wealth and food. Economist Robert Heilbroner notes that even 
hungry, poor states might soon get the nuclear arms with which to terrorize 
wealthy countries. Finally, Western man must decide whether his own sense 
of human dignity—which is the basis for democratic institutions—can 
survive as he witnesses so many people starving around the globe.          
–Time Magazine, Editors 19741099 
The crux of the problem of the last food crisis, as Time Magazine’s editorial staff opined with 
somewhat less subtlety than commentaries on the contemporary food crisis, offers us insights into 
the project of “feeding the world.” The subject of anxious concern in an increasingly dire food 
situation, where hundreds of millions risk starvation, is surfeited “Western man.” The driving 
question of how does “Western Man” assuage “his troubled conscience?” reveals: he does so by 
relying on two primary narratives. The first, a discourse of liberal “responsibility for,” hitched to 
the second, the logic of “economics” as the guiding metric for how to enact this responsibility, or 
moral obligation. I have traced how these two narratives operate (as alibi) in the construction of 
the contemporary geo-political economy regarding—and in the production of—food. The primary 
form this project has taken is the expansion of food as a commodity in the name of combating 
hunger and “feeding the world.” These projects hold such tremendous power because they are 
always also moral projects—and thus wield a moral authority to enforce their ends.  
3.2.1 | Question of liberalism 
  The agricultural development projects of the first and second Green Revolutions can be 
read as attending to and working through the tensions between the imperatives of 
governmentality (as manifest in managing hunger) and the imperatives of the free-market—
navigating the contradictions of development. While the navigation of the contradictions between 
the imperatives of governmentality and the “market” is arguably constitutive of the project of 
“development” itself, food plays a distinct role in ensuring these projects because of the unique 
demands on governing—as more than “managing” the relation between people and things, but, 
between its populace and the basics of life itself—food places an moral call upon the logics of 
governing as much more than managing.  
 I have sought to excavate the functioning of the framework of development through the ways 
that food has operated (i.e. access to food, food security, hunger, and food as a commodity to be 
sold, given, withheld, and speculated on). I suggested that the operation of food in projects of 
“development” and the “nation” can be broached through understanding how food’s dual 
functions—as both (i) a fundamental necessity of life, and (ii) a commodity that is bought, sold, 
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and hence unequally accessible—are harnessed and deployed in agricultural development 
policies. To address the “paradox” of pervasive food insecurity amidst plenty and the work done 
in the name of “development” in negotiating these relations and contradictions, it is helpful to 
trace how these dual functions (and the tensions between them) operated in the Green Revolution. 
Both the first Green Revolution and its nascent projects for a second GR were formed as 
development projects in and by the contradictions that liberal[capital]ism navigates, where 
national food security operates by moving between the tensions of governmentality and the “free-
market.” That is, I understand the two Green Revolutions as development projects that operate by 
shuttling between, and attending to: on the one hand, hunger and national food security as sites 
where the singularity of food’s use value is invoked, and on the other hand, agro-technology as a 
site that has functioned to further subsume food within the logic of its exchange value. It is in this 
gap (i.e. the navigation of these two roles) that national security operates; clearly, both “national 
food security” and “hunger” are sites where food cannot be fully subsumed within a market logic, 
within exchange value. As national food security serves a strategic purpose—it is an issue of 
sovereignty and maintaining (an imagination of) the nation’s status—food tautologically exceeds 
its exchange value. The strategic nature of security is why even (or especially) the most “free 
marketeer” states seek to avoid simply being dependent on the international market for food—for 
the food necessary to secure their population.1100 The catch, so to speak, seems to be that the 
strategic importance of national food security is in procuring food for the population; but when 
the nation is food secure and the population is not, the food which underpins national security 
serves a different purpose. When it is not the population that the food is for, who or what is the 
food for? In the neoliberal reshuffling, food stocks themselves have another use value unrelated 
to the population. It is no longer a Communist threat, but now the imaginary of “the nation” itself 
that the food surpluses sustain, and it is the “value” of the nation’s geopolitical security that is 
maintained by the food stocks (regardless of whether they are distributed to the needy). Thus, 
even while sufficient food for the population is what needs to be secured, in the register of 
national food security, the concern is not about the food (in)security of individuals. Rather, the 
food stocks that render the nation secure are not actually meant to feed the whole population. 
These stocks guarantee (the presence of) sufficient food for food’s dual roles to function—at least 
for those to whom the government answers.  
3.2.2 | The GRs as projects of “Governing Food”  
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 As economists have thoroughly documented, India’s national agricultural development 
policies after Independence emphasized the centrality of ensuring food security and nutrition.1101 
The accumulated food stocks in the last decade and a half resulted from restructuring aspects of 
these policies: cuts in distribution and social programs, but not in minimum price supports (the 
mechanism supporting prices for farmers).1102 As a result, the massive “accumulation of 
foodgrain in government stocks did not result from a growth in foodgrain production but 
[from]…the increase in real prices [which] forced consumers to consume less foodgrains.”1103 The 
stocks grew to record levels largely due to economic liberalization policies and cutbacks in social 
programs. “During the 1990s, the rate of decline in cereal consumption accelerated by about 
70%.”1104 State policies—under World Bank imperatives and the encouragement of domestic 
pressure groups—prioritized maintaining the price of grain at the expense of people’s access to 
the grain.1105  
 Such neoliberal policies are widely acknowledged to have profoundly shifted the accessibility 
of basic necessities and the state’s role in mediating their availability. But more, within the 
context of the contradictions of food security (i.e. an environment of pervasive individual food 
insecurity in a food secure nation), policy reforms regarding who has access to this food arguably 
restructure the nature of citizenship and governmentality itself. These shifts did not begin with 
neoliberal reforms and cannot be understood within the context of neoliberalism alone; I have 
maintained that to understand these shifts we must return to the (first) Green Revolution. The 
Green Revolution governed food production in a way integrally related to producing the subject 
of development.  
 The Green Revolution was fundamentally a knowledge project, deploying governmental 
technologies in agriculture in a way that served to subsume food increasingly within exchange 
value. However, it was also a development project that was driven by different imperatives than 
those of today. The concern with stability—which was threatened by the dual specters of hunger 
and Communism—articulated in a particular governmentality and broader social welfare 
programs designed to ensure the widespread food security of the population. As such, during this 
period, the increasing commodification of food was mitigated by social programs which offered 
food “below price” to the poor. Hence, when these programs were targeted by neoliberalism in 
the 1990s, the conditions were such that hunger rates almost could not but skyrocket.1106 This is 
the context of the second Green Revolution, where the nation’s food security is invoked as a 
driving need for agri-biotechnology.1107 While the second Green Revolution can also be read as 
shuttling between food’s two roles, it does not attend to the same imperatives of governmentality 
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(or, certainly not in the same way). Rather, I suggest that it invokes these imperatives as 
justification, but the concerns it is shuttling between are national food security and the market. 
Operating in the tensions between the two functions of food, the second Green Revolution 
invokes cases of exclusion from access to food (that result from policies which subsume food 
within its exchange value) as “exceptions,” mobilizing these to solidify food’s role as a 
commodity for a regime of market centric-governance (i.e. those who cannot afford food 
justify/require agricultural development and privatization).  
 Thus, it is not that neoliberal logic and the policies it manifests in simply exonerate the 
responsibility of the state; but rather, that in (re)writing the logic of the market as the guiding 
logic, the state’s responsibility has been restructured. In this, the food security of the population 
as a whole has been restructured out of the state’s concern and moored to the market as the 
catalyst of security. 
3.2.3 | Governing Development: accounting for poverty and hunger  
 The government’s representations of development and poverty provide perhaps the clearest 
example of how governmentality, the production of the population, and the commoditization of 
food (through the Green Revolution and the cutbacks in state welfare) can be read as converging. 
Increasingly subsuming food within its exchange value, the Green Revolution project achieved 
“national security” through the management of the population (where agro-technology served as a 
technology of government) as much as through efforts at increasing production. Utsa Patnaik has 
followed up with the situation of food insecurity today, documenting that food availability per 
capita is at the lowest levels since the 1930s, and that rural hunger is particularly acute.1108  
 She explains that despite the low and decreasing levels of food consumption, the Government 
repeatedly claims that poverty rates have not increased since the 1990s (i.e. since the major 
neoliberal reforms began). The Government’s statistics on poverty are possible only because the 
Government has stopped correlating calories consumed (or mal/nutrition) with poverty—after the 
PDS was cut, that metric did not produce “good” numbers.1109 This shift in how poverty is 
assessed—for the apparent purpose of being effaced—has enabled an increasing percent of the 
population to be declared “above” the poverty line. The neoliberal narrative of “the nation” relies 
on these decreases in poverty to anecdotalize the “paradox” of hunger amidst plenty as an 
exception, an irony, rather than the overdetermined outcome of policies of development as 
exclusion. The narrative that these statistics produce is mobilized as evidence to justify these 
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development projects (or, at minimum, it enables effacing the depth of the effects of neoliberal 
restructuring). The actual material resources (e.g. the amount of food consumed) do not count in 
the statistical representations of poverty, yet, at the same time as those who are malnourished are 
effaced into the monolithic category of population, their malnutrition and hunger are harnessed, 
and their exclusion from the market is mobilized for projects of development.  
 The government has played a balancing act with the population: they have been able to render 
deceptively large portions of the population “developed” through the manipulation of statistics 
and categories. By redefining and re-measuring “poverty” such that it excludes the most basic 
markers of bio-political deprivation and lowering the poverty line itself, more people are 
automatically delivered to the status of non-poor without any improvement in their material 
conditions. In this production of development, it is hunger that actually underwrites national 
security and “food security.” The government’s explanation that “[t]he agricultural sector, 
therefore, acts as a bulwark in maintaining food security and, in the process, national security as 
well”1110 can be read through the lens of the exclusion and commoditization of the majority of the 
agrarian population over the last fifty years. The effacement of the malnutrition of the majority of 
the population means that, the bulwark of the security of the nation is offered up with their 
bodies. Hence, the nation’s security has come to rest on the effacement of poverty and hunger to 
produce the necessary “surpluses.” This is the fundamental contradiction the Green Revolutions 
navigate: a logic which must both efface this poverty and hunger, at the same time as it is 
absolutely reliant on (invoking) it to secure its project of development. 
 Throughout the above chapters I have suggested that to approach this situation it is necessary 
to consider the production of the subject of development and the effacement of vast portions of 
the excluded “population” from this subject position. For, in the case of food, the majority of the 
population is excluded from resources that are available. In this case, where exclusion is not 
simply a matter of a lack of resources, exclusion results from the nature of development projects 
which (re)define how, and which, subjects have access to resources. The construction of this 
subject position shaped not only who received the basic resources of “development” and the state, 
but also whose needs and/or poverty are effaced when the government declares the nation to be 
“food secure.” 
 The era of the Gene Revolution is defined by “surplus” food, increasing inequality, and 
“superfluous” hungry populations. At no time has the world produced as much food as it does 
today, nor have there ever been as many people malnourished or in chronic hunger. In the market-
centric logic propelling GM crops in India, this paradox of hunger amidst plenty itself is taken up 
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to justify and to enable the need for “market competitiveness” as underpinning development. The 
functioning of these constitutive contradictions has also allowed an opening—one in which the 
alternative voices are emerging, to reopen the discussion the future of agriculture for development 
and to allow the autonomy for people to feed themselves.  
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1 These graphics, for instance, represent some of the numbers on price rises: 
   available at: 
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/sciencetech/article-1350009/Food-prices-rocket-50-global-hunger-epidemic-
causes-riots-famines.html 
   available at: 
http://www.ifpri.org/publication/food-security-risks-must-be-comprehensively-addressed 
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 available at: http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/2012/08/09/could-the-u-s-drought-
trigger-another-global-food-crisis/ 
2 For more on the food riots, see for example Holt-Gimenez and Patel 2009; McMichael 2009.  
3 A graphic indicating food riots alongside food prices: 
 available at: 
http://www.governorsbiofuelscoalition.org/?p=3385  
4 For more on the term “Third World” see for example Power 2003. 
5 There was a major concern among Western powers with mandating significant “population control” 
measures in the “third world”—due to the “sensitive” nature of explicit sterilization projects, these 
concerns were quickly largely subsumed into the project of “development,” and more specifically, 
“agricultural development” (see for example: Green 1999; Time (Editors) 1974a). 
6 This was the dominant rhetoric, however, then as today there are accounts that challenged this 
representation. Reporting from the 1974 UN Conference on the last “major global food crisis,” Simon 
(1975) offers an assessment that could be reprinted—with a simple change of date, thirty-three years 
later—in response to the global food crisis of 2008. He explains that the representation of the problem as 
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one of shortage, then as now, does very significant political work: “We may think there is scarcity; only the 
corporate traders know for certain” (ibid).  He continues that he exact causes of the crisis were intentionally 
obscured—namely by : 
Multinational agribusiness, primarily U.S.-based, [who] controls more than the markets 
of world agriculture, as Jean Pierre Laviec of the International Union of Food Workers 
said in a statement released in Rome: 
They decide the quantities of vital inputs to be produced, the quantities of agricultural 
products to be bought, where plants will be built and investments made. The growth 
rate of agribusiness has risen during the last ten years [1964-74] and . . . has been 
directly proportional to the increase of hunger and scarcity.  (Laviec, as quoted in 
Simon 1975; my emphasis). 
7 The UN FAO estimates that food prices will not stabilize or return to “normal” (i.e. 2005) prices until 
2017 (FAO 2008: European Commission 2008; FAPRI 2008; USDA 2008). 
8 (Kaufman 2008, 2012). 
9 That said, Goldman Sachs and the other primary speculators were not buying actual food stocks, of 
course. But futures, promises of potential food. A primary proposed means of regulating and reigning in 
speculation in the food system is to make such orders deliverable—for these speculative investors of course 
do not want the actual food they buy and cannot store it.  They are trading in financialized food: in effect 
speculations on the exchange value of what its use value will me.  
10 This, of course, is not an insight of the current food crisis, but a well-established, extensively 
documented point (Sen 1981). 
11  This was the dominant explanation in the 1970s (see for example Time 1975), in the second half of the 
1960s the blame had been on what Americans perceived to be lazy and incompetent Third World 
Governments (see for example Time 1974, Wallerstein 1980).  
12 (c.f. The Economist 2008a, 2008b, 2008c). 
13 (c.f. The Economist 2008a, 2008b, 2008c). 
14 Even though in this case, increased production clearly would have done nothing to stem the price rise—
the realm that needed intervention was regulatory and financial), the US Government’s response to the 
crisis argued that financial deregulation and the eradication of trade barriers in developing market 
agriculture was the only way forward (see Lugar-Casey, CSIS 2008). 
15 (Pollack 2008). 
16 (Wall Street Journal 2008, GRAIN 2008; Angus 2008; Anderson 2009; Monstanto 2008). 
17 Norman Borlaug, who left DuPont to work for the Rockefeller Foundations breeding HYV wheat in 
Mexico is often dubbed “The Man Who Fed the World” (Hesser 2006)—a project which lives on, 
summoning his Nobel Peace Prize as evidence of the intrinsically stabilizing work of “modernizing” 
agricultural production methods.  
18 (Sheeran 2008; as quoted in Kaufman 2012: 131). 
19 (Kaufman 2012: 132). 
20 (Sheeran 2008; as quoted in Kaufman 2012: 130). 
21 (Kaufman 2012: 134). 
22 (Kaufman 2012: 134).   
23 (Cullather 2014). 
24 (Faribairn 2011; UN 1974). 
25 (Kingdon 1995). 
26 (CSIS 2008: 6; my emphasis).   
27 (CSIS 2008: 3; my emphasis). 
28 In case there was any ambiguity as to what they mean, they elaborate—by this understanding the 
argument on the necessity to: 
Make the promotion of developing country agriculture a goal of U.S. trade policy.   
Press on an urgent basis for a successful conclusion of the Doha Development Round 
that promotes investment and trade in developing country agriculture and reduces long-
standing subsidy and tariff barriers. Focus U.S. executive-congressional dialogue on 
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concrete measures that could expedite U.S. approvals of Doha outcomes. Make the 
successful conclusion of the Doha Development Round a foreign policy priority in 
diplomatic relations with member states of the European Union (EU), member states of 
the African Union (AU), and emerging markets such as India and Brazil. 
Pursue targeted international and regional trade discussions that can bring rapid follow-
on benefits to developing country agriculture. Examine how existing U.S. trade 
preferences, already in place for many developing countries, might be used to reduce 
technical barriers to developing country agricultural exports to the United States and 
build trade capacity in those countries.  
Take deliberate bilateral and multilateral diplomatic action to ease export bans and 
restrictions that have contributed to higher food prices, including strengthening World 
Trade Organization (WTO) rules on export restrictions. The World Bank says that 26 net-
food-exporting countries have maintained or introduced such measures, making it hard to 
acquire and ship food to the most needy even when funds are available (CSIS 2008:  8-9). 
29 (CSIS 2008: 6; my emphasis). 
30 (c.f. The Economist 2009a, 2009b, 2009c). 
31 In addition to removing tariffs, subsidies and rolling-out futures trading to small marginal farmers, agro-
technologies (namely GM crops) also make a prominent entrance at this moment in “solving” the crisis of 
hunger. The far more complex series of social-economic-ecological relations that leave people without food 
are not always completely ignored in these claims; it is implied and explicitly stated in some accounts that 
GM crops provide the solution to the problems of acute poverty plaguing those marginalized in our global 
economy by enabling them (for the poor and hungry are twice as likely to be agrarian workers) to secure 
greater returns on their crops and thus become actors in the global market by selling their genetically 
enhanced produce.  
32 Here we can see Watts and Bohle’s (1993) concept of “spaces of vulnerability” mapping on a 
geopolitical scale. 
33 (Diouf 2009; as quoted in The Economist 2009b). 
34 (Sheeran 2008, as quoted in Kaufman 2012: 130). 
35 (Time 1974: http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,911503,00.html). 
36 (Rockefeller, John D. III. 1961[1976]: 35). 
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41 (Hesser 2006). 
42 (Thompson 2000: 60; Busch 2001). 
43 (Shiva and Jalees 2004; NYT 2009). 
44 The revamped Public Distribution System (PDS) was renamed the Targeted Public Distribution System 
(TPDS) 
45 (Chand 2005, 2008a; Swaminathan, M. 1999, 2000). 
46 (Chand 2005, 2008; Dreze 2001, 2003; Swaminathan 2009; Patnaik 2008). 
47 (DasGupta 2013; IFPRI 2010). 
48 (Dayal 1968: 77). 
49 As Dayal further explains: 
The  principle keystones of the New Strategy for agricultural production under the Fourth Plan have 
been enunciated as follows: ‘(i) to apply scientific techniques and knowledge of agricultural 
production at all stages, particularly in the fields, (ii) to select a few  areas with assured rainfall and 
irrigation for concentrated application of package of practices based on improved varieties of seeds 
responsive to heavy doses of fertilizers and availability of inputs and to fix special targets of 
production of foodgrains for such areas’ (Dayal 1968: 76). 
Under the new Food strategy or high yielding varieties programme, it is proposed to 
select within the existing IADP and IAAP areas a few blocks: 
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Where there is no problem of water—either the rainfall is good or the irrigation 
system is satisfactory. 
Which enjoy immunity from natural hazards such as floods, drainage problems, soil 
conservation problems, etc. 
Which have well-developed village institutions like cooperatives and village 
panchayats (Dayal 1968: 77). 
50 (RAC 1969: 25). 
51 (RAC 1969). 
52 (RAC 1969: 2). 
53 (Raina, Rajeswari, interview by author. New Delhi. February 24, 2011). 
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61  (McMichael and Schneider 2011: 126, citing Macinnis 2008).  
62 (Chatterjee 2004; Gupta and Sharma 2006). 
63 These interviews often took the form of long conversations and shaped the ways that I understand and 
frame the questions that I ask in the following pages; that said, the text of the interviews does not feature 
prominently in the dissertation chapters—as my primary concern here is to interrogate the work that 
agricultural development performs, many of these interviews helped me approach that question, rather than 
serving as textual examples of it. 
64 (Latour 1986; Scott 1998; Smith 2006, 2002). 
65 In this I follow postcolonial, feminist, and other critical scholars who conceive of ‘institutions’ and the 
work they perform not as an single concrete entity housed in a place, but rather ‘institutions’ are constituted 
in the intersections of modes of rule and regulation which coordinate the relations and everyday practices 
of state functioning (Gupta and Sharma 2006; Ferguson and Gupta 2002; Smith 2005, 2002; Devault 1999, 
2002). 
66 (Althusser 1974). 
67 (Latour 1986; Mitchell 2002; Smith 2002).    
68 “Reading” as defined in the Glossary of Reading Capital  (1997 [1968]) is as follows:  
The problems of Marxist theory (or of any other theory) can only be solved by learning to 
read the texts correctly (hence the title of Althusser's later book, Lire le Capital, 
'Reading Capital '); neither a superficial reading, collating literal references, nor a Hegelian 
reading, deducing the essence of a corpus by extracting the 'true kernel from the mystified 
shell', will do. Only a symptomatic reading… constructing the problematic, the 
unconsciousness of the text, is a reading of Marx's work that will allow us to establish the 
epistemological break that makes possible historical materialism as a science (q.v.). Both 
Hegelian and empiricist readings are attempts to return to the myth of direct 
communication, to the Logos, and they therefore have a religious inspiration. Marx's own 
reading of the classics provides an example of symptomatic reading. While apparently 
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69 (Althusser 1970: 318). 
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is less grain at a higher price than what some states already offered.  Further, empirical evidence indicates 
that only more inclusive, or universal, schemes can even reach the poorest—as the poorest are the first to 
be de facto excluded when any de jure criteria are in place. 
159 If prisoners were to die of lack of access to food, one could predict more outcry than when the poor die 
of the same physical deprivation. What is it about the logic of “economics” that has produced “poverty” as 
a (bio)political condition that we sanction even while it is so far outside of our otherwise taken for granted 
norms? The absolving logic of economics, worth, work and free-choice as alibis, obviously shape our 
capacity to condemn the undue death of a prisoner (who presumably had no other means of accessing 
food)—even though she ostensibly is in prison for acts which “violated” the “social contract,” she is still 
entitled to the basic necessities of life (the “social contract” is still in place enough to feed her).  
160 Gupta characterizes the violence of poverty as “structural violence,” but he continues that the state is 
culpable and should be linked (even though structural violence is clearly outside of Weber’s classic idea of 
the state as defined by its “monopoly on violence”). He suggests: “the reason such violence is considered to 
be structural is that it is impossible to identify a single actor who commits the violence. Instead, the 
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violence is impersonal, built into the structure of power” (2012: 20). That is, Gupta suggests, it is structural 
because it is a “crime without a criminal” (2012: 21)—without a criminal, I suggest, because of the 
releasing work of economics. Gupta characterizes this violence as “the reduction to bare life” (2012: 21). 
Gupta is drawing largely on Galtung (1969) for the base of his conception, and refining it with Das’ insight 
into uncertainty as an important aspect—for to Gupta (in his quest to understand bureaucracy) this aspect of 
arbitrariness is central. (His argument is that structural violence is enacted through everyday practices and 
that this violence coexists with care (found in welfare practices). 
161 The logic of economics acts as alibi can be read as an attempt at continuing the closure of the basic 
moral questions which (Foley, 2006) asked.  Political economy has since its articulation in the “moral 
philosophy” of Adam Smith, been grappling with the continuing the closure of the basic moral questions; 
Smith was first a moral philosopher and, as Foley (2006) argues, he sought to resolve the fundamental 
question of how to live a “moral life” within the antagonistic social relations that capitalism imposes 
(Foley, 2006: 2). Smith’s answer to this is that capitalism is the universal-elixir: by acting in one’s rational 
self interest within the constraints of capitalism, the natural human antagonism is actually transformed into 
‘service and regard for others’ (ibid). Smith thus “absolves us of the moral ambiguity and pain that haunt 
capitalist reality” (ibid: 3). This alibi functions likewise in cases of exclusion and poverty where we are 
absolved by the alibi of “not yet.” 
162 That is Agamben’s claim that the production of “bare life” is integrally tied to the “state of exception” 
does not hold up in the logic of the life-depriving violence of extreme poverty. For their exclusion is 
economic and sequential, even as they are actively involved in society.  
163 (Gupta 2012: 6; my emphasis).   
164 (Agamben 1998). 
165 (World Bank 1986: i). 
166 (World Bank 1986: v). 
167 (World Bank 1986: v). 
168  During this crisis a new solution originated. As Time Magazine explained: 
As their first priority, the delegates must approve a program to aid those who will face 
starvation during the next decade. In order to have supplies on hand for immediate aid to 
the victims of crop failures and natural disasters, the U.N.'s Food and Agriculture 
Organization will propose stockpiling national grain reserves as a "system of world food 
security." … 
The FAO proposal raises several questions that are as yet unanswered: Who will 
contribute to the reserve? Who will finance the storage and transport of the grain and who 
will control it? U.S. Secretary of Agriculture Earl Butz, whose views are crucial because 
no reserve system could function without major U.S. participation, worries that the 
existence of the surplus stocks could hang over the commercial market and depress the 
prices paid to farmers for their crops. His fear is based on the Government's experience 
handling the enormous U.S. grain surpluses during the 1950s and 1960s. American 
farmers commonly—and often bitterly—complain that the Government sold some of 
those stocks whenever grain prices moved up, thus denying farmers a higher return for 
their investment and work. 
If the U.S. supports the food security system, it will probably insist on ironclad 
limitations preventing the reserves from being used for anything but emergency relief. 
Moreover, the U.S. will want all nations, including the Soviet Union and China, to share 
in the cost of maintaining the stockpile (Time 1974). 
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Well, the US did not support the system. They insisted that stockpiles must be kept only by the private 
sector—as Simon (also reporting from the 1974 Conference) explained: 
Further, the U.S. has consistently opposed the creation of internationally held grain 
reserves. The virtual depletion of world food stocks prompted the U.N. meeting in Rome; 
yet the U.S. government maintains that the private sector is best able to build reserves. In 
1972, when the world suffered an exceptionally poor harvest, there were 209 million 
metric tons of grain, or 66 days’ worth, in world reserve. Last year saw record grain crops 
worldwide, yet the reserve was reduced to 25 million metric tons, or 37 days. This year 
there is estimated to be a 27-day reserve after exceptionally large grain harvests (Simon 
1975). 
169   The postwar food regime was built around the US’s massive food surpluses, including their allotment 
as food aid; the disposal of US surpluses was made so central that during this era there was seemingly 
paradoxically an emphasis on food aid alongside emphasis on building up national agriculture sectors 
(McMichael 2005; Friedmann and McMichael 1989).  That is, food aid was framed as having a key role to 
play in aiding development, and was not regarded as a competitor to domestic markets.  However, this food 
regime came to an end with the world food crisis of 1972-73  
In the early 1970s, the US food surpluses that had underwritten the reigning food regime were dwindling 
and oil shocks were increasing costs of production. In this context, food and financial trade began to 
overspill their previous containment largely within national borders. This confluence produced a significant 
global food crisis (Fairbairn 2011; Shaw 2007,). This crisis was the first of (neo)liberalism’s many shocks 
to stretch across world.  By the mid-1970s, the Green Revolution in India and many other countries was 
considered a failure (c.f. Time 1974). 
170 (FAO-United Nations 1974).   
171 (FAO- United Nations 1974; Mc Michael 2005).  
172  (World Bank 1986, 1996, FAO 1997).   
173 (World Bank 1986; UN 1974; McMichael 2005; Fairbairn 2011). 
174  (Fairbairn 2011). 
175 (World Bank 1986). 
176 (c.f. Conway 1998; Shaw 2007). 
177 (World Bank 1986; World Bank 1993; FAO 1997; Shaw 2007). 
178  (World Bank 1986; WB 1993; FAO 1997).   
179 (Swaminathan 2007; Joois 2001; Swaminathan, M. 1999). 
180 Before the Eighth Plan this view was articulated with the GOI’s 1991 new economic policy (dictated 
heavily by the WB and IMF), an economic policy which restructured the economy along the precepts of 
liberalization. The liberalization mandates by the WB/ IMF were partly in response to a mounting debt and 
foreign exchange crisis from 1979-1990; in order to resolve this they decreed India must open its economy 
and strive to increasingly integrate with the “global” economy.  
181 (GoI, Planning Commission 1992: i). 
182  (GoI, Planning Commission 1992: ii). 
183  (Pursell and Gulati 1993: 19).   
184 (World Bank 1986: vi; my emphasis). 
185 (World Bank 1993). 
186 The FCI and the PDS are results of both imperial and national development policies—as India was 
rendered an export based cash-crop colony under British rule, at independence it was heavily dependent on 
imported food to meet consumption needs (Krupadanam 1985; Sharma 1997). Thus, post-independence 
national development policy prioritized national self-sufficiency of production and access to food for all 
(Muller and Patel 2004). Following this, around the era of the green revolution, India’s Public Distribution 
System (the PDS) became the most extensive national system of food distribution (Mooij 1999; 
Swaminathan 2002). It was linked with the Food Corporation of India (FCI), which was established with 
two main roles: increasing domestic production towards reaching self-sufficiency and storing buffer stocks 
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in case of hunger or a failed harvest (Muller and Patel 2004). When the FCI was established in 1964, the 
PDS (dating from colonial times) was restructured under the FCI to distribute the massive US grain imports 
(Mooij 1999; Sharma 1997).)  
187 (Swaminathan 2000, 2002; Muller and Patel 2004; e.g. Sharma 2007). 
188 The “systematic dismantling” of the PDS in the 1990s—through dramatic reductions and a new 
‘targeted’ approach—was conceived under the leadership of then Finance Minister (now Prime Minister) 
Manmohan Singh (Patel, 2007). 
189 (Muller and Patel 2004; Swaminathan 1999, 2000; e.g. WB 2003). 
190 (Chand 2005; Muller and Patel 2004; Swaminathan 1999, 2000).   
191 (World Bank 1986: vi; my emphasis). 
192 As Sanyal explains, and as Chatterjee and others take up, the processes of (accumulation by] 
dispossession inherent in capitalist growth are re-mediated by the state. As the dispossession of the basic 
means of life itself is not seen as acceptable, a state must take some degree of redistributive efforts after the 
acts of dispossessing peasants. Even if only to allow the processes and logics to continue or accelerate, in 
the name of development. It is these relations that are being renegotiated in fundamental ways as 
understandings of food security, and with that peoples’ food entitlements, shift in this project of 
redefinition and re-imagination. 
193 (FAO 1997:3).   
194 (McMichael 2004, 2005). 
195 (Foucault 2007). 
196 (Gupta 2012: 18). 
197 (Foucault 2007 [1978]: 45). 
198 (Foucault 2007 [1978]). 
199 As Timothy Campbell explicates: 
For Foucault, the security of the population does not reside only in the negative motor of 
individual death brought on and maintained by scarcity; rather, security is equally 
productive in the sense that in the development of circuits linked to capitalism—circuits of 
greater exchange between persons, primarily—security will come to be seen as profoundly 
connected to instances in which the ‘members’ of a population are joined in circuits of 
exchange (Campbell 2011: 123; my emphasis). 
200 (World Bank 1986: v). 
201 (Campbell 2011: 126; my emphasis). 
202 (Campbell 2011: 126; my emphasis). 
203 (Gupta 2012: 18). 
204 (Gupta 2012: 18). 
205 (World Bank 1986: vi; my emphasis). 
206 (World Bank 2004: 38). 
207 (World Bank 2004: 38). 
208 (World Bank 2004: 38).   
209 (Montag 2005). 
210 (Montag 2005: 13). 
211  Campbell explains Montag’s “necroeconomics as homonymous with the market and the process 
whereby some are slowly killed so as to make the market work” (Campbell 2011: 176, note 23; my 
emphasis). 
212 (GoI, Planning Commission 1997). 
213 “The World Bank’s new ‘agriculture for development’ initiative seeks to improve small-farmer 
productivity with new inputs, and their incorporation into global markets via value-chains originating in 
industrial agriculture. …This is a view which regards “agriculture is [simply] a servant of economic 
growth” (McMichael and Schneider 2011: 119). 
214 (McMichael and Schneider 2011: 119). 
215 (World Bank 1986: v). 
216 (Gupta 2012: 6; my emphasis). 
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217 In this drive, the new crops are largely focused on transportability and “quality’ so that their “high value 
produce” can be shipped long distances to lucrative urban and foreign markets. The crops that are 
emphasized today have a distinct market audience than previous eras: they are not staple crops for the poor 
but meant to feed the elite. With the multiple shifts of neoliberalism, the GR era obsession with “feeding 
the nation” (even if only in name and to prevent “communism” and instability) has given way to a project 
of “feeding the world,” a project in which the poor have increasingly been effaced. 
218 However, for many of those who are incorporated in this market, part of the reason why they have not 
seen the expected benefit of rising staple food prices is fairly straightforward—as the WB earlier 
commanded—many who grow for “the market” (i.e. not subsistence) are not growing “staple” food grains, 
but rather “high value” specialty cash crops. For, with the neoliberal realignment, seen similar dynamics 
have played out across the nations of the “developing” world. The main shifts (mandated by various 
structural adjustment programs as well as by WTO regulation) have produced  processes marked by: 
a shift from a publicly supported domestically oriented agriculture producing staple foods 
for local and national markets, to a value-chain-oriented export agriculture producing 
for those with purchasing power in world markets. …crops such as green beans, coffee, 
flowers and biofuels. While economic theory postulates that high-value exports can assist 
in financing staple food imports, the food crisis revealed the limits of this scenario 
(McMichael and Schneider 2011: 125). 
That the food crisis revealed this should not have come as a surprise to any student of development—the 
same type of policies implemented in Africa in the 1980s managed to, in the course of one decade, 
transform the continent as a whole from a food surplus and food exporter into a state of consistent food 
shortage and staple food inputs (Shiva 1992). The transformations which the Bank implemented and 
pushed in many African nations promised that if cultivators switched to “high value” cash crops they could 
export these crops to Europe, and with the income pay off the national debt and individuals would have 
higher incomes than they received from staple crops, could in turn buy their necessary food on the market. 
The problems with this theory were many, not only did the value of “high value” specialty crops (vanilla, 
etc) crash fantastically, the more they crashed the more farmers tried to produce (Bello 2008; Patel 2008a; 
Patel and Action Aid 2008b). This implementation of this theory in policy, which inverted the fortunes of 
millions of people across Africa, however, was not indicted, but spread, across the “developing” world—as 
the means to achieve greater food security and development.  
219 (McMichael 2005: 276). 
220 (FAO 1997, as quoted in McMichael and Schneider 2011: 125; my emphasis). 
221 (FAO 1997, as quoted in McMichael and Schneider 2011: 125). 
222 (John Block, US Secretary of Agriculture 1986, as quoted in Bello 2008; my emphasis). 
223 (McMichael and Schneider 2011: 122). 
224 (McMichael 2009). 
225 The global agricultural sector has seen some of the greatest and geographically uneven effects of 
neoliberal trade policy reforms—shifts that have been both domestically driven and conditionalities of 
international development agencies and trade agreements (i.e. the WB, IMF, WTO). While subsidies and 
protection barriers in the Global North have actually increased, deploying this logic, agricultural sectors 
across nations of the Global South have been pried open, a process—which, alongside deep cuts in public 
investment, has fueled arguments for the increased need for private capital and has opened the way for 
policies in accordance with corporate demands (Patel 2008; Muller and Patel 2004). Together these have 
changed the direction of who can afford to produce food—such policies have rendered 70% of nations in 
the ‘South’ net food importers (Wahlberg 2008, Grain 2008). 
226 (World Bank 2003: 68). 
227 (World Bank 1986; Muller and Patel 2004). 
228 “The World Bank’s neoliberal conception of a ‘new agriculture’”—as offered in the Bank’s 2008 
“World Development Report 2008”—envisions a “market solution,” and is based on the assumption and 
expectation “that the private sector would drive ‘the organization of value chains that bring the market to 
smallholders and commercial farms’” (McMichael and Schneider 2011: 125, quoting World Bank 2008: 8).  
229 (McMichael and Schneider 2011: 126). 
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230 (Shiva 2002). 
231 (Shiva 2006). 
232 (FAO 1997). 
233 (McMichael and Schneider 2011: 127; quoting Patnaik, P. 2008).  
234 (World Bank 2003: 68). 
235 (Lynas 2001, as quoted in Corporate Watch 2001). 
236 (McMichael and Schneider 2011: 128). 
237 (McMichael and Schneider 2011: 128). 
238 (GoI, Planning Commission 1997). 
239 But, while the TPDS received celebrated endorsement from the Bank (WB 2003), the Government was 
more reluctant to dismantle the FCI—as the PDS’ budget was ‘targeted’ for restructuring, the FCI’s budget 
was increased (Muller and Patel, 2004; Swaminathan 2000). FCI stocks increased—the FCI procured twice 
as much food in 2001 (40 million tons) than it had in 1997 (Muller and Patel, 2004), and its “food-subsidy” 
— ostensibly for the poor and hungry (Dreze 2002)—increased two and a half times between 2001 and 
2007 (Goswami, 2007).  Yet, the scope and acuteness of hunger have also continued to increase. Post-
1990s-liberalization, economists explain both the PDS and the FCI have shifted tactics and concentrate 
more on guaranteeing minimum (if still insufficient) prices for farmers than on aiding the hungry poor 
(Chand 2005, 2008; Dreze; Swaminathan, M. 2009). But, this disjuncture produced deeply contradictory 
results: mounting state food “surplus” stocks alongside millions of people who cannot afford the food and 
whose minimal assistance to afford it (subsidies and entitlements) have been increasingly cut.  
240 (USDA 2007; Muller and Patel 2004; Sainath 2003; Swaminathan 2002). 
241 (NYT 2002). 
242 (Shiva and Jalees 2004; NYT 2009). 
243 (GoI, Planning Commission 1997). 
244 (World Bank 2003). 
245 (GoI, Planning Commission 1997; my emphasis). 
246 (Campbell 2011: 126; my emphasis). 
247 (Montag 2005: 15, quoting Adam Smith; my emphasis). 
248 Tracing the conceptual legacies of such policies of dispossession and “letting die,” Montag’s reading of 
Adam Smith yields that in such cases “The subsistence of a population may, and does in specific 
circumstances, require the death of a significant number of individuals: to be precise it requires that they be 
allowed to die so that others may live” (Montag 2005: 14). This is what “management” at the level of the 
population means. 
249 (Campbell 2011: 177, note 24; my emphasis). 
250 (Campbell 2011: 177, note 24; my emphasis). 
251 In fact, as Araghi summarizes the effects of these shifts: “with the rapid, massive, and global 
incorporation of formerly self-sufficient agricultural peoples into market relations, and with millions of 
people having lost their nonmarket access to the production of their means of subsistence, hunger has 
assumed a uniquely global character. “Hunger amidst scarcity” has given way to “hunger amidst 
abundance (2000: 155). 
252 (McMichael 2005: 285). 
253 (Kauffman 2011; Mooij 1999; Swaminathan, M. 2000; Patnaik 2008). 
254 (Manmohan Singh, as quoted in Bagla 2012; my emphasis). 
255 (Balasubramanian, P., interview by author. Chennai, Tamil Nadu. January 25, 2011). 
256  At the time GEAC was called the Genetic Engineering Approval Committee; following criticisms that it 
was basically a rubber-stamp body, the name was changed to be the Genetic Engineering Appraisal 
Committee (GEAC), as this was thought to better reflect what critics insisted the GEAC’s purpose should 
be. 
257 Not, it may be noted, the first GM crop, but the first GM food crop, a distinction of significant 
importance in the approval process.  
258 “Bt brinjal was developed by India's Maharashtra Hybrid Seeds Company (Mahyco) using the modified 
gene Cry1Ac, under license from Monsanto. The modified Cry1Ac gene, found in the soil bacterium 
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Bacillus thuringiensis, along with two other supporting genes, nptII and aad, are assembled in such a way 
that they work to produce an artificial insecticidal protein that is toxic to the targeted insect, in this case the 
fruit and shoot borer” (Sahai and Nichols 2010). 
259 Much of the literature that promotes “biotechnology for the poor” does so in a way from which three 
themes can be discerned. First, it takes up the rhetoric of science and claims that those who critique the 
Gene Revolution do not sufficiently understand the science and that their “fears” are “unfounded and 
unscientific” (cf. Paarlberg 2009; Bush 2003; Serageldin 2003; Pinstrup-Anderson 2001; Strauss 2000). 
Second, this literature invokes the poor and the specter of hunger to justify the need for biotech, promising 
that without this scientific intervention hunger and malnutrition will increase, and that the only sure means 
of increasing production is technology—the fact that hunger is not directly related to production is an issue 
that they consistently skirt (ibid). Third, the authors of much of this literature are tied to “independent” 
development institutions that happen to promote GM/biotechnology, and the line of argument in this 
literature aligns with the stance of the US government (e.g. USAID, USDA and the US Trade Commission; 
cf. Bush 2003). These accounts embrace the new agri-biotechnologies as the tools which will lift “the poor 
in developing countries” out of poverty and provide solutions to “the agricultural problems of developing 
countries.” Further, in doing so, it claims to speak and act on behalf of interests of the poor. For instance, 
President Bush and Robert Zoellick (then US Trade Representative and later President of the World Bank) 
when filing a complaint against the EU with the WTO (to attempt to force the EU to accept GM), put forth 
the argument that the suit and GM crops were being done in the interests of “feeding starving people in 
Africa” (McAfee 2003).  
This literature assures that GM will (i) boost agricultural productivity, (ii) improve the quality of food 
for the poor, and (iii) benefit populations by allowing them to become wealthier through increasing 
production and facilitating the transition from subsistence to cash crop agriculture (Paarlberg 2009; 
Pinstrup-Anderson 2001: 2). In order to make this argument, these literatures depend on writing out any 
questions about why people in developing countries are poor. They do not look at the role of policy, global 
economic structures, or even considerations of implications that agriculture and its inputs are commodities 
that operate within a market.  Instead, in promoting GM this literature deploys assumptions that the poverty 
that marks the people and places is timeless, and that the intervention of modernity is the first necessary 
step to addressing this poverty. As such it makes two competing, and at times contradictory, claims: first, it 
implies that these people and places are poor because they are isolated and still mired in a pre-modern form 
of poverty. This, of course, serves to deny that their poverty could be related to the terms of the market 
(domestic and/or international), or that the terms of this market are uneven and themselves produce 
poverty.  While it does not question the effects of the market overall, this literature does acknowledge 
shortcomings of the market—specifically that because innovation of these new technologies is market-led, 
the products developed cater to well-off, not poor, farmers (the problem being that GM crops are the same 
in North and South, and do not respond to the needs of poor farmers or the different environmental/climate 
conditions in the South).. Second, it argues that the strength of the Green Revolution was that it integrated 
people and places into the global market, and as such, began them on the path to development and out of 
poverty (Paarlberg 2009, 2001; Juma 2005; Serageldin 2003; Pinstrup-Anderson 2001; Conway 1998). 
This literature does acknowledge that there have been interventions from the outside, that these places are 
not untouched; to attempt to resolve the contradictions within its guiding narrative it cannot but 
characterize all expansion of the market as a positive force, offering hope, rather than as a force which 
under some conditions could serve to compound poverty and/or dispossession. This, of course, serves to 
deny that poverty could be related to the terms of the market (domestic or international).   
 While the premises of this literature do not question the (positive) effects of the market overall, this 
literature does acknowledge that the market has shortcomings. Specifically, it states that because the 
innovation of these new technologies is market-led, the products developed cater to well-off, not to poor 
farmers. The problem this literature names is that GM crops do not respond to the needs of poor farmers, or 
the different environmental/ climate conditions in the South, and that the GM crops marketed are the same 
in North and South. Acknowledging that the market does not respond to the needs of the poor, this 
literature suggests that the answer to this problem lies in private-public partnerships. This answer to the 
problem of inappropriate technologies is tied up in a second problem which the literature concerns itself 
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with: the fact that knowledge which is produced in the public-sector is often patented by private 
corporations (a problem which is, of course, deeply tied in with the putative solution to addressing the 
market’s shortcomings through private-public partnerships). Acknowledging tensions between the public 
and the private, this literature turns to improving property rights for the resolution; it argues that property 
rights can mediate and resolve tensions between the public and private if property rights and technologies 
stay in their respective spheres.  However, since it also argues that the solution to this situation of 
biotechnology not sufficiently responding to the needs of the poor lies in governments offering incentives 
for certain biotechnologies through private-public partnerships, the solution itself seems mired in the 
problem it sees with biotechnology.  Locked within the framework where modern science solves all 
ecological, social and development problems this literature’s answers threaten to deepen the very problems 
it points out. Further, the way that invocations of the ‘market’ operate in this literature serve to deny that 
the global agricultural “market” is not run by free market principles, but rather is a market carefully 
managed, maintained and governed by nation states and corporations (through the WTO and other multi- 
and bi-lateral agencies and agreements). 
260  Brinjal is the 3rd most common vegetable in India, after tomato and potato (Greenpeace India 2009).  
261 A partnership between, Cornell, Sathguru, Monsanto, Mahyco, TNAU-Coimbatore (Tamil Nadu 
Agriculture University) and UAS-Dharwad (University of Agricultural Science) and IIVR-Varanasi (Indian 
Institute of Vegetable Research), overseen by ABSP-II, USAID. “The partnership – designed by the US 
government, funded by the USAID and led by Cornell University – comprises Mahyco Hybrid Seed 
Company Ltd, Tamil Nadu Agriculture University (TNAU) in Coimbatore, the University of Agricultural 
Sciences (UAS) in Dharwad, and the Indian Institute of Vegetable Research in Varanasi. USAID’s 
Agricultural Biotechnology Support Project II is supporting Mahyco’s efforts to gain regulatory approval 
for the technology” (GRAIN 2010: 26). 
262 Lifting small and marginal vegetable farmers out of subsistence poverty is the major goal of most 
agricultural development projects today (see for example ABSP II 2009). 
263 Pictures proudly broadcast images of unadulterated produce alongside conventionally grown brinjal. For 
example:  
     
(Bagla 2010b, NDTV February 09, 2010b; http://www.ndtv.com/article/india/the-bt-brinjal-saga-16053). 
264 (ABSP II 2009; USAID 2009; ISAAA 2009; Biotech News 2010). 
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265  The Ministry of Environment and Forests was/is responsible for assessing the potential environmental 
impacts of new GM crops. For example, as this graphic indicates (CEE 2010: 62):  
 
266  (MoEF 2009a).   
267 Namely, the Cartagena Protocol 2000. 
268 (MoEF 2010a). 
269 Specifically, the moratorium was on Event EE1 in Mahyco’s Bt Brinjal (MOEF 2010a). 
270 Making his case, K.K. Narayanan. Managing Director, Metahelix Life Sciences Private Limited, 
Bangalore, explained:  
Vegetable cultivation in our country is beset with several problems, a major one being the 
losses due to insect pests. Brinjal is one of our major vegetable crops and its production 
is seriously affected by the Fruit and Shoot Borer (FSB), a pest which can be effectively 
and safely tackled using the Bt brinjal technology which increases the production of 
marketable fruits while significantly saving on pesticide use. Thus, it brings not only 
tangible economic benefits to the cultivator, but also benefits to the consumers in the 
form of pesticide-free vegetable and to the environment in the form of lower pesticide 
loads. I therefore do not understand why should anyone, least of all the environmental 
activist, have an issue with this technology? (Narayanan 2010: as cited in DBT 2010: 18). 
271 The Mahyco-Monsanto relationship is described by the company as follows: “Mahyco Monsanto 
Biotech (MMB)--a 50:50 joint venture between Mahyco and Monsanto Holdings Pvt. Ltd.” (MMB 2013; 
available at: http://www.monsantoindia.com/MMB.html). 
272 (One India News 2010a). 
273 (Team Mangalorean 2010). 
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274  (Team Mangalorean 2010). 
275 (Shenoy 2010). 
276 (Sehgal 2012). 
277  (see for example compiled comments in MoEF 2010b). 
278 (PM Bhargava 2010). 
279 (Choudhury 2010). 
280 (One India News 2010a). 
281 (One India News 2010a). 
282 (One India News 2010b). 
283 Underlying this analysis is the notion of “technopolitics, a concept that captures the hybrid forms of 
power embedded in technological artifacts, systems, and practices” (Hecht 2011: 3). 
284 (Cullather 2003: 229). 
285 (Cullather 2003: 229). 
286 This is obviously an old imaginary, one which, as I address in subsequent chapters was also at the core 
of debates about the GR.  
287 The former imaginary represents what in today’s language we’d term more “vertical,” and the latter a 
more “horizontal” or participatory vision..Sometimes explicitly drawing on (a modern fusion of older 
imaginaries—a faith in technology as modernity) language that offers a convergence between a nationalist 
swaraj and contemporary food sovereignty concerns (but they complicate these older imaginaries, infusing 
them with new concerns and new realities). 
288 (Prakash 1999; Visvanathan 2003; Bajaj 1990, 1988, 1988; Nandy 1988; Dasgupta 1975).   
289 (For the sake of clarity, I refer to the latter amalgamation of perspectives in the singular for the rest of 
the paper). 
290 (NYT July 2012; Reuters July 2012). 
291 (NYT July 2012; Reuters July 2012). 
292  (IFPRI 2010; World Bank 2010).   
293 As has been documented, over the last decade childhood malnutrition rates in India have generally been 
higher than sub-Saharan Africa; childhood malnutrition rates, particularly those under 5 years of age, are of 
note because they reflect the current realities of people. The increase in childhood malnutrition rates 
correlates with other studies showing that many people have been getting poorer despite a liberalized 
economy and increasing growth rates (see Ch 6 for a detailed examination).  
294 (IFPRI 2010a). 
295  (IFPRI 2010; World Bank 2010; Patnaik 2008).   
296 In the late 1950s and 60s India was heavily reliant on US food aid (60% of India’s wheat came from the 
US under PL480 (Patel 2008)) and India’s Green Revolution is widely considered to have reversed its 
“ship-to-mouth existence” (Sharma, D. 2009; Sharma, M. 1997), ending the (at times humiliating) 
dependence on foreign food aid and making India food self-sufficient  (for various narratives of this 
account, see for example: Subramaniam 1979, 1995; Sachs 2005; Bush 2005).  
297 Need it be said, this does not mean that they all follow this path; rather, whether they explicitly emulate 
the GR or are framed against the GR, they are defined in its shadow.  
298 ( Pandya, Atul, interview by author. Ahmadabad. February 3, 2011. Raina, Rajeswari, interview by 
author. New Delhi. February 24, 2011. Nambi, V.A., interview by author. New Delhi. January 10, 2011. 
Kumar, Ananda, interview by author.  New Delhi. March 22, 2011). 
299 (Singh 2005, 2012; Chavan 2010; Swaminathan 2007).   
300 These are debates with conceptual, policy, and institutional stakes, for example: should it be public 
universities and research institutions? State governments? The Central Government? NGOs? MNCs?    
301  This is complicated by the fact that the legacy of the GR is itself contested. The GR paradigm centered 
on the use of science, specifically, technological advancements being “injected” into Indian agriculture to 
revolutionize production (GoI 1965). It was a technology driven project designed to address social and 
political problems.  It is also regarded as a national triumph, and the nation’s FS remains a priority—many 
are suspicious of efforts that they perceive seek to re-colonize Indian agriculture, and Bt brinjal became 
caught up in that fight and came to be seen by some segments as just such a project. 
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302 (Ford 1959; Omvedt 1975; Cleaver 1970; Dasgupta 1989; Shiva 1989; GOI 1965; GoI 1971). 
303 (Outlook India 2012). 
304 (Outlook India 2012). 
305 (Shantharam 2010). 
306 (Mitchell 2009: 416).   
307 (Perkins 1997; Ford Foundation & GOI 1959; McMichael 2005; Bajaj1982; Dasgupta 1975; GoI 1965; 
Bornton 1966; Seshia and Scoones 2003; Parayil 2003).    
308  (GoI 1965: 3). 
309 (Hecht 2011: 3).   
310 (Hecht 2011: 3).   
311 (Hecht 2011: 43). 
312 Namely WDC and Ford and Rockefeller Foundations.  
313 (Ahlberg 2008; Wallerstein 1980; Cullather 2009; Perkins 1999; McMichael 2005; Patel 2008; Gupta 
2000).   
314 Clearly, such political goals are both painfully straightforward—eliminating hunger and ensuring food 
security—and profoundly messy: how to get there or achieve this end.   
315  (Ford 1959; GoI 1965; Bornton 1966, 1967; Cullather 2009, 2003; Dayal 1965; Subramaniam 1977, 
1971). 
316  (Ford 1959; GoI 1965; Bornton 1966, 1967; Cullather 2009, 2003; Dayal 1965; Subramaniam 1977, 
1971). 
317 (Omvedt 1975: 36-7; my emphasis). 
318 (c.f. DBT 2010). 
319 (DBT 2010a: 18; my emphasis). 
320 (c.f. DBT 2010). 
321 The advocates repeatedly invoke this argument despite the very clear definition of “organic” agriculture, 
which tautologically excludes the use of any and all genetically modified crops, just as it, by definition, 
excludes the use of synthetic chemical fertilizers and pesticides/herbicides (see USDA 2011a; USDA 
2011b). 
322 (DBT 2010a: 17; my emphasis). 
323 (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) 2009: 42, as quoted in Nally 2010: 
46; my emphasis). 
324 For example, most famously by many neo-Malthusians Paddock & Paddock, but also even by self-
declared “opponents” of Malthusianism (Borlaug and M.S. Swaminathan), for Malthusian claims continue 
to underwrite the possibility of their narrative.  
325 (NCA 1976: 27, reprint of “Speech of Shri C. Subramaniam at the inauguration of the National 
Commission on Agriculture, New Delhi October 16, 1970). 
326 (NCA 1976: 27, reprint of “Speech of Shri C. Subramaniam at the inauguration of the National 
Commission on Agriculture, New Delhi October 16, 1970). 
327 One of the Paddock brothers worked for the USDA and the other for the State Department (ibid: ix). 
328 (Paddock and Paddock 1967: 207). 
329  Triage as they explain “is a term used in military medicine. …Call triage cold-blooded, but it is derived 
from the hard experience of medical humaneness during a crisis. … President Johnson has proposed ‘that 
the United States lead the world in a war against hunger.’ On the battlefields of this forthcoming war the 
practice of triage will be vital because choices must be made as to which wounded countries will receive 
our food. The leadership in Washington comprises the medical staff. The stricken ones in need of medical 
attention (American food aid) are the hungry nations. To provide maximum effective treatment the medical 
staff must divide them into three classifications for triage: (1) …the ‘can’t be saved’ group. To send food to 
them is to throw sand into the ocean” (Paddock and Paddock 1967: 207; my emphasis). 
330 (Paddock and Paddock 1967: 207; my emphasis). 
331 (Paddock and Paddock 1967: 222). 
332 (Paddock and Paddock 1967: 219). 
333 (Paddock and Paddock 1967: 217). 
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334 Of the two Paddock brothers, one worked for the USDA and the other for the State Department 
(Paddock and Paddock 1967: ix).  
335 That is, while India was clearly not the first to use HYVs to increase production (India adopted the seeds 
only after Pakistan), Indian officials maintain that their own vision in how and why to use the seeds—as a 
project of development in themselves—was the unique and visionary aspect of the Green Revolution.  
336 (From “Speech of Shri C. Subramaniam at the inauguration of the National Commission on Agriculture, 
New Delhi October 16, 197 as reprinted in: National Commission on Agriculture Vol. 1. 1976: 27). 
337 (Joseph Lelyveld, “Philippines Tries New Rice Strain,” New York Times, 18 December 1966). 
338 But, in the Philippines this food self-sufficiency was not actually the case, Cullather (2003) 
demonstrates that it was essentially all for show. The use of agricultural technology in itself does not 
constitute an agricultural development policy. 
339 (Cullather 2003: 227; quoting Joseph Lelyveld, “Philippines Tries New Rice Strain,” New York Times, 
18 December 1966). 
340 (From “Resolution setting up the National Commission on Agriculture. No. 25-13/68. On August 29th, 
1970 in New Delhi as reprinted in: National Commission on Agriculture Vol. 1. 1976: 17). 
341 (Frankel 1971: 8). 
342 (Guha 2007: 443; quoting British Journalist Don Taylor; my emphasis). 
343 (Swaminathan 2009a; my emphasis). 
344 For instance, as the lead Green Revolutionary, Norman Borlaug continually reiterated, humans have 
since time immemorial been engaged in a constant struggle to produce food at a faster rate than they 
reproduce. 
Poets—and city folk—love  to  romanticize agriculture,  portraying as  some  sort  of 
idyllic state  of harmony between  humankind  and nature.  How far this is from the truth! 
Since Neolithic man - or most probably woman—domesticated  the major  crop and  
animal species some  10-12  millennia ago, agriculture has  been  a struggle between the  
forces of natural biodiversity and the need to produce food  under increasingly intensive 
production  systems. Thanks to advances in science during this century—which is when 
the population bomb really went off—food production has kept ahead of population 
growth and, in general, has become more reliable. But, with the global population 
currently increasing by one billion each decade, meeting future food demand is becoming 
ever-more challenging and worrisome (Borlaug 2002:221). 
345 (Borlaug 2000: 490; my emphasis). 
346 (Atwood and Levine 2009; my emphasis). 
347 (Watson as quoted in Bagla 2012). 
348 (Watson as quoted in Bagla 2012). 
349 As Borlaug explained: 
Thirty  years ago,  in  my acceptance  speech  for the Nobel  Peace Prize, I said  that the 
Green Revolution had  won  a  temporary  success  in  man's war against hunger, which  
if  fully  implemented,  could  provide sufficient food for  humankind through  the end of 
the 20th century.  But I warned that unless the frightening power of human reproduction 
was curbed, the success of the Green Revolution would only be ephemeral. I now say that 
the world has the technology that is either available or well advanced in the research 
pipeline to feed a population of 10 billion people. The more pertinent question today is: 
Will farmers and ranchers will [sic] be permitted to use this new technology? Extreme 
environmental elitists seem to be doing everything they can to derail scientific progress. 
Small, well-financed, vociferous, and anti-science groups are threatening the 
development and application of new technology, whether it is developed from 
biotechnology or more conventional methods of agricultural science (Borlaug 2000: 490). 
350 (Borlaug 2000: 487). 
351 (Borlaug 2000: 488). 
352 (Borlaug 2000: 490; my emphasis). 
353 (Borlaug 2000: 490; my emphasis). 
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354 (Borlaug 2000: 487). 
355 (Atwood and Levine 2009). 
356 (Borlaug 2000: 490). 
357 (Subramaniam 1995: 138-9). 
358 (Subramaniam 1979: 56; my emphasis). 
359 (Subramaniam 1968: 19). 
360 (Thompson 1995: 47). 
361 “The naive utilitarian sees the constraint as a problem for which technology is the answer: invent 
something that makes the pie bigger. This is exactly what the yield enhancing technologies of Twentieth-
century agricultural technology have attempted to do” (Thompson 1995: 64). 
362 “Measuring success in [increasing] production of food and fiber is taken to be both a necessary and a 
sufficient criterion for evaluating the ethics of agriculture. The productionist criterion amounts to a 
principle which states that more production is always better” (Thompson 1995: 47-48). 
363 (Busch 2000; Levidow 2001; Thompson 1995). 
364 (Thomson 1995: 60). 
365 Levidow characterizes the ways in which agro-technologies have been taken up as exhibiting a 
“utilitarian bioethics” which manifests in a “market fetishism.” Addressing the continuation from the Green 
to the Gene Revolution, he argues that “utilitarian ideology naturalized the early marketization of 
agriculture,” and that “‘utilitarian’ ethics fetishizes market relations today” (2001: 75). This utilitarianism 
ties together and redefines ideas of nature, development, and distribution through the logic of the market. 
For, “market relations [themselves] were fetishized as properties of nature,” and in turn these laws were 
seen as applying to both social relations and nature. He explains: 
For the utilitarians and neo-classical economists, ‘the market’ was naturalized as non-
interference, while any state regulation was deemed an unnatural ‘interference’.  As 
[Raymond] Williams further argues, ‘Nature in any other sense fled to the margins: to the 
remote, the inaccessible, the relatively barren areas’ (ibid). Nature became a legitimate 
object of endless ‘improvement’ according to natural laws which embodied models of 
commoditization (Levidow 2001: 78).    
The moral science of economics is premised on such a utilitarianism in order to offer a means of relief from 
responsibility, transferring moral responsibility to the state, science, and the market. These institutions are 
cast as providing a well-ordered society and abundance, “truth” about the world, and justice in [i.e. 
through] the market (Busch 2000). 
366 (Chaudhury, Shoma 2010). 
367 (Bhargava; as quoted in Akhileshwari 2010). 
368 (Mazumdar-Shaw as quoted in The Hindu 2010). 
369  (GEAC 2009: 7). 
370  GEAC is under the supervision of the Ministry of Environment and Forests (MoEF).  
371  (GEAC 2009: 7; my emphasis). 
372  (GEAC 2009: 7; my emphasis). 
373 Some of this data was information that civil society groups contend was available only because of a 30-
month Supreme Court ruling in a PIL (public interest litigation) legal battle on the RTI (right to 
information) (Greenpeace India 2009).    
374 The hearings were organized by CEE, and the stated objectives were: “The main objectives of the 
consultation are to provide a forum to various stakeholders to express their views and concerns related to Bt 
Brinjal at venues across the country; Provide appropriate inputs to the Minister before a final decision is 
taken” (MOEF, CEE, Primer on Bt Brinjal. 2010: 2.) Hearings were held at the following sites:  
Kolkata and Bhubaneshwar were both located in states that are leading producers of 
brinjals.  Hyderabad and Bangalore are representative of centres of science and research 
in agriculture and biotechnology.  Nagpur and Ahmedabad are in states that have 
extensive experience with Bt Cotton, the first GM crop commercialized in India. Finally 
Chandigarh was included to represent a state which has been at the centre of the green 
revolution (MOEF 2010b: 8).  
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375 (MoEF 2009a). 
376 As is articulated in the MOEF’s February 9 2010 “Report on Bt brinjal”: 
16.  Some scientists and civil society organisations have pointed out that the GEAC 
process has violated the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety to which India is a signatory, 
particularly the provisions pertaining to public consultations prior to the release of GM 
food crops and also the broad principles governing risk assessment. It is pertinent to also 
recall Article 15 of the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development (1992) which 
echoes the precautionary principle when it states "where there are threats of irreversible 
damage, the lack of full scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason for postponing 
cost-effective measures to prevent environmental degradation". Further, Section 45 of 
Codex Alimentarius "Guideline for the Conduct of Food Safety Assessment of Foods 
Derived from Recombinant-DNA Plants" says "The location of trial sites should be 
representative of the range of environmental conditions under which the plant varieties 
would be expected to be grown. The number of trial sites should be sufficient to allow 
accurate assessment of compositional characteristics over this range. Similarly, trials 
should be conducted over a sufficient number of generations to allow adequate exposure 
to the variety of conditions met in nature. To minimise environmental effects, and to 
reduce any effect from naturally-occurring genotypic variation within a crop variety, each 
trial site should be replicated. An adequate number of plants should be sampled and the 
methods of analysis should be sufficiently sensitive and specific to detect variations in 
key components." It does appear that the current standards by which the GEAC has 
formulated the decision to approve Bt-brinjal do not match these global regulatory norms 
to which India is a party (MOEF 2010a; para16). 
377 Some of these groups were already well mobilized at the time of the GEAC’s announcement, as there 
had been a 30 month “Right to Information” court case between civil society groups and Mahyco-
Monsanto for the release of bio-safety information preceding the GEAC’s 2009 approval. 
378 Marking fields as hazard sites:   (Nanda 2009). 
  (Kannan 2008).   
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379 Protests outside of Ahmedabad hearings (CEE 
2010). 
 (Sunderarajan 2010). 
380 As Ramesh notes (only the critics) in his Report: 
“17. I have received a number of emails from scientists in the USA, France, Australia, 
UK and New Zealand raising very serious doubts on Bt-brinjal and also on the way tests 
have been conducted in India. Amongst them, I should mention communications received 
from (i) Professor G.E. Seralini from France who in a detailed report has pointed out 
several flaws in the EC-II report and concludes that "the risk on human and mammalian 
health is too high for authorities to take the decision to commercialise this GM brinjal"; 
(ii) Dr. Doug Gurain-Sherman of the Union of Concerned Scientists, Washington DC 
which says that "the record compiled over a 13-year period shows that the 4% yield 
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enhancement contributed by Bt-corn varieties constitutes only 14% of overall corn yield 
increase. Further, Dr. Gurain-Sherman highlights serious flaws in the EC-II report on 
evaluation of gene flow risks from Bt-brinjal; (iii) Professor Allison Snow and Professor 
Norman Ellstrand of the Ohio State University that identifies several shortcomings in the 
EC-II report concerning gene flow from Bt-brinjal to wild and weedy relatives; (iv) Dr. 
Nicholas Storer of Dow AgroSciences (a private US company much like Monsanto)who 
does say that Bt-brinjal does not pose unreasonable adverse risks to the environment or to 
human and animal health but who calls for careful implementation of resistance 
management strategies and points out that Bt-technology should not be seen as a silver 
bullet to managing lepidopteran pests in brinjal; (v) Dr. Jack Heinemann of the 
University of Canterbury, New Zealand who questions the consistent yield increases 
claimed for Bt-cotton and says that the Bt-brinjal tests conducted in India would not meet 
careful international standards; (vi) Dr. David Andow of the University of Minnesota, 
USA who says that his reading of the EC-II report is sufficient to lead him to question the 
adequacy of environmental risk assessment but it is not sufficient for him to conclude that 
the environmental risk assessment is erroneous; and (vii)Dr. David Schubert of the Salk 
Institute of Biological Studies, USA who says that Bt-brinjal should definitely not be 
introduced in India since it poses serious environmental and health risks, will increase 
social and political dependence on private companies and will entail higher costs at all 
levels of the food chain; and (viii) Dr. Judy Carman of the Institute of Health and 
Environmental Research, South Australia who has analysed Mahyco’s biosafety dossier 
of 2008 in great detail and who says that her doubts and questions have not been 
answered at all in the EC-II report” (MoEF 2010a: para 17, page 10). 
In addition to those scientists who submitted papers to Ramesh (named above), international politicians 
including US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and her advisor (the famously fierce GM advocate) Nina 
Federoff intervened, in this case, to express their hope that India would reach a considered decision to reap 
the benefits of Bt brinjal (Ray, Shantanu Guha 2010).  
381 (MoEF 2010a). 
382 It is of interest that Jairam Ramesh (2011) notes that the issue was covered and was represented quite 
differently in the English language press and in the regional vernacular papers. The two have distinct 
audiences, while English language dailies tend to be read by the educated urban elite, vernacular paper are 
read more widely, and by a wider cross section of society. Ramesh explains that English language papers 
were generally pro-GM and condemned Ramesh’s decision while the vernacular papers treated GM with 
greater skepticism and characterized Ramesh’s decision in a more positive light. 
383   The Bt brinjal debates were complicated to some degree by the fact that there were multiple lines of Bt 
brinjal being developed at different locations. These crops used the same technology, but were different –
particularly in terms of their ownership structure after release.  The strand up for approval and discussion 
was Mahyco’s. While the products were distinct, they were all forms of “Bt brinjal,” and as such were 
generally cast under the same name. Questions of ownership came to feature quite prominently in the 
debate.  
Mahyco, a private seed company, was the original developer in India; they used Bt technology from 
their partner company Monsanto (Monsanto is a 26% owner of Mahyco). There were multiple strands 
because Mahyco then set up a PPP (public private partnership) in which it “shared” its Bt brinjal 
technology with a few public sector institutions. The reasons offered for this move vary (from trying to 
avoid monopoly charges, to the general sense that Indians are more accepting of technologies from the 
public sector (a GR legacy), to structures of international aid. The technology was provided through a PPP 
overseen by USAID and was ABSP II, administered by Sathguru.  
383 (ISAAA 2009; ABSP II, Sathguru Management Consultants, Pvt. Ltd 2010; Department of 
Biotechnology 2010; ABSP II undated-b; ABSP II undated-a). 
384 (Balasubramanian, as quoted in Department of Biotechnology 2010). 
385 By some advocates’ accounts, up to 70% of the crop can be lost to the FSB (ISAAA 2009; ABSP II, 
Sathguru Management Consultants, Pvt. Ltd 2010; Department of Biotechnology 2010).  
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386 (ABSP II, Sathguru and Cornell 2009; CEE 2010; ISAAA 2009; ABSP II, Sathguru Management 
Consultants, Pvt. Ltd 2010; Department of Biotechnology 2010;ABSP II undated-b; ABSP II undated-a). 
387 (GEAC 2009b). 
388 India currently only has one other GM crop legally approved to be grown, also a Bt (Bacillus 
thuringiensis) crop, Bt cotton. Bt versions of GM crops are different than the majority of GM crops 
currently grown in that they take a naturally occurring insecticide and breed the plant for insect resistance. 
Most (85%) of GM crops worldwide are modified to take heavier doses of pesticides while Bt crops are 
supposed to be able to reduce pesticide use, thus conferring benefits to consumers as well as farmers in 
reducing exposure to toxic chemicals.  
389 (Minister Chavan as quoted in Team Mangalorean 2010). 
390 (see for example Department of Biotechnology 2010).  
391 (Ray 2009). 
392 Most brinjal farmers are small or marginal they are the ostensibly targets of this project (see ABSP II 
2009). 
393 (Ananda Kumar as quoted in GEAC 2009: 4-5).   
394 (Fairbairn 2010; Bello 2008; McMichael 2005; Friedman and McMichael 2009; Patel 2008). 
395   In 1986 President Reagan’s Agriculture Secretary John Block famously declared: “the idea that 
developing countries should feed themselves is an anachronism from a bygone era. They could better 
ensure their food security by relying on U.S. agricultural products, which are available in most cases at 
lower cost” (Schaeffer 1995: 268). 
396 (Fairbairn 2010; Bello 2008; McMichael 2005; Friedman and McMichael 2009; Patel 2008). 
397 (Balasubramanian, interview by author. Chennai, Tamil Nadu. January 25, 2011 ppt also available 
online; Mazumdar-Shaw 2010).   
398 (Mazumdar-Shaw As quoted in Team Mangalorean 2010). 
399 (Bhargava 2010; MS Swaminathan 2010; Jagadisan  2010; Seralini 2010; MoEF 2010a, b, c, d, e). 
400 (CEE 2009). 
401 The Precautionary principle: 
…states that if an action or policy has a suspected risk of causing harm to the public or to 
the environment, in the absence of scientific consensus that the action or policy is 
harmful, the burden of proof that it is not harmful falls on those taking an action. 
Effectively, this principle allows policy makers to make discretionary decisions in 
situations where there is there is evidence of potential harm in the absence of complete 
scientific proof… The protections that mitigate suspected risks can be relaxed only if 
further scientific findings emerge that more robustly support an alternative explanation 
(CEE & MoEF 2010: 5; Quoting Recuerda 2006; ellipses in original). 
402 Their concern is with the unknowable effects of modifying eggplant in its country of origin. With well 
over 2,000 varieties, India houses the world’s genetic diversity in eggplant, a fact which makes some 
segments of the scientific community and civil society particularly cautious about GM eggplant for they see 
the possibility of contaminating this genetic history (Sahai 2010; Ramesh 2010; MS Swaminathan 2010). 
403 Bt cotton is currently the only GM crop grown in India and portions of the country are still reeling from 
its impact. The effects of growing Bt cotton—ranging from allegations of contributions to increased farmer 
suicides in certain regions (resulting from indebtedness incurred to purchase the inputs), to documented 
deaths of farm animals from grazing on Bt cotton fields, to new forms of rashes and sores on farm laborers 
exposed to the crops—have left farmers, veterinarians, doctors, and some policy makers concerned about 
the extent of the unknown social and health effects of Bt crops.  
404 Dissenting scientists on the Genetic Engineering Approval Committee (GEAC) and advising the 
Supreme Court insist that disagreement and critical evidence have been silenced and that the reasons that 
Bt brinjal was pushed through are not about food security but rather are economic and geopolitical. They 
claim it is in response to pressure from US based multi-national agribusiness.  The issue of Bt brinjal is 
discussed across sectors of society and the mainstream media—for not only does eggplant have a singular 
cultural significance in India, it also is seen by proponents and opponents alike as a gateway crop: since it 
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is the first GM food crop that would be grown in the country its path is expected to set important 
precedents.  
405  (IANS and Bhargava 2010).  
406  (Abhijit Sen, Member, Planning Commission, as quoted in Chaudhury 2010).  
407 (MoEF 2010a, b, e).  
408 As Latha Jishnu opined in The Business Standard India: 
Equally significant is the compact between the university and Mahyco which is aimed at developing 
and delivering “pro-poor varieties of insect- tolerant Bt eggplant to facilitate technology access to 
resource-constrained farmers.” Pro-poor varieties of Bt eggplant? That’s an intriguing term but what 
is germane here is the fact TNAU can only deliver the ”products” (Bt varieties) to farmers by a further 
agreement with the company. 
The restrictions on the university are many: TNAU cannot backcross the Bt gene into any other 
germplasm apart from the four selected varieties; it cannot further develop transgenic eggplants with 
”products” it derives from the partnership nor can it do any breeding work with these products. On the 
other hand, Mahyco has reserved for itself “certain rights to the use of the Bt gene.” 
It’s good to remember the overarching philosophy of ABSPII. The project document states that “to 
safeguard the licensor’s interests, specific strategies for the stewardship and monitoring of the 
technology by the licencees was addressed and formulated early in the sublicensing programme.” So 
while references to pro-poor varieties sounds impressive, it’s important to remember that IPRs extract 
a price - from the licensees, sub-licensees and the customer (Jishnu 2009). 
409  (IANS and Bhargava 2010).  
410 (T. V. Jagadishan 2010, as quoted in Tehelka 2010) 
411 Prime Minister Manmohan Singh maintains that only one-quarter of those currently farming in India 
should remain, helping to promote this goal (Sheelu Francis 2013), the WB has/offers “exit loans”—to try 
and get small farmers out of agriculture (Bhutani, Shalini, interview by author. New Delhi. March 16, 
2011).  
412 (Saberwal, Vasant, interview by author. New Delhi. March 2, 2011. Raina, Rajeswari, interview by 
author. New Delhi. February 24,2011. Bhutani, Shalini, interview by author. New Delhi. March 16, 2011). 
413 Namely NPM/IPM (NPM non-pesticide management and IPM integrated pest management). 
414 For example, as it manifests in high support prices for larger farmers and resultant massive government 
surpluses, while the majority of (small and marginal dry-land) farmers are consistently excluded from 
production support policies and increasingly food insecure with the liberalizing retrenchment of food 
distribution policies (see chapter 3).    
415 (Raina, Rajeswari, interview by author. New Delhi. February 24,2011; Saberwal, Vasant, interview by 
author. New Delhi. March 2, 2011; Sahai, Suman, interview by author. New Delhi, January 3, 2011). 
416 The concerns they articulated were not new, but were renewed with Bt brinjal. For example (several 
years earlier), activists commenting on a GOI document articulated that:  
The expressed imperative to have a long term policy on agricultural biotechnology in 
itself is suspect and questionable since the government has never expressed a similar 
need for having a long term policy on ecological agricultural options, before exploring 
biotechnology.  
Biotechnology is picturised [sic] in glorified terms in the paper, especially in the 
Introduction section, by a variety of expressions - “rapidly emerging”, “far-reaching”, 
“technology of hope”, “powerful, enabling technology”, “a number of agri-biotech 
products that have enormously helped mankind”, “can revolutionise agriculture and 
environmental sustainability”, “frontier technology” and so on. 
The paper accepts unquestioningly that biotechnology HAS to be applied in the field of 
agriculture, as if there are no other alternatives. Even if this is a blind and child-like faith 
in “science”, such fascination towards a ‘rapidly emerging’ area of science shorn of its 
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other realities is unacceptable (“Response to National Biotechnology Strategy 
Development Paper” 2005: 3-4). 
They continue, critiquing the GOI's unquestioning acceptance of the “need” for this technology as the only 
or primary means forward. Rather than putting GM technology on a pedestal in this way, the activists 
suggest that the GOI at least give consideration to the many other approaches being tried in India (namely, 
agro-ecology). 
417 Arguing that GM crops simply are not appropriate for India, they contend that the crops were designed 
for industrialized farmers to save on labor and fuel costs, both of which are irrelevant in India where crops 
are planted and harvested manually and where there are vast surpluses of low-cost rural labor in need of 
employment. 
418 These officials insist that GM crops appear successful only when compared to the devastating ecological 
effects of the Green Revolution, but fail in comparison to traditional methods of pesticide management. In 
fact, India has seen a resurgence in traditional agro-ecological methods, particularly following the bans on 
agro-chemicals in many districts across states in central India in recent years. These officials claim that the 
ecosystems in these regions have been slowly restored and that farmer suicides and indebtedness have 
fallen off dramatically as a result of using non-pesticide management schemes. 
419 However, part of why the general public was not convinced in the first place is because as—the frequent 
refrain relates: brinjal grows in such abundance that it is fed to cattle. However, it was also this abundance 
and its banality (as the everyday common vegetable) that lay behind the choice of Brinjal as the first GM 
food crop to try to introduce on a large scale.  While this may seem ironic—particularly from the 
proclaimed and well-rehearsed food security perspective—the goal as laid out to me by one of the leading 
scientists is to get a GM vegetable approved, accepted, and desired by the public.  As the head scientist of 
the public (unit) side of the BT Brinjal research explained: “once one is approved all the others will follow” 
(Balasubramanian, interview by author. Chennai, Tamil Nadu. January 25, 2011).  
420 (Choudhary, Bhagirath, interview by author. New Delhi. January 12, 2011. Mazumdar Shaw 2010). 
421 (One India News 2010a). 
422 (Choudhary, Bhagirath, interview by author. New Delhi. January 12, 2011. Mazumdar Shaw 2010). 
423  While some see GM crops as exacerbating agrarian distress, the picture that emerges so far is not that 
clear, but does open important questions. 
424 Agriculture is a designated as state subject under the constitution. Although the Green Revolution and 
other large scale modernizing projects have been central government projects, Ramesh claimed to be trying 
to restore some of the accountability to the states on this issue. The battle to try to shape the future of 
agriculture and who agriculture serves operates at every scale. The Bt Brinjal debates were national, but 
inevitably constantly contaminated by cross-scalar references, whether to international organizations, or 
Ramesh’s rebuttal to GM scientists that every state supported the Moratorium and not even one wanted it 
reversed. In my interviews, state governments were consistently characterized as being more accessible and 
more responsive to demands—whether from civil society or from MNCs.  Activist groups have had more 
success at the state level (e.g. Andhra Pradesh)—in some states—but in other states (e.g. Rajasthan), 
Monsanto has gained extensive access and market share through state lobbying in the name of 
development. Even in responsive states, the activists’ successes have been met with targeted opposition by 
agribusiness lobbying, consistently threatening to undo their steps toward progress. But, the state level 
focus could also serve to make the terrain of India’s agricultural future more geographically uneven. 
425 On the sunshine approach: 
Following a careful consideration of the recommendations of the Genetic Engineering 
Approval Committee (GEAC) on Bt Brinjal, Shri Jairam Ramesh, Minister of State (IC), 
Ministry of Environment and Forests, Government of India, decided on the following 
course of action. 
“1. The report of the Expert Committee (EC-II) submitted to the GEAC on October 8th, 
2009 that formed the basis of the GEAC's decision of October 14th, 2009 is being made 
public with immediate effect. It is being uploaded straightway on the website of the 
Ministry of Environment and Forests (www.moef.gov.in). All previous reports and 
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studies on Bt Brinjal are already in the public domain. Comments on the EC-II report are 
being sought by December 31, 2009 and I actively encourage their submission, 
2. During January and February 2010, I propose to have a series of consultations in 
different places with scientists, agriculture experts, farmers' organizations, consumer 
groups and NGOs. All points of view will be represented in these consultations.  
Strong views have already been expressed on the Bt Brinjal issue, both for and against. 
My objective is to arrive at careful, considered decision in the public and national 
interest. The decision will be made only after the consultation process is complete and all 
stakeholders are satisfied that they have been heard to their satisfaction (MoEF 2010c, 
CEE 2010 Annexure 1: 2). 
426 (MoEF 2010a). 
427 (MOEF 2010a: 3; my emphasis). 
428 (MOEF 2010a: 16-17; italics emphasized in original). 
429 (MOEF 2010a: 18; emphasis in original). 
430 That is, there were several similar types of GM eggplant in the pipeline. The Moratorium did not apply 
to these Bt brinjal products, only the one Mahyco product under consideration. 
431 The Annexure covered the following areas:  Annexure 1: Report on national Consultations (compiled by 
CEE with MoEF), Annexure 2: Scientists in India; Annexure 3 Scientists outside of India; Annexure 4: 
Civil Society groups and Individuals. 
 
432 (MOEF 2010a, b, c, d, e, f).   
433  Ramesh maintained that the publicly developed varieties of Bt brinjal needed to be released before the 
privately owned product (MoEF 2010a). 
434 (Dayal 1968; Subramaniam 1971, 1995).   
435 (Bhargava as quoted in Bidwai 2010), Bhargava is popularly considered to be the “Father of genetic 
engineering in India,” he was also the Supreme Court appointed Independent observer on the GEAC and is 
the founder and (former) director of the Centre for Cellular and Molecular Biology. 
436 (DBT 2010). 
437 (Mohan 2011; Shantharam 2010; Mazumdar-Shaw 2010; Hindu 2010b; the Business standard 2010; 
DBT 2010). 
438 (MOEF 2010a). 
439 The Bt brinjal debates were in many ways were funneled into longer-running concerns about the 
nation’s agriculture future. They opened a site for a discussion of questions of agrarian distress; these 
questions came to be articulated through biotechnology. The debates offered a spin on the hegemonic 
framework through which these questions are frequently taken up. For example, “biotech for the poor” 
aims to solve broader issues of poverty and development through the use of new and improved technology; 
hence, debates about broader concerns of issues with agrarian distress manifest largely through the question 
of technology. For example, the suicide deaths of one-quarter of a million small cotton farmers are 
commonly blamed on Bt cotton in popular discourse. This blame is despite the fact that state support, 
educational extension, and development projects are practically non-existent in many areas, which could 
also be credited for some of the failings. The debate is also limited as Bt cotton is often the only type of 
cotton seed available (constituting well over 90% of the cotton grown). Regardless of the shortcomings 
and/or potential of technology, the hegemony of a technocratic framework means that technology offers the 
dominant lens through which social, agrarian, and policy issues are discussed. Hence, Bt cotton came to be 
invoked repeatedly in airing the concerns: these concerns were often at the two extremes, either to prove 
the need for Bt brinjal or to warn of the looming disaster it would bring to hundreds of thousands of small 
vegetable farmers. Bt cotton has succeeded in making some farmers wealthy and has failed others; but, the 
issue, while credited entirely to this technology, is of course much more complicated. Because of the lack 
of institutionalized state support, technology bears a more significant portion of the debate (for and against) 
than it might in a context like the US or the EU where crop insurance and guaranteed government support 
eliminate much of the risk. However, instead of being framed in the more complicated and confusing 
context—lack of loans at fair terms, lack of insurance, lack of government support and lack of adequate 
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extension services, all in a context in which and international agreements regulating what very limited 
support can even be given to farmers—the debate, fundamentally one of policy (state, national, and 
international) instead, comes to hinge on the “technology.” 
440 (Thompson 1995: 60). 
441 (Raina, Rajeswari, interview by author. New Delhi. February 24, 2011). 
442 (MoEF 2010a: 17).   
443 (MOEF 2010a: 16). 
444 (MoEF 2010a: 22; my emphasis). 
445 (MoEF 2010a: 27; my emphasis). 
446 As “democracy” became a salient framing for GM food crops, it of course also gets spun both ways — 
as the PM’s contrast of India’s [implied un-wise] moratorium on Bt brinjal as set in opposition to China, 
marking India’s development modernity (Singh as quoted in Bagla 2012). 
447 (Ray 2010). 
448 (Mazumdar-Shaw quoted in The Hindu 2010a). 
449 (Shantharam 2011b; my emphasis). 
450  NBRA or BRAI—National Biotech Regulatory Authority, or Biotech Regulatory Authority of India. 
451 (Chavan 2009: 112; my emphasis). 
452 (Chavan 2009: 112; my emphasis). 
453 More sophisticated versions of this were also offered: as Able Executive Director, ABLE-Ag (The 
Association Of Biotech Led Enterprises) Dr. Shanthu Shantharam articulated: 
my biggest concern is that the whole Bt technology has been completely politicized. 
Because of the controversy there is an uncertainty on the future commercialization of 
biotech-based goods and services in India. It is really unfortunate that Bt brinjal became 
a victim of the ideologically motivated political campaign. The scientific knowledge, the 
empirical data from the field and the credible global scientific expertise have been 
neglected. It is no longer a fight on the safety of technology. It has become a battle of 
political ideologies of different groups on how agricultural development should take 
place. Some people claim to represent the 'public' or 'farmers' would like to shape this 
country's agriculture future by going back to old forms of agriculture. It is clearly conflict 
of ideology driven by activism of all sorts (Koul and Shantharam 2011b). 
454 (Jisnu 2010). 
455 Reclaiming the terrain: “While experts admitted there are risks associated with every new technology, 
they said the level of risk is the criterion on which a technology should be judged. They said perceived 
risks, unlike actual risks, have no basis and can never be answered. Dr. Parihar said this perceived risk is 
keeping Bt-brinjal from being commercialised.”  …  India cannot resist GM crops due to the increasing 
demand for foodgrain in the country, he said” (Deccan Chronicle 2012). 
456 (Essex 2008).    
457 The assumption (behind this technocratic view) is that the adoption and use of modern agro-technology 
itself constitutes an agricultural development policy. The conflicts over how much and which foreign 
agricultural technologies India should accept are not new. Preceding the GR there were anxieties about 
allowing in US seeds—(state them), CSS argued (quote). Today, these concerns with sovereignty remain, 
but “safety” has largely replaced “foreign exchange” as the featured metric /but the detailed monitoring of 
the effects on foreign exchange have largely been replaced by “safety” as the featured metric [grid-of-
intelligibility]. While this might seem [disconnected??], the framework on which GM crops are evaluated 
today is safety. This scientifically testable, enumerable measure/standard has become the international 
standard, and in the functioning of development schemes [and the international political economic dictates 
of] today, it has replaced foreign exchange (in the 1960s and the much more bounded national economies).  
Expanding this rubric of science (or scientific “risk” and its known risks, and known unknowns, and 
unknown unknowns, everything is forced into a rubric of science as the sole evaluator of social decisions 
(all of which must fit in this metric). But it didn’t quite work. For the concerns exceed this logic. As the 
only terms of assessment, measured and decreed in a standardized way has been a project of GM interests, 
however, the case in India demonstrates, this is not always as easy to control as intended or thought. In this 
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case, Bt brinjal exceeded the bounds within which it had been relegated. While “safety” has emerged as the 
terrain of assessment (and the battlefield), while much of the debate was about the in/adequacy of the 
testing & regulatory mechanisms, safety and health effects, the debates also exceeded these confines and 
another conversation emerged.  
458 (MoEF 2010a). 
459 (Choudhury 2010). 
460 Codex Alimentus, etc. 
461 (Hecht 2011: 3).  
462 (Rosenstein-Rodan 1961: 7). 
463 (Ford Foundation 1962, #3, B.3: 18). 
464 (Ford Foundation 1962, #3, B.3: 13-14). 
465 (Rostow 1960). 
466 The first, traditional societies (pre-Newtonian societies: not necessarily temporally, but culturally and 
logically so); second, the pre-conditions for take off (conditions which come about as a result of external 
interventions from “more advanced societies,” the effects of which unravel historical society its political 
structure, thus allowing the state to be more effective); third, the take off (entailing radical changes in 
commercialization and productivity); fourth, becoming mature (the country finds its place in the world and 
begins to produce things it had to rely on others for, etc.); and finally, “The Age of High Mass-
Consumption,” (as its name indicates it is marked by the production of “durable consumers’ goods and 
services”). Rostow is specific on how this process works, offering that the process of getting through these 
stages takes 20 years and that 60 years after take-off begins an economy is “mature.” An economy is 
mature when it is able to move beyond those industries which it built itself with and instead use modern 
technology in a wide variety of ways. 
467 (Rostow 1960: 12-13). 
468 He, of course, acknowledges that all societies have not stuck cleanly to this trajectory, and that there 
have been fluctuations and distortions—phenomena which he treats only as deviations, e.g. the result of 
wars, of imperfect investment, and faulty government policy. To Rostow these localized deviancies are 
dismissible as personal errors within a globally applicable law of economic progress and development, 
driven necessarily and solely by the inexorable laws of capitalism. 
469 This, of course, was US development policy, but given the US’s influence on international institutions 
and multi-lateral bodies—from the World Bank to the Consortium on aid to India—the influence of 
Modernization theory was extensive.  
470 The larger goal behind these modernization efforts was deeply tied with the weave of Cold War politics, 
geopolitical strategy, and the absolute centrality of legitimacy to win this war.  Development, as a 
geopolitical project on the periphery of the Cold War, was not simply a tactic in this larger battle, not 
simply a humanitarian project, and as the US framed it, not a continuation of European territorial 
imperialism. While these development projects had a moral, political and economic justifications and goals 
(as did earlier development projects under imperialism), the US’s early development projects were also 
defined by a particular sense of liberal idealism of a rising nation—they were in the limelight of the 
tremendous US success of the Marshall Plan in Europe and Japan more than the cynicism and deep 
questioning raised by project the Vietnam War. The Green Revolution as a geopolitical project fell in-
between these two major events, temporally and in its imaginaries. It was very much a project of nation-
building, idealistic and unabashed in its aims and sense of possibility. Vast portions of the world could be 
transformed. Tradition bound peasants could be made modern economic subjects. A global market could be 
built. It simply required a few changes. And these changes were to begin where peasants dwelled and 
toiled—at the level of the farm (see also Mellor 1968). 
471 (Rosenstein-Rodan 1957). 
472 (Lester B. Pearson 1970: 6; from a speech “Lester Pearson delivered in Washington several weeks ago 
[1970] before the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, in which he summarized the major 
findings of this far-reaching study [the Pearson Report]” (UNESCO 1970: 4)). 
473 They do offer the qualification “This [four weeks] is much too short a time for a comprehensive study. 
The agricultural problems of India are so numerous, so complex, and so interwoven with traditions, 
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religions and philosophies which are strange to the Western minds that it is obviously impossible to do 
justice to them in a month’s stay. Nevertheless, some of the problems are so obvious it would be impossible 
not to recognize them” (RAC 1952a). 
474 But also, the Americans also did not have a structural or academic training or framework to understand 
basic issues and realities they encountered. As Merrill explains: “Just as the United States lacked 
experience in using aid as a foreign policy tool, it also lacked extensive knowledge of India. Prior to 1947, 
British Imperial rule inhibited the development of both economic and political relations with India, and the 
Indian subcontinent fell well outside the geographic parameters of American foreign policy concerns” 
(Merrill 1990: 13). Few American Universities studied India and those that did were interested largely in 
Sanskritic and Humanities side of question, further, “Social scientists evidenced little interest in India. As a 
consequence, American policy makers had little chance of understanding India’s unique developmental 
needs” (Merrill 1990: 13). “A NSC [National Security Council?] Report in 1951 argued that India was ‘the 
keystone to stability’ in South Asia ‘and every effort must be made to stabilize conditions’ in that country” 
(Merrill 1990: 75). 
475 (RAC 1952a: 3; my emphasis). 
476 (Lewis 1959). 
477 (Rostow 1960). 
478 The British Raj’s colonial development approach had been obsessed with “the agrarian,” which manifest 
in policies that implicitly kept places from industrializing in the name of promoting peasant/rural harmony 
(Hodge 2007). However, some economists took issue with this approach from the 1940s on; among them 
and most famously Arthur Lewis, who saw rural over-population/under-employment as a major hindrance 
to development. Lewis (1950) advocated an “agrarian revolution”—to raise capital for basic improvements 
(health, infrastructure, etc.) and to make agriculture much more efficient. Lewis criticized the reigning 
British approach to colonial development, but even more than this, he argued that the state needed to plan a 
path towards rapid industrialization—through which it would be able to absorb the large rural surplus 
population. The British officials soundly rejected the very idea; Lewis resigned. But, in the newly 
independent nations, nationalist leaders embraced Lewis’ approach and pushed these understandings of 
how to achieve development much further. They wanted rapid industrialization—regarded as something the 
British had gained through empire but had systematically blocked in the colonies. (Lewis was hired, for 
instance, by Trinidad and Ghana as a consultant to help forge early national economic development plans 
(Hodge 2007).) Lewis argued that industry should be the engine of growth, absorbing surplus and 
subsistence labor, it could then produce the necessary capital which could then allow for modernization and 
restructuring of the agricultural sector. The driver was to be industry; agricultural changes were simply one 
result of industrial development and economic growth. This was seen as fairly radical at the time as 
Britain’s colonial policy had kept industrialization from happening. Thus to be independent was to now be 
able to industrialize too. 
479 (Lewis 1959; as cited in Latham 2011: 51).  
480  (RAC 1952a: 4). 
481 (RAC 1952a: 5).  
482 (Lewis 1959; as cited in Latham 2011: 51). 
483 In India the “otherworldly” philosophy’s effects on blocking development and modernization stretched 
beyond discouraging “material want,” Ensminger credits it as the primary hindrance. 
484 Ensminger directed Ford’s programs for South Asia; he oversaw Ford’s activities in Pakistan, Nepal, 
and India during the 19 years of his tenure (1951-1970). 
485 (Ensminger 1972. Box B.3:2-3).   
486 (RAC 1952a: 3-4). 
487 (Ensminger 1972. Box B.3: 15-16; my emphasis).   
488 (Ensminger 1972 B.3). 
489 (RAC 1952b). 
490  (RAC 1952a: 12).   
491  (RAC 1952a: 12).   
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492 The RF, unsurprisingly, came to a similar conclusion—RF explain the crux of the problem Ensminger 
also lays out—i.e. why the peasants lack of ambition and lack of enterprising nature is a problem / limiting 
factor on the nation’s development as a whole.  After painting the scene the Rockefeller men proceed to 
explain that the biggest problem the RF foundation point to with the village as a “well-established 
ecological complex” is that it is only self-sufficient. It is the subsistence nature of the village economy itself 
which RF scientists deem to be the root of India’s problems: 
In other words, the villages maintain themselves on a subsistence level with respect to 
food, but do not produce a surplus for the cities. India has reached a point where the 
practice of agriculture no longer serves the traditional and important purpose of providing 
leisure for the development of the creative aspects of culture, the arts, sciences, and 
religions (1952a: 6; my emphasis). 
They are clear: the peasant farmers are not producing sufficient surplus to fuel, feed, or supply a leisure 
class.  
493 (Ensminger 1972. Box B.3: 15-16; my emphasis).  
494 Further, In arguing that the first necessary step is to instill “want” in the peasants, the Americans are of 
course harnessing a long tradition in (conservative thought and) political economy. Malthus had opined a 
century and half earlier in The Principles of Political  Economy: 
It is unquestionably true that wealth produces wants; but it is a still more important truth 
that wants produce wealth. Each cause acts and reacts upon the other, but the order, both 
of precedence and importance, is with the wants which stimulate industry. … The 
greatest of all difficulties in converting uncivilized and thinly peopled countries into 
civilized and populous ones, is to inspire them with the wants best calculated to excite 
their exertions in the production of wealth. One of the greatest benefits  which foreign 
commerce confers, and the reason why it  has always  appeared an almost necessary 
ingredient in the progress of wealth, is its tendency to inspire new wants, to  form  new  
tastes,  and to  furnish fresh  motives  for industry. Even civilized and improved countries 
cannot afford to lose any of these motives (Malthus 1968: 403). 
495 (Ensminger 1972. Box B.3: 15-16; my emphasis).   
496 (Rostow 1960). 
497 (Hirschman 1958). 
498 (Hirschman 1958). 
499 (Ensminger 1972. Box B.3: 15-16; my emphasis).  
500  Thus endorsing and building on the prescription of primitive accumulation, this vision and explanation 
of the process of development draws heavily on colonial understandings of “underdeveloped” peoples. 
Rostow’s deep colonial inheritance is not at all surprising, particularly because this approach can in many 
ways be read as extending British Imperial policies; policies which explicitly privileged science, 
technology, and scientific expertise as the guiding values to setting agricultural policy (c.f. Hodge 2007). 
501 The imperative they craft is distinctly opposed to British imperialism while at the same time, in many 
ways they pick up from where the British left off.   
502 (Ensminger 1972). 
503 (RAC 1952a: 6; my emphasis). 
504 As they explain, the concern with hunger permeated all aspects of Rockefeller programming, even its 
Arts wing, for: “The Foundation’s program in the Arts is a civilized and civilizing initiative. Nevertheless, 
there is widespread medical and psychological evidence to show that hungry people are listless, apathetic, 
and disinterested in most aspects of their environment, including artistic endeavors.” (RAC 1982: 2). As 
such, the Foundation must: “…support initiatives in food and agriculture that are innovative and that other 
institutions have not begun to support”— “food will continue to be one of mankind’s major problems for 
the foreseeable future if only because man has not yet reached the state of civilization in which hunger and 
deprivation are viewed by all people as dehumanizing and barbarous threats to civilization itself”(RAC 
1982: 12). 
505 (RAC 1929; my emphasis), 
506 (RAC 1929). 
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507 As they explain (in a letter which also reveals that the Ag program was linked to other RF programs), 
India was an important site for their work: 
Thirdly, India constitutes a big chunk of “mankind.” The Foundation program of 
population control can be put to an acid test and could do great things for India if 
population becomes stabilized. In the meantime, the ad hoc committee on morals, virtues, 
and values will probably be studying the Indian situation to see, if in the struggle for 
survival here, populations can have values which enable them to live peacefully and be 
satisfied with limited amenities, opportunities, and employment (RAC 1972: 4). 
508 (RAC 1952c: 1; my emphasis).  
509“Sir Josiah Stamp understands the situation when he observes: “The question is what proportion of 
human effort the peoples of the world are prepared to devote to merely feeding themselves” (RAC 1929). 
510 (RAC 1972). 
511 (Patnaik 2008). 
512 (RAC 1952a: 3, 4). 
513  Pausing to consider what the American scientists are assessing and in effect advocating: as they lay it 
out the driving problem in the villages is not that the village people are starving. Nor is the “problem” (as 
far as the Americans assess) that villagers are unhappy or are longing for a better life (rather, the Americans 
modernization theorists repeatedly puzzle over how to instill “the desire for progress” in these peasants). 
The problem is not the peasants’ want. Rather, the crux of the problem is that the villages are not 
sufficiently subsidizing others (be it the rural landed elite or the urban elite—whether directly or 
indirectly—e.g. via cheap food for the increasing and underpaid urban proletariat). The lack of surplus 
value is the fundamental core, or crux, of the problem the Americans locate. This necessary surplus value 
cannot be extracted because it is not being produced. The “self-evident” answer the RF scientists present is 
thus is to restructure agriculture away from a subsistence relation and into a structure that will effectively 
produce a surplus (which can then be appropriated) to provide for “the important purpose of providing 
leisure.” The model is the US and Europe; to instill such “want” they conclude that they must break them 
out of their lethargy and rouse their natural sprit of competition.  
Whose leisure they seek to reinstate and secure is not explicitly stated, but it is implicit throughout the 
text that it is not the leisure of those “creatures motivated largely by inherited animal instincts, and devoid 
of any inclination to depart from a fixed hereditary pattern,” preferring their “strange symbiotic 
relationship” with cattle and plants (1952a: 3, 4). The “traditional … leisure” is so plainly not for these 
peasants that the RF experts do not need to spell out that it is for others, elites and urbanites. The authors 
make this resoundingly clear at points throughout—the goal was to figure out how to extract sufficient 
surplus to build a leisure class outside the village, all while ensuring that the villager himself does not 
aspire to migrate or to join that lifestyle: the challenging line which they must figure out how to navigate is 
how to modernize him just enough to ensure that he can produce more without wanting more for himself. 
For example, as they take this issue up in the conclusion of their report with the need to create more 
agricultural training schools: 
such schools should be very carefully designed and located and they should be protected 
in such a way that students receive essentially only simple practical instruction which 
will enable them to return to their villages as community assets, but will not make them 
dissatisfied with village life and create an urge for urban existence or further education 
which will make them unwilling to return to their native villages (1952a: 29; my 
emphasis). 
The best path to take is not yet clear. They continue to debate and deliberate over how to produce surplus: 
is it to take the farmers “off of their land and put them in factories” (RAC 1949) or is it to make sure they 
stay on their land and continue to produce, but in excess. This question is not immediately or explicitly 
resolved. (In the end, it comes to be ascribed to a force called “the market.”) 
514 (Ensminger 1972. Box B.3: 15-16; my emphasis). 
515 (RAC 1949). 
516 (RAC 1952a: 11-12; my emphasis). 
517 (RAC 1952a: 11-12; my emphasis). 
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518 (RAC 1952a: 11-12; my emphasis). 
519 (RAC 1952a: 5). 
520 The nature of this work was entwined with the interests of making the “world” stable for US interests 
and capital, RF was a primary international actor in this regard, and food was one of the most important 
realms in which this work was pursued. For example, as US Vice President Henry Wallace told Rockefeller 
Foundation President: “If the RF would undertake to help the Mexican people increase yield per acre…it 
would mean more to the future of Mexico than anything else that government or philanthropy could 
devise” (Wallace 1940; as cited in Dowie 2001: 108). 
521 The numerous already failing American projects they visited and commented upon (RAC 1952a). 
522 The RF was also concerned that their efforts succeed for the sake of India and Indians. As explained in 
the profoundly dehumanizing and paternalistic document “Precarious Welfare” RF was aware of their 
power asymmetry (certainly not in the way it would be understood in RF today) and felt that they risked 
simply toying with Indians’ future if their efforts did not succeed.  
Imagine an uninhabited island with a population of about 1,000 head of deer. Suppose 
this population of deer is held in check by the inadequacy of abundant parasite free 
water[1], by a certain number of pumas[2], and by a limited amount of forage[3] [a 
footnote on the page states “to correspond with [1]pestilence, [2]war, and [3] famine, 
referred to by Malthus”]. 
Now, what will happen if you construct one clean and steadily flowing water trough or 
well, hold a successful puma hunt every year, and introduce a few new forage grasses? 
The deer population will increase.  
But if you let the water supply become clogged and infected, stop killing the predatory 
animals, and allow the forage crops to be eliminated by overgrazing? The deer will be 
starved or killed back to the old level—or below it. 
It seems to me that the main problem for us in India is to teach Indians how to produce 
locally and by themselves the knowledge and skills now and ‘til now furnished to them 
by the West. Medical science, stability of government, and agricultural technology have 
made possible the growth in population, and on these their enormous number now utterly 
depend. 
Indians are not deer, but they are still dependent, and until they become independent we 
are playing with their welfare, precariously (RAC 1951b: 1). 
523 (Willkie 1942). 
524 (RAC 1949: 2). 
525 The class dimensions of their critique and their civilizing plans are implicit throughout; in “Notes,” RF 
Ag men opine that the failures are largely caused by the fact that the US projects are led by small minded 
lower-class [American] men, not the well-educated more successful elite (RAC 1952a). 
526 Further, they framed the relatively lean and strategic focus of their intervention as due to the imperative 
to focus their own relatively limited resources as strategically as possible to guarantee success. 
527 (RAC 1956: 11).  
528 (RAC 1952a: 12). 
529 (RAC 1952a: 25). 
530 (RAC 1952a: 24-5). 
531 (RAC 1952a: 24-5). 
532 (RAC 1952a: 25). 
533 (RAC 1952a: 25). 
534 (RAC 1952a: 26; my emphasis). 
535 (RAC 1952a: 25). 
536 (RAC 1952a: 26; my emphasis). 
537 (RAC 1952a: 26; my emphasis). 
538 (RAC 1952b: 1; my emphasis).  
539 (RAC 1956: 11; my emphasis). 
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540 Throughout the decades, RF officials indicate a paternalistic engagement, even when voiced as respect 
for:  
Indian scientists [as they] are intelligent, or even brilliant, serious and scholarly, although 
often if not indeed usually impractical. …they often seem to be more interested in science 
for its own sake than for its application to basic national problems. …they shun direct 
field work … Even those Indian scientists who as a result of their experience in the US 
land grant colleges have now come to respect field work and to practice it to a degree, 
seem to lack the vision necessary to enable them to transpose these results thus obtained 
into terms of practical application for improved national yields (1952a: 27). 
RF officials voice a constant frustration at what they characterize as Indian scientists lack of “practicality” 
and “aversion to fieldwork.” In a circular, the New Delhi staff explain to other Americans at the RF 
(circulated within and outside of India) what they see as the problem with Indian scientists minset, namely 
that it: 
…overemphasized creativity, breakthroughs etc. for India. They are indeed important, but 
in India the scientists have difficulty growing a crop. I feel that more effort need to be put 
forth in basic project organization, the problem approach, implementation, hard work. 
The strict adherence to a short seven-hour day and tea breaks has got to change. It may 
seem that these topics are too mundane for mention in a “project projection” but Indian 
scientists in general have less difficulty creating ideas in the office than they do in putting 
them into practice because they have little concept of practicality.  A very effective way 
of changing this is with training programs and concentration at a few locations where 
adequate power and tillage equipment and good irrigation and drainage facilities are 
available. If it was not difficult to evolve CSH-1, why was it not done without RF 
assistance? It will also not be difficult to breed shoot fly resistance into an improved 
agronomically desirable variety—but, how many additional years would it take without 
RF support and organization? The idea is not difficult to create; it is putting into practice 
that is difficult, especially in India (RAC 1973c). 
The enduring theme, constantly repeated that “the Indians just won’t actually do the work,” “aren’t 
practical,” and “aren’t concerned to resolve the practical hard work issues.” As an American scientist 
complained:  
 I am concerned about the attitudes of many of our Indian colleagues.  … 
…We have a professional opportunity even if the local system fails. This is 
complicated—they do not like their own failures and like even less someone else doing 
something when they feel they cannot. This is not too difficult to appreciate in the limited 
sense. But we are there for the well fare of people in India in particular and of others, 
especially in South East Asia in general. An attempt by them to continue good will 
toward us will help us help them. Their attitude makes a bad situation even worse. Even 
from a selfish point of view—why should I as an individual or RF as an organization 
accept a situation in which our ability to perform is seriously hampered.  …   
I am concerned that given the credit because they want it while they refuse to come 
forward with any responsible action is not helping them and probably hurting them. In 
the rules of the game, one does not get a pat on the back for doing a bad job. If they are 
not willing to be serious in accepting responsibility, and cannot stand to have people 
around who are, then lets [sic] not proceed. The pace is slow, the anguish great, and 
everyone ends up at odds with everyone else” (RAC 1965: 7-8).  
541 Ensminger continues: 
..in 1962-63 when we were in the process of trying to get greater support from the 
Government to move forward on all recommendations of the Food Crisis Report … I had 
a conversation [with]…a senior person the in the Ministry of Finance.  … He saw that I 
was considerably concerned about the lack of attention on the part of the government to 
implement [agricultural] programs. After a while he said, and I will quote him, “Oh Hell, 
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Doug, until a couple of million people in India have died of starvation, don’t expect us to 
get very excited about what we are doing or not doing on the agricultural front.”  
… Several years later, after India had really come face to face with the possibilities of a 
famine, and he saw the evidence the Ford Foundation had stayed with its commitments 
and had helped the country develop enough experience and enough understanding to put 
together a national program of food production, he reminded me of the conversation and 
… he wanted to impress upon how right I was and how wrong he was in assuming one 
could not bring the nation or the leadership of the nation to strive to maximize and 
increase its agricultural production potential.  This I record simply to illustrate the great 
difficulties we had in working with India when the top leadership itself was more or less 
lackadaisical about implementing programs once they were conceived, tested and proven 
to be workable (1972. B.3: 20-21).  
542 (Ensminger 1972. B.3: 20).  
543 (Ensminger 1972). 
544  (Ensminger 1972. Box B.3: 11-12). 
545 Ensminger explains that as such: none of aspects of what we “In the West, and now in India, … think 
about [as constituting] agricultural development, one thinks of improved seeds, water for irrigation, 
pesticides, fertilizers, and so forth [were in India—instead]… Indian research was oriented toward 
traditional agriculture” (Ensminger 1972. Box B.3:12; my emphasis).   
546  (Ensminger January 5, 1972. Box B.3: 12; my emphasis).   
547 (Ford Foundation 1962, #3, B.3: 20-21). 
548 It is of note that this account in the FF records is very different than the account in the RF records—
which relates the Indian leadership as singularly obsessed with the question of hunger and food enough. 
The conflicting accounts, I suggest are indicative of the fact that the Americans’ explanatory framework 
was not yes written. Rather, over this process, their representations of India and its problems are in 
formation.  
549 In the letters Americans in RF and FF consistently speak of their counterpart Indian scientists as if they 
are naughty (but clever, “even brilliant”) children in need of constant supervision, only interested in bench 
science, unwilling to do anything “practical,” even the most basic tasks.  
550  (Ford Foundation 1959). 
551 (Ford Foundation 1962, #3, B.3: 15-16). 
552 Ensminger elaborates: 
I finally concluded the reason why you could not get the administrative leadership of 
India, and the political leaders, to feel anxious about agricultural development was, over 
the years poor hungry people living on the borderline of insufficient food had been a part 
of India. Therefore, there was nothing strange about the fact large numbers of people in 
India did not know whether or not they would have enough food from one day to the next 
(1972. B.3: 20).  
553 (Ford Foundation 1962, #3, B.3: 9). 
554 (GOI 1952: 82). 
555 The view that “tradition” and mindsets as a major source of the problem was an understanding shared 
between the American and Indian administrative elite; both were concerned with the need to change 
mindsets. However, the answer of how to do so, and where to go from there, or how to proceed to 
development and deal with this “problem,” was at odds and not agreed on.   
556  Karunaratne (1976) Failure of the CDP in India : 
The C.D. Programme in India was launched in 1952 on a pilot basis. The basic aims of 
the Programme, as summarized by Prof S.C. Dube were as follows: 
‘1. To provide for a substantial increase in the country’s agricultural production and 
for improvements in the system of communications, in rural health and hygiene and 
in village education. 
2. To initiate and direct a process of integrated culture change, aimed at transforming 
the social and economic life of the villagers.’ … 
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 In the words of Nehru, the Prime Minister of India: 
‘these Community projects appear to me to be something of vital importance, not 
only in the material achievements that they would bring about, much more so, 
because they seek to build up the community and the individual, and make the latter 
a builder of his own village centre and of India, in the larger sense’ 
It is important to note here that the emphasis was not only on the material and economic 
aspects, but also o the human and social aspects. The Report “U.N Development Decade” 
says: 
‘development concerns not only man’s material needs but also the improvement of 
the social conditions of his life and his broad human aspirations.’ (as quoted in 
Karunaratne 1976). 
557 Karunaratne (1976: 115) Failure of the CDP in India: “the people’s efforts to work for their own welfare 
and progress. It is thus inevitable that the C.D. Programme, instead of making people self-reliant , has made 
them increasingly dependent on official assistance” (Dwivedy, Surendranath 1965: 15, as quoted in 
Karunaratne 1976: 115). 
558 (GoI undated (1962?): 1). 
559 “Community Development is a programme of aided self-help for individual and collective welfare of 
India’s vast rural population. The programme is intended to be planned and implemented by villagers 
themselves. Government offering only technical guidance and financial assistance. Its objectives are to 
develop self-reliance in the individual and initiative in the village community. Community thinking and 
collective action are encouraged through people’s institutions like the Panchayats, cooperative societies, 
vikas mandals, etc.” (GoI undated (1962?): 1). 
560 Bowles served two non-consecutive periods as US Ambassador to India, he was seen in Washington as 
an advocate of India; to Bowles India was the key battleground of the Cold War.  
“Chester Bowles was moved to accept the post of [US] ambassador to India because: 
‘India is the key point in the entire East, and a country which we simply must learn 
to live with a whole lot more successfully that we are doing at present. If we lose 
India, as we lost China we shall certainly lose Southeast Asia with the repercussions 
running all the way through Africa’” (Rosen 1985: 11). 
 
561 (Merrill 1990). 
562 Many members of India’s administration were also deeply concerned with instilling “scientific mindset” 
in people: As Karunaratne explains the purpose of the CDP: 
In the words of another stalwart, V.T. Krishnamarchari, the purpose was: ‘to create in the 
millions of rural families a burning desire to change their old time outlook, and arouse 
enthusiasm in them for new knowledge and new ways of life. This “will to live better” is 
to be brought about by ensuring that every family has a programme for increased 
employment and production…that every family makes its voluntary contribution to 
works of benefit to the community as a whole’ (as quoted in Karunaratne 1976). 
563  (Ensminger 1972. Box B.3: 15-16; my emphasis).   
564 (Baviskar and Saberwal 2002). 
565  (Ensminger 1972. Box B.3: 15-16; my emphasis).   
566 (Merrill 1990: 6). 
567 (Baviskar and Saberwal 2002). 
568 See for example: Ford Foundation and GoI 1959, where they argue that agriculture must be prioritized 
and yield increases pursued with a war like urgency. 
569 (Merrill 1990; GoI 1956).   
570  (Rosen 1985: 72). 
571  (Rosen 1985: 72). 
572 (Rosen 1985). 
573  In “Failure of the CDP in India,” Karunaratne (1976: 113) diagnoses that: “It was not understood that 
the people had to be educated out of their subsistence agriculture situation, and that in this respect, 
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education was an essential input for agricultural development.” That said, Karunaratne continues to explain 
that: “John W. Mellor after a study of the causes for the failure of the C.D. Programme in India says: ‘It is 
easy to argue for the failure of the C. D. Programme, but it is difficult to formulate a better alternative for 
the India of 1951’” (Mellor p 41 in “The Evolution of Rural Development Policy” as cited in Karunaratne 
1976: 116). 
574 The way that the GoI explains this task: “Increasing agricultural production is one of the major tasks of 
the C.D. Programme. Most of the time of the Block agency and a substantial part of the C.D. funds are 
devoted to activities leading to better agricultural production. Adoption of improved agricultural practices 
and as use of improved seeds fertilizers and improved implements and mobilization of local resources like 
compost and green manuring, field bunding, soil conservation and reclamation are the major items of this 
programme. Each village panchayat is encouraged to prepare its association with the cooperative and 
progressive cultivators a realistic production programme taking into account the locally available resources 
and the outside help that may be forthcoming and give effect to it with assistance of the Block extension 
staff. Credit is made available through the Cooperatives which also arrange to supply the necessary 
requisites such as seed, fertilizers and implements” (GoI undated (1962?): 3). 
575 (Karunaratne 1976: 116). 
576 Its “failure” status, some argue, was because the CDP was drastically underfunded and otherwise a well 
thought-out program; others suggest that its priorities were not straight and it became muddled in 
bureaucratic institutions (Karunaratne 1976). Others argue that it was dismissed and maligned because the 
CDP was seen as taking a Nehruvian approach, and its rejection was part and parcel of the movement 
rejecting all things Nehruvian. Dey, for example insists that “the tirade against the C.D. Programme and 
Panchayati Raj continued unabated within both the Parliament and the Press … The denigration of the C. 
D. formed part of the wider program of denigrating everything connected with Jawaharlal Nehru” (as cited 
in Karunaratne 1976: 116). 
577 (Merrill 1990: 142). 
578 China was very much the specter haunting the Americans, driving their “intrusion” and steering the 
nature of their interventions. The Americans’ project in India was deeply entwined with fighting the specter 
of Communism (represented both by the Soviets and just in general). Citing “the Marshall plan as ‘the most 
spectacular demonstration of what economic aid can contribute by helping people to help themselves’. 
…economically as well as in terms of resisting communist political control”(Paul Hoffman as quoted in 
Rosen 1985: 11), Hoffman advocated the same in India—insisting that if we had embarked on such a 
program in China in 1945 it would have “been a China completely immunized against the appeal of the 
Communists. India, in my opinion, is what China was in 1945” (Hoffman as quoted in Rosen 1985: 9). 
579 While the “United States influence in India never reached hegemonic proportions. In spite of the large 
influx of aid during the late 1950s and early 1960s, Washington never established the firm, controlling 
authority over India’s decision making processes, and the American presence in India remained limited.  
Yet United States leads can be said to have harbored hegemonic ambitions relating to India’s development. 
In this sense, the American effort to make India a model for capitalistic growth and non-Communist 
political evolution can be understood to have constituted an effort to implement indirect control over that 
nation’s future. The crucial problem that arose in India, and which endlessly frustrated Washington, was 
that of reconciling American developmental policies with the economic and political realities in the 
recipient nations” (Merrill 1990: 13). 
580 (Frankel 1978: 117,128, 144, 147). 
581 (Rosen 1985: 73)  
582 (Rosen 1985)  
583 (See Bajaj 1982). 
584 (Baviskar and Saberwal 2002). 
585 (RAC 1952a). 
586 (RAC 1952a). 
587 (RAC 1952a).  
588 To understand how changes in farming were to defeat Communism and produce a global free market 
necessitates addressing a few key points.  A technology fetish defined this modernity and a view of the 
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individual’s role in this desired market. The idea was to give peasants themselves the incentive and a means 
to revolutionize their production methods. Something they would clearly opt for if it was remunerative.  As 
Galbraith and the Ford Foundation had earlier laid out, there were regarded to be two main means of 
improving peasant’s earnings: better quality inputs and better prices for their crops. The former component 
was one that international agencies brought, the latter only the government could do; heavy pressure was 
applied to the Indian Government on this issue, this was the first point made in the Ford Foundation’s 
lengthy 1959 Report and was repeatedly insisted upon during the Johnson Administration.  Private 
Foundations (Ford and Rockefeller) and the US government applied pressure to the Indian government, 
encouraging them to raise the floor prices for crops and ensure farmers prices at which they could afford to 
produce profitably. These changes seem self-evident and clear, so where does the “Revolution” come in?—
the revolution is a counter-revolution: and needs to be done through technology. 
589 (Government of Madras 1956: 4). 
590 (Government of Madras 1956: 4). 
591 (Government of Madras 1956: 4). 
592 (Merrill 1990: 141). 
593 (Karunaratne 1976; Nayar 1960; GoI 1968, 1973, 1978; Government of Madras 1956). 
594 (Ford Foundation 1962: 9). 
595 Mosher was head of the Allahabad Agricultural Institute from 1948-1953 (Daniels 1992). 
596 (RAC 1952a). 
597 The project of “Getting Agriculture Moving” was spearheaded by the Agricultural Development 
Council. The series targeted “agricultural officials and technicians in Asia, Africa and Latin America” 
(1966b: 3).  The project was also supported by the RF. Mosher was President of the Allahabad Agricultural 
College when RF selected the college as an appropriate project to support in accomplishing the broad scale 
transformation they deemed necessary.  
598 As Nelson Rockefeller (1951) emphasized, it was essential that these nations feel as if they too are 
progressing /have a chance/can catch up.  This was not necessarily a fair chance/shake at this prosperity, 
but at least a stake in it and in the sense of a larger progress. 
599 (Mosher 1966: x; my emphasis).   
600 (RAC 1952b). 
601 (RAC 1956: 11).  
602 (Nobel Commitee1970). 
603 (Nobel Commitee1970). 
604  (Little 1982: 105). 
605 In 1958 Ensminger toured rural India, focusing on the farm level. He “was especially struck by the 
peasants failure to adopt improved production practices, and reported this to Nehru and …Krishnamachari. 
He suggested it might be useful to have a team of foreign experts work” come to India (Rosen 1985: 74). 
They could assess what was happening and make recommendations for improving Indian agriculture 
(Rosen 1985: 74)—this was the team that wrote the 1959 Ford Report (Rosen 1985: 75). 
606  Ensminger explains: 
…this Food Crisis Report was not really the product of a group of foreigners. It was the 
product of the interaction of a group of foreigners with a group of comparable and 
competent Indian agricultural officials and specialists. This is really what made it such a 
remarkable report. 
I would be remiss in not reporting while I am talking about the Food Crisis report, that 
the people who have read it, even ten years later, say it is one of the most remarkable 
documents they have ever seen written on a problem in a developing country. I think this 
is true. It is a scholarly document and it is a document where the findings are documented 
and the recommendations come out of well reasoned analysis based upon a situation in 
India (Ensminger 1972. Box B.3: 31-32; my emphasis).  
607 Ford Foundation describes the IADP as follows: 
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“The Intensive Agricultural District Program (IADP), popularly known as the “Package 
Program,” is currently in operation in seven districts, each in a different state. This 
program, sponsored and partly financed by the Ford Foundation, is an outgrowth of a 
Report “India’s Food Crisis and Steps to Meet it,” prepared by a team of American 
specialists in early 1959. More specifically and immediately, this effort to achieve a rapid 
increase in agricultural production is based on the integration of a ten-point program, the 
principal ingredients of which are farm production plans, adequate credit, fertilizers, 
improved seeds and farm implements, price incentives and improved marketing facilities, 
and a public works program, using local labor for a variety of land improvement projects 
from minor irrigation works to the building of godowns and roads. While most of these 
measures are well-known, tried and tested, what was novel about this program is the 
attempt to integrate and concentrate all of them, backed by adequate technical guidance 
and financial resources used for productive purposes. If India’s agriculture was to attain a 
“breakthrough,” what was needed was “a big push applied in short enough time span to 
ensure its effectiveness. Putting inadequate resources into the needed improvement of 
agriculture can be compared to pushing a large stone without enough concentration of 
impact—neither the production problem nor the stone may move at all.” So much for the 
origins and philosophy underlying the package program” (Ford Foundation 1962, #3, 
B.3: 17-18).  
608 It was called “the package program” because it brought a “package” of practices and inputs to select 
farmers in select districts, and its success was dependent on all of its components being used together, as a 
package). The farmers had to have a “progressive” mindset, willing to adopt new practices and inputs and 
have good land that could demonstrate the effects of this program. The criteria for a district to participate in 
the package program was basically the same as what came to be the criteria for the new strategy/GR: 
“…the overall criteria were favorable soil and water facilities, minimum of natural hazards, and better than 
average cooperative and village panchayat organization” (Ford Foundation 1962, #3, B.3: 18). 
609 (Ford Foundation 1962, #3, B.3: 18). 
610  (Ford Foundation 1962, #3, B.3: 14)  
611 (RAC 1969a: 25).   
612 (RAC undated-b, IBEC Box 12, Folder 295; my emphasis).  
613  (Ensminger 1972. Box B.3: 15-16; my emphasis).   
614  (RAC undated-b, IBEC Box 12, Folder 295; my emphasis).  
615 (RAC 1952a: 4; my emphasis.) 
616  (RAC undated-b, IBEC Box 12, Folder 295; my emphasis). 
617  (RAC undated-b, IBEC Box 12, Folder 295; my emphasis). 
618  (RAC undated-b, IBEC Box 12, Folder 295; my emphasis).  
619  (RAC undated-b, IBEC Box 12, Folder 295; my emphasis). 
620  (RAC undated-b, IBEC Box 12, Folder 295; my emphasis). 
621  (RAC undated-b, IBEC Box 12, Folder 295; my emphasis). 
622  (RAC undated-b, IBEC Box 12, Folder 295; my emphasis).  
623 (RAC 1968). 
624 (RAC 1952a). 
625 The New Strategy is the approach which comes to be popularly known as the “Green Revolution.” 
626 (Ford Foundation 1962: 13-14; my emphasis). 
627 The FF does note that in some villages and locales, this did not work—the masses were not interested in 
copying the elite. As if lacking all/any imagination and/or insight, they declare that in those places it is 
impossible to know what will work.  
628  Though, it might be noted that caste is conspicuously absent, never mentioned or so much as 
acknowledged in any of the notes and memos; apparently Indian villages in the 1950s and 60s were without 
caste relations, or awareness.  
629  (Ford Foundation 1962: 16; my emphasis).  
630  (Ford Foundation 1962: 5). 
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631  (Ford Foundation 1962: 2).  
632 (Ford Foundation 1962: 3-4). 
633 (Ford Foundation 1962: 13-14; my emphasis). 
634 On the other hand, Ensminger noted the project had many limitations as well, namely: 
The program is essentially governmental and bureaucratically-ridden, where the farmers, 
for all their seeming participation, are not really insiders.  Partly because of the 
preoccupation with the quantitative targets the program set for itself at the inception; 
partly because … partly because … partly because …, and admittedly and importantly, 
partly because farmers don’t take to change at the drop of a hat—for all these reasons the 
enlistment of the active cooperation of the cultivators remains a major problem. … in the 
final analysis this involvement, as nothing else, will determine the success or failure of 
the package program (Ford Foundation 1962: 2). 
635 (Ensminger 1972). 
636  (RAC 1969: 25). 
637 (RAC 1952a: 11; my emphasis). 
638  (Ford Foundation and GoI 1959: 29; italics in original). 
639 (Ford Foundation 1962: 13-14; my emphasis). 
640 (Ford Foundation 1962: 16; my emphasis). 
641 (Ford Foundation 1962: 15; my emphasis). 
642 (Rosen 1985: 76). 
643  (Rosen 1985: 77). 
644  (Rosen 1985). 
645 (Rosen 1985: 77). 
646 (Rosen 1985). 
647 Rosen suggests that the first five years of the IADP were “trial and error” trying to figure things out and 
make it work. Ensminger wanted FF Head Office (in New York) to renew it for another five years, but they 
would not agree to do so because they argued that the GoI had engaged in too much foot-dragging (Rosen 
1985). 
648 While records of the time do not acknowledge caste, Ensminger does, in his later oral memoirs note that 
their view of villages as homogenous and the fact that it never occurred to them to attend to tenure relations 
or other differences between villagers did in the end hinder Ford’s early development projects. Thus, he 
explains that since small and marginal farmers and those who rented were less likely to make changes, the 
agricultural programs going forth did not target them, as they were less likely to implement the changes, 
much less succeed (Ensminger 1972).  
649 (Ford Foundation 1962: 15; my emphasis). 
650 The use of crisis here to get policy through was strategic. In reflecting on the FF’s India activities, 
Ensminger commented on the necessary role of crises in setting policy—explaining that it was only with a 
crisis that the GOI listened up and was finally willing to do anything—“Ensminger was struck by the role 
of crises in India’s policy making in that sector and by the foundation’s role as an aid that helped India to 
experiment in crisis solution” (Rosen 1985:81-2). 
651 As Agricultural Minister Subramaniam explained: “There has been a cry that it is only the better-off 
farmers who have been using the fertilizer so that we have been only subsidizing them. But, you have to 
strike a balance because if they do not use the fertilizer they will not produce and the whole nation will 
have to starve” (Subramaniam 1979: 56; my emphasis). 
652  (Ford Foundation and GoI 1959: 29; italics in original). 
653  (Ford Foundation and GoI 1959: 29; italics in original). 
654 (Ford Foundation 1962: 16; my emphasis). 
655 (Ford Foundation 1962: 16; my emphasis). 
656 (Dayal 1968: 72).  
657 (Ford Foundation 1962: 16; my emphasis). 
658  American experts were convinced that technology itself could bring the revolution they aimed to 
instigate—it “could inspire changes in behavior and thought, it could instill a sense of rationality, 
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efficiency, and respect for empiricism in contrast to native passivity” (Latham 2003: 3). Similarly “The 
Rockefeller Foundation adopted a “technology first” approach—articulated in “the firm belief that new 
technology is the leading factor in the process of desired social change because technology is also the 
locomotive of economic growth. RF officials understood the importance of demonstrating the efficacy of 
technology in the field, visible to governments and publics. But their approach was always in a measured 
relation their attempt to reform existing institutions or create new ones. In the RF’s immediate 
environment, there was also a compelling attraction to the prospect of ‘behavior science,’ a kind of science 
which would permit social engineering comparable to biological engineering being proposed for agriculture 
which actually was being tested in the RF’s project in Mexico. … But despite this interest in social 
engineering there was the perception that eventually the new technologies could be applied to the solution 
of the problem of insufficient food production with little reference to the less tractable problem of food 
maldistribution or the thorny issue of land reform. Technology would be the leading factor in the profound 
changes which governments appeared to desire and which the RF believed to be inevitable” (Anderson et al 
1991: 31). 
659 For, most rural areas were not addressed under this strategy anyway and the food produced was not for 
rural areas. 
660 (Ford Foundation 1962: 3-4). 
661 (Dayal 1968: 72). 
662 (Dayal 1968). 
663 (Baviskar and Saberwal 2002, citing Frankel 1971: 5; Dayal 1968). 
664 (GoI, draft outline of the Fourth Plan, as quoted in Dayal 1968: 74; my emphasis). 
665 (GoI, National Commission on Agriculture 1976; Dayal 1968; Bajaj 1982). 
666  (GOI, MoIB 1966).  
667 (GoI, MoIB, 1966: 11). 
668 (GoI, MoIB, 1966: 6). 
669 (GoI, MoIB, 1966: 3). 
670 (GoI, MoIB, 1966: 11). 
671 (GoI, MoIB, 1966: 10). 
672   Subramaniam pushed this interpretation of the modernization of agriculture even more explicitly than it 
is articulated in the American’s records (see Ch. 4 for more a detailed discussion of this). The process of 
development itself, Subramaniam insists, needs to be ruled by scientists and run scientifically. In an effort 
to instill efficiency and create science as a vital driving life force, he characterizes some of the most 
important changes of the new strategy/GR policy as the replacement of the bureaucrats with scientists 
(Subramaniam 1973; 1979; 1995). Subramaniam sought to expand technocractic management to far more 
sectors of society—to ensure that the path of science was what was guiding the nation’s institutions and to 
avoid the sorts of larger development and allocation challenges that “non-specialists” brought up. Guided 
by the certainty that: “Every country which has improved its agriculture has done so only through the 
introduction of science and technology into farming. India cannot be an exception” (Subramaniam 1995: 
108).  
At the heart of efforts to introduce this “modern outlook,” Subramaniam insists, lies technology. 
Subramaniam argues that the founders share a vision of development in which it is / which is defined by 
“the lack of appropriate and efficient technology is at the root of underdevelopment, rather than other 
factors” (Subramaniam 1973: 3). In this story, agricultural technology has a key role to play in creating 
modern scientific subjects, As C.S. Subramaniam articulates this project of subject making of the masses: 
Nehru… called it the evolution of ‘a scientific temper,’…This has a great deal to do with 
ways of thinking that are relevant to our activity as economic agents … Its importance in 
promoting a new culture based on science is undeniable. ...  
Two years after his death when we carried our package of improved seeds, fertilizers and 
pesticides to the rural community, the response that the new strategy evoked was, I 
believe, in large measure due to earlier attempts at opening mental doors and stimulating 
a modern outlook among all our people (Subramaniam 1973: 4; my emphasis). 
Subramaniam further explains the subject and consciousness (re)making potential of this project, narrating: 
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Once science and technology are brought into day to day productive activity the attitudes 
of the people completely change. This can be seen in the development of the High 
Yielding Varieties Programme … If we are able to make a dramatic initial impact by 
introducing science and technology, even illiterate conservative rural people will be 
prepared to make further changes. For example … Now they have begun to ask, ‘If 
artificial insemination is possible for animals, is it possible to control human pregnancy 
artificially?’ family planning thereby becomes much easier in this area because villagers 
are exposed to these new ideas. Thus a major transformation in attitudes takes place once 
a new change is introduced (Subramaniam 1979: 77). 
Beyond making development and its institutions more efficient, for science to become a “vital force,” this 
mindset had to be instilled in the population themselves. Subramaniam continues citing the nation’s 
founders and leading scientists in constructing his origin myth. Clearly there is no dearth of statesmen’s 
writings and speeches exalting “science for development,” the question of concern, however, is what kind 
of technology and science are being envisioned and for whom? With the agricultural revolution inducted 
under the name of the “New Strategy,” the direction of “science for development” was realigned, focused 
down a slightly different path; while nominally the paths remained much the same—in their discursive 
appeals and populist justification, the focus of the policy and the understanding of how development 
spreads (or the directionality of development’s “trickle” effect) shifted in ways with significant lasting 
effects to this day. Some of these differences were immediately highly contentious and others took decades 
of further policy change for the effects to be evident. What is clear is that this “scientific” mindset—of 
accepting agricultural technology was a pre-condition for “rational(ity’s)” metric: surplus production, 
producing for a market (Ensminger 1972). Subramaniam’s reading and reformulation of “science-for-
development” offers an insight into these shifting understandings in their formation. As a number of 
scholars have argued, Subramaniam redefined “science,” shifting it away from Nehru’s (socialist-
democratic-technocracy) understanding and into an understanding more in line with what the Americans 
were arguing for. Subramaniam was a “resolute modernizer” and this more “expertise”-driven and opaque 
technocratic science; a science ultimately linked to the drive of private enterprise (Visvanathan 2006; 
Frankel 2006). 
673 (Brown 1970).  
674 “During the 19 years that I was in India the Ministers of Food and Agriculture were rather representative 
of the political leadership of India in their understanding and orientation to agriculture as being necessarily 
traditional. The only exception to this was C. Subramaniam who, more than any other individual in India, 
gave leadership to the designing of agricultural programs to move the nation from traditionalism to 
modernism” (Ensminger 1972: 23). Likewise, India’s Ambassador to the US, B.K. Nehru recalls President 
Johnson being specifically impressed with Subramaniam as a modernizer (Nehru 1997). 
675 (Ensminger 1972: 23). 
676 Ensminger argues that the all of the other ministers simply were not concerned with the food problem; 
the Food and Agriculture Ministers just assured the nation everything was fine.  
I went on to say, “But I think you could have said to them, “we have work to do, we have 
to really work hard if we are going to finally get ourselves to where we are free of the 
need for importing food grains.” The Minister [of Food and Agriculture] looked at me 
and smiled. This was pretty much the attitude of the various Ministers of Food and 
Agriculture in the centre Government during the time I was there. This made it very 
difficult to get the States and the districts to be serious about agricultural development 
(Ensminger 1972: 24). 
677  Rao, it may be noted, was vehemently against the New Strategy until this point—Ensminger complains 
repeatedly about Rao’s resistance as hindering the progress of this approach (Ensminger 1972). 
678 (Rao 1967: 15). 
679 Rao also asserts that while the Ministry of Agriculture wants to distribute large concentrated doses of 
fertilizer over very small areas, this tactic is not necessarily the most effective and must be further 
“contemplated.” For, some have pointed out that “the overall economics of fertilizer use may be in favor of 
their application over a larger area in smaller doses (say of about 40 to 60 lbs of N per acre) rather than 
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over a smaller area in larger doses” (Rao 1967: 20).  The question that CSS effaces by appealing to the 
“nature” of the seeds (and the “nature” of certain farmers) needs to be addressed more carefully than it has 
been. Rao also has practical and ecological concerns, explaining that “moreover, it is a well-known fact that 
chemical fertilizers need to be accompanied by organic fertilizers. Even in Japan, which as perhaps the 
largest application of chemical fertilizers per acre, organic fertilizers are used to the extent of 50%...or a 
proportion of 1:1 with chemical fertilizers” (Rao 1967: 20). 
680 (Rao 1967: 13-14; my emphasis).  
681  How to achieve this?—the mechanism is technology in itself, C.S. Subramaniam argues that the 
founders he invokes share a vision of development: “…the lack of appropriate and efficient technology is at 
the root of underdevelopment, rather than other factors” (Subramaniam 1973: 3). 
The second feature of the above philosophy is that sustained development will not take 
place on the basis of selective application of modern technology to a few enclaves in the 
economy. What is postulated, on the other hand, is what Bhabha called “transforming” 
the entire economy, which has its echo in the plan document when it refers to the need for 
a ‘balanced programme of research covering every sector of the economy.’ This will 
explain why …before India attained political independence, a process of self-sustaining 
growth had not been triggered off in the economy. What was lacking was an across-the-
board application of the tools of modern science, with progress in one direction 
impinging on the other sectors, in a pattern of dynamic chain reaction (Subramaniam 
1973: 3). 
682 (Subramaniam 1968; as quoted in RAC 1968).  
683 This wheat revolution became the famous GR—as US AID Administrator Gaud explains, coining the 
term:  
These and other developments in the field of agriculture contain the makings of a new 
revolution. It is not a violent Red Revolution like that of the Soviets, nor is it a White 
Revolution like that of the Shah of Iran. I call it the Green Revolution.  
This new revolution can be as significant and as beneficial to mankind as the industrial 
revolution of a century and a half ago. … 
To the farmer, the new seeds and fertilizer represent an untried and expensive investment. 
The high yields of IR-8 depend on a combination of intensive labor and materials which 
makes it four times as costly to grow as ordinary rice. Only when the farmer sees that the 
added investment will increase his profit will he give them a try (Gaud 1968). 
684 (Nobel Committee 1970). 
685 (USDA 1961). 
686 As Brown explains, the most important aspect of the GR was to be in reshaping consciousness: 
Perhaps the most significant aspect of the farm revolution is the psychological effect it 
may have on government leaders in the developing countries. If modern technology 
should enable the developing countries to solve their food problem—a problem many 
consider insoluble—then it may give government leaders confidence in the ability of 
modern technology to solve some of the other difficult problems (Brown 1968: 27). 
687 (as cited in Dowie 2001: 106). 
688 (M.S. Swaminathan 2009a; my emphasis).   
689 (J.K. Bajaj 1982: 100; my emphasis). 
690 The GoI’s National Commission on Agriculture (NCA) numbers—on which Bajaj makes this claim —
are (detailed in his preceding paragraph) as follows:  
In Table 2, we display the plan-wise rates of growth of agricultural production, area and 
productivity. What we see there is that during the Third Plan period (1961-62 to 1964-
65), i.e., during the period immediately preceding the years when the decision to 
implement the HYVP was made, the productivity had reached an all time high rate of 
growth. The rate of growth of productivity in this period was 2.7% per annum, as 
compared to the annual growth rate of 1.4% and 1 8% achieved during the First and the 
Second Plan periods. Thus the productivity graph, far from having reached a plateau, 
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was actually moving upwards in the years before the Green Revolution. During the 
Fourth Plan (1969-70 to 1973-74), i.e. during the five year period immediately following 
the introduction of the Green Revolution technology, the rate of growth of productivity, 
however, touched an all time low of 1%. Thus it is obvious that the decline in 'the growth 
of productivity after the Green Revolution cannot be trivially explained by taking 
recourse to the law of declining marginal productivity (Bajaj 1982: 99). 
691 (Dowie 2001: 105). 
692 (Cullather 2003: 227). 
693  (Sachs 2005, Dossani 2008; Majumdar 2007). 
694 (Dossani 2008). 
695 (Sachs 2005: 177). 
696 (Majumdar 2007: 64). 
697 The technologies used in the GR initially came to India via American foundations (which had been 
working on cross-breeding improved crops in Mexico). In the American version of the GR story, the new 
agricultural technologies were the result of decades of work by Americans abroad and it was American 
men that were to credit for their global dissemination. The American rendition of the GR narrative 
summons images of “age old” hunger as the “native condition” of far-off places to paint a backdrop, 
against which the vision of a few (American) men harness the power and potential of “modern” science to 
help “feed the world” and secure against the destabilizing threat of hunger (and its feared handmaiden, 
communism). In this worldview, hunger and (geo)political stability and security are intimately linked. After 
all, Norman Borlaug (of the Rockefeller Foundation) was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize (not a science 
prize) in 1970, for ostensibly solving Asia’s endemic hunger with the new HYV (high-yielding variety) 
seeds used in the GR.   
698 The point is not that the events in their “truth” lie waiting to be uncovered, or that their “truth” needs to 
be “uncovered” and told to construct a new narrative, nor that such “truth” matters more than the lasting 
tale. This is not because such empirical “truths” are irrelevant, but rather, reading across various 
representations of events—from policy documents, to private letters, to public speeches and published 
materials, I “read” the GR’s lasting narrative, attempting to excavate and unravel the GR’s lasting power 
and address: what is at stake in this rendition of the Green Revolution story? What does this GR narrative 
reveal and conceal? What work does this success narrative do? How does this tale continue to be sustained? 
699 (Streeter and Rockefeller Foundation 1969: iii). 
700 (Streeter and Rockefeller Foundation 1969). 
701 (Streeter and Rockefeller Foundation 1969: 3-4, 7; my emphasis). 
702 (NCA vol. 1 1976: 27). 
703 As a point of comparison, the drought was more severe—although a shorter duration—than the US Dust 
Bowl of the 1930s. 
704 (Streeter 1969). 
705 This legacy and its line of argumentation not only continue today, but are made into an explicit 
case/argument for why poor people (often in African countries) do not have the right or the choice to say no 
to GM crops (see for example Paarlberg 2009).  
706 (RAC 1969b). 
707  (Law 2000: 2).   
708 (Brown 1970; as quoted in Sen 1974: 3). 
709 (Currie 1998: 90). 
710 The “success” as narrative of the GR is more clear-cut in some cases than others. A simplistic example 
of narrative “producing” its own reality could be read in the case of the GR in the Philippines GR, where 
the new rice variety 
IR-8 appeared to solve the rice crisis, and for the Marcos administration, the appearance 
of success was sufficient. The new variety covered a million acres in the Philippines in 
1968 according to IRRI (750,000 according to the CIA). U.S. intelligence reports noted 
that the gap between production and consumption of rice was about 10 percent, roughly 
what it had been before miracle rice was introduced, but that the technocrats had 
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produced a bountiful harvest through fraud. The Marcos administration, which first 
claimed self-sufficiency in 1968, maintained the illusion well into the 1970s through the 
simple device of exporting small quantities amid great fanfare while secretly importing 
tons of rice from Hong Kong and faking the figures. Marcos’s reputation as a 
modernizing, technocratic leader—as well as his victory in the 1969 election—rested on 
the feigned achievement of his Green Revolution. Marcos’s publicity agents wrote the 
early drafts of the Green Revolution legend: “Coming at the precise moment in history 
when the Philippines’ growing population was forcing the country steadily and surely 
into a maelstrom of hunger,” a spokesman elaborated, “the development of miracle rice 
marks a turning point which may not only arrest this possibility, but makes possible a 
complete reversal toward self-sufficiency” (Cullather 2004: 245; my emphasis). 
While such a case is clear-cut, it is the narratives that underwrite it—self sufficiency, technology, modern 
“knowledge,” independence—that I suggest are the powerful enabling claims, or naturalized 
understandings. It is these narratives that I seek to examine in this chapter, for they produce a “reality” and 
have far reaching material effects (such as implementing these policies and keeping Marcos in power); 
these narratives are thus more interesting to me than those (such as “the Philippines is rice self-sufficient”) 
that have a clear break from the material referent, which remains “outside.”  
711 (Birla 2002: 178). 
712 There are several reasons for this, including that the narrative itself produces: a clear intentionality (and 
its intending subject), a linear time (which in turn underwrites the imaginaries of the nation and the 
subject), an imagination of the technology (as itself almost necessarily bringing progress—manifest for 
example in the productionist paradigm). 
713   While I seek to examine “narrative” and hence I dwell more in accounts of the time than the official 
records, my account’s access to the official records is also limited by the fact that official files from the 
Ministry of Food and Agriculture and its affiliated agricultural departments and institutions are not 
available for the time period of the Green Revolution. Agriculture Ministry files from any period after the 
late 1950s are not housed at the National Archives of India (NAI) where other GoI files from the time 
period are kept; as they are not available in the National Archives these files are not available to researchers 
or the public, despite being more than 50 years old (and thus technically decommissioned). None of the 
archivists at NAI had much of an explanation as to why the files were not there, other than that the Ministry 
of Food and Agriculture simply had never released the files. However, the files from other GoI ministries 
and departments (Foreign Affairs, Aid, etc) are available and are in the NAI. From the available Indian 
Government official files I rely largely on files of the Finance Ministry, Economic Affairs, Aid Division, 
because these files come closer than other available files at the NAI to revealing the official relation 
between the US and India during this time. To gain insight into the Agriculture Ministry’s perspective on 
the GR I am confined largely to published accounts and cross-referencing with other available archival 
material at the NAI (as well as US Government and US Foundations). While the official files from the 
Ministry are not available, there are many reports and pamplets on the GR, or “new strategy,” published by 
various offices and Ministries of the GoI, many of which are available at Nehru Memorial Library and 
elsewhere. In addition, there are hundreds of texts on the GR, from the published records of the many 
symposia held across India during the 1960s to those addressing specifc questions at the time, to more 
recent scholarly and historical accounts. Drawn together, this work informs my understanding of the GR 
and provides a solid base for understanding and building an account of the dominant narratives. Likewise, 
there are many post-GR reports, such as the 14 volume National Commission on Agriculture study (1970). 
However, the perspective revealed in accounts written after the GR reflects the GR-era’s consolidation of 
shifts in understanding—that is the (change in) perspective is put forth in a fairly self-evident manner, 
unlike texts during the GR which reveal ambiguity and the sense of ongoing battle and contingency. For 
further insight, I invoke the writings of C. Subramaniam, India’s Minister of Agriculture during the GR (via 
texts of his lectures and his memoirs on the GR). Subramaniam was instrumental in bringing in the GR and 
taking ownership of it. C. Subramaniam’s accounts of how the “New Strategy” came to be largely align 
with other published and US archival material. In building an understanding of the US’s perspective, I was 
able to rely more extensively on archival data: The US Government files from the era have been 
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declassified and are available, I also rely on the personal files of the US Ambassador to India, Chester 
Bowles, on the Rockefeller Foundation’s archives, and on the personal files of Douglas Ensminger, 
President of the Ford Foundation in India.  
714   For example, statistics of agricultural yields and reports on agricultural crop production published by 
India’s National Commission on Agriculture and those of the Directorate of Economic Statistics reveal that 
India’s agricultural yields increased most rapidly in the period before the Green Revolution (NCA, GOI 
MoA 1976). This squares with what other scholars have reported: that the rate of growth in agricultural 
output in India was higher preceding the Green Revolution policies than it was during or after the Green 
Revolution (Blyn 1966; Griffin 1972).  For example, based on this official data, Balwinder Singh argues: 
According to the all-India trend growth rates of production (published by the Ministry of 
Agriculture) for two distinct periods i.e. 1949-50 to 1964-65 (pre-GR period) and 1967-
68 to 1984-85 (post GR period), there has been a deceleration in the annual growth rate 
of production during the latter period while the improvement in productivity has been 
very modest and not adequate to offset the much slower increase in area. … the 
compound growth rate of agricultural production slacked to 2.66%/annum between 1967-
68 and 1984-85, from 3.13% between 1949-50 and 1964-65 (Singh 1990: 19-20). 
And Sudhir Sen explains that “A former chairman of the Agricultural Prices Commission even went to the 
extent of claiming that the growth rate of foodgrains output had actually declined in the sixties” (Sen 14; 
see Ashok Mitra, “Bumper Harvests has created some dangerous Illusions” The Statesman Oct 14-15 
1968). 
Further troubling the idea of a (foreign) intervention suddenly revolutionizing age-old agricultural 
stagnation, discussions at the Rockefeller Foundation India and US offices in the late 1960s (as revealed in 
archival documents) were obsessed with two question: why is productivity declining despite all the 
technological upgrades and how do we get agricultural growth rates back up to what they were in the 
1950s?  The GR was an attempt at restoring these earlier growth rates. As revealed in letters and 
correspondence, the declining food production during  the GR period was a serious concern: 
In the past decade, the period of the ‘Green Revolution’ in India, the availability of food 
declined from 463.1 grams per capita per day in 1961-2 to 458.8 in 1970-71—India’s 
best food year of the record. In 1971-72 availability declined further 4 percent and, now 
more than half way through 1972-73, we’re reconciled to a further decline in availability 
during this year of about 4.6 per cent. Deterioration in quality of available food in the 
period has been even more serious as the lower yielding legumes, and important sources 
of protein in India, have been unable to compete with cereals (RAC 1973a). 
When Knowles visited they discussed with GoI possible areas of continued RF involvement. It continues:  
When the Foundation began to phase its program activities in 1970-71, India was in a 
relatively strong position in areas of Foundation involvement. Since that time she has 
been beset by one adversity after another. Food availability has declined annually—107.8 
M/T to 104.6 M/T to about 95 this year. Within the past 12 months she has exhausted not 
only her 9M/T of buffer stocks of food but also expended about two-thirds of her foreign 
exchange. At this time, India does not have sufficient foreign exchange to buy enough 
food grain to offset recent production shortfalls, even if the food grain can be found, and 
to procure fertilizers on the world market for the next crop, the target for which is 
115M/T. this tonnage is urgently needed.  The 107.8 M/T was not enough food in 1970-
71. This year she will have but about 95 M/T and 54 million more people to feed (RAC 
1973b). 
It was not just that food had declined since the peak in 1970, it had declined significantly since 1960, the 
quality of the average person’s diet had been in decline over this period as well, and buffer stocks were 
declining (ibid in letter dated March 16, 1973). But, even after noting that over the decade of the GR food 
production has declined, consumption has declined and buffer stocks have declined, the RF proceeds to 
recommend the application of “modern science” as the solution (ibid).  
The exact reason why agricultural growth rates declined during and after the GR is not entirely agreed 
upon. The lack of remunerative prices seems to have been an important factor; in the years preceding the 
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GR, this was exacerbated by the failure of the Monsoons (a drought of very significant proportion, at least 
as devastating as the US’ “dust bowl” years). Further, from the mid-1950s to late 1960s India was heavily 
dependent on US food aid; this food aid flooded the market at subsidized prices and undercut the ability of 
local farmers to compete. Central government policies intentionally kept prices low for urban consumers to 
keep wages relatively low for industrial labor. However, without assured prices (and unsure if they could 
even afford to produce in a context of cheap imported food aid), farmers’ production levels (of wheat in 
particular) steadily declined until the GR price supports.  
715 (NCA, GoI 1976, RF 1972). 
716 (Mukerji 1974: 1). 
717 (Mukerji 1974: 1). 
718 (Sen 1974: 1-2). 
719 (Chand 1970: 16; my emphasis).   
720 (Chawdhari 1970: 18).   
 721 (Mukerji 1974: 1-2). 
722 (Sen 1974: 12).  Sen suggests that: 
 One way of evaluating the recent increases in annual foodgrain output is to compare 
them with the long run trend rate of growth established in the period 1949-50 to 1964-65, 
that is before the advent [sic—or, at least their introduction into India] of the high 
yielding varieties” (11). Hence, “The expectation is that since the GR represents a sharp 
break from the past, it will have raised the long run trend rate of growth of foodgrains 
output considerably over the rate of the 3.05 per cent per annum established during the 
period of 1949-50 to 1964-65” (12). However, in comparing growth rates and yields, Sen 
assesses that there was “an improvement that can be termed at best nominal. It appears 
that in terms of rates of growth of foodgrains output, the achievement of the GR has been 
grossly overrated. The long run trend growth rate improves from 3.05 to 3.26 per cent per 
annum when the output increases between 1967-68 and 1970-71 are taken into account. It 
is hard to take this small improvement as being significant enough to merit the term 
revolution.  The record in respect of foodgrain yield is no different. …  The long run 
trend growth rate of growth in yield rose from 1.63 in 1949-50 to 1964-65, to 1.99 per 
cent per annum in 1949-50 to 1970-71 (Sen 1974: 12). 
723 (Norman Borlaug; as quoted in Paarlberg 1970: 19). 
724  (Hansra and Shukla 1991: vii; my emphasis). 
725 Rudolph and Rudolph’s (1984[1967]) account The Modernity of Tradition: Political Development in 
India rather unproblematically deploys the idea of “modernity.” While the authors do so in an attempt to 
destabilize its binary with tradition, what they tell us of modernity is in many ways more revealing.  By 
modernity they say that it generally references a universalism and cosmopolitanism, individualism and 
choice, rationalism (and the waning of faith itself for faith in science and calculation) and the mastery 
(rather than fear) of nature. Basically, the modernity they invoke could be read as the modernity featured in 
Horkheimer and Adorno’s treatise on “The Dialectic of the Enlightenment.” While Rudolph and Rudolph’s 
account aims to demonstrate some of the ways in which our Western conceptions of modernity are limited 
and that Indians are also modern (taking up the examples that their social structures are mobile, and they 
are entrepreneurial). Thus, taking on how these mis/understandings of modernity and tradition have 
produced an “analytic gap” between the ostensibly traditional and modern societies (and their 
corresponding East/West geographies). It is these divisions that are productive, promising to people that 
they can leap over to the other side. To modernity. If only they behave in the right ways. And the GR was 
one key such way, as Cullather argues the GR exemplified “the use of a technology—such as rice [or wheat 
seeds]—to visualize a boundary between tradition and modernity” (Cullather 2003: 229). 
One account that exemplifies the conception of modernity which Rudolph and Rudolph critique is 
Dipankar Gupta’s (2000) book Mistaken Modernity: India between worlds. His account of Indian 
modernity and the place of the Green Revolution therein enforces these conceptions of modernity and the 
natural role of the west as the origin and definition of modernity and civilization. His main argument is that 
the Green Revolution helped farmers produce more crops/yield on their land without the need for 
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agricultural labor and that it helped medium sized farmers become more plentiful and more prosperous, 
decreasing tensions with labourers (and the need for them, in many cases).  This simplistic sketch fits into 
his larger argument on modernity, “Whether sympathetic or critical, narratives of the Green Revolution 
follow a structure conventional to histories of technology, beginning with the inspiration of scientists, 
climaxing in the defeat of tradition, and unfolding in tables of statistics measuring harvests, revenues, and 
social disturbance” (Cullather 2003: 229). 
As has been repeatedly discussed by postcolonial scholars, the narrative of modernity is the guiding, or 
defining, narrative of development, from the time of territorial imperialism through the present day. And 
the scientism of this modernity narrative runs particularly deep in agricultural development. Modernity and 
progress conquering hunger and producing food as industrial goods in abundance, stamping out the specter 
of hunger. 
726 This is not to create a binary between discourse and materiality—for, they are in many ways not 
separable as such. Rather, this is to point out and examine this aspect of their coproduction. 
727 To see this revolution it is necessary to look beyond output levels. As Sen suggests, input levels offer 
one place to start. But more specifically, who used these inputs, how did they access them and on what 
terms, and with that effects? 
728 (M.S. Swaminathan 2009a; my emphasis).   
729 (M.S. Swaminathan 2009a; my emphasis).   
730 To be clear: by “conceal” I do not mean an agent directed process, I am not implying an intentionality to 
conceal or trick. Rather, I am interested in excavating much more than that, in understanding how this 
narrative comes to be produced through the conjuncture of a large array of factors that defined what the 
problem is, how it is to be understood, addressed, and how this entire process is to be catalyzed.  
731 (Freeman 1968: 154). 
732 (Subramaniam 1979: 48-9). 
733  (Subramaniam 1979: 46-7). 
734 (Ensminger 1972). 
735 (Norman Borlaug; as quoted in Paarlberg 1970: 19). 
736 (Subramaniam, as quoted in RAC 1968). 
737 (RAC 1966b).  
738 Borlaug complains (in a private letter to Glenn Anderson of the RF, India Agriculture Program (RAC 
1966b)). 
739  (Subramaniam 1995: 135). 
740  (Subramaniam 1995: 135). 
741 (RAC 1966b). 
742 (RAC 1966a).  
743 The policy of “concentration” was the concentration “a heavy dosage of chemical fertilizers.” This was 
the key to this new “breakthrough” and the HYVs being able to show any improvements (Subramaniam 
1995: 119). Given the limited fertilizer supplies in the country, the New Strategy sought to “maximize” 
resources by distributing these resources (chemical fertilizers) only in select “areas where irrigation is 
assured.” 
744 (RAC 1966b). 
745 (RAC 1966b). 
746  (Subramaniam 1995: 116; my emphasis). 
747 Dr. V.K.R.V. Rao was a member of the Planning Commission from1963–66. 
748 (Rao as quoted in Dayal 1968: 88-9; my emphasis). 
749 (Rao as quoted in Dayal 1968: 88-9; my emphasis). 
750 (Dandekar as quoted in Dayal 1968: 88-9; my emphasis). 
751 (Subramaniam 1995: 135). 
752 The IADP (Intensive Agricultural Development Programme) was the predecessor to the New Strategy. 
The theory behind and approach of the two programs was largely the same.  
753 (Melvin Fox, A FF consultant, as quoted in Berman 1983: 164). 
754 (Dayal 1968: 87-8; my emphasis). 
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755 (Dayal 1968: 87-8; my emphasis). 
756 (Dayal 1968: 87-8; my emphasis). 
757  (Dayal 1968: 90; my emphasis). 
758 (Subramaniam 1995: 117). 
759(Streeter and Rockefeller Foundation 1969: iii). 
760 (Subramaniam 1995). 
761 (Dowie 2006). 
762 (RAC 1966b). 
763 Borlaug advocates for a technocracy—a structure in which only agricultural technology “experts” 
should have a say—a policy structure in which there are NO social concerns, no larger questions of 
national goals, equity, development, allocation, or anything else to mind other than the management of 
“technology.” 
764 (RAC 1966b). 
765 (Borlaug “Memorandum” entitled “Considerations and actions needed to keep India’s accelerated Wheat 
production program rolling forward on Target and on Schedule.” RAC, RG 6.7, Box 82 Folder 528: 1). 
766 (Borlaug “Memorandum” entitled “Considerations and actions needed to keep India’s accelerated Wheat 
production program rolling forward on Target and on Schedule.” RAC, RG 6.7, Box 82 Folder 528: 1). 
767  (Hirschman 1967). 
768 Hirschman explains: “The Hiding Hand is essentially a way of inducing action through error” 
(Hirschman 1967: 21)—“its principal usefulness is in inducing risk-averters to commit themselves to risk-
taking behavior. This commitment permits an acceleration of economic growth ... The Hiding Hand is thus 
essentially a transition mechanism through which decision-makers learn to take risks” (Hirschman 1967: 
20; my emphasis). 
769 (Lewis 1969 House Committee on Foreign Affairs, The Green Revolution, 91st Cong, 1st sess., 5. 
December 1969, 63; as quoted in Cullather 2003: 241). 
770 (Pal 1964: 4–5; my emphasis). 
771 The speech was before The Society for International Development at the Shorehan Hotel in Washington, 
DC on March 8, 1968. 
772 “These and other developments in the field of agriculture contain the makings of a new revolution. It is 
not a violet Red Revolution like that of the Soviets, nor is it a White Revolution like that of the Shah of 
Iran. I call it the Green Revolution. This new revolution can be as significant and as beneficial to mankind 
as the industrial revolution of a century and a half ago” (Gaud 1968: my emphasis).   
773 Gaud ended his speech with a plea to the funders: 
Is the aid program in trouble because economic development does not matter - because it 
is not important? Nonsense! Development is the burning obsession of more than half the 
people in the world. Development as Pope Paul has said, is the new name for peace. 
Development does matter and it cannot wait. 
Is it because foreign aid will not work? Hardly! There is far too much evidence to the 
contrary. The story of the Green Revolution is not a story of failure, it is a story of 
success. 
Is it because we cannot afford the foreign aid program? Absurd! We are the richest and 
the most affluent nation on earth. Our Gross National Product has been increasing by tens 
of billions of dollars each year. We can afford what we want to afford (Gaud 1968). 
774 (Gaud 1968).   
775 (Gaud 1968).   
776 At this point Subramaniam was already India’s former Minister of Agriculture. 
777 (Subramaniam, as quoted in RAC 1968). 
778 (Subramaniam, as quoted in RAC 1968). 
779 (Subramaniam, as quoted in RAC 1968). 
780 (Subramaniam, as quoted in RAC 1968).  
781 Agriculture Minister Subramaniam details his battles with the Planners, explaining that it was quite 
controversial, not least because the Planners were quite opposed to the “New Strategy” of the GR. While 
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the Planners on the Commission in 1965 advocated the very Community Development approach that 
Subramaniam had declared a failure for focusing “too broadly”; however, instead of becoming mired in 
policy debates, the problem turned out to be simple enough to resolve: there was a top-down initiated 
change of leadership. When Indira Gandhi became Prime Minister, Subramaniam was appointed to the 
Planning Commission. The Commission’s stance changed accordingly, and the New Strategy and the price 
support policies were adopted. 
782 While the most vocal opposition the “New Strategy” in Parliament came from the Leftist Parties (who 
argued it would foster dependence on the US), they did not present the largest obstacle to Subramaniam 
proposed approach. Critique came on all aspects and from many quarters, and the Finance Minister’s 
resolute opposition (on the grounds that the cost of the large subsides would throw India’s approach of 
balanced development entirely out of sync) was the largest stumbling block. Subramaniam explains:  
The finance minister, T.T. Krishnamachari, was the first to object to the price policy—
because the urban population could not afford it and secondly, because “any increase in 
food prices would unsettle the planning process which was based on a certain food price 
policy. I placed my view as forcibly as possible as said my entire agricultural policy 
would depend on the price policy (Subramaniam 1993: 113). 
783 (Subramaniam 1979: 51). 
784 (Subramaniam 1979). 
785 In fact, not surprisingly many farmers did lose money and were not repaid, as multiple newspaper 
accounts of the time chronicle.  
786 (Dayal 1968: 87, summarizing Dandekar). 
787 “Our aim is maximizing the output with limited resources in the shortest possible time. The principle of 
selection of areas runs contrary to this purpose” (Dandekar as summarized by Dayal 1968: 87). 
788 (Subramaniam 1995: 119) 
789 (Subramaniam 1995: 139). 
790  (Subramaniam 1995: 138). 
791  (Subramaniam 1979: 56; my emphasis). 
792 “There has been a cry that it is only the better-off farmers who have been using the fertilizer so that we 
have been only subsidizing them. But, you have to strike a balance because if they do not use the fertilizer 
they will not produce and the whole nation will have to starve” (Subramaniam 1979: 56; my emphasis). 
793 Subramaniam’s development vision has (perhaps unexpected) resonances with the vision of another 
development “revolutionary”—US national security adviser W. W. Rostow. In his most famous move—the 
amputation of Lenin’s stagist progression of its final state (communism)—Rostow argued that instead it is 
capitalism’s “age of high mass consumption” that signifies arrival. High-mass consumption was to be the 
ultimate state of development; it is this that all societies are to strive for and prioritize in development 
policy.     
794 (Subramaniam 1995). 
795 (Dayal 1968: 78).   
796 The “New Strategy”—which later came to be known as the “Green Revolution”—was basically an even 
more targeted version of the previous agricultural modernization programs (the IAAP and IADP). These 
previous programs melded a new take on development economics (a distinctly different take than the 
Nehruvian socialism pursued thus far, and backed this new economic ideology with the power of science, a 
belief in which was in many ways a re-articulation of the longstanding faith in science and technology as 
modernity of the Indian nation state. The commitment to making agriculture remunerative coupled with the 
logic of scarcity defining the time, determining that agriculture would only become remunerative for those 
already engaged in capitalist (surplus producing) agricultural production. Only “the most productive land 
farmed by the more efficient farmers” were included in the GR approach. In order to accomplish this 
goal—of aiding industrial development—the GR took a highly targeted approach: 
The new food strategy is really an extension of the IADP initiated in 1960 and extended 
into [the] IAAP in 1964.  … under the new Food strategy or high yielding varieties 
programme, it is proposed to select within the existing IADP and IAAP areas a few 
blocks: 
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Where there is no problem of water—either the rainfall is good or the irrigation system is 
satisfactory. 
Which enjoy immunity from natural hazards such as floods, drainage problems, soil 
conservation problems, etc. 
Which have well-developed village institutions like cooperatives and village panchayats 
(Dayal 1968: 77). 
797 In this period, all development agencies from the GOI to USAID and the FF and RF emphasized the 
importance of effective planning for development.  
798 (Frankel 1972). 
799 My aim here is not to be an arbiter of development processes, but as all choices involve a politics and 
ethical stance, it can of course be noted that each of these two approaches to development can find 
justification in the instrumentalities of economic literature. The former approach—of prioritizing equity has 
been established on the rational terrain of economics as achieving desirable ends in itself: the economic 
argument being that safer societies where people have more chances, while the latter takes a different 
economic justification: employing theory rather than results to argue that this approach should be the most 
efficient and best able to produce desired results. Economic evidence for and against each approach can of 
course be mobilized; but all of the evidence requires buying into the abstract metrics of economic studies as 
able to effectively reflect society.  
800 (RAC 1966b). 
801 Before addressing the work of the seed’s “natural” materiality, it is apparent that the politics of 
knowledge is markedly absent from these narratives, swapped for a reverence of technology. This 
reverence is shared by nationalist and developmentalist narratives of the era. The faith in “Science for 
Economic Development” (Subramaniam 1972) binds the two, and the absence of the politics of knowledge 
(not to be confused with “technical know-how,” which is very much discussed in developmentalist 
narratives) cements the tale. It is not simply knowledge, but contingency, possibility, and conjuncture that 
are written out: the GR was undoubtedly controversial at the time (and its existence owes to fairly 
significant political maneuvering). 
802 (Subramaniam 1979: 35-36). 
803 (Singh 1966). 
804 (Dayal 1968: 85; my emphasis). 
805 (Dayal 1968: 85; my emphasis). 
806  (Dayal 1968: 86; my emphasis). 
807 (Subramaniam 1979: 35-36). 
808 (Subramaniam 1979: 35-36). 
809 (Subramaniam 1979: 35-36). 
810 (Subramaniam 1979: 35-36). 
811 But that is not to be the issue, collaborating with the technical framing, aggregate output was not the 
question at hand—the question had become one of how to get the particularities of the strategy through. 
That said, it must be acknowledged that if India were to follow this approach, then the new seeds they had 
procured—an investment which was by far the largest seed purchase ever made (up to that time) would risk 
being entirely in vain. The “path,” as it were, had been “set,” or written, and having set out upon this path, 
it was necessary to ensure the results of their investment—for the new seeds they had procured were 
different.  
812 This is in part because of the technology, the HYV is the only technology available—as the RF explain 
in “A Fresh Strategy…” after pointing to this problem they note that—there is not yet a new approach for 
increasing yields on dry and rain-fed lands the way there is for irrigated lands.  
813 (Ensminger 1972; FF 1962). 
814  (Subramaniam 1995: 139). 
815 (Subramaniam 1979: 56; my emphasis). 
816  (Subramaniam 1995: 138-9). 
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817  Implicit throughout this is the idea that the GR did increase production. But, as is clear from the start, 
the lack of “evidence” for this position is a major part of why it was controversial and was repeatedly 
questioned. For, not only did the field statistics not indicate significant improvements across GR districts 
(with the select exception of a few areas of Punjab), there were stories in newspapers about the failure of a 
number of the new HYVs. As the RF notes in response to one such story: the GoI bought off farmers and 
had to silence the farmers when the crop failed. 
818 (Subramaniam 1995: 139). 
819 Some argue that the perspective of the CDP as a clear failure was more a reflection of a change in the 
tide of thinking about development and part of the shift away from Nehruvianism than it was an indictment 
of the CDP itself. 
820 (Ford Foundation 1959; Subramaniam 1971). 
821 Distinct from the question of “technicizing” is the question of technology (and the role of technology in 
imagining modernity). The GR success narrative is marked by a repeated sleight-of-hand, in which 
technology and technocracy are deployed in the service of the other—as if to accept or use new technology 
a society must also surrender all (social, political, economic) decisions to the technocratic framework, a 
framework in which the criteria assessed are not those of the larger question at hand, but rather simply the 
relevant (i.e. measurable) criteria of one quantifiable aspect of one of the technologies among those that 
could possibly be used. That is, the “technical decisions” Borlaug references are not considerations of, or 
decisions about the question or problem, but rather are decisions about one among a multitude of possible 
approaches, masquerading as the (only) solution. In this move the actual problem is obscured, the 
technological solution functions to efface the possibility of discussion and inserts in its place the ostensible 
solution as what now must be attended to. It is a sleight-of-hand that writes out the question of whether this 
technology could or should be a solution, and instead deposits it as the only means of managing the 
problem. Moreover, the “solution” operates with authority of the weight and urgency and of the problem’s 
moral imperative. This is the collaborative work of technicizing and technology that we see in the GR’s 
quantitative yield success narrative. Managing HYVs properly comes to stand in for managing the 
problems of inequity—in land, in food access, in inequality and in power relations—between individuals, 
groups, communities, governments, agencies/ministries within a government (inequities of hunger and lack 
of access). It becomes: if we just manage these few inputs properly, then all the other (much larger and 
more systemic) problems will be treated and will decrease or go away. This isn’t just the process of 
technicization, it is also concomitant with the process of industrialization and dispossession—
masquerading behind “technical expertise.” 
822 (Ford Foundation 1962). 
823 (RAC 1969a; my emphasis). 
824 (RAC 1969a; my emphasis).  
825 Not meeting goals at large, and in some more specific cases spectacularly fa  iling (RAC 1973a, 1973b). 
826 (RAC 1969a; my emphasis). 
827 (NCA 1976). 
828 A 1973 RF report offers a sharp contrast to a report two decaces earlier which had discussed the quantity 
and quality of food available and the need to supplement vegetarian diets with animal protein. The earlier 
report was written in the early 1950s around the time of the RF’s arrival in India and while the RF did not 
publically engage in a program of trying to change diets from vegetarianism, by 1973 they note that the 
avaialibility of both grains and of vegetarian proteins (legumes) have both suffered during the GR. The RF 
report notes this as the Foundation was preparing to wrap up and phase out their programs in India (when 
Knowles visited the RF and GoI did discuss possible areas of continued RF involvement). The report (dated 
June 26 1973) worries about the state of the country’s agricultural future, explaining:  
Since that time [1970-71] she [India] has been beset by one adversity after another. Food 
availability has declined annually—107.8 M/T to 104.6 M/T to about 95 this year. Within 
the past 12 months she has exhausted not only here 9M/T of buffer stocks of food but 
also expended about two-thirds of her foreign exchange. At this time, India does not have 
sufficient foreign exchange to buy enough food grain to offset recent production 
shortfalls, even if the food grain can be found, and to procure fertilizers on the world 
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market for the next crop, the target for which is 115M/T. this tonnage is urgently  needed.  
The 107.8 M/T was not enough food in 1970-71. This year she will have but about 95 
M/T and 54 million more people to feed.  
As far as quality of the diet is concerned, we have by virtue of our contribution to cereal 
technology worsened the competitive position of legumes. A decade ago, when the impact 
of improved technology for cereals was beginning to be felt the diet contained about 62 
gr/cap/day. In the intervening decade, legume production has been static, so population 
growth diluted by 1970-71 the legume fraction of the diet to about 49 gr/cap/day, and the 
competitive position of legumes to cereals is worsening annually (RAC 1973b; my 
emphasis). 
829 (Rao 1967). 
830 (Rao 1967: 12). 
831 (Rao 1967: 12). 
832 In fact, the FF’s Ensminger notes that Rao was his strongest opponent when Ensminger was pushing for 
a policy change to the NS, but that with the course of evenets, even Rao was eventually convinced (to some 
degree) of the NS’s necessity. 
833 (Rao 1967: 12). 
834 (Rao 1967: 12). 
835  (Rao 1967: 21-22). 
836 (Saberwal, Vasant, interview by author. New Delhi. March 2, 2011; Bhutani, Shalini, interview by 
author. New Delhi. March 16, 2011.). 
837 (RAC 1969b). 
838  The implication is that even if they will not be statistically more productive, now that the GoI has 
committed to this path it must at least get the yield increase from these areas, even if that means taking all 
fertilizer (and any other limited forms of support) away from other areas (Subramaniam 1979).   
839 (For example see Muller and Patel 2004 and Ghosh 2002). 
840 (World Bank 1986). 
841  (Nobel Committee 1970; my emphasis). 
842 (Nobel Committee 1970). 
843 (Kennedy 1963: 2). 
844 (Nixon May 28, 1969). 
845 (Singh July 19, 2005). 
846 The 1965 US tethering of food aid to India’s implementation of the “New Strategy” (which came to be 
known as the Green Revolution) is considered to be the only “successful” use of “food as a weapon” in the 
history US foreign policy. This term was used by Nixon’s agricultural Secretary Earl Butz—who argued 
that instead of deploying military force, the US should foster food dependence as then the US could “starve 
nations into submission” (Paarlberg 1985; Thomson 1992; Perkins 1997; Ahlberg 2003). 
847 (Ahlberg 2008; Thompson 1992; Wallerstein 1980).  
848 (Paarlberg 1970: 18-19).  
849 (Paarlberg 1970: 18-19). 
850 (Cullather 2004: 247). 
851 Editorial Cartoon commenting on aid conditionalities (image depicts US President Johnson and Indian 
Prime Minister Shastri, the caption reads: “I’m sure you won’t mind a li’l old string to go with that wheat, 
pardner…”) clipping from the Hindustan Times (9/30/1965), Chester Bowles Files, Yale Library Archives. 
852  (Paarlberg 1970: 18-19). 
853 (Cullather 2010: 218). 
854 George Rosen, who worked on economic development in India and with the Ford Foundation’s India 
programs, in his book reflecting on the Ford Foundation’s work in South Asia, explains that in the 
Foundation’s programs and more generally in development work: “the religious basis for the activity had 
been abandoned, to be replaced by a secular moral imperative that emphasized direct economic and social 
change. The science of economics had replaced medicine as the spearhead of the attack on poverty” (Rosen 
1985: 7). 
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855 (Subramaniam1979: 54). 
856 A slightly more nuanced version of this is offered, for example by John Lewis Gaddis in his forward to 
Michael Latham’s seminal text on the geopolitics of development in the Cold War “Modernization as 
Ideology.” As Gaddis characterizes: 
Ideologies make it easier than it might otherwise be to cope with reality. They provide 
simple models of complex phenomena. They suggest directions in which history is 
moving. They generate rhetorical justifications for action. And because ideologies 
perform these tasks, they tempt the leaders of states into relying upon them as guides to 
action (Gaddis, in Latham 2010: x). 
This view presumes that the leaders who rely on and mobilize these claims do so for a distinct and larger 
end project; for something else, outside of what they say, and that the ideological claims they make to get 
them there are simply that, a means. 
857 In an effort to turn previous understandings of ideology, particularly those in Cold War scholarship, on 
their head—scholarship that saw ideology as something “they” have (read: the USSR), while “we,” on the 
other hand, the implicit claim is, have the truth. Aiming to expand this understanding of ideology, Gaddis 
asks: 
Historians of the Cold War have been reassessing the role of ideology in the former 
Soviet Union, its Eastern European satellites, and the People's Republic of China. New 
archival sources suggest that within these states ideology played all of these roles: that 
Marxism-Leninism frequently determined foreign policy priorities. 
But what about the United States? Was there a comparable American ideology during the 
Cold War? (Gaddis, in Latham 2010: x). 
The essential limitation, however, remains, as the basic understanding of ideology that he takes is still the 
same; this view is the idea that ideologies are “false,” that their main work is in masking reality, and 
correspondingly that there is a concrete reality that is entirely different, waiting to be unmasked and 
revealed. As such, while this view is here expanded to include the United Sates as also using and buying 
into an ideology, the problem is that this not only deploys a gods-eye-view understanding of the world, it is 
also enabled by, reliant on, and reinforces an understanding of objective knowledge that is part of the very 
modernist ideology they seek to critique.  
858 That is, “ideology” must be understood as functioning in and through its practices and mechanisms.  As 
such, the relation between ideology and acts/action is regulated through material practice.  
859 As such, this is integrally bound with the understanding of reading discussed in Chapter 4. Ideology is 
what makes possible the creation of particular kinds of subjects—not only the subject of development, but 
(given how development has since come to be defined) more specifically “modern market subjects.”  This 
is not simply because of the view of the market or people’s relation to it; much more foundational than that, 
it is because ideology is characterized by “creating certainties as certainties”—that is, by making and 
securing the very foundations of meaning and their referents as solid and beyond question.  Ideology also 
performs more than a “naturalizing” function; ideology, creates the very foundations on which things can 
then come to be naturalized, it allows for us to understand things as naturalized.  
860 (Althusser 1965; Cultural studies now 2011). 
861 (Althusser 1969: 233). 
862 While there is an extensive literature on both food and agricultural aid, much of this focuses on the 
practices of aid and its effects, largely neglecting the logic of aid. In doing so, these works miss (a key 
component of) the “larger picture,” or context, which is necessary to understand the geopolitics of aid in 
development. Agricultural aid cannot be fully understood without addressing its functioning as a 
knowledge project. I explore the epistemologies propagated through these projects.  For, it is through 
these—their practices and effects—that particular forms of knowledge come to be produced, legitimated, 
and become dominant. Hence, it is in these practices and effects that the processes and assumptions of 
these forms of knowledge can be observed, pried open, and unpacked. The core aspect of development aid 
has been the expansion of the reach of the market; during the GR this was promoted under the banner of 
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fighting Communism, and today neoliberal development discourse proclaims that this project of market 
expansion is itself a means to alleviate poverty.   
863 (Ahlberg 2008; Juma 2005; Seshia and Scoones 2003; Krupadanam 1985; Kux 1992; Prasad 1980; 
Wallerstein 1980). 
864 “India's  most  pressing  economic  need  in  late  1949  was  for food assistance to  stave off a possible 
famine. With this in mind, Nehru asked the President for a million tons of wheat to provide a stronger food 
reserve” (Kux 1992: 79). 
865 (Ahlberg 2008; Juma 2005; Seshia and Scoones 2003; Krupadanam 1985; Kux 1992; Prasad 1980; 
Wallerstein 1980). 
866 US Public Law 480, later known as “Food for Peace,” was created in 1954 under US President 
Eisenhower. At the time Europe no longer wanted US post-War food aid, and as the US had massive 
surpluses, it sought new places to ship this food. This food aid was part of the 1954 bill for massive US 
food-aid to the ‘Third World’—known as the PL 480, or ‘Food for Peace’— which was integrally about 
fighting the ‘spread’ of communism (Ahlberg 2003; Perkins 1997). 
867 (Krupadanam 1985). 
868 By 1960, the PL 480 food aid transaction had been expanded to a four-year agreement which required: 
[T]he creation of a national food reserve with one-fourth of the wheat and all of the rice 
[from the US] set aside by the Indian Government for this purpose.  
“For a country as large as ours with a population of over 400,000,000 people and a history 
of recurring food shortages, a national reserve is of paramount importance,” said Food 
Minister Patil in signing the agreement (Patil, 1956; as quoted in McGovern 1964: 88). 
869 The following images from a USIS (United States Information Services) pamphlet titled “Overcoming 
India’s Food Problem” distributed in India depict the process of US food aid disbursement (courtesy of 
Bowles files, Yale Library Archives). 
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870 GoI archival records clearly explain that maize could be attained cheaper from Africa, and often at better 
quality and likewise with rice from Thailand and other less expensive Asian countries (Ministry of Food, 
NAI, 1957). 
871 India was bartering mainly with manganese ore, tea, jute, cotton, indigo and a few other raw 
commodities (Ministry of Food, NAI, 1957, 1958). 
872 Beyond this, since the surpluses were a side-effect of propping up farm prices at home, Cullather (2010) 
explains tht the US promised access to the surplus food for as long as India wanted it. However, the notes 
of negotiation reveal that the terms of this promise were always at least somewhat conditional; the US and 
Indian Governments at this time were trading 450,000 metric tons of foodgrains (in exchange for the 
equivalent value of ore). Because this was a trade relation, no foreign exchange was involved except for the 
freight on the wheat. As India sought to increase the amount of wheat, the US initially said no and 
suggested the allotted wheat should be enough for the year and India needed to get any more wheat 
somewhere else. As India continued to request more wheat, the US implied to India that their PL480 
prospects would be better if the bartering deals were concluded—apparently to help counter domestic 
arguments that the US was just giving food away. Food aid rather than food barter or trade moves forward, 
but as it does all kinds of other little issues come up, like shipping and interest rates on the shipping and the 
speed at which the wheat being sent, what type of wheat, etc.) (Ministry of Food, NAI, 1957, 1958). 
873 But even the US could not provide sufficient quantities of food under PL480, and bartering (for 
manganese ore) remained a method India pursued to attain supplementary food grain (Ministry of Food, 
NAI, 1957, 1958).  
874  Moreover, the US specified that they in turn use these rupees to “promote India’s development” and 
that they sought to promote India’s trade and role in the global economy instead: “America does not use 
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rupees from PL 480 shipments to purchase India’s good and import them to the United States. This kind of 
barter programme would deprive India of needed currencies she can earn with her goods on the world 
market” (USIS, NAI, 1964: 5). Instead, the rupees were used as part of aid as a larger knowledge project to 
provide grants and loans for development and to establish agricultural universities based on the US Land-
Grant model. 
875 One of the main debates around PL 480 in India became its “inflationary effects;” this policy was later 
changed (both in India and the) after which the US accepted only US dollars in the 1970s (Laliwala 1968; 
GoI, Department of Economic Affairs, 1968; Desai 1973). 
876 (Patel 2008). 
877  (Cullather 2010; Rosen 1985). 
878 The approach of redressing uneven land distribution seemed necessary to many, and was advocated by 
various bodies ranging from USAID to several Indian task forces that had been established to study the 
issue, including those disbursed to China in an attempt to determine why China’s yields were so much 
higher than India’s, it was found that yields increased following land reform. 
879  (Cullather 2010; Rosen 1985). 
880 For example: 
Hubert H. Humphrey, one of those most responsible for P.L. 480, saw its potential this 
way: “I have heard . . . that people may become dependent on us for food. I know that 
was not supposed to be good news. To me that was good news, because before people 
can do anything they have got to eat. And if you are looking for a way to get people to 
lean on you and to be dependent on you, in terms of their cooperation with you, it seems 
to me that food dependence would be terrific (Humphrey 1955, as quoted in Omvedt 
1975: 15).  
881 (Cullather 2010; Ahlberg 2008: 108; Gupta 1998; Gunder Frank 1973).   
882 (RAC 1951a: 4).  
883 (Rockefeller, Nelson 1951: 523). 
884  Another prominent international actor during the Cold War era, the Ford Foundation, largely shared this 
perspective. Two years earlier in 1949 the Ford Foundation set about to more specifically delineate its 
aims, focusing on “human welfare” and the existing state of knowledge to determine “where problems are 
most important and where additional efforts toward their solution are most needed” (Ford Foundation 1949: 
9).  Repeatedly assessing that “today’s more critical problems are…social rather than physical in 
character—those which arise in man’s relation to man rather than in his relation to nature” (Ford 
Foundation 1949: 14), the Gaither Report then—seemingly contra its own assessment—declares that the 
issue that is “[f]undamental to any consideration of human welfare is human survival. All efforts to prolong 
life, to prevent malnutrition and famine” are necessary (Ford Foundation 1949: 17). The report is largely 
“rights”-based and repeatedly asserts of the need to solidify liberal values, with less commentary of the 
specifics of the programs to come.  This most often articulated in a technocratic faith:  
Ford Foundation officer Melvin Fox commented that people at the foundation believed 
that they could transfer to developing nations the technology and the conceptions about 
modernization that they had helped to popularize. They assumed that the transference of 
the concepts and techniques necessary for modernization would quickly result in full-
blown development.  Indeed, once the transference was accomplished: “modernization, it 
was felt, would flow like water over a dam automatically.” There was a genuinely held 
believe at Ford during the 1960s Fox continued, that by “transferring some of our know-
how, we would enable [those] countries to, if not take off in the sense in which that term 
was used by Walter Rostow some years ago, at least begin the climb toward 
modernization (Berman 1983: 164; quoting his interview with Melvin Fox). 
South Asia became a major cite of focus and the sector of concern was village development. In 1950-51 
India had a very low agricultural output; ‘the country was in the grip of a serious food shortage and food 
prices were ruling at high levels’” (Rosen 1985: 9; quoting from GOI Ministry of Food & Agriculture, 
Report of the Food Grains Enquiry Commission, 1957). In this context, the Ford Foundation went to India 
with big dreams: they thought that villagers’ incomes could be raised by 50% in 3-4 years (Rosen 1985: 
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15-16). They set about to begin this endeavor by “start[ing] in the field of village development, since such 
‘a development program in India might have some effect in warding off the political crisis which is bound 
to come… at a future time if economic conditions continue to deteriorate as they have so far’” (Rosen 
1985: 9; quoting from Howard’s report to Chester Davis). And, also in part because there were not private 
American parties there yet, they essentially sought to create a privately led Marshall Plan for India. The 
project in India was deeply entwined with fighting the specter of Communism (represented both by the 
Soviets, China and in general). Citing “the Marshall Plan as ‘the most spectacular demonstration of what 
economic aid can contribute by helping people to help themselves’. … economically as well as in terms of 
resisting communist political control” the Ford Foundation’s Paul Hoffman advocated the same in India 
(Rosen 1985: 11; quoting Hoffman). 
885 This notion—of an “enlightened self-interest”—remains a central tenet of US liberal expansion to this 
day (see for example Obama’s 2013 Inauguration speech). 
886 (RAC 1951a: 4).  
887 In the 1940s, the Rockefeller Foundation’s international efforts had been largely confined to Europe, but 
in the 1950s it became increasingly concerned with the non-European world—not only with the issue of 
hunger and food but also as it tied to concerns with development and poverty more generally.  Hunger and 
overpopulation were credited as root cause of political instability, the Rockefeller Foundation program 
directors argued:  
What now are the great enemies of the welfare of mankind? Hunger, the incapacity of the 
hungry, the resulting general want, the pressures of expanding and demanding 
population, and the reckless instability of people who have nothing to lose and perhaps 
something to gain by embracing new political ideologies designed not to create individual 
freedom but to destroy it—these seem to be basic dangers of our present world (RAC 
1951a: 1). 
In 1951 the Rockefeller Foundation, laying out its program philosophy, declared the largest problem facing 
humanity to be hunger, and that the main problem driving hunger was population growth. Diagnosing 
hunger in a simplistic Malthusian framework of people outpacing resources (rather than as having political, 
economic, social or other drivers), the Foundation resolved to modernize India’s agricultural production. 
The RF summed up the root of the hunger problem as “(population)/(resources) = (well being);” their faith 
in the social as itself regulated by science shone through. But, while they saw population as essential, they 
came to the conclusion that they it was not going to be feasible to directly intervene to limit India’s 
population growth, as such they focused heavily on modernizing India’s agricultural sector (RAC 1951a).   
888 (Unger 2011; Brinkman 2009). 
889 (Rockefeller, Nelson 1951: 526). 
890 (Rockefeller, Nelson 1951: 525). 
891  “But  the  aim  of  our foreign economic policy should  remain  constant in peace, in emergency, or  in 
war, if  war  cannot  be  avoided.  we  live up to  our pronouncements, we  shall  conduct  our  economic  
affairs  as  a  whole  in a way to  further  the healthy, balanced development and  the progressively  larger  
yield of  the  economies   all peoples who  elect  to belong to  the  free-world trading  system” (Nelson 
Rockefeller 1951: 526). 
892 (Rockefeller, Nelson 1951). 
893 “The rudimentary character of manufacturing and industry in the underdeveloped world explained why 
the first objective was to be a drive to increase food production. Of course this would be costly, but he 
pointed to the annual US military budget of $60 billion: the cost of conquering hunger would be lower he 
[Rockefeller] said, than the cost of military control, and his strategy might even reduce military budgets” 
(Anderson et al 1991: 22-23).   
894 (Millikan 1957). 
895 (Rostow 1960). 
896 (Hirschman 1958). 
897 (Shils 1963: 8).  
898 “The United States could “offer the example of a successful colonial revolution against imperialism; it 
could offer the continuing effort to keep many ethnic strains from living together in peace in a complex 
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society; it could offer finally, the image of the independent farmer and of the career still largely open to 
talent” (Lerner 1957: 894). 
899 (Lipset 1963). 
900 American experts were convinced that technology itself could bring the revolution they aimed to 
instigate—it “could inspire changes in behavior and thought, it could instill a sense of rationality, 
efficiency, and respect for empiricism in contrast to native passivity” (Latham 2003: 3). 
901 “The key, Mahalanobis concluded from his studies of the USSR, was steel. It was steel, he claimed, that 
turned underdeveloped Russia into an economic power in less than four decades” (Engerman 2004: 33; 
Mahalanobis 1985: 5). 
902 (Bowles 1968: 12). 
903  Bowles explains: “The United States and other developed countries have a massive stake in India’s 
survival as a democratic nation offering increasing opportunities to its people. America’s legitimate 
national interest is to assist India’s economic progress and support India’s own drive to achieve political 
stability, with a growing measure of social justice” (1968: 11). But, he worries, as: “The Export-Import 
Bank and one or two members of the [Western aid to India] Consortium are already taking more money out 
of India than they are putting in. unless the net assistance to India can be maintained at an adequate level 
for a few more years, India will almost certainly be forced to reverse the present trend toward a dynamic, 
market-oriented economic operation within a free society” (1968: 12).  
Bowles continues, saying if India were to decline or collapse the impact would be comparable to China 
becoming communist. And that “No person who understands America’s long-range national interest in a 
stable Asia will deny that an independent democratic India… is at least as vital as Southeast Asia” (1968: 
12). But Bowles is concerned with how much the US spends in Vietnam compared to the pittance in India: 
if the US were to spend over a full year what it spends in a mere 10 days in Vietnam, then it could “also 
provide a persuasive demonstration that developing nations do not need to follow in the bloody, totalitarian 
steps of Communist China to achieve political stability and rapid economic growth” (Bowles 1968: 13). 
904 (Bowles 1968: 6). 
905 (Bowles 1968: 7). 
906 (Bowles 1968). 
907 (Bowles 1968). 
908 (Bowles 1968: 13). 
909 (Bowles 1968: 13). 
910 (Bowles 1968: 13). 
911  (Bowles 1968).  
912  (Bowles 1968).  
913 (Bowles 1968: 7; my emphasis). 
914 (Rostow 1955: 30). 
915 (Rostow 1955: 30). 
916 (Rostow 1955: 30). 
917 (Rostow 1955: 30). 
918 (Rostow 1955: 30; my emphasis). 
919 India had a commitment to emphasizing this in the first plan, “There was a new approach. Emphasis was 
to be placed on the rapid development of heavy machine building, heavy electricals, steel and non-ferrous 
metals, and energy to supply a sound foundation for economic self-reliance” (Mahalanobis 1961: 5).  
Likewise: 
…in the Second Five Year Plan, which marked a radical break with the old way of 
thinking. It was realized that unemployment and poverty can be cured only through rapid 
industrialization. … It was necessary to increase the supply of energy and of machinery 
and tools of production to create more employment. …the only way to do this in a big 
country like India was to establish, as rapidly as possible, the basic steel, heavy machine 
building, and heavy electicals, industries and chemical engineering (Mahalanobis 1961: 
95).   
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Hence, while “[i]n India the highest priority must be given to the establishment and expansion of the basic 
industries” this is not all that the Planers were focused on. Agriculture remained a significant concern. The 
approach to reforming agriculture however, was to try to address social and political aspects (hindering 
production) rather than a capital intensive approach. He continues that: “in India, the production of an 
agricultural surplus is the key to industrialization. It is … necessary to produce a surplus … land reform 
and the organization of village cooperatives are urgent and essential needs for increasing agricultural 
production” (Mahalanobis 1961: 95-6). Thus, while the US saw itself as a model, the realities in these 
places were of course very different. 
920 (Dowie 2001: 109). 
921 (Rosen: 1985). 
922  The “problem” was identified and defined based upon what the institutions wanted these changes to 
look like and how they wanted (the eventual GR) to transform society. These changes were based in ideas 
that had been laid out years earlier, ideas which themselves were deeply limited. It was not a lack of 
knowledge as much as an inability to think otherwise that defined poverty and its solution in this way. A 
foundational premise was the view that increasing capital and technology in themselves constitute 
development, resting on the idea that development and modernization needed to take a particular path. Both 
of these perspectives continue to underwrite development assumptions.   
923 As Nelson Rockefeller—chairman of the US’s International Development Advisory Board, tasked with 
expanding the Marshall Plan and Truman’s Point Four activities beyond Europe to encompass a global 
scale—argued (in his article “Widening Boundaries of National Interest” where he suggests the 
establishment of the agency to carry these tasks out): 
3. Since  the security and  continued prosperity of  the  United States  and  other relatively 
industrialized  nations  can  be  maintained only if there  is complementary  progress in  
the economically backward areas, we  should  assume  the leadership in  a  concerted 
productive effort  which  will promote both  their  interests  and  ours.  
4.  Basic  to  the accomplishment of  this purpose is  a  flow  of  investment capital,  
carrying with  it  technical  and managerial  skills, to  create  and  harness  mechanical 
power and production tools  and equipment so  that they  supplement the  work  of  
human  muscles. Our policy should focus on creating conditions that permit and 
encourage such transfers, under procedures that avoid imperialism (Rockefeller, N. 1951: 
523; my emphasis). 
924 (Galbraith 1979: v-iv). 
925 American experts were convinced that technology itself could bring the revolution they aimed to 
instigate—it “could inspire changes in behavior and thought, it could instill a sense of rationality, 
efficiency, and respect for empiricism in contrast to native passivity” (Latham 2003: 3). 
926 (USDA FAS 1965: 12).   
927 Similarly “The Rockefeller Foundation adopted a “technology first” approach—articulated in “the firm 
belief that new technology is the leading factor in the process of desired social change because technology 
is also the locomotive of economic growth. RF officials understood the importance of demonstrating the 
efficacy of technology in the field, visible to governments and publics. But their approach was always in a 
measured relation their attempt to reform existing institutions or create new ones. In the RF’s immediate 
environment, there was also a compelling attraction to the prospect of ‘behavior science,’ a kind of science 
which would permit social engineering comparable to biological engineering being proposed for agriculture 
which actually was being tested in the RF’s project in Mexico. … But despite this interest in social 
engineering there was the perception that eventually the new technologies could be applied to the solution 
of the problem of insufficient food production with little reference to the less tractable problem of food 
maldistribution or the thorny issue of land reform.  Technology would be the leading factor in the profound 
changes which governments appeared to desire and which the RF believed to be inevitable” (Anderson et al 
1991: 31).  
928  (Anderson et al 1991: 31). 
929 (Ford 1959: 14). 
930 (Ford 1959: 14). 
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931 (Ford 1959: 21). 
932 (Thorner 1959: 904; my emphasis). 
933 (Cullather 2010). 
934 (Kennedy 1963). 
935 “The real goal, therefore, must be to produce more food in the nations that need it. Know-how is not the 
problem. For the first time in the history of the world we do know how to produce enough food now to feed 
every man, woman, and child in the world, enough to eliminate all hunger completely. Farm production has 
undergone a scientific revolution which is dwarfing the industrial revolution of 150 years ago, but this 
means that agricultural departments and ministries and governments and citizens must make a greater and 
more systematic effort to share this knowledge. For the first time to know how to conquer the problem and 
not conquer it would be a disgrace for this generation. We need to help transmit all that we know of farm 
technology to the ends of the earth, to overcome the barriers of ignorance and suspicion. The key to a 
permanent solution to world hunger is the transfer of technology which we now have to food deficit 
nations, and that task, second to none in importance, is the reason for this Congress” (Kennedy 1963: 2). 
936 (Kennedy 1963). 
937 Similarly, “The Rockefeller Foundation adopted a “technology first” approach—articulated in “the firm 
belief that new technology is the leading factor in the process of desired social change because technology 
is also the locomotive of economic growth. RF officials understood the importance of demonstrating the 
efficacy of technology in the field, visible to governments and publics. But their approach was always in a 
measured relation their attempt to reform existing institutions or create new ones. In the RF’s immediate 
environment, there was also a compelling attraction to the prospect of ‘behavior science,’ a kind of science 
which would permit social engineering comparable to biological engineering being proposed for agriculture 
which actually was being tested in the RF’s project in Mexico. … But despite this interest in social 
engineering there was the perception that eventually the new technologies could be applied to the solution 
of the problem of insufficient food production with little reference to the less tractable problem of food 
maldistribution or the thorny issue of land reform. Technology would be the leading factor in the profound 
changes which governments appeared to desire and which the RF believed to be inevitable” (Anderson et al 
1991: 31).  
938 While India was not the first developing country to use HYVs, the National Commission on Agriculture 
maintains that India was the first to use HYVs specifically as a tool for development (National Commission 
on Agriculture, GoI 1976). 
939  As Minister Food and Agriculture Patil  had explained earlier on upon signing an agreement for food 
disbursement “Freed from the anxiety of food shortages we shall be able to concentrate our efforts and 
energies to the all-around development of our country” (Patil, 1956; as quoted in McGovern 1964: 88).   
940 (Cullather 2010). 
941 The PL 480 (Food for Peace) program eventually tapered off not because of its effects on suppressing 
domestic production, but because of US mandates; there became more and more “strings” or the 
conditionalities on this food aid—in the name of “self-help” and national food security. 
942 “Self-help,” as US Secretary of Agriculture Orville Freeman explained: 
Unless we can call up the will to bring about a better balance between food and 
population, modern civilization will be racked by increasing turmoil and unrest... When 
this happens, a world based on reason and reasoned action will be gravely threatened.  
Who should produce food for our hungry world?... 
To date the United States has been the only country willing to pay its own producers to 
grow food to give away in significant quantities over a sustained period. But, even with 
our large resources, we cannot afford to continue such a policy indefinitely. Moreover, it 
is very likely that exploding populations in the less developed countries will outrun the 
productive capacity of the United States and other developed nations before the turn of 
the century.   
Instead of trying to feed the world, we must work at top speed and with tireless 
determination toward the only possible long term answer: the bulk of the world’s food 
must be produced where it is consumed. Countries with capital and know-how and 
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countries with hungry people must form a partnership to mobilize the resources needed 
to increase total food production… Meanwhile, we buy time with food aid. The problem 
facing us is more than national or regional; it is world-wide. Its solution demands great 
international effort (Freeman 1968: xi). 
943 (Ahlberg 2008; Prasad 1980; Wallerstein 1980).  
944 (Sharma 1997; Majumder 2004). 
945 (Johnson, 1965; US Congressional records 1966). 
946 As Johnson’s tapes and archives record: 
Johnson was seriously concerned about “give-aways” at a time when the grain surplus in 
the United States was depleted and he was facing the prospect of a $135 billion budget. 
In a follow-up conversation with Freeman on November 11, Johnson said that in future 
food allotments he wanted to know what the United States was going to get in return for 
its food. “Usually we just get kicked in the pants. That's what she [Gandhi] does to us. 
She'll call old Tito or somebody else and just give us hell. I don't want to write her 
foreign policy, but it looks to me the least they could do, right before our election, is quit 
kicking us.” (FRUS 389 1966). 
947 (Johnson 1971; Prasad 1980; Wallerstein 1980; Kux 1992; Ahlberg 2008). 
948 “The Perkins Committee, a special presidential advisory group on foreign aid that included Gaud, 
Dwayne Andreas of Archer Daniels Midland, and David Rockefeller, urged that this momentary leverage 
should be used “to force India to increase her agricultural productivity.” The force had to be subtle, 
however. “Any such use of our power must be done cautiously,” the committee warned. “Such a policy has 
hazards and the powerful and rich cannot do this sort of thing too publicly” (Perkins Committee, “Minutes 
of Meeting with McGeorge Bundy,” 12 October 1965, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968: 
117; as quoted in Cullather 2003: 242). 
949 (Kux 1992; Prasad 1980; Wallerstein 1980; Freeman 1968; McGovern 1964). 
950 (Kux 1992: 242-3, referencing Johnson, L.B. 1971: 222-24.).  
951  (Cullather 2010; Ahlberg 2008; Cohen and Tucker 1994; Kux 1992; Prasad 1980; Wallerstein 1980; 
Freeman 1968; McGovern 1964).  
952 While the US vision seeks to provide an unshakable monolithic meta-narrative—something for societies 
to hold onto as they climb history, the vision was not as stark outside of US centers of thought and power. 
As Mahalanobis declared: “It is now accepted, …that economic planning in the USSR ... has led to a far 
more rapid rate of industrialization than had been achieved in Western Europe and the United States in the 
past” (Mahalanobis 1985).  “The key, Mahalanobis concluded from his studies of the USSR, was steel. It 
was steel, he claimed, that turned underdeveloped Russia into an economic power in less than four 
decades” (Engerman 2004: 33).  
 953 (FRUS 253 1965),  
954 (ibid: 187; FRUS 253 1965).      
955 “It was agreed that: 
1. Investment in agriculture during the fourth Five Year Plan (1966–67 to 1970–71) 
would be 2,400 crore rupees (nearly 5 billion dollars) or more than double the investment 
levels during the third plan period ending this year. 
2. Investment in agriculture during the coming year (1966–67) would be increased by at 
least 40 percent above the current year even though the emergency might require 
cutbacks in other areas of investment. 
3. Investment in agriculture next year (1966–67) will be 410 crore rupees as against 304 
this year.” (FRUS 253 1965).  
956 By the mid-1960s India received as much as 60% of its wheat from the US through PL480 (Sharma 
1997). 
957 As Kux explains “Not  trusting  the  Department  of Agriculture, the President had NSC staffer Robert 
Komer check out  details of shipping grain from  the  Gulf of Mexico to  India. According to Komer, the 
President wanted to know exactly how long he could delay shipments” (Kux 1992: 243; based on Kux’s 
interview with Komer). 
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958 (FRUS 253 1965).  
959 (FRUS 253 1965).  
960 While US development approach was shifting somewhat from earlier modernization theory which 
focused on industrialization, it retained the same tenets and understanding of society, simply transferring 
these to agriculture. The Big Push that USAID is concerned with via the “New Strategy” is borrowed from 
modernization theory—as Rosenstein-Rodan (1961: 7) explains: “Proceeding ‘bit by bit’ will not add up in 
its effects to the sum total of the single bits. A minimum quantum of investment is a necessary, though not 
sufficient, condition for success. This, in a nutshell, is the contention of the theory of the big push.” 
961 (Rostow 1960: 4-16). 
962 As US aid projects aimed to scale back the amount of food disbursed they also increased the emphasis 
on agricultural technologies, as depicted in these images from the USIS (1965? (undated?): 3, 10) 
publication “Overcoming India’s Food Problem.” 
  
963 The Green Revolution in India was pushed by the US through the tethering of food-aid to steps toward 
industrial (chemical-based) agriculture. The leveraging power was considerable as by the mid-1960s India 
received as much as 60% of its wheat from the US through PL480 (Sharma 1997). The US requirements 
stated that food aid disbursement was contingent upon India’s purchase of fertilizers, or domestic 
manufacture thereof, and also required that India liberalize its agro-input production sector (fertilizers, etc) 
and allow increased foreign investment (Wallerstein 1980). The US’s interests in the Green Revolution in 
India are generally understood within the geopolitical framework of the Cold War, and are primarily cited 
as containing the specter of Communism which the threat of widespread hunger seemed to evoke conjure. 
The goals of the Indian government and Planners during this period can be read, most benevolently, as 
framed within the Nehruvian commitment to self-sufficiency and access for all to development; this view 
is, of course, contested and problematized.  While Nehru did emphasize the centrality of food security to 
successful development projects, agriculture in itself was not an area that was emphasized by the planning 
commission during this era. Initially emphasis was on land reform and social justice/redistribution efforts 
as the engine driving agricultural growth and increase agricultural production (while land reforms were 
attempted and some went through, predictably they faced opposition from the landed elite, who were still 
power brokers and had substantial sway in the Parliament).  
There was a conjuncture between the Nehruvian faith in state-harnessed technology to bring about 
development alongside the resistance of the landed elite to land reform, and the heavy pressure from the US 
to increase agricultural production (through new seeds and chemicals)—a conjuncture which was under-
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laid by groundwork of the Ford and Rockefeller Foundations’ programs in India (which began with village-
based efforts towards rural development in the 1950s and came to focus more heavily on ‘intensive 
agriculture’). The Ford Foundation’s 1959 Report, India’s Food Crisis and Steps to meet it, laid the 
groundwork for the shift from growth through equity (tenure reform, etc) to growth through agro-
technology (Seshia and Scoones 2003; Ford 1959). This approach was taken up in the Third Five Year 
Plan, which introduced the IADP [the Intensive Agricultural District Programme], a program which the 
Ford Foundation introduced by grafting it onto its existing Community Development Programme (ibid). 
964 As the US became dominant, food dependence on the US was fostered along with military and 
economic domination (McMichael 2005). In this, the US used food as a tool of foreign policy, the power of 
which was enabled by the widespread of the dependence on this food aid. As McMichael notes:  
[T]he U.S.-centered food regime (1945-1970) pivoted on the contradiction between 
global integration and the coherence of national farm sectors. During this time, the U.S. 
deployed food aid to secure its geo-political perimeter in the Third World, underwriting 
industrialization in states such as India and South Korea as ‘development showcases’ 
(Grosfoguel 1996) in which Third World states depended on western foods to provision 
reconstructed urban diets (Friedmann 1982). By extension, the green revolution 
consolidated the global movement under the guise of addressing the question of national 
food security (McMichael 2004: 3). 
965 (Ahlberg 2008; Gupta 1998; Wallerstein 1980). 
966 President Johnson insisted this agreement be kept obsessively secret—telling Secretary Freeman “If 
anybody finds out about this, your ass will be hanging from a yardarm”—he reportedly did not trust anyone 
else in the US Government to assess India’s progress or make food-aid disbursement decisions (Freeman as 
quoted in Kux 1992: 244).  
967 The controversial nature of this path and the pressure to follow this path were significant, and 
exacerbated by the fact that India was not only dependent on the US for basic foodgrain supplies—by 1970, 
after years of using the Rupee to purchase increasing quantities of US food aid, the US owned a third of the 
Indian Rupee, giving it substantial control over the Indian economy (Patel 2008).     
968 (Rajya Sabha, GoI, 1965, 1966).  
969 (Ford 1959). 
970  The US’s interests in the Green Revolution in India are generally understood within the geopolitical 
framework of the Cold War, and are primarily cited as centering on containing the specter of Communism, 
which the threat of widespread hunger seemed to evoke/conjure. The goals of the Indian government and 
Planners during this period can be read, most benevolently, as framed within the Nehruvian commitment to 
self-sufficiency and access for all to development; this view is, of course, contested and problematized. 
While Nehru did emphasize the centrality of food self-sufficiency to successful development projects, 
agriculture in itself was not an area that was emphasized by the Planning Commission during this era. 
Initially, emphasis was placed on land reform and social justice/redistribution efforts as the engine driving 
agricultural growth and increase agricultural production. But while land reforms were attempted and some 
went through, predictably they faced opposition from the landed elite, who were still power brokers and 
had substantial sway in the Parliament; the latter were strongly against land reform, a position which their 
heavy over-representation in Parliament allowed them to hold sway over by stalling (Patel 2008; Bajaj 
1982; Frankel 1971). This desire to not forfeit the power of landlordship, coupled with political elites’ faith 
in science, and the demands of industrialists (and the state) for a reliable affordable food supply for the 
urban proletariat coupled with the specter of hunger in ushering in the green revolution.  
971  (Frankel 1971: 5).   
972 (Ahlberg 2008; Seshia and Scoones 2003; Shiva 1993; Bajaj 1982; Wallerstein 1980; Frankel 1973). 
973  (Paarlberg 1970: 18-19). 
974  (NAI 1964a; my emphasis)  
975 Guhan explains: 
The technical examination of the Durgapur fertilizer application does not seem to be 
complete yet. The Cochin fertilizer application has been filed very recently. In regard to 
both these projects, AID are under the impression that GoI are “shopping” for private 
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collaboration with the public sector. Minister (Economic) will recall that this point came 
up when Minister (F&A) met Mr. David Bell. As recorded in the minutes of that meeting, 
“in regard to Durgapur and Cohcin fertilizers, he (Mr. Bell) understood that the 
Government of India had some ideas of financing them with private investment. Aid 
would prefer that these two fertilizer projects should be built with private capital.” AID’s 
stand appears to be compounded of (a) basic disinclination to finance public sector 
fertilizer projects in India. TO my query whether this was an ideological inhibition, I was 
told that it was on the “sound practical experience: of our public sector fertilizer plants 
not being notable success and (b) the anxiety that in any event we should fully explore 
the possibility of working out a joint venture with private foreign investors before going 
ahead with these two projects at 100% public sector plants. In other words, AID would 
want us to bear the onus of convincing them as to why we desire to have these two 
projects in the public sector. These views of AID are not just the personal views of 
Messers Lustig and Firstenburg but have been formulated in discussions with Mr.  Bell 
and Mr. Gaud. Minister (Economic) has sent the record to the Minister (F&A)—Bell 
discussions to Economic Secretary. In view of the importance and priority of these two 
fertilizer projects, it is necessary that we should avoid any possibility of delay arising 
from GoI and AID not being on the same wavelength. We may apprise Delhi specifically 
of the AID position and request the to take a view on whether (a) while formally retaining 
these two application on the AID list, private collaborations will be explored; or (b) it 
will be conveyed to AID that we wish to pursue then as public sector projects—if so, for 
what special reasons—and would like AID to give us their definitive reaction on their 
willingness or otherwise to finance them as such as soon as new commitments are 
resumed. Similar considerations might apply to Trombay III and for which the formal 
application has not yet been filed (NAI 1964a; my emphasis).  
976 (Dated December 18, 1965). 
977 (NAI 1965b: 2).   
978 (NAI 1965b: 3).   
979 (NAI 1965b: 3).  
980 (NAI 1965b: 3). 
981 (Davis 2002; Lenin 1917). 
982 The green revolution project operated fundamentally through governing knowledge as much as 
deploying the materiality of food. In this process knowledge itself served as an internationally traded 
commodity that was leveraged to secure compliance with specific political-scientific understandings and 
agendas. For example, while imports of food aid were no longer needed—“however, [the] decreased 
imports of cereals did not imply a decreased foreign dependence on agriculture. What was gained in terms 
of reduced cereal imports was lost in terms of increased imports of agricultural requisites, especially 
fertilizer” (between 1960-1 and 1974-5, fertilizer expenditure skyrocketed from 13 crores in total to 532.5 
crores on imported fertilizer alone (Bajaj 1982: 102). “Thus the import dependence of Indian agriculture 
had in fact been rising quite fast” (ibid: 103).  That is, foreign dependence was not eradicated, but simply 
shifted to terms that—even while they did not deploy the actual food stocks themselves, deployed food’s 
materiality to rewrite the nature of food production and development in ways that were more powerful:  
In addition to this dependence on tangibles like fertilizers, pesticides, seeds, etc., of the 
farmer on the Government and of the Government on foreign supplier, an intangible, but 
not any less important, external dependence for knowledge of the agricultural processes 
appeared. The farmer who till now was the expert on agricultural technology became 
ignorant in one sweep.  He had to look up to the university expert to acquire knowledge 
of the correct processes. And those experts themselves looked to the so-called 
international community of agricultural scientists to learn the latest on the new 
technology (Bajaj 1982: 103). 
These processes operated through the convergence of epistemic and economic modes of power. For 
instance, while the Planning Commission was the initial instigator of the intensive technology approach 
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that initiated the Green Revolution, the Planners and government economists became increasingly skeptical 
of the Green Revolution because of its effects on the balance of trade (Shiva 1992: 31). By this point, 
however, the rationality and power of this form of development had been secured—through the expertise 
produced by the educational institutions and exchanges that food aid conditionalities financed.  As the 
Green Revolution was fundamentally a knowledge project, the structures through which its knowledge was 
enacted served to consolidate the power of its governance. Thus, despite the Planners’ concerns with 
financing it, the scheme was pushed through by the scientists that had been trained in the US under the 
exchange programs which India was required to fund to receive US food aid (Shiva 1992; Wallerstein 
1980). 
983 As the “Editorial Note” of FRUS document 389 explains: 
On November 10, 1966, President Johnson told Secretary of Agriculture Freeman... : 
‘You must've had two men write this memo. You gave the best damn arguments I ever 
saw for not giving it to them. You said they hadn't kept their agreement on investment 
and fertilizer. That it's moving slowly. That they're jockeying to try to get a deal that's 
better for themselves. That they're delaying. That they don't have the follow-through 
necessary to do what they agreed to do… . That they're easing regulations and controls in 
the agricultural sector, which we're concerned about. That the government is using the 
Foodgrains Corporation to procure them at below market price, discouraging food 
production rather than stimulating it as agreed to… . Therefore, I recommend we give 
them 1.2. (FRUS 389 1966: “Editorial Note”). 
984 The US held that the terms of all of these projects were to be “confidential” (i.e. “not open for public 
discussion”), yet, the push for market expansion was not simply to serve as an instrument for advancing 
capital’s interests and cannot be read simply in today’s terms, it was regarded as one point among many in 
trying to ensure that India reach that critical moment of “take-off” (NAI 1966c, 1966d). The emphasis on 
removing restrictions on foreign private capital in fertilizer production was seen as necessary for the “take-
off “of private enterprise, and importantly, a way around the perceived persistent “foot dragging” of the 
GOI (RAC, Cummings, 1967). For example, restrictions on fertilizers that were financed through US loans 
also stipulated that it “is not to be used for cotton and tobacco” (NAI 1964b). While this policy was meant 
to encourage India to emphasize food production (and also serve as a disincentive for competition with the 
US on non-food agricultural cash crops of cotton and tobacco), the US quickly realized this policy was not 
sufficient to have the intended effect. The GoI consistently took aid in a piecemeal form, arranged to the 
most advantageous effect. 
985 (Brian Atwood, USAID Administrator from 1992-1998; interview by author, Minneapolis, November 
13, 2009). 
986  (Subramaniam 1972). 
987  (Bowles 1968: 1). 
988  (Bowles 1968: 1). 
989  With the GR, agriculture was now on the path to becoming a “rational” economic sector, the 
modernization of the agricultural sector was to set the path for “take-off.” 
990 (Frankel 1971, 2006; Patel 2008). 
991   For, these inputs affected the balance of trade with the US; by 1970, after years of increasing US wheat 
imports, followed by fertilizer imports, the balance of trade was becoming increasingly skewed, with the 
US owning a full third of the Rupee (Patel 2008).     
992(RAC, Lewis, Undated-b (1965?): 3).  
993 (Frankel 1971). 
994 (RAC, Lewis, Undated-b (1965?): 3).  
995 (Frankel 2006). 
996 The Bell Mission of the World Bank’s aims were: 
This study has a number of related aims[,] including appraisal of (1) the extent to which 
fiscal, monetary and financial policies and measures have served to maximize the flow of 
real resources to investment, as opposed to consumption; (2) the extent to which such 
policies and measures have maximized the use of existing real resources (3) the extent to 
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which they have facilitated and directed the use of such resources in the most productive 
manner.  
These appraisals will consider not only the direct effects of the policies and measures 
adopted but also their wider effects upon incentives, efficiency, development of the 
capital market, the sectoral enterprise allocation of investment funds, etc. (NAI, Planning 
Commission, 1964c). 
997 For example, on the question of: 
Agriculture: The following is a preliminary listing of some of the major questions to 
which the Mission plans to address itself: 
1. What were the factors responsible for the growth of agricultural output in the 
1950’s? What accounts for the apparent absence of growth of output in the several 
last years? 
2. What were the contributions to increased output of the incremental physical inputs 
(land, water, fertilizer, improved seed, insecticides and fungicides, labor)? What has 
limited the supply of these inputs? Or the demand for them? 
3. What are the critical constraints upon significant and sustained growth of agricultural 
output? 
4. What are the Center and State Government programs directed toward reduction of 
these constraints? What are the objectives and what are the observed effects of these 
programs? What are the limitations on their effectiveness in expanding agricultural 
output? 
5. What demands for materials, equipment and services (transportation especially) do 
the requirements of increased agricultural output impose on other sectors? To what 
extent are these demands not being met? 
6. What input contribution does the agricultural sector now make to output in other 
sectors? To what extent has agricultural output been a constraint upon the output of 
other producing sectors of the economy? 
7. To what extent has the allocation of investment (and of current) resources to 
agriculture been a factor in accelerating or retarding the growth of agricultural 
output? How have these allocations been determined? How have specific projects 
and programs been selected and designed?  How has the distribution of additional 
inputs by area, crop or sector of the farm population been determined? What 
principles of selection and concentration have operated? 
8. To what extent have increases in agricultural income, where they have occurred, 
simulated the development of local or area supporting and supplying industries and 
services? What factors have contributed toward or militated against such 
development. 
9. What is the magnitude and the seasonal distribution of unutilized labor in rural 
areas? What programs have been directed toward utilization of this supply of labor 
(if it exists)? And what have been the limiting factors in this effort? (NAI, Planning 
Commission, 1964c). 
998 (FRUS 310 1966).  
999 Shortly after this initial devaluation the rupee was again devalued by another 23%. 
1000 (Bowles as quoted in NAI 1966a; my emphasis).  
1001 (Frankel 1971, 1974, 2006). 
1002  (Lok Sabha, 1967: Vol. 1: 689-90). 
1003 (Lok Sabha, 1967: Vol. 1: 689). 
1004 (Subramaniam 1995). 
1005 (Subramaniam in Rajya Sabha December 7 1965: 4146-7).  
1006 (Freeman 1969 in his interview with Wallerstein, as recorded in Wallerstein 1980: 279 n 16). 
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1007 Subramaniam takes ownership, arguing that he thought of and offered up all the terms and conditions in 
the Treaty of Rome. The (un)proveability of these claims is not the point (yes these terms were essentially 
what the Ford Foundation’s 1959 Report had laid out earlier); the point is that Subramaniam seems to have 
convinced himself, wrote in his memoirs, and testified to Parliament that these were his own ideas. Beyond 
such claims, he was indisputably their staunch advocate; he did (seem to) believe this was the solution.  
The work of ideology becomes particularly significant with the transition to the contemporary era—take for 
example PM Singh’s repeated assertion that India needs GM crops, and Agriculture Minister Pawar and 
Technology Minister Chavan’s even stauncher backing of this position. Clearly there may be some 
financial interests at play (as Wiki-leaks cables revealed), but more than that, this is an issue of knowledge 
and the production of knowledge about development; specifically, and subject creation, which is to say, the 
production of ideology. 
1008 (Subramaniam 1979: 52-3; my emphasis). 
1009 (Patel 2008). 
1010 (Subramaniam1979: 54; my emphasis). 
1011 (Subramaniam, Rajya Sabha, December 7 1965: 4152; my emphasis). 
1012 (Mehbub-ul-Haq (the founder/editor of the UN Human Development Report and the former Finance 
Minister of Pakistan); as quoted in Sharma 2000).   
1013 (FRUS 304 1966). 
1014 (FRUS 304 1966). 
1015 That is, the goal of “self-sufficiency” here was being redefined—away from an autarkic understanding, 
self-sufficiency was not to be attained through self-reliance, but referred simply to food-output, regardless 
of how dependent or “self-sufficient” India was when it came to the inputs; these discrepant understandings 
were a major topic of debate in Parliament and one of the largest stumbling blocks that held back the GR 
implementation (see Subramaniam 1995; 1979; Rajya Sabha records Dec 6, 1965a: 3727-9; Rajya Sabha 
Dec 7, 1965b: 4073, 4138-66).  
1016 “Vickery served as assistant secretary of commerce for trade development in the Clinton 
administration, focusing on India in the department’s Big Emerging Markets initiative. He also previously 
served as chair of the U.S.-India Business Council Working Group on Chemicals and Petrochemicals, 
working on tariff, liability and regulatory issues” (Vickery 2011: biography). 
1017 (Vickery 2011: 238-9). 
1018  (Bowles 1968: 1). 
1019 (Singh 2005). 
1020 (Ford 1959, Thorner 1959; Bajaj 1982). 
1021 (Thorner 1959; Bajaj 1982). 
1022 (Singh 2005). 
1023 (GoI 2009, 2007, 2002; Kumbamu 2006; Brooks 2005; Seshia and Scoones 2003).   
1024 (Singh 2005). 
1025 (Bush 2006). 
1026 (Mishra 2006). 
1027 (Sahai 2006). 
1028 Critics charged that it trumped domestic regulations regarding the terms of agricultural production and 
access, as well as rights to traditional knowledge, handing over extensive powers to corporations (Mishra 
2006; Kumar Anjaan 2006). 
1029 (Hindustan Times 2006a,b; Mishra 2006; Kumar-Anjaan 2006; Patel 2007; USDA 2006b). 
1030 By placing the most vulnerable producers—80% of those who are too poor to buy food are rural 
agrarian workers—under increased corporate pressure, the agreement threatens to deepen the chronic food 
insecurity of growing segments of the population as well as the unevenness of these divides (i.e. Muller and 
Patel 2004; Shiva and Jalees 2006; Mooij 1999; Swaminathan 2000, 1999). 
1031 The rural bias of hunger and poverty has been clearly demonstrated—80% of rural residents are under-
nourished, and the calorie intake per person in rural areas has been consistently declining since the 1980s, 
and over 95% of rural households spend more than half of their income on food (Swaminathan, 2000). 
1032 (USDA November 2006: “Fact Sheet: U.S.-India Agricultural Knowledge Initiative”). 
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1033 (USDA 2006a; USAID 2007). 
1034   That is, described as “the US’ payoff for its nukes deal with India,” The AKI was chartered by an 
initially undisclosed board including major American corporations (including Walmart and Archer 
Midlands). The agreement granted US corporations and universities “unhindered access” to push GM 
crops, to the Indian biotechnology market and to the intellectual property rights of Indian biodiversity 
(Mishra 2006; Anjaan 2006).The US was “clear from the beginning” that it would not be funding the 
agreement, and estimates—from a Ministry of Agriculture official are that the AKI will cost India over Rs. 
1000 crores (or USD 215million) (ibid).  
1035 Over this relationship hunger (or, the management of hunger) has been deployed as a leveraging tool 
both in bilateral relations, and in corporate sales strategies of agri-technology inputs (Shiva 2000; Gupta 
1998; Patel 2008). Following this,  Prime Minister Singh’s introduction of the AKI as “a second Green 
Revolution” (Mishra 2006) is also a reminder that, the terms of the first “bilateral revolution” 
(Ambassador) while produced by geopolitical arm-twisting were publicly owned (Patel 2008; Ahlberg 
2003) In fact, with the aim of addressing the ecological havoc wreaked by the Green Revolution through 
biotechnology, the AKI is blatantly ahistorical—continuing the bilateral discourses which have been 
marked by their attention to hunger as a technical issue of level of development, where political histories of 
trade and power relations (international or domestic) supposedly do not come into play (Shiva 1993, 1997).   
1036  The US Department of Agriculture (USDA) has been clear that “the US goal [in this initiative] is to 
make sure that Indian biotechnology markets remain open” (USDA 2005).  Specifically, that Indian 
markets remain open to American agri-business corporation’s products and to American technology and 
grain exports.   
1037 (Mishra 2006, Noronha 2006). 
1038 (USDA 2005). 
1039 (Mishra 2006, Noronha 2006). 
1040 (Patel 2008). 
1041 (Ferguson and Gupta 2002). 
1042 (Bush 2006). 
1043 “This is not surprising, considering that the high point of Indo-US collaboration was always in the field 
of agriculture” (Hindustan Times 2006).  
1044 (Brown 1968: 16; my emphasis). 
1045 (Brown 1968: 16; my emphasis).  
1046 (USIS 2012; Feed the Future 2012). 
1047 (ABSPII 2009: 2).  
1048 (ABSPII 2006). 
1049 (ABSPII 2009: 3). 
1050 (ABSPII 2009: 2).   
1051 (Dr. P. Balasubramanian, interview by author. Chennai, Tamil Nadu. January 25, 2011). 
1052 The calls for a “Second green revolution” in themselves were not new. Such calls have been made 
consistently since the 1970s, through the 80s and 90s. It is a mantle that many projects seek to claim but 
few can fill. 
1053 (Vickery 2011: 238-9). 
1054 (Vickery 2011: 238-9). 
1055 (Vickery 2011: 240). 
1056  (Gupta and Sharma 2006; Gupta 2012). 
1057  (Gupta and Sharma 2006). 
1058 (Friedmann and McMichael 2005; McMichael 2009; Schneider and McMichael 2011). 
1059  (Juma 2005). 
1060 (Parayil 2003). 
1061 Such technology driven approaches to development are widely invoked and critiqued: celebrated as the 
promise to a better future and the sole means of meeting the needs of the world’s poor (Paarlberg 2009; 
Serageldin 2003), and also extensively criticized by scholars across disciplines for writing out questions of 
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politics, distribution, and the realities of inequality, rendering them ‘technical’ matters of science (Nandy 
2005; Watts 2000; Shiva 1993). As is well documented, hunger is a (bio)political condition; hunger is an 
issue of poverty, distribution and entitlements, not a question of supply or scarcity (Lappe 2006 [1998]; Rai 
2005; Edkins 2000; Sen and Dreze 1989; Sen 1981). Hence, the relevant question with regards to hunger is 
not whether these technologies increase food output, but how they affect food distribution and accessibility.  
1062 (Rajan 2005; Prakash 1999; Gupta 1998; Chatterjee 1993; Nandy 1988). 
1063  (Manmohan Singh as quoted in Bagla 2012; my emphasis). 
1064 (Vickery 2011: 240). 
1065 (Chatterjee 2008: 62). 
1066 (DasGupta 2013). 
1067 (UNCTAD 2013)  
1068 “The objective of the International Assessment of Agricultural Knowledge, Science and Technology for 
Development (IAASTD) was to assess the impacts of past, present and future agricultural knowledge, 
science and technology on the:  
 reduction of hunger and poverty,  
 improvement of rural livelihoods and human health, and  
 equitable, socially, environmentally and economically sustainable development” (IAASTD 2009). 
1069   As Raj Patel summarizes, the IAASTD: 
So how should we farm tomorrow? To answer this, we’ll need the very best independent 
and peer-reviewed science. In 2005, the World Bank’s chief scientist, Robert Watson, 
brought together leading natural and social scientists, representatives from government 
(including the U.S.), private sector and non-governmental organizations to ask how we’d 
feed the world in 2050, when there will be nine billion of us. 
Over three years, more than 400 experts worked on a sobering report which has recently 
been published as “Agriculture at a Crossroads.” 
The scientists concluded that genetically modified crops had failed to show much 
promise in feeding the world. Instead, the study suggested that to feed the world, we need 
both political and technological change. Tomorrow’s agriculture will need to be much 
more regionally controlled and locally adapted, and will need a diversity of approaches 
to meet the challenges of climate change and resource scarcity. 
Among the farming techniques endorsed by the report is agroecology, which builds soil, 
insect and plant ecology. The result is a farming system that uses water 
frugally, sequesters vast amounts of carbon and doesn’t require external inputs. 
This is cutting edge science, but it isn’t terribly profitable for large U.S.-based 
agricultural corporations. Perhaps that explains why, despite strong support for this report 
among governments overseas, the U.S. government last year refused to endorse it (Patel 
in NYT Blog 2009). 
1070 Cover of November 1965 issue of the journal “Indian Farming” (caption: “spraying paddy with a 
power sprayer.” Photo Credit: Gurcharan Singh).   
Cover of September 2013 UNCTAD “Trade and Environment Review.” 
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1071 (UNCTAD 2013). 
1072 (UNCTAD 2013). 
1073 (UNCTAD 2013). 
1074 (RAC 1952a). 
1075 (Saberwal, Vasant, interview by author. New Delhi. March 2, 2011). 
1076 (Bhutani, Shalini, interview by author. New Delhi. March 16, 2011). 
1077 (Dayal 1968: vii). 
1078 (Simon 1975). 
1079 (UNCTAD 2013: iii). 
1080 (Dayal 1968: vii). 
1081 (Dayal 1968: vii). 
1082 (UNCTAD 2013: iii). 
1083 (Kaufman 2010). 
1084  (Leigh 2004). 
1085 (Diamond 1987). 
1086 Bridging some divides, Spivak offers development as “aporetic”—that which one cannot not want 
(Spivak, Landry and MacLean 1996:28). 
1087  (Mitchell 2008; Chakrabarty 2000). 
1088 (Borlaug 1968; RAC 1952a, 1968). 
1089 As Cecil Rhodes famously declared:   
I was in the East End of London (a working-class quarter) yesterday and attended a 
meeting of the unemployed. I listened to the wild speeches, which were just a cry for 
‘bread! bread!’ and on my way home I pondered over the scene and I became more than 
ever convinced of the importance of imperialism.... My cherished idea is a solution for 
the social problem, i.e., in order to save the 40,000,000 inhabitants of the United 
Kingdom from a bloody civil war, we colonial statesmen must acquire new lands to settle 
the surplus population, to provide new markets for the goods produced in the factories 
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and mines. The Empire, as I have always said, is a bread and butter question. If you want 
to avoid civil war, you must become imperialists (Rhodes, as quoted in Lenin 1917). 
1090 (Friedmann and McMichael 1989; Weiss 2006). 
1091 (Davis 2006). 
1092 (Sen 1982). 
1093 (NYT 1943). 
1094 After all, these claims, in repeating this, are channeling their trumped up interpretation of Adam Smith, 
who famously diagnosed that  
‘famine has never arisen from any other cause but the violence of government attempting, 
by improper means to remedy the inconveniences of a dearth’ and its corollary that ‘the 
unlimited, unrestrained, freedom of the corn trade…is the only effectual means privative 
of the miseries of a famine’ (Montag 2005: 14; quoting Smith 1981: 526-7).  
The extension of and grafting of Smith’s logic onto the contemporary global food economy is based on 
many flawed and enabling assumptions. 
1095 These projects and programs were geographically uneven (not only by state, but within regions): 
agricultural development programs addressed rural areas whereas the food distribution programs targeted 
urban areas and urban populations. The Public Distribution System’s ration shops are in cities and towns, 
not in rural areas (Roose 1988). The programs’ discrepancies in access tie into larger shifts towards the 
needs of the urban consumer, shifts that I will argue were further consolidated by the Green Revolution. 
1096  The second Green Revolution as operationalized through the AKI is not a continuation of bilateral, or 
international, development-aid and transfers of technology. Rather, while it was negotiated by heads of 
state, it is a commercial project, driven by multinational and domestic corporate interests, and defrayed 
largely by Indian taxpayers (Sahai 2006; Mishra 2006). The AKI’s alliance of business, state, academic and 
NGO actors approximates what Ferguson and Gupta (2002) call “transnational governmentality”: a polity 
marked not by the withdrawal of the state, but by the increasing withdrawal of policy initiatives—in this 
instance, agricultural policy—from the recourse of electoral control and public accountability (Patel 2008, 
2008b).   
1097 (AKI 2006; ABSP II 2009). 
1098 I read the project of development as navigating the founding contradictions and exclusions of 
liberal[capital]ism, operating at the convergence of notions of moral duty and governmentality (i.e. uplift 
and improvement), where these are operationalized through the rationality of the market as the driving 
structure. 
1099 (Time 1974: http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,911503,00.html). 
1100 Clearly, the politics of “security” in the governance that is at stake here binds geopolitics and individual 
bodies as inseparable in efforts to understand the machinations of national food security.  The government 
explains it thus: “A nation of more than a billion people cannot be dependent on imports for basic items 
like food-grains. The agricultural sector, therefore, acts as a bulwark in maintaining food security and, in 
the process, national security as well” (GOI 2002: 513; my emphasis). But, the agricultural sector is not 
only a bulwark of national security, it is also inseparably one of the prime negotiating grounds on the 
bargaining table for other national security concerns. As scholars and activists have noted, the Indo-US 
Agricultural Knowledge Initiative—inaugurated by Prime Minister Manmohan Singh as a “second Green 
Revolution”—made it “apparent that India has agreed to pay in the agricultural sector for the concession 
that it has sought from the US in the nuclear field” (Sahai 2006). While this sort of “willingness to sacrifice 
the agricultural sector to the interest of national development” is not new (ibid), the roles of “development” 
in relationships to national security, food security, vulnerability are shifting (ibid; Kuruganti 2006).  While 
the work of food and food security (in national security and geopolitics) is also clearly distinct from the 
agricultural sector, more intriguingly, food security is also seeming distinct from governmental imperatives 
of the liberal state. For national food security in practice is not about all, or even most, of the one billion 
people: while they are invoked, their food-insecurity is effaced by rendering them into the nation itself. 
1101 (Chand 2008, 2005; Patnaik 2007; Swaminathan 2007, 2000). 
1102 (Chand 2008; Muller and Patel 2004).   
1103 (Chand 2008: 14). 
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1104  (Chand 2008: 14; e.g. Patnaik 2004; Swaminathan 2000; Mooij 1999).   
1105 (Muller and Patel 2004; World Bank 2003; Shiva 2002). 
1106 Hunger deaths have increased greatly since the dismantling of social support networks—particularly 
the PDS (public distribution system)—and the concomitant (post-1994) liberalization of the agricultural 
sector under WTO agreements. The cuts in the PDS led to vast surpluses at the FCI (Food Corporation of 
India), which were disposed of as people could not afford to buy them (USDA 2007; Muller and Patel 
2004; Sainath 2003; Swaminathan 2002).   
Around the era of the Green Revolution India’s Public Distribution System (the PDS) became the most 
extensive national system of food distribution (Mooij 1999; Swaminathan 2002). [It was linked with the 
Food Corporation of India (FCI), which was established in 1964 with two main roles: increasing domestic 
production towards reaching self-sufficiency and storing buffer stocks in case of hunger or a failed harvest 
(Muller and Patel, 2004). When the FCI was created the PDS was restructured under the FCI to distribute 
the massive US grain imports (Sharma, 1997).] However, as the bodies charged with the task of 
procurement and distribution of food grains, the FCI and its subsidiary the PDS—even and only 0.3% of 
the GDP—became favorite targets of liberalization (Swaminathan 2000, 2002; Muller and Patel 2004; e.g. 
Sharma 2007). Attendant with the World Bank’s condemnations, the PDS was slashed, or ‘targeted’, in 
1992 and restructured again for the 1997 elections (Muller and Patel 2004; e.g. World Bank 2003). (The 
“systematic dismantling” of the PDS in the 1990s—through dramatic reductions and a new ‘targeted’ 
approach—was conceived under the leadership of then Finance Minister (and now Prime Minister) 
Manmohan Singh (Patel, 2008).)   
Under the new ‘targeted’ PDS (the TPDS), the number of people the PDS reaches has been halved, 
food-prices have doubled, and incidents of hunger and starvation have become increasingly widespread 
(Muller and Patel 2004). While the TPDS has received celebrated endorsement from the Bank (World Bank 
2003), the government has been has been more reluctant to dismantle the FCI—demonstrated by the fact 
that as the PDS’ budget was ‘targeted’ for restructuring the FCI’s budget has increased (Muller and Patel 
2004; Swaminathan, M. 2000). (Post-liberalization, both the PDS and the FCI have shifted tactics and 
concentrate more on guaranteeing minimum prices for farmers than on distributing food to the poor.) While 
FCI stocks have increased—the FCI procured twice as much food in 2001 (40 million tons) as it had in 
1997 (Muller and Patel 2004), and its “food-subsidy”—ostensibly for the poor and hungry (Dreze 2003)—
in 2007 is two and a half times what it was in 2001 (Rs. 24,000 crores compared to 10,000) (Goswami 
2007).  Yet the scope and acuteness of hunger have also continued to increase. In fact the Government was 
reported to be spending more on storage of the “surplus” food than on agricultural and rural development 
programs, irrigation and flood control together (NYT 2002).  
1107 (GoI 2007). 
1108 (Patnaik 2008 2005; 2004; e.g. Swaminathan 2000). 
1109 Patnaik explains that while the government reports rural poverty at 28.3% in 2004-5, using a method 
that takes nutrition into account she finds rural poverty to be 87% (Patnaik 2007, 2005). 
1110 (GoI 2002). 
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Picador. 
———. 2010. The Birth of Biopolitics: Lectures at the Collège de France, 1978--1979 (Lectures at the 
College de France). Picador. 
Frankel, Francine R. 1967. “Ideology and Politics in Economic Planning: The Problem of Indian 
Agricultural Development Strategy.” World Politics 19 (04): 621–45. 
———. 1969. “India’s New Strategy of Agricultural Development: Political Costs of Agrarian 
Modernization.” The Journal of Asian Studies 28 (4): 693–710. 
———. 1972. India’s Green Revolution Economic Gains and Political Costs. Princeton, N. J: Princeton 
University. 
———. 1975. India’s Green Revolution. New Jersey: Princeton University Press. 
———. 1978. India’s Political Economy, 1947-1977: The Gradual Revolution. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton 
University Press. 
———. 2006. India’s Political Economy, 1947-2004: The Gradual Revolution. New Delhi; Oxford: 
Oxford University Press. 
Frankel, Francine R, and Karl Von Vorys. 1972. The Political Challenge of the Green Revolution: Shifting 
Patterns of Peasant Participation in India and Pakistan. Princeton, N.J.: Center of International 
Studies, Princeton University. 
Frank, Katherine. 2002. Indira: The Life of Indira Nehru Gandhi. London: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt. 
Freeman, Orville L. 1968. World without Hunger. F. A. Praeger. 
Friedmann, Harriet. 1992. “Distance and Durability: Shaky Foundations of the World Food Economy.” 
Third World Quarterly 13 (2): 371–83. 
Friedmann, Harriet, and Philip McMichael. 1989. “Agriculture and the State System: The Rise and Decline 
of National Agricultures, 1870 to the Present.” Sociologia Ruralis 29 (2): 93–117. 
Friedmann, John Rembert Peter, Mike Douglass, and Seminar on Industrialization Strategies and the 
Growth Pole Approach to Regional Planning and Development: the Asian Experience, eds. 1975. 
Agropolitan Development: Towards a New Strategy for Regional Planning in Asia. Los Angeles: 
University of California, School of Architecture and Urban Planning. 
  335 
                                                                                                                                                 
FRUS, (Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968. Volume XXV, South Asia). 1965a. “FRUS 
253: ‘Telegram from the Embassy in Italy to the Department of State 1.’ Telegram from the Embassy 
in Italy to the Department of State 1. Rome, 1381. Dept Pass Texas White House—Eyes Only for 
President From Secretary Freeman. Embtel 1373.2".” Telegram. Available at: 
http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v25/d253. (Original documents: Johnson 
Library, National Security File, NSC History, Indian Famine, August 66–February 67, Vol. II). 
———. 1965b. “FRUS 270. ‘Memorandum for Record Washington, December 20, 1965. SUBJECT: 
President’s Meeting with Indian Food Minister Subramaniam.’” Washington DC. 
http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v25/d270#fn1. 
———. 1966a. “FRUS 304: ‘The Economic Bargain with Mrs. Gandhi.’” (Original document: LBJ 
Library). 
———. 1966b. “FRUS 310: ‘Memos to the President, Walt W. Rostow, Confidential.’” Washington DC. 
(Original document Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, Walt W. 
Rostow, Vol. I, 4/2–5/26/66). 
———. 1966c. “FRUS 389: ‘Editorial Note:’ ‘Recording of Telephone Conversation Between President 2– 
and Secretary of Agriculture Freeman.’” Tape F66.31, Side A, PNO 158. 
Fukuda-Parr, Sakiko. 2007. The Gene Revolution GM Crops and Unequal Development. London; Sterlling, 
VA.: Earthscan. 
Galbraith, John Kenneth. 1979. The Nature of Mass Poverty. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. 
Gaud, William. 1968. “The Green Revolution: Accomplishments and Apprehensions.” presented at the The 
Society for International Development, Shorehan Hotel, Washington, DC: March 8, 1968. Washington, 
D.C. US Agency for International Development. 
Gavin, Francis J., and Mark Atwood Lawrence. 2014. Beyond the Cold War: Lyndon Johnson and the New 
Global Challenges of the 1960s. Oxford University Press. 
GEAC, (Genetic Engineering Approval Committee), ed. 2009. “Decisions Taken in the 97th Meeting of the 
Genetic Engineering Approval Committee (GEAC) Held on 14.10.2009.” In Meeting Notes. Delhi, 
India: Government of India. 
GEAC, (Genetic Engineering Approval Committee), and Expert Committee (EC-II). 2009. “Report of the 
Expert Committee (EC-II) on Bt Brinjal Event EE-1.” Ministry of Environment and Forests. 
http://envfor.nic.in/sites/default/files/Report%20on%20Bt%20brinjal_2.pdf. 
George, Susan. 1977. How the Other Half Dies : The Real Reasons for World Hunger. Montclair, N.J: 
Allanheld, Osmun. 
GLOVER, DOMINIC. 2010. “Is Bt Cotton a Pro-Poor Technology? A Review and Critique of the 
Empirical Record.” JOAC Journal of Agrarian Change 10 (4): 482–509. 
GoI, (Government of India), Ministry of Statistics and Programme Implementation Central Statistics 
Office, and SAARC. 2011. SAARC Development Goals - India Country Report: 2010 - Mid-Term 
Statistical Appraisal. www.mospi.gov.in. 
GoI, (Government of India), and Department of Biotechnology Ministry of Science & Technology. 2006. 
Report of the Working Group for the Eleventh Five Year Plan (2007-2012). 
GoI, (Government of India), and Expert Group on the Monetary Impact of PL 480 Transactions 
Department of Economic Affairs. 1968. Report of the Expert Group on the Monetary Impact of PL 480 
Transactions, December, 1968. New Delhi: Dept. of Economic Affairs. 
GoI, (Government of India), and Department of Economic Affairs Ministry of Finance. 108AD. “‘The Bell 
Mission’ of the World Bank.” Planning Commission Files 1/108/64-CDN. NAI. 
GoI, (Government of India), and Ministry of Information and Broadcasting. 1966. Towards a Better Life: 
The New Strategy. Delhi: GOI Publications Division, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting. 
GoI, (Government of India), and Planning Commission. 1992. “Eighth Five Year Plan.” 
———. 1997. “Ninth Five Year Plan.” 
———. 2002. “Tenth Five Year Plan.” 
Goldman, Michael. 2005. “Tracing the Roots/Routes of World Bank Power.” International Journal of 
Sociology and Social Policy 2 (1): 10–29. 
  336 
                                                                                                                                                 
Gonzalez-Pelaez, Ana. 2005. Human Rights and World Trade : Hunger in International Society. New 
York: Routledge. 
Goodman, David. 1987. From Farming to Biotechnology. Cornwall, UK: Basil Blackwell. 
———. 2001. “Ontology Matters: The Relational Materiality of Nature and Agro-Food Studies.” 
Sociologia Ruralis 41 (2): 182–200. 
Goodman, David, and Michael Watts. 1997. Globalising Food: Agrarian Questions and Global 
Restructuring. New York: Routledge. 
Gopal, Lallanji. 2008. History of Agriculture in India: (up to C. 1200 AD). Concept Publishing Company. 
Goswami, Bhaskar. 2007. “Can Indian Dairy Cooperatives Survive in the New Economic Order.” In 
Session on “Supply Management in Support of Rural Livelihoods under the WTO.” 4 – 5 October, 
2007  Geneva. 
———. 2011a. “India Together: Scars of the Green Revolution: Bhaskar Goswami - February 2, 2011.” 
http://indiatogether.org/punjab-agriculture. 
———. 2007b. “Why Is India Importing Wheat ?” Which Direction Incredible India Agriculture? May 17 
2007. http://goswami.wordpress.com/2007/05/17/why-is-india-importing-wheat/. 
Goswami, Manu. 2004. Producing India: From Colonial Economy to National Space. Chicago: University 
Of Chicago Press. 
Government of Madras, India, and Community Projects Administration. 1956. Manual for Village Level 
Workers. 
Government of West Bengal (India), Development Department, and Community Development Project. 
1955. Training Manual for Village Level Workers. Alipore. 
Grain. 2008b. “Lessons from a Green Revolution in South Africa.” Seedling: Biodiversity, Rights and 
Livelihood October: 1–36. 
———. 2008. “Seed Aid, Agribusiness and the Food Crisis.” Seedling: Biodiversity, Rights and Livelihood 
October: 1–36. 
GRAIN. 2010. “Indian Farmers Organise to Stop Bt Brinjal.” Seedling. 
Greene, Ronald Walter. 1999. Malthusian Worlds: US Leadership and the Governing of the Population 
Crisis. Boulder, CO: Westview Press. 
Greenpeace India. 2009. Bt Brinjal: The Truth behind It. Greenpeace India. 
Griffin, Keith. 1972. The Green Revolution: An Economic Analysis. Geneva: United Nations Research 
Institute for Social Development. 
———. 1987. World Hunger and the World Economy : And Other Essays in Development Economics. 
New York: Holmes & Meier. 
Gubrium, Jaber F, and James A Holstein. 2002. Handbook of Interview Research: Context & Method. 
Thousand Oaks, Calif.: Sage Publications. 
Guha, Ramachandra. 2000. Environmentalism: A Global History. New York: Longman. 
———. 2007. India After Gandhi: The History of the World’s Largest Democracy. New York, NY: Harper 
Perennial. 
Guha, Ramachandra, and Juan Martinez-Alier. 1998. Varieties of Environmentalism: Essays North and 
South. Delhi: Oxford University Press. 
Guha, Ranajit. 1986. Elementary Aspects of Peasant Insurgency in Colonial India. Delhi: Oxford 
University Press. 
Guha, Sumit. 1992. Growth, Stagnation, or Decline? Agricultural Productivity in British India. Delhi; New 
York: Oxford University Press. 
Gulati, Ashok, James A Hanson, and Garry Pursell. 1990. Effective Incentives in India’s Agriculture: 
Cotton, Groundnuts, Wheat, and Rice. New Delhi Resident Mission and Country Economics 
Department, World Bank, Washington D.C.: World Bank. 
Gunder Frank, Andre. 1973. “Reflections on Green, Red and White Revolutions in India.” Econpoliweek 
Economic and Political Weekly 8 (3): 119–24. 
Gupta, Akhil. 1995. “Blurred Boundaries: The Discourse of Corruption, the Culture of Politics, and the 
Imagined State.” American Ethnologist 22 (2): 375–402. 
  337 
                                                                                                                                                 
———. 1998. Postcolonial Developments: Agriculture in the Making of Modern India. Durham: Duke 
University Press. 
———. 2005. “Narratives of Corruption.” Ethnography 6 (1): 5–34. 
———. 2012. Red Tape: Bureaucracy, Structural Violence, and Poverty in India. Durham: Duke 
University Press. 
Gupta, Akhil, and Aradhana Sharma. 2006. “Globalization and Postcolonial States.” Current Anthropology 
47: 277–307. 
Gupta, Dipankar. 2000. Mistaken Modernity: India between Worlds. New Delhi: HarperCollins Publishers, 
India. 
Hannam, Kevin. 2002a. “Coping with Archival and Textual Data.” In Doing Cultural Geography, edited by 
Pamela Shurmer-Smith, 189–97. London: Sage Publications. 
———. 2002b. “Using Archives.” In Doing Cultural Geography, edited by Pamela Shurmer-Smith, 113–
20. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications. 
Hansra, B. S, A. N Shukla, and Indian Council of Social Science Research. 1991. Social, Economic, and 
Political Implications of Green Revolution in India. New Delhi: Classical Publishing Co. 
Harcourt, Wendy, and Elena Mancusi-Materi. 2001. “People Not Commodities: The Political Challenge of 
Food Security (introduction to Special Issue on ‘Food Security and Livelihoods’).” Development 44 
(4): 3–5. 
Hardin, Lowell Stewart. 1999. Memoir of an International Farmer. West Lafayette, Ind.: West Lafayette, 
Ind. : s.n. 
Harrar, J. G. 1967. Strategy toward the Conquest of Hunger. Selected Papers of J. George Harrar. New 
York: New York, Rockefeller Foundation. 
Harriet Friedmann. “From Colonialism to Green Capitalism: Social Movements and Emergence of Food 
Regimes.” In New Directions in the Sociology of Global Development, 11:227–64. Research in Rural 
Sociology and Development 11. Emerald Group Publishing Limited. 
Harriss-White, Barbara, and John Harriss. 2004. Green Revolution and After: Studies in the Political 
Economy of Rural Development in South India. Anthem Press. 
Hart, Gillian. 2010. “D/developments after the Meltdown.” Antipode 41 (January): 117–41. 
Harvey, David. 1974. “Population, Resources, and the Ideology of Science.” Economic Geography 50 (3): 
256–77. 
———. 2002. “The Geopolitics of Capitalism.” In Spaces of Capital: Towards a Critical Geography, edited 
by David Harvey, 312–44. New York: Routledge. 
———. 2006. Spaces of Global Capitalism: A Theory of Uneven Geographical Development. New York: 
Verso. 
Hassanein, Neva, Kloppenburg, Jack R. 1995. “Where the Grass Grows Again: Knowledge Exchange in 
the Sustainable Agriculture Movement.” Rural Sociology 60 (4): 721–40. 
Hecht, Gabrielle. 2011. Entangled Geographies: Empire and Technopolitics in the Global Cold War. MIT 
Press. 
Heller, Patrick. 2000. “Degrees of Democracy: Some Comparative Lessons from India.” World Politics 52 
(4): 484–519. 
Herring, R. 2007. “The Genomics Revolution and Development Studies: Science, Poverty and Politics.” 
Peace Research Abstracts Journal 44 (4). 
Hesser, Leon. 2006. The Man Who Fed the World: Nobel Peace Prize Laureate Norman Borlaug and His 
Battle to End World Hunger: An Authorized Biography. Dallas, Tex.: Durban House. 
Himanshu. 2007. “Recent Trends in Poverty and Inequality: Some Preliminary Results.” Economic and 
Political Weekly, February. http://www.epw.in/special-articles/recent-trends-poverty-and-inequality-
some-preliminary-results.html. 
———. 2013. Poverty and Food Security in India. SSRN Scholarly Paper ID 2322649. Rochester, NY: 
Social Science Research Network. http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=2322649. 
Hindustan Times. 2006. “Let It Grow.” Http://www.hindustantimes.com/. 
http://www.hindustantimes.com/news-feed/nm7/let-it-grow/article1-70764.aspx. 
  338 
                                                                                                                                                 
Hindu, The. 2010. “India Giving Wrong Signal by Putting on Hold Bt Brinjal, Says Biocon.” The Hindu. 
http://www.thehindu.com/sci-tech/agriculture/india-giving-wrong-signal-by-putting-on-hold-bt-brinjal-
says-biocon/article105422.ece. 
Hirschman, Albert O. 1967b. Development Projects Observed. Brookings Institution Press. 
———. 1958. The Strategy of Economic Development. Yale University Press. 
———. 1967. “The Principle of the Hiding Hand.pdf.” National Affairs Winter 1967 (6). 
http://www.nationalaffairs.com/doclib/20080516_196700602theprincipleofthehidinghandalbertohirsch
man.pdf. 
Hisano, Shuji. 2005. “A Critical Observation on the Mainstream Discourse of Biotechnology for the Poor.” 
Tailoring Biotechnologies 1 (2): 81–105. 
Hodge, Joseph Morgan. 2007. Triumph of the Expert: Agrarian Doctrines of Development and the Legacies 
of British Colonialism. Athens: Ohio University Press. 
Holmer Nadesan, Majia. 2008. Governmentality, Biopower, and Everyday Life. New York: Routledge. 
Holt-Gimenez, Eric. 2009. “From Food Crisis to Food Sovereignty: The Challenge of Social Movements.” 
Monthly Review 61 (3). 
Holt-Gimenez, Eric, and Raj Patel. 2009. Food Rebellions!: Forging Food Sovereignty to Solve the Global 
Food Crisis. Cape Town; Oakland, CA; Boston, MA: Pambazuka Press. 
Holt, Mark. 2010. Mark Holt (USDA FAS), interview by author. Washington D.C. 9/28/2010. 
Hughes, Alex. 2006. “Geographies of Exchange and Circulation: Transnational Trade and Governance.” 
Progress in Human Geography 30 (5): 635–43. 
IAASTD (International Assessment of Agricultural Knowledge, Science and Technology for 
Development). 2009. Agriculture at A Crossroads: Global Report. IAASTD. 
http://www.unep.org/dewa/agassessment/reports/IAASTD/EN/Agriculture%20at%20a%20Crossroads
_Global%20Report%20(English).pdf. 
IANS, and P. Bhargava. 2010a. “Bt Brinjal Will Be Single Largest Disaster, Says Scientist.” Thaindian 
News. http://www.thaindian.com/newsportal/business/bt-brinjal-will-be-single-largest-disaster-says-
scientist_100313246.html. 
IANS, Thaindian News, and P Bhargava. 2010b. “Bt Brinjal Cleared without Proper Tests: Scientist.” 
Thaindian News. 27/2010 6:18:00 AM. http://www.thaindian.com/newsportal/sci-tech/bt-brinjal-
cleared-without-proper-tests-scientist_100310599.html. 
IFPRI. 2010b. Global Hunger Index: Focus on the Crisis of Child Undernutrition --The Challenge oF 
Hunger. Issue Brief 65. International Food Policy Research Institute. 
———. 2008. “Renewed Policy Action for the Poorest and Hungry in South Asia.” 
http://www.indiaenvironmentportal.org.in/files/cp10.pdf. 
IFPRI, and Joachim Von Braun. 2009. “Food-Security Risks Must Be Comprehensively Addressed: IFPRI 
2008-2009 Annual Report Essay.” International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) 2008-2009 
Annual Report Essay. http://www.ifpri.org/publication/food-security-risks-must-be-comprehensively-
addressed. 
IFPRI, Heidi Fritschel, Doris Wiesmann, Yisehac Yohannes, Maximo Torero, and Klaus Von Grebmer. 
2010a. 2010 Global Hunger Index: The Challenge of Hunger: Focus on the Challenge of Child 
Undernutrition. International Food Policy Research Institute. 
IndiaGMInfo. 2005. “IndiaGMInfo | Get Acquainted with GM Crops in India.” 
http://indiagminfo.org/two/biotech_policy_response_2005.pdf/. 
India GM info. 2005. “Response to National Biotechnology Strategy Development Paper.” 
http://www.indiagminfo.org/two/biotech_policy_response_2005.pdf. 
ISAAA. 2009. “Pocket K No. 35: Bt Brinjal in India.” ISAAA. December 2008, Revised Nov. 2009 (No. 
35). http://www.isaaa.org/resources/publications/pocketk/document/Doc-Pocket%20K35.pdf. 
Iyer, R. D. 2002. Scientist and Humanist: M.S. Swaminathan. Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan. 
Jha, Shikha, P. V. Srinivasan, and Maurice Landes. 2007. Indian Wheat and Rice Sector Policies and the 
Implications of Reform. Economic Research Report Number 41. USDA (United States Department of 
Agriculture). 
  339 
                                                                                                                                                 
Jishnu, Latha. 2009. “Who Owns the Eggplant?” Business Standard India, December 10. 
http://www.business-standard.com/article/opinion/latha-jishnu-who-owns-the-eggplant-
109121000007_1.html. 
Johnson, Lyndon Baines. 1971. The Vantage Point: Perspectives of the Presidency, 1963-1969. Holt, 
Rinehart and Winston. 
Jomo K. S. 2005. The Great Divergence: Hegemony, Uneven Development, and Global Inequality. New 
Delhi: Oxford University Press. 
Juma, Calestous. 2005a. “Biotechnology in a Globalizing World: The Coevolution of Technology and 
Social Institutions.” BioScience 55 (3): 265–72. 
———. 2005b. “The New Age of Biodiplomacy.” Georgetown Journal of International Affairs 6. 
Kabra, Kamal Nayan. 1990. Political Economy of Public Distribution of Food in India. New Delhi: Ajanta 
Publications (India) : Distributor, Ajanta Books International. 
Kannan, Amutha. 2008. “Protest against Bt Brinjal Field Trials.” The Hindu 
http://www.hindu.com/2008/02/23/stories/2008022359810700.htm. 
Kapur, Harish. 1994. India’s Foreign Policy, 1947-92 : Shadows and Substance. New Delhi ; Thousand 
Oaks, CA: Sage Publications. 
Karunaratne, Garvin. 1976. “Failure of the Community Development Programme in India.” Community 
Development Journal, Community Development Journal, 11 (2): 95–119. 
Katoch, Prakash. 2012. “Fraud Food Reserves.” Fair Observer. http://www.fairobserver.com/article/fraud-
food-reserves. 
Kaufman, Frederick. 2010. “How Goldman Sachs Created the Food Crisis.” Foreign Policy. 
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/04/27/how_goldman_sachs_created_the_food_crisis 
———. 2012. Bet the Farm: How Food Stopped Being Food. Hoboken, N.J.: John Wiley & Sons. 
Kaviraj, Sudipta. 1989. “A Critique of the Passive Revolution.” Economic and Political Weekly 23 (48). 
http://www.epw.in/special-articles/critique-passive-revolution.html. 
———. 2013. The Imaginary Institution of India: Politics and Ideas. Columbia University Press. 
Kellman, Mitchell. 1987. World Hunger : A Neo-Malthusian Perspective. New York: Praeger. 
Kennedy, John F. 1963. “Remarks at the Opening Session of the World Food Congress.” June 4. available 
at: The American Presidency Project. http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=9249. 
Kent, George. 1984. The Political Economy of Hunger : The Silent Holocaust. New York: Praeger. 
Kesmodel, David, Lauren Etter, and Aaron O. Patrick. 2008. “Grain Companies’ Profits Soar As Global 
Food Crisis Mounts.” Wall Street Journal, April 30, sec. Earnings. 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB120949327146453423.html. 
Knutson, Ronald D., J. B. B. Penn, and Barry L. Flinchbaugh. 2006. Agricultural and Food Policy. 6th 
Edition. New York: Pearson. 
Koning, Niek, and Per Pinstrup-Andersen. 2007. Agricultural Trade Liberalization and the Least 
Developed Countries. 2007 edition. Dortrecht, Netherlands: Wageningen Academic Publishers. 
Krige, John, and Helke Rausch. 2012. American Foundations and the Coproduction of World Order in the 
Twentieth Century. Schriftenreihe Der FRIAS School of History; v. 4. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & 
Ruprecht. 
Krishna, Daya. 1971. The New Agricultural Strategy; the Vehicle of Green Revolution in India. Delhi: New 
Heights, Rainbow Book Co. 
Krupadanam, B. J. B. 1985. Food Diplomacy: Indo-US Relations. New Delhi: Sunil Printers. 
Kumar, Ananda. 2011. Dr. Ananda Kumar (IARI), interview by author.  New Delhi. 3/22/2011. 
Kumar-Anjan, Atul. 2006. “Indo US Knowledge Initiative Needs Review.” New Age. 
Kumar, L. Pushpa. 2011. Dr. L. Pushpa Kumar (University of Delhi), interview by author. New Delhi.  
3/29/11. 
Kuruganti, Kavitha. 2006. The Indo-US Knowledge Initiative on Agriculture - an Overview. www.csa-
india.org. Centre for Sustainable Agriculture. 
———. 2008. “Targeting Regulation in Indian Agriculture.” Economic and Political Weekly, 19–22. 
Kux, Dennis. 1992. India and the United States: Estranged Democracies, 1941-1991. DIANE Publishing. 
Ladejinsky, Wolf. 1976. “Agricultural Production and Constraints.” WD World Development 4 (1): 1–10. 
  340 
                                                                                                                                                 
Lakshmi, M. 2011. Dr. M. Lakshmi (MSSRF), interview by author. Chennai, Tamil Nadu. 1/21/2011. 
Laliwala, Jaferhusen I. 1968. Monetary Impact of P.L. 480 Finance. Ahmedabad: Harold Laski Institute of 
Political Science. 
Lang, T. 1996. “Food Security: Does It Conflict with Globalization?” Development 4: 45–50. 
Lappe, Frances Moore. 2006. “A Right to Food?: How to Frame the Fight against Hunger.” The Nation, 
September 11. 
Lappe, Frances Moore, Peter Rosset, and Joseph Collins. 1998. World Hunger : Twelve Myths. Emeryville, 
CA: Grove Press. 
Latham, Michael E. 2000. Modernization as Ideology: American Social Science and “Nation Building” in 
the Kennedy Era. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press. 
———. 2010. The Right Kind of Revolution: Modernization, Development, and U.S. Foreign Policy from 
the Cold War to the Present. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 
Latour, Bruno. 1986. “Visualization and Cognition: Drawing Things Together.” Knowledge and Society 6: 
1–40. 
Law, John. 2000. “On the Subject of the Object: Narrative, Technology, and Interpellation.” Configurations 
8 (1): 1–29. 
Lawson, Victoria A. 2007. Making Development Geography. New York: Hodder Arnold. 
Leigh, G. J. 2004. The World’s Greatest Fix: A History of Nitrogen and Agriculture. Oxford Univ. Press. 
Lemke, Thomas. 2011. Biopolitics : An Advanced Introduction. New York: New York University Press. 
Lenin, Vladimir Ilich. 1917. Imperialism: The Last Stage of Capitalism. London: Communist Party of 
Great Britain. 
Lerner, Mitchell B. 2012. A Companion to Lyndon B. Johnson. John Wiley & Sons. 
Levidow, Les. 2001. “Utilitarian Bioethics? Market Fetishism in the GM Crops Debate.” New Genetics & 
Society 20 (1): 75–84. 
Levine, Allen S., and J. Brian Atwood. 2009. “World Hunger Requires Research, Not Rancor.” Huffington 
Post. http://www.huffingtonpost.com/allen-s-levine/world-hunger-requires-res_b_384057.html. 
Lewis, William Arthur. 1950a. Industrial Development in the Caribbean. 
———. 1950b. The Industrialization of the British West Indies. Govt. Print. Office. 
Lewis, William Arthur. 2013 [1949]. Principles of Economic Planning. Reprint edition. Routledge. 
Leys, Colin. 1996. The Rise and Fall of Development Theory. Indianapolis: Indiana University Press. 
Lien, Marianne, and Brigitte Nerlich. 2004. The Politics of Food. Oxford University Press. 
Lipset, Seymour Martin. 1960. Political Man: The Social Bases of Politics. Garden City, N.Y.: Anchor 
Books. 
Little, Ian Malcolm David. 1982. Economic Development: Theory, Policy, and International Relations. 
Basic Books Publ. 
Locke, Virginia. 1989. The Agricultural Development Council a History. Morrilton, AR: Winrock 
International Institute for Agricultural Development. 
Ludden, David. 1992. “India’s Development Regime.” In Colonialism and Culture, edited by Dirks, 
Nicholas, 247. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. 
———. 1994. Agricultural Production and Indian History. London: Oxford University Press. 
Lundestad, Geir. 1999. “‘Empire by Invitation’ in the American Century.” Diplomatic History 23 (2): 189–
217. 
Macinnis, Laura. 2008. “Poorer Farmers Not Benefiting from Food Price Rise.” Reuters, April 29. 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2008/04/29/us-food-un-farmers-idUSL2918501020080429. 
Madeley, John. 2001. Hungry for Trade: How the Poor Pay for Free Trade. New York: Zed Books. 
Magdoff, Fred, John Bellamy Foster, and Frederick Buttel. 2000. Hungy for Profit: The Agribusiness 
Threat to Farmers, Food, and the Environment. New York: Monthly Review Press. 
Mahalanobis, P. C. 1961. Talks on Planning. Bombay: Asia Publishing House. 
———. 1985. Papers on Planning. Calcutta: Statistical Publishing Society. 
Mahyco, (Maharashtra Hybrid Seeds Company Ltd). 2013. “Development and Assessment of Fruit and 
Shoot Borer-Resistant Bt Brinjal.” ILSI meeting, New Delhi. http://www.ilsi-
  341 
                                                                                                                                                 
india.org/PDF/scientific_workshop_on_biotech_safety_assessment/Session%204/Bharat%20char,%20
Bt%20Brinjal.pdf. 
Majumder, Bhaskar. 2004. Poverty, Food Security, and Sustainability: Public Distribution System in India. 
New Delhi: Rawat Publications. 
Malthus, T. R. 1992. Malthus: “An Essay on the Principle of Population.” Cambridge University Press. 
Manoramaonline News. 2010. “Govt’s Testing Rules for GM Crops Insufficient: GEAC Member.” 
February 2. http://www.manoramaonline.com/cgi-
bin/MMOnline.dll/portal/ep/contentView.do?channelId=&contentId=6677281&BV_ID=@@@. 
May, Tim. 2002. Qualitative Research in Action. Thousand Oaks, California: SAGE. 
Mazoyer, Marcel. 2006. A History of World Agriculture : From the Neolithic Age to the Current Crisis. 
New York: Monthly Review Press. 
McAfee, Kathleen. 2003b. “Biotech Battles: Plants, Power, and Intellectual Property in the New Global 
Governance Regimes.” In Engineering Trouble: Biotechnology and Its Discontents, edited by 
Takahashi Kelso, Dennis Doyle, and Rachel Schurman. Berkeley: University of California Press. 
———. 2003a. “Neoliberalism on the Molecular Scale. Economic and Genetic Reductionism in 
Biotechnology Battles.” Geoforum 34: 203–19. 
McCuen, Gary E. 1986. World Hunger and Social Justice. Hudson, Wis: G.E. McCuen Publications. 
McDonald, Bryan L. 2013. Food Security. John Wiley & Sons. 
McGovern, George S. 2001. The Third Freedom : Ending Hunger in Our Time. New York: Simon & 
Schuster. 
McGovern, George Stanley. 1964. War Against Want: America’s Food for Peace Program. Walker. 
McMichael, Philip. 2009a. “A Food Regime Genealogy.” Journal of Peasant Studies 36 (1): 139–69. 
———. 2009b (July-August). “The World Food Crisis in Historical Perspective.” Monthly Review 61 (03): 
http://monthlyreview.org/2009/07/01/the – world – food – crisis – in – historical – perspective/. 
———. 1994. The Global Restructuring of Agro-Food Systems. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. 
———. 1995. Selections in Food and Agrarian Orders in the World-Economy. Westport: Greenwood 
Press. 
———. 1998. “Global Food Politics.” Monthly Review 50 (3). 
———. 2000a. “A Global Interpretation of the Rise of the East Asian Agro-Food Import Complex.” World 
Development 28 (3). 
———. 2000b. “World-Systems Analysis, Globalization and Incorporated Comparison.” Journal of 
World-System Research VI (3). 
———. 2001. “The Impact of Globalisation, Free Trade and Technology on Food and Nutrition in the New 
Millennium.” Proceedings of the Nutrition Society 60 (2). 
———. 2004. “Global Development and the Corporate Food Regime.” 1–24. 
McMichael, Philip, and Mindi Schneider. 2011. “Food Security Politics and the Millennium Development 
Goals.” Third World Quarterly 32 (1): 119–39. 
Meier Konosuke Matsushita, Gerald M. 2004. Biography of a Subject : An Evolution of Development 
Economics: An Evolution of Development Economics. Oxford University Press. 
Mellor, John W. 1968. Developing Rural India: Plan and Practice. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 
Memarsadeghi, Sanaz, and Raj Patel. 2003. Agricultural Restructuring and Concentration in the United 
States: Who Wins, Who Loses?. Policy Brief No.6. Food First. 
Mepham, T. B. 1996. Food Ethics. New York: Routledge. 
Merrill, Dennis. 1990. Bread and the Ballot: The United States and India’s Economic Development, 1947-
1963. UNC Press Books. 
Michael, Ben Heasman Fine, and Judith Wright. 1996. Consumption in the Age of Affluence : The World of 
Food. New York: Routledge. 
Millikan, Max F. 1957. A Proposal; Key to an Effective Foreign Policy,. New York: New York, Harper. 
Mishra, Sourav. 2006. India Looks to Open Agriculture to US Corporates. Vol. 2007. 
Misra, R. P, Sundaram, and V. L. S Prakasa Rao. 1974. Regional Development Planning in India: A New 
Strategy. Delhi: Vikas Publishing House. 
Mitchell, Timothy. 1991. Colonizing Egypt. Berkeley: University of California Press. 
  342 
                                                                                                                                                 
———. 1998. “Fixing the Economy.” Cultural Studies 12 (1): 82–101. 
———. 2002. Rule of Experts: Egypt, Techno-Politics, Modernity. Berkeley: University of California 
Press. 
———. 2008. “Rethinking Economy.” Geoforum 39 (3): 1116–21. 
Mittal, Anuradha. 2009. “The 2008 Food Price Crisis- Rethinking Food Security Policies.” UNCTAD 
(UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT). 
http://unctad.org/en/docs/gdsmdpg2420093_en.pdf. 
MoEF, Ministry of Environment and Forests. 2010a. “Decision on Commercialisation of Bt-Brinjal.” Bt 
Brinjal: Note by Ministry of Environment and Forests. Ministry of Environment and Forests (February 
9 2010). Ministry of Environment and Forests, GoI. 
———. 2010d. MoEF, Ministry of Environment and Forests.  February 10, 2010. Annexures: “Annexure 
III A : Submissions by Scientists in India” and “Annexure III B : Submissions by Scientists from 
outside of India.” New Delhi: MoEF, GoI. 
———. 2010c. MoEF, Ministry of Environment and Forests.  February 10, 2010. Annexures: “Annexure 
II : Letters from States/ MPs.” New Delhi: MoEF, GoI. 
———. 2010b. MoEF, Ministry of Environment and Forests.  February 10, 2010. Annexures: “Annexure 
I: Report of National Consultations on Bt-Brinjal Prepared by Centre for Environment Education.” 
New Delhi: MoEF, GoI. 
———. 2010e. MoEF, Ministry of Environment and Forests.  February 10, 2010. Annexures: “Annexure 
IV : Submissions by Civils Society Groups/ Research Institutes and Concerned Individuals.” 
———. 2009. Press Report on Bt Brinjal. MoEF, GoI. 
Mohan, N. Chandra. 2011. “Bt Brinjal and Its Discontents.” Business Standard India. http://www.business-
standard.com/article/opinion/n-chandra-mohan-bt-brinjal-and-its-discontents-111061700064_1.html. 
Monsanto India. 2011. “Mahyco-Monsanto Biotech, (MMB) Monsanto India.” Mahyco-Monsanto Biotech, 
(MMB). http://www.monsantoindia.com/MMB.html. 
Montag, Warren. 2005. “Necro-Economics: Adam Smith and Death in the Life of the Universal.” Radical 
Philosophy 134: 7. 
Mooij, Jos E. 1999. Food Policy and the Indian State : The Public Distribution System in South India. 
Delhi ; New York: Oxford University Press. 
Moore Vaughan, Lawrence. 1949. Farm Work Simplification. New York: New York, J. Wiley. 
Morgan, Kevin, Terry Marsden, and Jonathan Murdoch. 2006. Worlds of Food: Place, Power, and 
Provenance in the Food Chain. New York: Oxford University Press. 
Mosher, Arthur Theodore, and Agricultural Development Council. 1966. Getting Agriculture Moving; 
Essentials for Development and Modernization. New York: Published for the Agricultural 
Development Council by Praeger. 
Mosse, David. 2005. Cultivating Development: An Ethnography of Aid Policy and Practice. Ann Arbor, 
MI: Pluto Press. 
M. S. Swaminathan Research Foundation, and World Food Programme. 2004. Towards Hunger Free India, 
from Vision to Action: Proceedings of Consultation on Towards Hunger-Free India, Count Down from 
2007, New Delhi, 4-5 April, 2003. Madras, India: East West Books. 
M. S. Swaminathan Research Foundation, and World Food Programme. 2001. Food Insecurity Atlas of 
Rural India. M.S. Swaminathan Research Foundation. 
Mujumdar, N. A. 2007. Inclusive Growth: Development Perspectives in Indian Economy. Academic 
Foundation. 
Mukerji. 1974. In Symposium on Green Revolution, Held at Nagpur, 1974. Allahabad: National Academy 
of Sciences. 
Muller, Anders Reil, and Rajeev Patel. 2004. Shining India? Economic Liberalization and Rural Poverty in 
the 1990s. Policy Brief 10. Food First. 
Munck, Ronaldo, and Dennis O’Hearn. 1999. Critical Development Theory: Contributions to a New 
Paradigm. Dhaka: University Press Limited. 
Murdoch, William W. 1980. The Poverty of Nations : The Political Economy of Hunger and Population. 
Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. 
  343 
                                                                                                                                                 
Murgai, Rinku. 2011. Dr. Rinku Murgai (WB), interview by author.  New Delhi. 3/24/2011. 
Murphy, Dan. 2012. “How Rising Food Prices Are Impacting the World.” Christian Science Monitor, 
September 23. http://www.csmonitor.com/World/2012/0923/How-rising-food-prices-are-impacting-
the-world#. 
NAI (National Archives of India). 1964a. “AID Loans – Cochin Fertilizer Project.” National Archives of 
India, New Delhi. File#: F.2(3)AID/64 {vol 2} 1964-66. National Archives of India. 
———. 1965a. “Fertilizer Programme for 1966 – Import under AID Non-Project Loan No. 386-H-152.” 
File: 4(37) AID/ 65 {vol II} 1965, Ministry of Finance, Dept of Economic Affairs. Division: Aid. 
National Archives of India. 
———. 1964c. “Meeting of the Planning Commission with ‘the Bell Mission’ of the World Bank Bank, on 
Dec 3, 1964.” National Archives of India, New Delhi. [File # 1/108/64-CDN], Planning Commission. 
National Archives of India. 
———. 1964b. “Points Discussed with Mr. Walter Farr, Asst Director, AID on Aug 17, 1964.” File folder 
F(38)AID/64 [Vol 1]. 
———. 1965b. “Private Letter (dated Dec 18, 1965) from John Lewis (USAID’s India Country Director) 
Related to S. Bhoothalingam (the Secretary of the Department of Economic Affairs in India’s Ministry 
of Finance) in NAI File: ‘AID Loans—Cochin Fertilizer Project, 1964-66.’” National Archives of 
India, New Delhi. File#: F.2(3)AID/64 {vol 2}. 
———. 1957. “Import of Rice and Wheat from USA under Fresh (second) PL 480.” National Archives of 
India, New Delhi. File # FIMP-110 (61)/I/57.  Ministry of Food, Basic Plan. National Archives of 
India. 
———. 1958. “Import of U.S. Government Agricultural Surpluses Against Barter of Raw Materials – 
Indian Manganese Ore—US Wheat Barter.” National Archives of India, New Delhi. FIMP-110(66)/58  
{Vol 2}.  Ministry of Food, Basic Plan. National Archives of India. 
NAI (National Archives of India), and Chester Bowles. 1966a. “US Ambassador Chester Bowles ‘Remarks 
for Non-Project Loan Agreement Signing:  July 8, 1966.’” File name: USAID Loan 386-H-160. 
National Archives of India. 
NAI (National Archives of India), and Sanchindra Chaudhuri. 1966c. “Shri Sanchindra Chaudhuri 
(Minister of Finance) in Communication with USAID India in Document ‘Fertilizer Programme for 
1966—Import under AID Non-Project Loan No. 386-H-152.’” National Archives of India, New Delhi. 
File: 4(37) AID/ 65 {vol II} 1965, Ministry of Finance, Dept of Economic Affairs. Division: Aid. 
National Archives of India. 
Nair, Sudha. 2011. Dr. Sudha Nair (MSSRF), interview by author.  Chennai, Tamil Nadu. 1/21/2011. 
Nally, David. 2011. “The Biopolitics of Food Provisioning.” Transactions of the Institute of British 
Geographers 36 (1): 37–53. 
Nambi, V.A. 2011. Dr. V.A. Nambi (MSSRF), interview by author. New Delhi. 1/10/2011. 
Nanda, Rupashree. 2009. “Bt Brinjal Tests Inadequate: How Safe Is It?” IBNLive. 
http://ibnlive.in.com/news/bt-brinjal-tests-inadequate-how-safe-is-it/106477-3.html. 
Nandy, Ashis. 1988. Science, Hegemony and Violence: A Requiem for Modernity. Tokyo, Japan; Delhi: 
United Nations University ; Oxford University Press. 
National Seminar on Food, Nutrition, Food Security, and Public Distribution System in North-East India, 
Banerjee, Amalesh, and North-East India Council for Social Science Research, eds. 2004. Food 
Security and Public Distribution System Today: Failures and Successes. New Delhi: Kanishka 
Publishers, Distributors. 
Nayar, Baldev Raj. 1960. “Community Development Programme: Its Political Impact.” The Economic 
Weekly, September. 
———. 2001. Globalization and Nationalism : The Changing Balance in India’s Economic Policy, 1950-
2000. New Delhi ; Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications. 
NCA (National commission on agriculture), and Ministry of Agriculture. 1976. Report of the National 
Commission on Agriculture. New Delhi: Ministry of agriculture and irrigation. 
NDTV. 2010a. “The Pros and Cons of Bt Brinjal.” NDTV.com. http://www.ndtv.com/article/india/the-pros-
and-cons-of-bt-brinjal-16064. 
  344 
                                                                                                                                                 
———. 2013. “India’s Grain Mountain Grows despite Push for Exports.” 
http://profit.ndtv.com/news/economy/article-indias-grain-mountain-grows-despite-push-for-exports-
318536. 
Neale, Walter C. 1990. Developing Rural India: Policies, Politics, and Progress. Glenn Dale: Riverdale 
Co. 
Nehru, Braj Kumar (B.K.). 1997. Nice Guys Finish Second. New Delhi: Viking. 
Newman, William C., Lucile F. Crossgrove. 1990. Hunger in History : Food Shortage, Poverty, and 
Deprivation. Cambridge, Mass., USA: B. Blackwell. 
New York Times Blog. 2013. “The Food Security Debate in India.” India Ink. 
http://india.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/07/09/the-food-security-debate-in-india/. 
Nicholas, René Cohen Dumont, and Joint Author. 1980. The Growth of Hunger : A New Politics of 
Agriculture. Boston: M. Boyars; Distributed by T.C. Lothian. 
Nicholson, Ralph L., Heather Johnston. Nicholson, and Joint Author. 1979. Distant Hunger : Agriculture, 
Food, and Human Values. West Lafayette, IN: Purdue University. 
http://www.loc.gov/catdir/enhancements/fy0630/78060761-d.html; Materials specified: Publisher 
description http://www.loc.gov/catdir/enhancements/fy0630/78060761-d.html. 
Nixon, Richard. 1969. “Special Message to the Congress on Foreign Aid.” Washington D.C., May 28. 
Available at: The American Presidency Project. http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=2073. 
Nobel Committee. 1970. “The Nobel Peace Prize 1970: Norman Borlaug, Award Ceremony Speech." 
Presentation Speech by Mrs. Aase Lionaes, Chairman of the Nobel Committee.” Oslo, Norway, 
December 10, 1970. http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/peace/laureates/1970/press.html. 
Noronha, Frederick. 2006. “India At The Forefront Of Knowledge Commons Debate.” http://www.ip-
watch.org/weblog/index.php?p=389. 
Obama, Barack, and Joint Congressional Committee on Inaugural Ceremonies. 2013. Inaugural Addresses 
of the Presidents of the United States: From George Washington, 1789 to Barack Obama, 2013. New 
York: Cosimo Classics. 
Omvedt, Gail. 1975. The Political Economy of Starvation : Imperialism and the World Food Crisis. 
Bombay: Leela Bhosale. 
One India News. 2010b. “Kiran Mazumdar-Shaw Frowns on Bt Brinjal Decision.” News.oneindia.in. 
http://news.oneindia.in/2010/02/12/kiran-mazumdar-shaw-frowns-on-bt-brinjal-decision.html. 
———. 2010a. “Kiran Mazumdar-Shaw Slams Bt Brinjal Protests.” News.oneindia.in. 
http://news.oneindia.in/2010/02/05/kiran-mazumdar-shaw-slams-bt-brinjal-protests.html. 
Outlook India. 2012. “‘Anti-GM Protesters Don’t Seem to Understand Science’.” 
http://news.outlookindia.com/items.aspx?artid=777140. 
Paarlberg, Don. 1970. Norman Borlaug: Hunger Fighter. Washington DC: Foreign Economic 
Development Service, USDA, cooperating with USAID.“Program Aid 969” Published: US 
Government Printing Office. 
Paarlberg, Robert. 1985. Food Trade and Foreign Policy: India, the Soviet Union and the United States. 
Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 
———. 2009. Starved For Science. Harvard University Press. 
Paarlberg, Robert L, and International Food Policy Research Institute. 2001. The Politics of Precaution: 
Genetically Modified Crops in Developing Countries. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. 
Paddock, William, and Paul Paddock. 1967. Famine, 1975! America’s Decision: Who Will Survive? 
Boston: Little, Brown. 
Pal, B.P. 1964. “Reorganisation of Agricultural Research in India.” Indian Farming 157: 4–7. 
Pal, Suresh. 2008. “Agricultural R&D Policy and Institutional Reforms: Learning from the Experiences of 
India and China.” Economic and Political Weekly 43 (26). 
Pandya, Atul. 2011. Atul Pandya (CEE), interview by author. Ahmadabad. 2/3/2011. 
Parayil, Govindan. 2003. “Mapping Technological Trajectories of the Green Revolution and the Gene 
Revolution from Modernization to Globalization.” Research Policy 32 (6): 971–90. 
Paridah, Ajay. 2011. Dr. Ajay Paridah (MSSRF), interview by author.  Chennai, Tamil Nadu. 1/252011. 
  345 
                                                                                                                                                 
Parthasarathy, G. 1971. The Green Revolution and the Weaker Sections. Vaikunth Mehta National Institute 
of Co-Operative Management, Motilal Nehru Institute of Business Management. Bombay: Thacker. 
Patel, Raj. Wednesday 14 May 2008b. Testimony before the House Financial Services Committee. 
———. 2007b. “Transgressing Rights: La Vía Campesina’s Call for Food Sovereignty.” Feminist 
Economics 13 (1): 87–93. 
———. 2004. “Agricultural Imperialisms and New Peasant Solidarities.” 1–18. Presentation at Centre for 
Civil Society Seminar Series, September 2004. 
———. 2005. “Global Fascism, Revolutionary Humanism and the Ethics of Food Sovereignty.” 
Development 48 (2): 79–83. 
———. 2006. “International Agrarian Restructuring and the Practical Ethics of Peasant Movement 
Solidarity.” Journal of Asian and African Studies 41 (1/2): 71–93. 
———. 2008. Stuffed and Starved: Markets, Power and the Hidden Battle for the World Food System. 
Brooklyn, N.Y.: Melville House Pub. 
———. 2012. “The Long Green Revolution.” Journal of Peasant Studies 40 (1): 1–63. 
Patel, Raj, and Action Aid. 2008c. The World Bank and Agriculture: A Critical Review of the World Bank’s 
World Development Report. Action Aid. 
Patel, Raj, and Philip McMichael. 2004. “Third Worldism and Lineages of Global Fascism: Neo-
Liberalism and the Regrouping of the Global South.” Third World Quarterly: Journal of Emerging 
Areas, Special 25th Anniversary Issue 25 (1). 
Patel, Raj, and The New York Times Blog. 2009. “Can Biotech Food Cure World Hunger?” Room for 
Debate. http://roomfordebate.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/10/26/can-biotech-food-cure-world-hunger/. 
Patel, Raj, Robert J. Torres, and Peter Rosset. 2005. “Genetic Engineering in Agriculture and Corporate 
Engineering in Public Debate: Risk, Public Relations, and Public Debate over Genetically Modified 
Crops.” International Journal of Environmental and Occupational Health 14 (4): 428–36. 
Patel, Raj, Harald Witt, and Matthew Schnurr. 2006. “Can the Poor Help GM Crops? Technology, 
Representation and Cotton in the Makhathini Flats, South Africa.” Review of African Political 
Economy 109: 147–63. 
Patnaik, P. 2008. “The Accumulation Process in the Period of Globalization.” Economic & Political 
Weekly, no. 28 (June): 108–13. 
Paul, Helena, Ricarda Steinbrecher, and et al. 2003. Hungry Corporations: How Transnational Biotech 
Companies Colonise the Food Chain. New York: Zed Books; Palgrave. 
Pearse, Andrew Chernocke, and United Nations Research Institute for Social Development. 1980. Seeds of 
Plenty, Seeds of Want: Social and Economic Implications of the Green Revolution. Oxford; New York: 
Clarendon Press ; Oxford University Press. 
Pearson, Lester B., and UNESCO Courrier. 1970. “Speech on The Pearson Report: A New Strategy For 
Global Development.” UNESCO Courrier. 
Pechlaner, Gabriela, and Gerardo Otero. 2008. “The Third Food Regime: Neoliberal Globalism and 
Agricultural Biotechnology in North America.” Sociologia Ruralis 48 (4): 351–71. 
Peet, Richard, and et al. 2003. Unholy Trinity: The IMF, World Bank and WTO. New York: Zed Books. 
Peet, Richard, and Elaine Hartwick. 1999. Theories of Development. New York: Guilford Press. 
Pence, Gregory E. 2002. The Ethics of Food: A Reader for the 21st Century. Lanham, Md.; Oxford: 
Rowman & Littlefield. 
Perkins, John H. 1997. Geopolitics and the Green Revolution: Wheat, Genes, and the Cold War. New 
York: Oxford University Press. 
Phillips, Lynne Patricia, and Suzan M Ilcan. 2007. “Responsible Expertise: Governing the Uncertain 
Subjects of Biotechnology.” Critique of Anthropology 27 (1): 103–26. 
Pinstrup-Andersen, Per Schiøler. 2001. Seeds of Contention : World Hunger and the Global Controversy 
over GM Crops. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. 
Plumer, Brad. 2012. “As Food Prices Spike, How Close Is the World to Another Crisis?” The Washington 
Post, August 9. http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/2012/08/09/could-the-u-s-
drought-trigger-another-global-food-crisis/. 
Pohekar, G. S. 1970. Studies in green revolution. Bombay: United Asia Publications. 
  346 
                                                                                                                                                 
Pollack, Andrew. 2008. “Monsanto Seeks Big Increase in Crop Yields.” The New York Times, June 5, sec. 
Business / World Business. http://www.nytimes.com/2008/06/05/business/worldbusiness/05crop.html. 
Pomeranz, Kenneth. 2000. The Great Divergence China, Europe, and the Making of the Modern World 
Economy. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton, N.J. : Princeton University Press. 
Power, Marcus. 2003. Rethinking Development Geographies. New York: Routledge. 
Prakash, Gyan. 1999. Another Reason: Science and the Imagination of Modern India. Princeton, N.J.: 
Princeton University Press. 
Prasad, Devki Nandan. 1980. Food for Peace : The Story of U.S. Food Assistance to India. Bombay ; New 
York: Bombay ; New York : Asia Publishing House. 
Pray, Carl E., Prajakta Bengali, and Bharat Ramaswami. 2005. “The Cost of Biosafety Regulations: The 
Indian Experience.” Quarterly Journal of International Agriculture 44 (3): 267–90. 
Pursell, Garry, and Ashok Gulati. 1993. Liberalising Indian Agriculture: An Agenda for Reform. 
Washington, D.C. (1818 H St., NW, Washington DC 20433): Trade Policy, Policy Research Dept., 
World Bank. 
RAC (Rockefeller Archive Center), and John Lewis. Undated. “The Meaning of an Export Strategy.” RF-
IBEC, box 12 folder 296. Rockefeller Archive Center, Sleepy Hollow NY. 
RAC (Rockefeller Archive Center), Rockefeller Foundation. 1973c. “IAP – Sorghum: Project Projection 
1968-1973.” RG 6.7, Box 26, Folder 148. Rockefeller Archive Center, Sleepy Hollow NY. 
———. Undated. “‘Innovative Ideas for Rural Development.’” Record Group: IBEC. Box 12, Folder 295. 
Rockefeller Archive Center, Sleepy Hollow NY. 
———. 1952b. “Memorandum Regarding: Conferences on India and Pakistan.” RG 1.2, series 460, box 1, 
folder 1. Rockefeller Archive Center, Sleepy Hollow NY. 
———. 1952a. “‘Notes on Indian Agriculture,’ Written Jointly by JG Harrar, Paul C Mangelsdor and 
Warren Weaver.” RG 6.7, Box 26, Folder 147. Rockefeller Archive Center, Sleepy Hollow NY. 
———. 1952c. “World Food Problems.” RG 3.1, series 915, box 3 folder 21. Rockefeller Archive Center, 
Sleepy Hollow NY. 
———. 1929. “‘A Division of Agricultural Science’ Alan Gregg. October 1, 1929.” Rockefeller Archive 
Center, Sleepy Hollow NY. 
———. 1949. “Memorandum Regarding: The Study of Efforts to Help Backward Peoples Help 
Themselves.” RG 3.2, series 900, box 60, folder 332. Rockefeller Archive Center, Sleepy Hollow NY. 
———. 1951. “Precarious Welfare, by Alan Gregg.” RG 1.2 series 460 box 1 folder 1. Rockefeller 
Archive Center, Sleepy Hollow NY. 
———. 1956. “A Statement by the President Regarding the Rockefeller Foundation’s Role in the 
Underdeveloped World (Excerpt from Rockefeller Foundation Newsletter).” RG 3.2, series 900, box 
61, folder 333. Rockefeller Archive Center, Sleepy Hollow NY. 
———. 1965. “A Projection of Sorghum and Millet Activities in India During the Next 3-5 Years.” RG 
6.7, Box 26, Folder 148. Rockefeller Archive Center, Sleepy Hollow NY. 
———. 1966a. “Personal Letter: David Hopper Writes to Borlaug for Help (and Cc’s Cummings),” 
February 10. RG 6.7, Box 82, Folder 527. Rockefeller Archive Center, Sleepy Hollow NY. 
———. 1966b. “Private Letter from Norman Borlaug to Glenn Anderson,” September 27. RG 6.7, Box 82, 
Folder 527. Rockefeller Archive Center, Sleepy Hollow NY. 
———. 1968a. “Foreign Leaders See Success Ahead in World Food Crisis; US Businessmen and Officials 
Urged to Conquer Hunger (Subramaniam’s Speech Is under the Section #2, on India).” Series 1.2, Box 
19, Folder 128. Rockefeller Archive Center, Sleepy Hollow NY. 
———. 1968b. “Subramaniam, as Quoted in RAC 1968) (RAC Series 1.2, Box 19, Folder 128. Dated 
Tuesday Morning April 2, 1968. Titled ‘Foreign Leaders See Success Ahead in World Food Crisis; US 
Businessmen and Officials Urged to Conquer Hunger’ under the Section on India (#2) Subramaniam 
Spoke).” 
———. 1969a. “In a Handwritten Note from SW [Sterling Wortman] to EGS with the Subject ‘Paarlberg’s 
Ms [manuscript] on Borlaug’ Dated 3/11/69, by Sterling Wortman.” Rockefeller Archive Center, 
Sleepy Hollow NY. 
  347 
                                                                                                                                                 
———. 1969b. “A Fresh Strategy for Agricultural Developments Relative Contributions of Weather and 
New Technology to 1968-69 Food Grain Production and Implications for the Future, by Ralph W. 
Cummings, Jr and S.K. Ray.” RG 6.7, Box 33, Folder 212. Rockefeller Archive Center, Sleepy Hollow 
NY. 
———. 1972. “Letter to Knowles, from Wayne H Freeman (on AICRIP Stationary).” RG 6.7, Box 27, 
Folder 154. Rockefeller Archive Center, Sleepy Hollow NY. 
———. 1973a. “A Letter from Ordway Starnes to Dr. Knowles,” March 16. RG 6.7 Box 2 Folder 29. 
Rockefeller Archive Center, Sleepy Hollow NY. 
———. 1973b. “Meeting Record Dated June 26 1973.” RG 6.7 Box 2 Folder 34. Rockefeller Archive 
Center, Sleepy Hollow NY. 
RAC (Rockefeller Archive Center), Rockefeller Foundation, and Warren Weaver. 1951. “The World Food 
Problem, Agriculture, and the Rockefeller Foundation.” RG 3, Series 915, Box 3, Folder 23. Advisory 
Committee for Agricultural Activities, Rockefeller Foundation Archive Center, Sleepy Hollow NY. 
Raina, Rajeswari. 2011. Dr. Rajeswari Raina (NISTADS), interview by author. New Delhi. 2/24/2011. 
Rai, Parshuram, and Susan George. 2005. “Freedom from Hunger Campaign.” 
http://www.cefsindia.org/reports/Gist%20of%20First%20Freedom%20from%20Hunger%20Lecture.p
df. Delhi: The Centre for Environment and Food Security (CEFS). 
Rajan, Kaushik Sunder. 2005. Biocapital: The Constitution of Postgenomic Life. Durham: Duke University 
Press. 
Ramachandran, L. 1977. India’s Food Problem : A New Approach. New Delhi: New Delhi : Allied 
Publishers. 
Raman, Papri Sri. 2009. “TN Agro University in Eye of Bt Brinjal Storm.” 
http://currentnews.in/2009/10/26/tn-agro-university-in-eye-of-bt-brinjal-storm/. 
Randhawa, M. S, and Ludhiana Punjab Agricultural University. 1975. Green Revolution in Punjab. 
Ludhiana: Punjab Agricultural University. 
Rao, C. H. Hanumantha. 2001. “WTO and Viability of Indian Agriculture.” Economic and Political 
Weekly, Vol. 36, No. 36 (Sep. 8-14, 2001), Pp. 3453-3457. http://www.jstor.org/stable/4411087. 
———. 2006. Agriculture, Food Security, Poverty and Environment: Essays on Post-Reform India. New 
York: Oxford University Press. 
Rao, C. Kameswara. 2010. Moratorium on Bt Brinjal: A Review of the Order of the Minister of 
Environment and Forests, Government of India. Foundation for Biotechnology Awareness and 
Education. 
Rao, V.K.R.V. 1967. Agricultural Development in the Fourth Plan. GOI, Planning Commission. 
Rao, V. M. 1994. “Agriculture and Liberalisation: Some Implications for Development Policies.” 
Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 29, No. 16/17 (Apr. 16-23, 1994), Pp. 999+1001-1003. 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/4401102. 
Ratnakar, Adhikari (Ed ). 2001. “Selections.” In Food Security in the Global Age : South Asian Dilemma, 
1–187. New Delhi: SWATEE [South Asia Watch on Trade, Economics and the Environment]. 
Ravi, Bala. 2011. Dr. Bala Ravi (MSSRF), interview by author.  Chennai, Tamil Nadu. 1/24/2011. 
Ray, Kalyan. 2010. “BTing the Retreat.” Deccan Herald. 
http://www.deccanherald.com/content/52514/bting-retreat.html. 
Ray, Shantanu Guha. 2010. “The Busy American: Nina Fedoroff Lobbies Hard in New Delhi.” Tehelka 
Magazine, February 20. 
Reuters. 2012. “India’s Hunger ‘Shame’: 3,000 Children Die Every Day, despite Economic Growth - 
World News.” February 16. http://worldnews.nbcnews.com/_news/2012/02/16/10424930-indias-
hunger-shame-3000-children-die-every-day-despite-economic-growth?lite. 
———. 2013. “India’s Wheat Left to Rot due to Lack of Storage.” Toronto Star. 
http://www.thestar.com/news/world/2012/05/10/indias_wheat_left_to_rot_due_to_lack_of_storage.ht
ml. 
Richard, Kym Damania Anderson, World Bank, Development Research Group, and Trade. 2004. Trade, 
Standards, and the Political Economy of Genetically Modified Food. Washington, D.C: World Bank, 
  348 
                                                                                                                                                 
Development Research Group, Trade Team. 
http://www.econ.worldbank.org/view.php?type=5&id=38347. 
Robertson, Thomas. 2012. The Malthusian Moment: Global Population Growth and the Birth of American 
Environmentalism. Rutgers University Press. 
Rockefeller Brothers Fund. 1958. Foreign Economic Policy for the Twentieth Century. Garden City, N.Y.: 
Doubleday. 
Rockefeller Foundation. 1959. Program in the Agricultural Sciences; Annual Report. Program in the 
Agricultural Sciences; Annual Report. 
———. 1968. Strategy for the Conquest of Hunger; Proceedings of a Symposium Convened by the 
Rockefeller Foundation, April 1 and 2, 1968, at the Rockefeller University. New York: New York, 
Rockefeller Foundation. 
Rockefeller, John D. III. 1976. “People Food and the Well Being of Mankind.” In Reprinted in FAO 
Studies in Food and Population. 1961 McDougall Memorial Lecture (reprinted in FAO studies in Food 
and Population): Rome: FAO. 
———. 1978. “Population Growth: The Role of the Developed World.” Population and Development 
Review 4 (3): 509–16. 
Rockefeller, Nelson. 1968. Unity, Freedom & Peace; a Blueprint for Tomorrow,. New York: New York, 
Random House. 
Rockefeller, Nelson A. 1951. “Widening Boundaries of National Interest.” Foreign Affairs 29 (4): 523–38. 
———. 1960. “Purpose and Policy.” Foreign Affairs, 370–90. 
———. 1968. “Policy and the People.” Foreign Affairs, 231–41. 
Rosen, George. 1985. Western Economists and Eastern Societies: Agents of Change in South Asia, 1950-
1970. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. 
Rosenstein-Rodan, P. 1961. In Economic Development for Latin America: Proceedings of a Conference 
Held by the International Economic Association. New York: St. Martin’s Press. 
———. 1964. Capital Formation and Economic Development. Cambridge: Cambridge, M. I. T. Press. 
Rostow, Walt Whitman. 1972. The Diffusion of Power: An Essay in Recent History. Macmillan. 
Rotberg, Ester, Robert I. Rabb, Theodore K.Boserup. 1985. Hunger and History : The Impact of Changing 
Food Production and Consumption Patterns on Society. Cambridge Cambridgeshire: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Rudolph, Lloyd I., and Rudolph. 1984. The Modernity of Tradition: Political Development in India. 
University of Chicago Press. 
Ruivenkamp, Guido. 2005. “Tailor-Made Biotechnologies: Between Bio-Power and Sub-Politics.” 
Tailoring Biotechnologies 1 (1): 11–33. 
Russell, Sharman. 2005. Hunger : An Unnatural History. New York: Basic Books. 
Saberwal, Vasant. 2011. Dr. Vasant Saberwal (Ford Foundation), interview by author. New Delhi. 
3/2/2011. 
Sachs, Jeffrey D. 2005. The End of Poverty: Economic Possibilities for Our Time. New York: Penguin 
Press. 
Sackley, Nicole. 2011. “Narratives of Development: Models, Spectacles, and Calculability in Nick 
Cullather’s The Hungry World.” H-Diplo Rountable Review, 23–28. 
———. 2004. “Passage to Modernity: American Social Scientists, India, and the Pursuit of Development, 
1945-1961.” Dissertation. Princeton University. 
Sahai, Suman. 2006b. Farmers Protest Against Wheat Imports And The New Indo-Us Pact On Agriculture. 
The Gene Campaign. 
———. 2006c. India Readies to Pay in Agriculture for Nuclear Deal with US. The Gene Campaign. 
———. 2006. India Pays In Agriculture For Nuclear Deal With Us: Opens Doors To Gm Crops And 
Foods. The Gene Campaign. 
———. 2010. “Rs 60,000 Crore Is the Cost of Rotting Food Grain Every Year. Yet, Millions Go Hungry.” 
Tehelka Magazine, Vol 7 (Issue 31). 
http://archive.tehelka.com/story_main46.asp?filename=Op070810opinion.asp. 
———. 2011. Dr. Suman Sahai (Gene Campaign), interview by author. New Delhi, 1/3/2011. 
  349 
                                                                                                                                                 
Sahai, Suman, and Carly Nichols. 2010. “The Bt Brinjal Story.” Suman Sahai Blog. Friday, December 10, 
2010. Available at: http://sumansahai-blog.blogspot.com/2010/12/bt-brinjal-story.html#comments. 
Sahai, Suman, Prasmi Pavithran, and Indrani Barpujari. 2007. BIOPIRACY: Imitations Not Innovations. 
The Gene Campaign. 
Saldanha, Leo. 2011. Leo Saldanha (ESG), interview by author. Bangalore. 1/26/2011. 
Sanyal, Kalyan. 2013. Rethinking Capitalist Development: Primitive Accumulation, Governmentality and 
Post-Colonial Capitalism. New Delhi: Routledge India. 
Schurman, Rachel, and Dennis D. Kelso. 2003. Engineering Trouble: Biotechnology and Its Discontents. 
Berkeley: University of California Press. 
Scoones, I. 2002. “Biotech Science, Biotech Business: Current Challenges and Future Prospects.” 
Economic and Political Weekly 37 (27): 2725–33. 
Scoones, Ian. 2006. Science, Agriculture and the Politics of Policy: The Case of Biotechnology in India. 
Delhi. 
Scott, James C. 1998. Seeing like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have 
Failed. New Haven: Yale University Press. 
Sehgal, Rashme. 2012. “Experts Demand Ban on Bt Brinjal Lifted.” The Asian Age. 
http://archive.asianage.com/india/experts-demand-ban-bt-brinjal-lifted-027. 
Seminar on Green Revolution: the Unfinished Task, Centre for the Study of Social Change, ed. 1974. 
Green Revolution: The Unfinished Task. Calcutta: Minerva Associates (Publications). 
Sen, Abhijit, and Himanshu. 2004a. “Poverty and Inequality in India - I.” Economic and Political Weekly, 
September. http://www.epw.in/special-articles/poverty-and-inequality-india-i.html. 
———. 2004b. “Poverty and Inequality in India-II.” Economic and Political Weekly, September. 
http://www.epw.in/special-articles/poverty-and-inequality-india-ii.html. 
———. 2011. “Why Not a Universal Food Security Legislation?” Economic and Political Weekly, March. 
http://www.epw.in/special-articles/why-not-universal-food-security-legislation.html. 
Sen, Amartya. 1981. Poverty and Famines: An Essay on Entitlement and Deprivation. New York: Oxford 
University Press. 
Sen, Amartya, and Jean Dreze. 1989. Hunger and Public Action. New York: Clarendon Press; Oxford 
University Press. 
———. 1990. The Political Economy of Hunger. New York: Clarendon Press; Oxford University Press. 
———. 1999. The Amartya Sen and Jean Drèze Omnibus Comprising Poverty and Famines, Hunger and 
Public Action, India: Economic Development and Social Opportunity. New Delhi: Oxford University 
Press. 
Sen, Bandhudas. 1974. The Green Revolution in India; a Perspective. New York: Wiley. 
Sengupta, Arjun, and National Commission on Enterprises in the Unorganized/Informal Sector (NCEUS). 
2009. The Challenge of Employment in India An Informal Economy Perspective. Vol. Volume I - Main 
Report. Volume II - Annexures. 
Sen, S. R. 1962. The Strategy for Agricultural Development. Bombay: Asia Publishing House. 
———. 1966. The Strategy for Agricultural Development, and Other Essays on Economic Policy and 
Planning. New York: Asia Publishing House. 
Sen, Sudhir. 1975. Reaping the Green Revolution: Food and Jobs for All. Maryknoll, N.Y.: Orbis Books. 
Serageldin, Ismail, and Gabrielle J. Persley. 2003. Biotechnology and Sustainable Development: Voices of 
the South and North. First edition. Wallingford, Oxon, UK: CABI. 
Serageldin, Ismail. 1999. “Biotechnology and Food Security in the 21st Century.” Science 285 (5426): 
387–89. 
Seshia, Shaila, and Ian Scoones. 2003. “Tracing Policy Connections: The Politics of Knowledge in the 
Green Revolution and Biotechnology Eras in India.” IDS Working Paper 188. Institute of 
Development Studies, Brighton, Sussex, England. 
http://opendocs.ids.ac.uk/opendocs/handle/123456789/3984. 
Shah, S. M. 1972. Economic Development and Agriculture. New Delhi: Government of India, Planning 
Commission. 
  350 
                                                                                                                                                 
Shantharam, Shanthu. 2011a. Dr. Shanthu Shantharam (ABLE-Ag) , interview by author.  New Delhi. 
3/25/2011. 
———. 2010. “BRAI Seems to Be Only Way out of Present GM Crops Imbroglio.” The Financial 
Express. http://www.financialexpress.com/news/brai-seems-to-be-only-way-out-of-present-gm-crops-
imbroglio/657710. 
Shantharam, Shanthu, and Rahul Koul. 2011b. “‘We Are Ready to Create Public Awareness on 
Technology:’ Interview With: Dr Shanthu Shantharam, Executive Director, Able-Ag, New Delhi.” 
http://biospectrumindia.ciol.com/content/biotalk/11102042.asp). 
Sharma, D. 2005. “Challenges before Indian Agriculture: Agriculture, Food Security and Hunger.” Journal 
Fur Entwicklungspolitik 21 (3): 85–110. 
Sharma, Devinder. 2000. Selling out: The Cost of Free Trade for Food Security in India. New Delhi: 
Ecological Foundation. 
———. 2007. Protection at Home, Preaching Abroad. 
———. 2009. “The Borlaug I Knew.” India Together, September. 
———. “Who Decides What We Eat?” Tehelka. http://www.tehelka.com/who-decides-what-we-eat/. 
Sharma, Devinder, New Delhi Ecological Foundation, and UK Food Group. 1997. In the Famine Trap. 
New Delhi: The Ecological Foundation. 
Sharma, Prakash C. 1974. Green Revolution in India: A Selected Research Bibliography. Monticello, Ill.: 
Council of Planning Librarians. 
Sharma, Rita, and Thomas T Poleman. 1993. The New Economics of India’s Green Revolution: Income and 
Employment Diffusion in Uttar Pradesh. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press. 
Sharma Sandhu, Tanushree. 2012. “Rotting Grain Adds to India’s Food Problem.” DW.DE. June 25. 
http://www.dw.de/rotting-grain-adds-to-indias-food-problem/a-16048233. 
Shaw, D. John. 2007. World Food Security: A History since 1945. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Shenoi, P. V. 1975. Agricultural Development in India: A New Strategy in Management. Delhi: Vikas 
Publishing House. 
Shenoy, Ramanath. 2010. “Let Farmers Decide on Bt Brinjal, Says Kiran Mazumdar-Shaw.” Hindustan 
Times. http://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/let-farmers-decide-on-bt-brinjal-says-kiran-
mazumdar-shaw/article1-505532.aspx. 
Shils, Edward in, and Clifford (Ed.) Geertz. 1963. “On the Comparative Study of New States.” In Old 
Societies and New States; the Quest for Modernity in Asia and Africa. Vol. University of Chicago. 
Committee for the Comparative Study of New Nations. New York: Free Press of Glencoe Collier-
Macmillan. 
Shiva, Vandana. 1992. The Violence of the Green Revolution: Agriculture, Ecology and Politics in the 
South. Goa, India: Other India Press. 
———. 1993. Monocultures of the Mind: Perspectives on Biodiversity and Biotechnology. Atlantic 
Highlands, N.J.; Penang, Malaysia: Zed Books ; Third World Network. 
———. 1997. Biopiracy: The Plunder of Nature and Knowledge. Boston, MA: South End Press. 
———. 2000. Stolen Harvest: The Hijacking of the Global Food Supply. Cambridge, MA: South End 
Press. 
———. 2005. “Terrorism, Agriculture and U.S. India Cooperation.” Z Magazine, no. 8. 
———. 2007. Manifestos on the Future of Food & Seed. Cambridge, Mass.: South End Press. 
Shiva, Vandana, and Kunwar Jalees. 2006. Roti, Kapda Aur Makaan [Food, Clothing and Shelter]. 
Navdanya/RFSTE [printed by Systems Vision]. 
Silva, J. Sousa. 1988. “The Contradictions of the Biorevolution for the Development of Agriculture in the 
Third World: Biotechnology and Capitalist Interest.” Agric Hum Values Agriculture and Human 
Values 5 (3): 61–70. 
Simon, Laurence. 1975. “The Ethics of Triage: A Perspective on the World Food Conference.” The 
Christian Century. 
Singh, Harpal, and Linwood Lamb Hodgdon. 1966. Adoption of Agricultural Practices in Madhya 
Pradesh; Factors Associated with the Adoption of Recommended Agricultural Practices in Two 
Villages of Madhya Pradesh. Hyderabad (A.P.): National Institute of Community Development. 
  351 
                                                                                                                                                 
Singh, Jasbir. 1974. The Green Revolution in India -- How Green It Is!. Kurukshetra: Vishal Publications. 
Singh, Manmohan. 2005. Congressional Record, V. 151, Pt. 12, July 14 to July 22, 2005. U.S. Congress, 
Washington DC: Government Printing Office. 
Singh, Manmohan, and NDTV. 2012. “Full Text of PM’s Speech at the Release of the HUNGaMA 
Report.” NDTV.com. January 10. http://www.ndtv.com/article/india/full-text-of-pm-s-speech-at-the-
release-of-the-hungama-report-165450. 
Singh, Manmohan, as quoted in Bagla, Pallava. 2012. “‘Discoverer of DNA Says Yes to Genetically 
Modified Food,’” July 12. http://www.ndtv.com/article/world/discoverer-of-dna-says-yes-to-
genetically-modified-food-242729. 
Sinha, Mrinalini. 2006. Specters of Mother India: The Global Restructuring of an Empire. Durham: Duke 
University Press. 
Sivaramakrishnan, K. 2000. Modern Forests: Statemaking and Environmental Change in Colonial Eastern 
India. Stanford University Press. 
Slater, David. 2004. Geopolitics and the Post-Colonial: Rethinking North-South Relations. Malden, MA: 
Blackwell. 
Smith, Dorothy E. 2006. Institutional Ethnography as Practice. Rowman & Littlefield Publishers. 
Smith, Neil. 2003. American Empire: Roosevelt’s Geographer and the Prelude to Globalization. Berkeley: 
University of California Press. 
Sneddon, Chris. 2003. “Reconfiguring Scale and Power: The Khong-Chi-Mun Project in Northeast 
Thailand.” Environment and Planning A 35 (12): 2229–50. 
———. 2012. “The ‘sinew of Development’: Cold War Geopolitics, Technical Expertise, and Water 
Resource Development in Southeast Asia, 1954–1975.” Social Studies of Science 42 (4): 564–90. 
Sneddon, Chris, Richard B. Howarth, and Richard B. Norgaard. 2006. “Sustainable Development in a Post-
Brundtland World.” Ecological Economics 57 (2): 253–68. 
Solovey, Mark, and Hamilton Cravens. 2012. Cold War Social Science : Knowledge Production, Liberal 
Democracy, and Human Nature. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Sood, Jyotika. 2010. “Agriculture Ministry Bats for GM Crops.” Down To Earth, March 19. 
http://www.downtoearth.org.in/content/agriculture-ministry-bats-gm-crops. 
———. 2013. “400,000 People Petition Parliament Panel to Withdraw BRAI Bill.” Down To Earth, 
August 24. http://www.downtoearth.org.in/content/400000-people-petition-parliament-panel-
withdraw-brai-bill. 
Sparke, Matthew. 2005. In the Space of Theory: Postfoundational Geographies of the Nation-State. 
Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. 
———. 2006. “A Neoliberal Nexus: Economy, Security and the Biopolitics of Citizenship on the Border.” 
Political Geography 25 (2): 151–80. 
Spielman, David J. 2007. “Pro-Poor Agricultural Biotechnology: Can the International Research System 
Deliver the Goods?” Food Policy Food Policy 32 (2): 189–204. 
Spivak, Gayatri, Donna Landry, and Gerald MacLean. 1996. The Spivak Reader: Selected Works of Gayati 
Chakravorty Spivak. New York: Routledge. 
Springer, Jenny. 2000. “State Power and Agricultural Transformation in Tamil Nadu.” In Agrarian 
Environments: Resources, Representations, and Rule in India, edited by Arun Agrawal and K. 
Sivaramakrishnan, 86–106. Durham: Duke University Press. 
Stakman, E. C. 1967. Campaigns against Hunger. Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press. 
Strauss, M. 2000. “When Malthus Meets Mendel.” Foreign Policy 119, Summer: 105–12. 
Streeter, Carroll P., and Rockefeller Foundation. 1969. A Partnership to Improve Food Production in 
India: A Report from the Rockefeller Foundation. Rockefeller Foundation. 
Subramaniam, C. 1972a. India of My Dreams. New Delhi: Orient Longman. 
———. 1972b. The New Strategy in Agriculture: A Collection of the Speeches. New Delhi: Indian Council 
of Agricultural Research. 
———. 1979. The New Strategy in Indian Agriculture: The First Decade and after. New Delhi: Vikas 
Publishing House. 
———. 1995. Hand of Destiny: Memoirs. Bombay: Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan. 
  352 
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